HKSAR v. Nguyen Lam
Read the full judgment text of CACC 496/1999 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 6 January 2000.
1. On 10 September 1999, the Applicant was convicted of burglary and sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment, following a trial in the District Court before Judge Muttrie. The Applicant now seeks leave to appeal against conviction.
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CACC000496/1999 CACC 496/1999 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 496 OF 1999 (ON APPEAL FROM DCCC 682 OF 1999)
_____________________ Coram: Hon. Stuart-Moore VP, Mayo and Wong JJ A Date of Hearing: 6 January 2000 Date of Judgment: 6 January 2000 _______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ Stuart-Moore VP (giving the judgment of the Court): 1. On 10 September 1999, the Applicant was convicted of burglary and sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment, following a trial in the District Court before Judge Muttrie. The Applicant now seeks leave to appeal against conviction. 2. The case was wholly dependent upon PW1 having correctly identified the Applicant as an intruder who she had caught in the act of ransacking desk drawers in a room used at the Tung Chau Street temporary market as a rest and changing room. At about 12.05 p.m. on 17 July 1999, PW1, who was employed as a cleaner with Urban Services Department, had gone out of this room leaving the door ajar. When she returned, she saw a man at the desk who immediately rushed out. PW1 alerted two foremen in the office next door. One of these was PW2 who testified that, as he stepped out of his office, PW1 was pointing to the Applicant who was walking away quickly onto a loading platform. PW3 gave similar evidence. The two foremen then arrested the Applicant. The Applicant was searched and was found not to have stolen anything. When asked what he was doing in the pump room, the Applicant replied simply: "Nothing". 3. The Applicant's case was that he was passing through the market on his way to the park when someone ran and turned. He then heard PW1 shout "theft" and, when PW2 and PW3 came out of their office, he found himself being apprehended. He denied ever having been in the pump room and described the man he had seen running away as wearing very similar clothing to the clothing which he himself was wearing that day. 4. In his principal grounds of appeal, the Applicant stated that there were many passers-by at the scene, that PW1 could not recognise his face in so short a time, that the witnesses were unable to be sure that it was the Applicant who was the culprit, that he had no tools for burglary on him, and that the judge had not given him a chance to present his defence. 5. Dealing with the last point made by the Applicant first, it is apparent from the Reasons for Verdict that the defence had been fully presented and that the judge had understood the Applicant's case. Indeed, the evidence fell within such a narrow compass that it is hard to imagine that the defence which had been put forward could have been more simple. There is nothing in this point. 6. Equally straightforward is the Applicant's point that he possessed no tools for burglary. He would have needed none because the door to the premises he allegedly entered was open. Burglary, in the present circumstances, involved the entry of premises as a trespasser with the intention to steal. If the prosecution could establish that the Applicant had so entered, that was sufficient for their purposes to raise an irresistible inference that he was there to steal. 7. The remaining grounds of appeal can be dealt with together. As we have already stated, the case rested wholly on PW1's evidence that she had seen the Applicant at the desk while he was ransacking it and had pointed him out to PW2 and PW3 who then made a citizens' arrest of him. Could she have been mistaken? PW2 and PW3 were unable to assist as they were only alerted to what had happened after the Applicant had allegedly run away. 8. Nowhere in the Reasons for Verdict did the judge make any reference to R v Turnbull and others, (1977) 1 QB 224. Plainly, as the prosecution wholly relied upon the correctness of PW1's identification which the defence had alleged was mistakenly made, the judge should have warned himself about the special need for caution before convicting the Applicant and have warned himself as to the reasons. 9. Having said this, a professional judge sitting in the District Court will be expected to know the law in this respect. There is, of course, no requirement for a judge to refer to Turnbull by name provided it is clear from the context of the Reasons for Verdict that all caution has in fact been exercised by the judge and that the evidence about the circumstances in which the identification was made have been closely examined by him. As the judgment in Turnbull at page 231C sets out:
10. Turning now to the Reasons for Verdict, the judge assessed the evidence at page 7 in the following way:
11. Mr Cheung Wai-sun has, on behalf of the Respondent, very responsibly accepted that the judge did not appear to have warned himself about the special need for caution in the circumstances which pertained here. It could be said that this was perhaps because the circumstances were so overwhelmingly indicative of the Applicant being the guilty culprit, that the judge overlooked this direction to himself. This resulted from the judge being satisfied that there was no one else with whom the Applicant could have been confused at the scene of the crime. He had, after all, been seen to run from the office to the place where he was arrested without ever leaving PW1's sight. 12. Having regard to the judge's omission to direct himself as to the special need for caution or to have used words to this effect, we have had to ask ourselves in the particular circumstances of this case whether this amounted to a material irregularity. We are satisfied, having regard to the judge's acceptance of PW1's evidence that the Applicant had been in her view up to the time he was arrested, that this was not a material irregularity. The case was utterly overwhelming against the Applicant. Indeed, before us today the Applicant appears to accept that is so because, when called upon to say whether was anything further he wished to add to his written grounds of appeal, he said, amongst other things: "I admit to attempting to steal but not to burglary". When he was asked why he had not admitted the lesser offence in the court below instead of denying responsibility, he said that he had not thought about it at that time. 13. We propose in this case to give leave and, treating the hearing as the appeal, we dismiss the appeal.
Representation: Mr Cheung Wai Sun, DPGC of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent. Applicant in person. |
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