HKSAR v. Wong Chong Kai
Read the full judgment text of CACC 551/1997 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 19 March 1998.
1. On 13th August 1997, this Applicant was convicted of handling stolen goods contrary to section 24(1) and (2) of the Theft Ordinance, Cap.210. This followed a trial before Judge Kilgour in the District Court.
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CACC000551/1997 1997, No.551 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL -------------------------------
------------------------------- Coram: Power, V.-P., Mayo & Stuart-Moore, JJ.A. Date of Hearing: 6 March 1998 Date of Judgment: 19 March 1998 ---------------------- J U D G M E N T ---------------------- Stuart-Moore, J.A. (giving the judgment of the Court): 1. On 13th August 1997, this Applicant was convicted of handling stolen goods contrary to section 24(1) and (2) of the Theft Ordinance, Cap.210. This followed a trial before Judge Kilgour in the District Court. 2. In summary, the particulars of the charge were that on or about 12th December 1996 (as amended), the Applicant had dishonestly received two stolen LHD Mercedes Benz S320 cars knowing or believing them to be stolen goods. 3. It was an admitted fact at trial that the cars mentioned in the charge were stolen. The real issue to be determined was whether the Applicant was aware of the nature of the goods inside the container in which the two cars were being transported at the time he took the container into his constructive possession. The Applicant could only be found guilty if it was proved that he knew this, and that at the time of his receipt of those goods he knew or believed the cars to be stolen. 4. There was no direct evidence against the Applicant to establish either of these essential ingredients to the charge from which, if proof was established, dishonesty obviously flowed. Having looked at the evidence of the surrounding circumstances, the trial judge drew inferences that were adverse to the Applicant in satisfying himself that these issues had been proved. 5. The first ground of appeal advanced on the Applicant's behalf by Mr. Plowman, S.C., is directed at what he submits is the poor quality and insufficiency of evidence which led the judge to draw these crucial inferences. In his second ground, Mr. Plowman has argued that the judge was wrong to have relied upon evidence that the cars in the Applicant's possession had been recently stolen when the real issue in the case was concerned with whether the Applicant knew what he had in his possession at all. 6. The judge accurately summarized the prosecution's evidence in his Reasons for Verdict as follows:
7. The Applicant elected not to give evidence. 8. Mr. Plowman has submitted that the matters taken into account by the judge, when he then went on to draw certain inferences, are flawed in several respects. He points out in particular that this was, for the Applicant, a normal transaction for someone who was accustomed to import and export automobile parts when trading with China. He also places emphasis on a passage in the Reasons where the judge referred to "two possibilities" relating to the Applicant's request on 26th December 1996, that the container should be taken to Ma Tso Lung. He submits that one of these so-called possibilities was irrelevant and that both were inconsistent with guilty knowledge on 12th December 1996 when the Applicant originally received the container. There is considerable force in this last submission. 9. The passage where the judge deals with these possibilities is to be found at page 9 line S in the appeal bundle and reads as follows:
10. Mr. Bruce S.C. concedes on behalf of the Respondent that the knowledge which a third party might have concerning the trailer is irrelevant and he accepts that this was not a material consideration. However, he argues that there were several other matters on which reliance was correctly placed leading inevitably to the necessary inferences being drawn against the Applicant. 11. We have considered these. 12. Firstly, in regard to the movement of the trailer to an unprotected area at the side of the road, if this had stood alone, it is obvious that this evidence would be equally consistent with guilty knowledge having been acquired on or about 26th December 1996 as at the date when the goods were received on or about 12th December 1996. However, this evidence did not stand alone. 13. The Applicant was a trader in motor car parts, not refrigeration units Whilst the evidence was that the Applicant knew very little English so that it may be that he was unable to read all of the words on the bill of lading which referred to these goods as "used freezer", it was the Applicant who gave instructions to PW1 to write "auto parts" in Chinese on the release order (P2). He also gave PW1 the chop bearing the name of the non-existent company calling itself Lung Fung Trading Limited. The Applicant retained at all times close links and control over the container until he gave instructions for the container to be parked at the roadside on 26th December 1996 not far from the border with China. 14. These were circumstances that in our judgment cried out for explanation when taken together with what the judge found to be strong evidence of recently stolen goods being found in the possession of the Applicant. This leads us to consider the second ground of this application. 15. In Archbold (1998 Ed.), "recent possession" is dealt with at paragraphs 21-125 to 127, and the following passage from Cross and Tapper on Evidence (8th ed.) p.35 is quoted:
16. Mr. Plowman has submitted that this general rule as to recent possession ought not to apply where no physical handling of the goods has taken place, such as in the present case where they have at all times remained in a sealed container. We can see no logical reason why that should be so. Here was a motor trader receiving a container marked as a "used freezer" which he caused to be released under the description of "auto parts". 17. The container had arrived falsely described and was released under another different false description. The cars were stolen in Taiwan only a few days earlier. We are confident that recent possession was a factor proper to be used in deciding that the Applicant was a dishonest receiver of the goods when they came into his possession on or about 12th December 1996 and that no improper use was made thereof. 18. In these circumstances, we are satisfied that there is no substance in either of the grounds advanced on behalf of this Applicant. The application is accordingly dismissed.
Representation: Mr. A.A. Bruce, S.C., S.A.D.P.P. and Mr. Narash Daryanani, S.G.C. (D.P.P.) for the Respondent. Mr. Gary Plowman, S.C. and Mr. Paul Leung instructed by Messrs. S.H. Chan & Co. for the Applicant. |