The Queen v. Lam Yin Sang and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCMA 46/1993 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment.
1. The appellants were convicted before a magistrate of the offence of promoting a pyramid selling scheme contrary to section 3 of the Pyramid Selling Prohibition Ordinance, Cap. 355. Each was fined $800 and they now appeal against conviction. A female, Lee Lai-chun was jointly charged with them but was acquitted after trial. A charge of improper use of the word "Limited" contrary to section 350 of the companies Ordinance, Cap. 32 against the appellants was dismissed by the magistrate for duplic
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG APPELLATE JURISDICTION MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 46 OF 1993 ___________
___________ Coram: The Hon. Mr. Justice Wong in Court Date of Hearing : 8th April 1993 Date of Judgment : 8th April 1993 ________________ J U D G M E N T ________________ 1. The appellants were convicted before a magistrate of the offence of promoting a pyramid selling scheme contrary to section 3 of the Pyramid Selling Prohibition Ordinance, Cap. 355. Each was fined $800 and they now appeal against conviction. A female, Lee Lai-chun was jointly charged with them but was acquitted after trial. A charge of improper use of the word "Limited" contrary to section 350 of the companies Ordinance, Cap. 32 against the appellants was dismissed by the magistrate for duplicity. 2. The facts were agreed and not in dispute. It is not necessary for me to go into them for the purposes of my decision. This appeal centres on the question and meaning of "reward" and whether there is evidence to support such a finding made by the magistrate. A "pyramid selling scheme" is defined by section 2 of Cap. 355 as meaning
3. "Reward" includes refund, commission, discount or allowance but does not include payment for sales demonstration equipment and materials supplied at not more than their fair market value and not resold. 4. Mr. Lui, who appears for the appellants, does not seek to argue that paragraph (a) has not been satisfied, but contends that paragraph (b) has not been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. His argument is that the reward was based on the fair market value of the goods sold by sub-participants introduced by a participant in the scheme. In support of this, Mr. Lui drew my attention to some passages in the evidence and one passage comes from Miss Ong Gwat-giem at p.43 of the appeal bundle which reads :-
At p. 27 Chung Chun-wah, PW2 says :-
But this same witness says at p.28 :-
Miss Yip Hiu says at p.47 :-
But she also says immediately afterwards at the same page :-
5. Miss Hartstein rightly points out that the offence is proved if the reward is based at least in part and not necessarily wholly on something other than the fair market value of goods or services actually sold by him or by another participant introduced by him. There is overwhelming evidence pointing to this direction. For instance, Miss Wong Kwai-ying says at p.32 :-
Cheuk Kwan-wah says at p.34 :-
Kong Kwan at p.37 says :-
Ling Wai-sze says this at p.53 :-
Under cross-examination, this witness agrees that her discount depends on the volume of sales by the new members she introduced. 6. On the evidence before him, I am satisfied that the learned magistrate was entitled to the conclusion that the reward was based at least in part on something other than the fair market value of goods or services actually sold by a participant or by or through another participant introduced by him. The appeal by both appellants against conviction is accordingly dismissed.
Miss V. Hartstein C.C. for the Crown. Mr. K.L. Lui (D.L.A.) for the appellant. |