Lee Shun Chung v. Li Kam Chuen and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCCW 572/2005 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 5 December 2005.
1. At the end of the hearing of the 1 st respondent’s application to strike out the petition herein, I made an order in terms of that application. The following are the reasons for the Judgment.
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HCCW 572/2005 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE COMPANIES WINDING-UP PROCEEDINGS NO. 572 OF 2005 ____________
____________ BETWEEN
____________ Before: Hon Chung J in Court Date of Hearing: 5 December 2005 Date of Judgment: 5 December 2005 Date of Handing Down Reasons for Judgment:12 December 2005 ___________________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ___________________________________ Introduction 1.At the end of the hearing of the 1st respondent’s application to strike out the petition herein, I made an order in terms of that application. The following are the reasons for the Judgment. 2.The petition was presented on 26 July 2005. It was said to have been presented pursuant to ss. 168A(1) and 177(1)(f), Companies Ordinance (Cap. 32). Those provisions read:-
3.The petition was based on several grounds. By the time of the hearing on 5 December 2005, it was in gist based on two:-
4.The background facts leading to the petition are largely undisputed and can be summarised as follows. 5.Lee and Li were the only 2 partners of a partnership business known as “Che Hing Paper Wares Factory” (“Che Hing”). Whatever might have been the reason(s), the partnership was terminated on 28 August 2002. Che Hing became Li’s sole proprietorship business since. 6.The company was incorporated with the common intention on the part of Lee and Li for it to hold a unit in an industrial building which was to be occupied and used by Che Hing. That took place when the company became the registered owner of such a unit (“the suit property”) on 28 December 1998 (some 4 years before the termination of the partnership). Che Hing used to pay the company rent for occupying and using the suit property. Similar to Che Hing, Lee and Li are the company’s only 2 shareholders and directors. 7.According to Lee, the parties entered into an agreement at the same time as the termination of the partnership. The petition stated that:-
The above averment was in effect repeated in the affirmation in support of the petition. 8.Hence, since 28 August 2002 (about 3 years before the date of the petition), Lee has been receiving HK$10,500 per month from Li whereas the company has received nothing. 9.The petition alleged that Li ceased paying that monthly sum to Lee since August 2004 (about 1 year before the date of the petition). Lee contended this act constituted the unfairly prejudicial conduct on which the petition is grounded. 10.Li submitted at the hearing such conduct can only be actionable by Lee in his personal capacity because the conduct could not properly be regarded as conduct related to “the affairs of the [company]” as required by s. 168A(1), Cap. 32. 11.Lee submitted otherwise. In short, Lee argued that the consideration he has given in return for the monthly sum of HK$10,500 was related to his right as a shareholder, namely, he promised not to call for a general meeting or otherwise procure the company to take action against Li for occupying and using the suit property. As such, Li’s conduct of not paying the said monthly sum can be regarded as related to “the affairs of the [company]”. 12.I do not consider Lee’s argument to have substance. The said monthly sum was never payable to the company under the agreement. Lee’s promise to Li was related to his personal right as a shareholder. How a shareholder of a company exercises his right founded upon the shares is something personal to him, and cannot normally be regarded as part of the company’s affairs. 13.Lee then argued that the agreement between him and Li had effectively deprived the company of its rental income. Lee said that he has thereby suffered loss because his chance of receiving dividends was reduced or even lost as a result. However, even if this was true, it was brought about by an agreement in which Lee was a party; Lee has not come with clean hands and cannot complain: see for example Re Shiu Fook Co. Ltd. [1989] 2 HKC 342, 349; Ebrahimi v. Westbourne Galleries [1973] AC 360, 387. 14.Since the last-mentioned argument has been rejected for the reason stated above, there is no need to consider the so-called “reflective loss principle”: see Re Landune International Ltd., unrep., HCCW 1178/2004 (14 July 2005), para. 36 to 37; Johnson v. Gore Wood & Co. [2002] 2 AC 1, 35-36 and 62-67. 15.In relation to the other ground of petition which was still relied upon by Lee at the time of hearing (the deadlock in management ground), I have taken into account the following matters:-
16.In these circumstances, I agree with Li that:-
17.Lee has sensibly not relied on the other grounds set out in the petition. Accordingly, there is no need to discuss them herein.
Mr Roland Lau, instructed by Messrs C Y Chan & Co., for the Petitioner Ms Phoebe Man, instructed by Messrs Lo Chan & Leung, for the 1st Respondent 2nd Respondent acts in person and absent The Official Receiver is excused from attendance |
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