Deacons v. Wonderyouth Industries Ltd
Read the full judgment text of DCCJ 1891/2006 on BabelCite. This District Court judgment was delivered on 18 August 2006.
1. On the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment under Order 14, the plaintiff acted for the defendant in several actions since 1999 and represented the defendant all the way up to the Court of Final Appeal. In the course of these actions the defendant had paid the plaintiff bills of costs on previous occasions.
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DCCJ1891/2006 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION CIVIL ACTION NO. 1891 OF 2006
BETWEEN
Coram: Deputy District Judge W.C. Li in Chambers (Open to public) Date of Hearing: 18 August 2006 Date of Decision: 18 August 2006
D E C I S I O N
1.On the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment under Order 14, the plaintiff acted for the defendant in several actions since 1999 and represented the defendant all the way up to the Court of Final Appeal. In the course of these actions the defendant had paid the plaintiff bills of costs on previous occasions. 2.There were no previous disagreement over solicitors’ fees, particularly the hourly charge imposed by the solicitors and no disagreement over experts fees, and that is including counsel fees. No complaint has been raised that there had been any overcharging or that the rates charged were in any way excessive. 3.Over a period of seven to eight years the plaintiff acted for the defendant. Counsel fees were part of the costs of legal representation and the defendant had not in any way involved themselves in choice of counsel or in the costs over counsels’ fees. That is a matter very much left to the expertise and experience of the plaintiff. I agree with the plaintiff when they say that when the defendant says that they had no opportunity to agree to counsel fees, that is really not a defence not to pay the solicitors’ bill of costs as and when payable after the trial actions. 4.The defendant had been represented by two other firms of solicitors. They were and they should be well aware of their right to ask for taxation of the bill of costs. They had not exercised this right nor did they express a desire for solicitors’ bill of costs to be taxed before payment. 5.The defendant could apply for taxation. They did not. A mere assertion that they had no opportunity to have the bill taxed is not a defence to a demand for payment by the plaintiff. The arguments that they had offered to pay or were offered a discount were neither here nor there. The allegations were denied by the plaintiff, and other than the bare assertion, the defendant had no further submission on these points. 6.I agree with the plaintiff that in the circumstances of this case the plaintiff had a lien over the defendant’s papers in these actions. I have heard the plaintiff’s solicitor, the defendant being absent in today’s hearing, and having considered the matter as a whole, I find the defendant has no defence at all to the plaintiff’s claim. I therefore enter judgment accordingly against the defendant in favour of the plaintiff for:
7.The second matter this morning is the summons for interim payment. The plaintiff asks for no order, I therefore make no order on this application.
Mr G. Shaw of Plaintiff, appeared in person No appearance of Messrs Jewkes Chan & Partners, for the Defenant |
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