Lai Chuk-ting and Others v. The Queen
Read the full judgment text of CACC 1065/1977 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment.
1. The notice of appeal on behalf of the 1st Appellant raises a number of grounds of appeal but we asked counsel to address us on the 7th ground first. This alleges that the conviction of this Appellant was unsafe and unsatisfactory on the grounds that the learned judge reached his conclusions and prepared his Reasons for Verdict before hearing the final submissions made by the 1st Appellant's counsel.
Cited by 3 cases
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CACC001065/1977
----------------- Coram: Huggins and Pickering, JJ.A. and McMullin, J. Date of Judgment: 2nd August 1978. ----------------- JUDGMENT ----------------- Huggins, J.A.: 1. The notice of appeal on behalf of the 1st Appellant raises a number of grounds of appeal but we asked counsel to address us on the 7th ground first. This alleges that the conviction of this Appellant was unsafe and unsatisfactory on the grounds that the learned judge reached his conclusions and prepared his Reasons for Verdict before hearing the final submissions made by the 1st Appellant's counsel. 2. The position was this. There were three Defendants, two of whom were represented professionally. For some reason the advocate for the 2nd Defendant addressed the judge first and he concluded his address on 29th September 1977. Counsel for the 1st Defendant then sought an adjournment until the following morning before making his address. It would seem that over night, with the commendable purpose of expediting matters, the learned judge prepared Reasons for Verdict. On the following morning counsel addressed him on behalf of the 1st Appellant and then, according to the record, the learned judge proceeded immediately to read out his Reasons for Verdict. Those Reasons extend over some fourteen pages of type-script and the last page or just under a page relates to the 2nd and 3rd Defendants. It is, therefore, contended that the learned judge had not only made up his mind but had written his judgment before hearing counsel and that it is, therefore, impossible to say that he gave proper consideration to the address of counsel. 3. Now there are, of course, two conflicting principles here. We should not too readily assume that a judge, and particularly a judge of this experience, would make up his mind finally before hearing the address of a defendant's counsel. However, with some reluctance, we have come to the conclusion that the other principle outweighs that, and that principle is that justice must manifestly be seen to be done, and it is possible is that the Defendant and his counsel would be aggrieved and believe that the learned judge may not have given proper weight to the address which was made to him. There is little more that we can say. We think that there is some justification for such a grievance and, therefore, this appeal of the 1st Appellant must be allowed. 4. I would add that we did not think it appropriate to obtain an affidavit from the learned judge since that could not have cured the appearance of what was done. 2nd August 1978. Representation: |
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