Ho Sau Chun v. Asat Ltd
Read the full judgment text of DCPI 126/2004 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment.
1. This is an application by the Plaintiff to claim for damages for personal injuries sustained in the course of employment as an operator in the employment of the Defendant on 18 th January 2000. She alleged that she sprained her back when she tried to move a heavy trolley fully loaded with integrated circuit chips from the 9 th floor to the 10 th floor of QPL Industrial Building, 138 Texaco Road, Tsuen Wan, N.T. (“the Building”) where the Defendant carried on its business of integrated circui
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DCPI 126/2004 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO. 126 OF 2004 -------------------- BETWEEN
-------------------- Coram: H.H. Judge Chow in Court Date of Hearing : 28th, 29th & 30th September 2005 Date of Handing Down Judgment : 14th December 2005 ____________ Judgment ____________ 1.This is an application by the Plaintiff to claim for damages for personal injuries sustained in the course of employment as an operator in the employment of the Defendant on 18th January 2000. She alleged that she sprained her back when she tried to move a heavy trolley fully loaded with integrated circuit chips from the 9th floor to the 10th floor of QPL Industrial Building, 138 Texaco Road, Tsuen Wan, N.T. (“the Building”) where the Defendant carried on its business of integrated circuits assembly. She complained that when she was about to push the trolley into the lift, she found that the lift had stopped about 2 inches above the floor level of the 9th floor. She could therefore not push the trolley into the lift. She had no alternative but to go into the lift and lifted the trolley up so that it could be moved inside, and as a result she sustained serious personal injuries. The Defendant filed its defence against the claim. It had also issued a Third Party Notice against the Third Party for indemnity or contribution against the Plaintiff’s claim. Eventually the Plaintiff settled her claim with the Defendant. 2.In the Third Party Notice, the Defendant alleges that the accident was caused by the negligence and/or breach of common duty of care under the Occupiers Liability Ordinance on the part of the Defendant, particulars as follows :-
3.The hearsay statements of the Plaintiff and Li Tze Ying (another operator employed by the Defendant) produced under a hearsay notice served by the Defendant revealed that previously two employees were assigned to move the trolleys but that in around 1998/1999 only one employee was assigned to move them. On the day of the accident the cart was fully loaded and the Plaintiff had to move a number of such trolleys; the work was very busy on the day of the accident and she had to work without stop. In the hearsay statement the Plaintiff said that the Defendant failed to provide “sufficient and experienced staff so that I can perform my duty safely. Otherwise, I would not have had to push and pull the heavy cart alone……..”. She also said that the Defendant failed to provide her sufficient and proper instruction, guidance, warning and training to teach her how to push and pull the cart. 4.The evidence of Madam Lau Kwong Ping, witness for the Defendant, revealed:-
So the Plaintiff’s evidence that the Defendant’s system of work was inadequate and that the Defendant failed to provide sufficient manpower was supported by the evidence of Lau Kwong Ping. 5.The Defendant alleged that the Third Party did not deploy anyone to patrol the lift lobby in question, hence the Third Party did not take any steps to discharge its duties towards the Defendant, hence exposing the Defendant to a risk of breaching its duty as the Plaintiff’s employer. The Third Party was unable to discharge its duties Clause 9(h)/(i) of the Deed of Mutual Covenant of the Building in relation to the common areas of the floors occupied by the Defendant (namely, 7th – 12th Floors of the Building) because these floors were occupied by the Defendant, which has its own security, cleaning and facility/engineering departments to perform the duties in these sub-clauses. Mr. Chan Hung Wan of the Third Party said by the time he started to work in this building it was part of the practice/custom in the building that the Defendant assumed responsibility for these duties. The Third Party had no authority to prevent the Defendant from occupying the common areas of these floors. He said that he personally conducted random inspection of the lifts every two days and his staff below him also did this. The security guards of the Third Party would also report any defects. For 97% of the time, the height gap in the lifts was less than 1 inch and this was safe. It only 3% of the time it exceeded 1 inch when he would stop the lift and call Hang Fung Lift Limited to come and repair it. Lau Kwong Ping said that in the 9 years she had been employed by the Defendant there were only about 2 occasions when she had to call for assistance in lifting the trolley into the lift. In this respect her evidence supports the evidence of Chan Hung Wan that this type of situation where the height gap was 2-3 inches was extremely rare. 6.The burden is on the Defendant to prove on the balance of probabilities that the allegations contained in the Third Party notice are substantiated. There is no evidence that the Third Party knew about the existence of the gap in the lift in question, so that it had to take immediate action to remove the gap height, because such a gap very rarely happens. The particulars of negligence contained in the Third Party Notice are simply not substantiated. 7.At the material time the Third Party was the manager of the Building. It exercised its power under clause 8(c) of the Deed of Mutual Covenant of the Building to employ professional persons for the purpose of carrying into effect the terms of the deed. It employed a reputable lift contractor, the Hang Fung Lift Limited, to provide professional specialist skills to the maintenance of the lifts in the building. There is nothing more it could have done. It has discharged its duty under the Deed of Mutual Covenant. Exemption clause 8.Clause 9(z) (cc) of the Deed of Mutual Covenant provides:-
9.Even if the Third Party was negligent in avoiding the said gap height to be created, it is exonerated from liability under the above clause, because in order to be liable, the act must involve criminal liability or dishonesty or wilful negligence. This is not the case here. 10.The Defendant relies on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to prove that the accident was caused by the negligence of the Third Party, its servants or agents. Since there was no negligence on the part of the Defendant, this doctrine does not apply in this case. 11.Due to the reasons above-said, I dismiss the Defendant’s claim of indemnity or contribution against the Third Party. Costs 12.I make an order nisi for costs, to be made absolute in 14 days’ time, that the Defendant is to pay costs of this claim for indemnity or contribution against the Third Party to be taxed, if not agreed, with certificate for Counsel.
The Defendant: represented by Mr. Victor Gidwani, instructed by M/S. Christine M. Koo & Ip, Solicitors. The Third Party: represented by Mr. Ashok Sakhrani instructed by M/S Dibb Lupton Alsop, Solicitors. |