The Queen v. Lee Ping Hung
Read the full judgment text of CACC 542/1989 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 19 April 1990.
1. This is an application by Mr. LEE Ping Hung (''the Defendant) for leave to appeal against his conviction by Judge Chua in the District Court on one charge of blackmail and one charge of common assault.
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CACC000542/1989
BETWEEN
------------ Coram: Sir Derek Cons, Ag. C.J., Hunter & Macdougall, JJ.A. Date of hearing: 19 April 1990 Date of delivery of judgment: 19 April 1990 ----------------- JUDGMENT ----------------- Sir Derek Cons, Ag. C.J., delivered the judgment of the Court: 1. This is an application by Mr. LEE Ping Hung (''the Defendant) for leave to appeal against his conviction by Judge Chua in the District Court on one charge of blackmail and one charge of common assault. 2. There was only one witness for the prosecution, i.e. the victim of the two charges, one Mr. WONG Kai Yuen. He is the proprietor of a garment factory. The Defendant was at one time manager for Mr. Wong, resigning in July 1987. Subsequently the two had a dispute about money. The Defendant claimed that there was owing to him some $290,000 by way of commission. Eventually he took the matter to the Labour Tribunal where it apparently stands adjourned for him to produce further evidence if he can. 3. The incident which gave rise to the prosecution took place on the 16th January last year. It happened at the offices of Mr. Wong which are on the 20th floor of a building in Tsuen Wan. It was accepted at the trial that the Defendant arrived there at about 10:30 in the morning together with his nephew and three other men and that they were there in pursuit of the $290,000. It is common ground that the meeting became somewhat heated, both Mr. Wong and the Defendant admitting to losing their tempers. It is also common ground that at one stage the Defendant left, leaving behind his nephew and the three other men with Mr. Wong. 4. It was not disputed - and it could not have been because only Mr Wong gave evidence as to this part, no other witness being called for the defence than the Defendant himself - that there were, subsequent to that, threats to the person of Mr. Wong and that he was assaulted. 5. The Defendant's evidence as to what had happened before he left the meeting was significantly different from that of Mr. Wong. The judge did not accept his evidence. She did accept the evidence of Mr. Wong. The Defendant today suggests that she was wrong to do so and that she did not fully consider Mr. Wong's evidence. In particular he refers to the fact that at one stage Mr. Wong said that the Labour Tribunal proceedings had concluded and that the Defendant been fully paid, but later accepted that in fact the proceedings still stood adjourned. 6. Mr. Wong gave an explanation of that discrepancy which was accepted by the judge. She felt that it did not impinge upon his general truthfulness. The explanation on its face is not unreasonable. That being so there is no reason for this Court to interfere in what is essentially a matter for the judge. 7. Until this morning the Defendant had the benefit of solicitor and counsel to help him in his application. He has how withdrawn his instructions but adopts the grounds of appeal already prepared by counsel. Basically they come down to the submission that there was not sufficient evidence to justify a conviction of either offence. 8. The relevant evidence is short and does not condescend to detail. We quote first from the evidence in chief of Mr. Wong:
Later in cross-examination:
On the face of it, the fast answer is a contradiction of his earlier evidence that threats were uttered both before and after the Defendant left the meeting. However, the judge was well aware of that and expressly referred to it in her Reasons for Verdict. She decided that in fact there was no contradiction, drawing a distinction between threats as to bodily injury and other threats. 9. Be that a valid distinction or not, the remainder of the evidence, if believed, as it was, is ample to justify a conclusion that the Defendant was present at and party to the making of some threats and to justify an inference that he knew similar conduct, including the likelihood of assault, was likely to continue after he left and that he so intended. 10. Where, on a question of fact, there is evidence on which a judge could properly come to a conclusion of guilt this Court will not interfere. It will only do so if no reasonable judge could have come to that conclusion. That, as we have indicated, is not the situation here. The application must be refused.
Representation: John Reading, Crown Prosecutor for the Respondent. Applicant in person. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||