Re Leung Yat Tung
Read the full judgment text of CACV 119/2006 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 30 June 2006.
1. A bankruptcy order was made on 1March 2001 against the bankrupt on the petition filed on 14 June 2000.
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CACV 119/2006 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 119 OF 2006 (ON APPEAL FROM HCB NO. 2019 OF 2000) _________________________________ RE: LEUNG YAT TUNG, the Bankrupt _________________________________
Before: Hon Tang JA and Stone J in Court Date of Hearing: 30 June 2006 Date of Judgment: 30 June 2006 Date of Reasons for Judgment and Decision on costs: 11 July 2006 __________________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT __________________________________
Hon Tang JA (giving the reasons for judgment of the Court): 1.A bankruptcy order was made on 1March 2001 against the bankrupt on the petition filed on 14 June 2000. 2.According to the report of the Official Receiver dated 2 February 2005, “proofs of debt claiming the total sum of HKD173,331,915.23, SGD4,844,265.30 and USD9,587,639.50 were received. The total assets realized to date amount (sic) to HKD92,707.84.” 3.In 1991, the bankrupt set up two trusts: “The 747 Trust” and “The Harbour Front Unit Trust”. The trust deeds are both dated 2 September 1991. The trusts have been referred to as the Family Trust since the principal beneficiaries are the wife and the children of the bankrupt. 4.The trustee of The Harbour Front Unit Trust is a Harbour Front Ltd which is the registered owner of shares in Fonfair Co Ltd (“Fonfair”) and Money Facts Ltd (“Money Facts”). The shares were transferred by the bankrupt to Harbour Front Ltd in 1998. 5.Fonfair is the owner of Yau Tong Marine Lot Nos. 2, 3 and 4 (“the Yau Tong property”). The shares in Fonfair and Money Facts have substantial value because they owned indirectly about two thirds of this Yau Tong property. Although the transfer of the shares by the bankrupt took place only in 1998, it is the bankrupt’s case that on 5 September 1991, he had made a declaration of trust in respect of his shares in Money Facts in favour of Harbour Front Ltd, and that Harbour Front Ltd in turn made a declaration of trust (also executed by the bankrupt who was then the sole director of Harbour Front Ltd) in favour of The Harbour Front Unit Trust. 6.In relation to Fonfair, the bankrupt’s case is that on 12 September 1991, he made a declaration of trust in favour of Harbour Front Ltd and that on the same day, Harbour Front Ltd made a declaration of trust in favour of The Harbour Front Unit Trust. 7.There is strong evidence to show that these declaration of trusts were made no earlier than 1998 so that they would be caught by section 49 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance, Cap. 6. 8.An important issue in the recovery of assets is when the transfers were made. 9.The public examination of the bankrupt took place before Master Hui in February 2006. At the end of the public examination, Master Hui made the following orders:
10.The application for the discovery order was made orally. The first intimation of the intended application was made by counsel for the Official Receiver at the end of the first day of the public examination. That was repeated on the second day. 11.The bankrupt was represented by Tsang & Lee, Solicitors, at the hearing of the public examination. 12.On 16 February 2006, Tsang & Lee wrote the following letter to Harbour Front Ltd, attentioned Mrs Irene Leung, who is the wife of the bankrupt. This letter reads:
13.The reply, dated the same date, was from Poon & Cheung, solicitors for Harbour Front Ltd and reads:
14.This is what the Master said when he made the discovery order:
15.Ms Cheung submitted that the discovery order was in two parts. First, it required the bankrupt to supply information from his own recollection. Secondly, it required the production of documents. The wording of the discovery order is less than clear. It is not clear what information is sought from the bankrupt and given the potential serious consequence of non compliance, it is important that any such order should be clearly worded. Furthermore, the bankrupt has made it clear in the public examination that he had no relevant information to supply. No co-operation could be expected from him. As for production, the correspondence has made it clear that in relation to some of the items, Harbour Front Ltd asserted that they did not have them and in relation to others, they would not supply them to the bankrupt. The Master ordered the supply of information and discovery on the basis that the bankrupt “equals to Harbour Front Ltd”. We do not believe it was open to the Master so to find in the course of the public examination, particularly, when no notice or no proper notice had been given to the bankrupt that that was the basis upon which discovery was sought. 16.For the above reasons, we set aside the discovery order. Appeal against the costs order 17.Mr Bartlett, counsel for the bankrupt, argued that the usual order is for the costs of the public examination to be paid out of the estate and he cited Re Strand, ex-parte The Board of Trade [1883] 13 QBD 492 in support. 18.But as Re Li Tat Kong, ex parte Official Receiver [2003] 2 HKLRD 501, a decision of Deputy Judge Barma SC (as he then was) shows, the costs of a public examination is at the discretion of the court. In that case, he ordered the costs to be borne by the bankrupt, because his answers during the public examination had been far from satisfactory and had made the exercise largely futile. 19.Here, the Master was of the view that the public examination was largely futile because of the attitude of the bankrupt. The Master was entitled to take that view. We see no reason to interfere with the exercise of discretion by the Master. 20.The Master made a gross sum assessment in a sum of $225,331 to cover the costs of the three days. However, the third day was taken up by the order for discovery. Since we set aside the discovery order, the bankrupt should not be required to pay the third day’s costs. The parties have agreed that the costs for that day was $44,000. So the amount would be reduced to $181,331. 21.The Master also adjourned the public examination sine die. Under rule 83 of the Bankruptcy Rules, the court may, for example, adjourn the public examination sine die:
22.It is not clear on what basis the Master adjourned the public examination sine die. 23.It is possible that the Master was influenced by the discovery order that he made. Since we now have set aside the discovery order, we believe it is fair that we should remit the matter to the Master so he can revisit the exercise of his discretion. Costs of the appeal 24.Mr Bartlett asked for the costs of the appeal. Since he has been substantially, but not fully, successful, we believe the bankrupt should have 75% of the costs of the appeal. Such costs should be borne by and paid out of the estate of the bankrupt. 25.The Official Receiver was performing its statutory duty. Though we take the view that the discovery order should not have been made, the Official Receiver had not acted in an improper or unreasonable way, Re Li Tat Kong. This is not a case where the Official Receiver was the unsuccessful party below and appealed. The appeal is a direct consequence of the discharge by the Official Receiver of its statutory duty. So the costs of the appeal should be borne by the estate and not by the Official Receiver personally.
Mr Jeremy Bartlett, instructed by Messrs Tsang & Lee, for the Bankrupt (Appellant). Ms Karen Cheung, of the Official Receiver as the Trustee of the Bankrupt. |
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