Mak Shiu Tong v. Yue Kwok Ying and Another
Read the full judgment text of CACV 199/2002 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 30 September 2004.
1. This is an appeal by the 1 st defendant against the decision of Chung J who struck out his defence and gave judgment to the plaintiff on his claim.
Cites 1 case
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CACV 199/2002 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 199 OF 2002 (ON APPEAL FROM HIGH COURT ACTION NO. 3758 OF 1998) BETWEEN
Before: Hon Cheung JA and Hon Yam J in Court Date of Hearing: 15 September 2004 Date of Judgment: 30 September 2004 ________________ J U D G M E N T ________________ Hon Cheung JA (giving judgment of the court) :
1.This is an appeal by the 1st defendant against the decision of Chung J who struck out his defence and gave judgment to the plaintiff on his claim. The words 2.The plaintiff sued the 1st defendant for defamation in respect of the words spoken by the defendant and published in a magazine. The published words were :
The defamatory meaning 3.The plaintiff pleaded that the words were ‘defamatory of the plaintiff in the way of his profession, trade or business’. (Paragraph 7 of the Statement of Claim) 4.The plaintiff claimed that the defamatory meaning of the words was
5.Paragraph 10 of the Statement of Claim further pleaded that ‘the words complained of imputed a crime punishable by imprisonment, namely obtaining money from investors by deception and/or a fraudulent scheme and that those words were calculated to and did disparage the plaintiff in his profession, trade or business’. 6.Paragraph 11 further pleaded that ‘the plaintiff’s personal and business reputation has been seriously damaged and he has suffered considerable distress and embarrassment’. Defence 7.Much has been said about the nature of the defence. It is clear that before the judge, according to the state of his pleading, the 1st defendant merely denied that the defamatory words were referable to the plaintiff. His substantive defence was justification and fair comment. 8.That the words referred to the plaintiff was clearly evidenced by the repeated reference to the plaintiff in the published article. 9.The admission that the words contained the defamatory meaning was also supported by the way paragraph 4 of the Amended Defence was pleaded. There was no express denial and the meaning of the defamatory words was deemed to have admitted. 10.In respect of justification and fair comment, what the 1st defendant sought to justify and relied on by way of fair comment was that the project was a scam and the plaintiff had no intention to build or develop any property. It is clear that the particulars relied upon by the 1st defendant simply do not support the plea and in fact some of the particulars contradicted the plea. Theparticulars failed to show that the intention not to develop or build was present when the project was introduced. Defence properly struck out 11.In our view, based on what was pleaded in the Amended Defence, the defence and counterclaim was properly struck out. Application to amend defence 12.The substantive issue in this appeal is whether leave should be granted to the 1st defendant to further amend the Amended Defence (the counterclaim was abandoned), so that the judgment that was entered against him would be set aside and he would be allowed to defend the action. 13.In the proposed amendment the 1st defendant maintains his defence of justification and fair comment. The most important aspect of the amendment is at Paragraph 4 which now reads :
Withdrawing an admission 14.By this new amendment, the 1st defendant did not completely deny the defamatory meaning of the words relied upon by the plaintiff in Paragraph 9 of the Statement of Claim. If there was a complete denial of the defamatory meaning of the words,it would amount to a withdrawal of an admission which the 1st defendant has to justify before he would be allowed to withdraw it. But even in its current state, the new paragraph 4 is still seeking to withdraw (although not completely) an admission of the defamatory meaning as pleaded by the plaintiff. The 1st defendant is now, in effect, saying that the project was still a scam. Although the plaintiff might not have such an intention when the project was introduced, he developed this intention later on. 15.Mr. Kwong, counsel for the 1st defendant, while relying on this meaning, at the same time submitted that the 1st defendant is still contesting the case on the basis that the project was a scam from the beginning. This was the stand of the 1st defendant at the hearing before the judge. His defence of justification and fair comment on such a basis was clearly unsustainable. 16.As to the defamatory meaning now relied upon by the 1st defendant, he really has to show why he had previously made the admission and why he only seeks to make the withdrawal at such a late stage. The explanation 17.The only explanation that was offered is that the 1st defendant drafted the defence personally and he had omitted to place a full stop after he denied paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Statement of Claim. It was explained that the intention of the 1st defendant was to deny paragraphs 7 to 11 in respect of the defamatory meaning relied upon by the plaintiff and also a specific denial of the reference to the plaintiff. Mr. Kwong also challenged the accuracy of English translation of the Amended Defence which included the words ‘in that’ after the denial. 18.We are unable to accept this explanation. Paragraph 4 of the Amended Defence and its translation are as follows :
19.Even without relying on the translation, it is clear from a fair reading of paragraph 4 that the denial was directed only towards the identity of the plaintiff. This is apparent from the structure of the sentence itself. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, the 1st defendant should not be allowed to withdraw from the admission at such a late stage. 20.The action was commenced on 11 March 1998. The Amended Defence was filed by the 1st defendant’s legal representatives on 27 October 1998. On the basis of this defence, judgment was obtained on 23 March 2002 which was four years after the commencement of the action. The application to re-amend was only made by summons dated 13 September 2004, a substantial time after the judgment had been obtained. This being the situation, the proposed amendment must be subject to a stringent scrutiny than is the usual case of amending pleading before judgment. After all, a judgment has indeed been obtained. 21.Furthermore, the 1st defendant had failed to specify at this late stage as to when this intention not to complete took place. Mr. Kwong vaguely suggested that the scam began ‘somewhere along the line’ after the project had started. This is simply not good enough when the words imputes fraud on the part of the plaintiff. Specific details must be provided for by the 1st defendant, particularly at this late stage. 22.The new particulars provided by the 1st defendant in the proposed amendment such as ‘The plaintiff did not build the houses as scheduled’; ‘The plaintiff did not build a single house’ and ‘The plaintiff devised a complicated and false scheme to withdraw from the company concerned when he knew that he would be held responsible for his failure to build the property’ do not advance his new case any further. Even at this stage, he still has not provided details on his allegations of ‘a false scheme to withdraw from the company’. Amendment refused 23.This Court had expressed certain views on the defence in the application for security for costs. They were provisional views made in an interlocutory application. We had expressly made clear that they were not intended to be a final opinion on the matter. 24.In our view the 1st defendant has not satisfied the high threshold that is demanded of him for putting forward a new case after judgment had been obtained. We will refuse the application to amend. Conclusion 25.Accordingly we will dismiss the appeal with costs to the plaintiff.
Mr. Horace Wong, S.C., instructed by Messrs Richards Butler, for the plaintiff Mr. Jimmy Kwong, assigned by Hong Kong Bar Association Free Legal Service Scheme, for the 1st defendant |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under CACV 199/2002