The Queen v. Leung Tak Yin
Read the full judgment text of CACC 10/1987 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment.
1. This is an application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence on one charge of indecent assault.
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 1987 No. 10 BETWEEN THE QUEEN AND LEUNG TAK-YIN Coram: Roberts, C.J., Yang & Silke, JJ.A. Date: 10th March, 1987 _____________ JUDGMENT _____________ Roberts, C.J. 1. This is an application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence on one charge of indecent assault. 2. The applicant, who was the first defendant at the trial was jointly charged with another man with eight different charges, one of false imprisonment, three of blackmail, three of criminal intimidation and one of indecent assault. 3. At the conclusion of the Crown case the Judge led that there was no case to answer on seven of the eight charges against both defendants. 4. We observe, in passing, that it was a matter of some surprise to us that he should have reached this conclusion in relation to the second and third charges of blackmail and criminal intimidation, since the principal witness on whom the Crown relied, in relation to those charges, was the same witness as the one on whose evidence the Judge relied in order to convict the first defendant on the charge of indecent assault. 5. It is unnecessary to go into any detail as to the background facts giving rise to these charges, other than to say that the girl who was the subject of the alleged indecent assault, whom I will refer to as the complainant, had been to Macau for the purposes of gambling and had borrowed a substantial sum of money from a group of men there, who expressed themselves willing to lend money on certain conditions to those who wished to continue gambling. 6. After various incidents, into which it is unnecessary to go, the complainant found herself with the two defendants and other men on the 9th September, in the afternoon, on the premises of the Tak Fuk Association in Wanchai, where a room had been rented by the group of men who were there with the complainant. 7. The evidence in relation to the indecent assault falls within a short compass. I quote the relevant passage of the complainant’s evidence –
8. Mr MacKenzie-Ross submitted on behalf of the applicant that the second defendant, although no doubt he and the applicant shared a common purpose to regain the money that they had lent, had gone further on his own than can reasonably be said to have been the common intention of the group. 9. In his very short Reasons for Verdict, the Judge directs himself on this issue in the following terms -
10. There can, I think, be no criticism, and none was rasised by Mr. MacKenzie-Ross, of the Judge’s finding that an order to a woman to undress, accompanied by threats, would amount to an indecent assault in law. 11. The question, however, is whether the Judge has correctly directed himself on the question of common purpose. As we interpret his ruling, it can be summarized as follow. 12. Firstly, the two defendants had a common purpose, namely to secure the return of the money which they had lent to the complainant. 13. Secondly, in the course of that common purpose, the second defendant forced the complainant to remove her clothes. 14. Thirdly, that constituted and indecent assault by the second defendant. 15. Fourthly, the first defendant is also guilty of indecent assault because he shared with the second defendant a common purpose which the indecent assault was designed to further, though he took no part in the indecent assault, and there is no evidence that he encouraged it, though he watched it. 16. In our view, this is an incorrect direction on the law governing alders and abettors. The authorities state that, before a person may properly be convicted as an alder and a better, it is not sufficient merely for him to be present while an offence is committed. If he takes no part in it and does not act in concert with those who commit it, it is insufficient merely for him not to try to prevent the offence being committed. We were referred by Counsel for the Crown to R. v. Clarkson & Others[1], in which the main principles are set out. At p.450, Lord Justice Megaw quoted an earlier passage from the case of Coney (1882) 8 Q.B.D. 534 -
17. Had the Judge directed himself in the manner required by Clarkson1 and various other authorities, he might well have come to the same conclusion which he did. However, for the reasons which we have already given, we are satisfied that the Judge did misdirect himself and that his approach to the evidence was in error. 18. We therefore feel obliged to allow the application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence and to quash both conviction and sentence, though we do so with some regret because, as we have already commented, had the Judge correctly directed himself properly it might very well be that he would have reached the same conclusion. Mr. D. MacKenzie Ross (C.W. Leung & Co.) for Appellant Mr. I.G. Cross, Ag. Sen. Asst. Crown Prosecutor, for Respondent/Crown Prosecutor [1] [1971] 55 Cr. App. R. 445 |