Mark Alexander Turner and Another v. Hung Hok Man
Read the full judgment text of HCA 2387/2004 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 13 March 2007.
1. This action concerns a failed sale and purchase transaction in respect of a property known as House No.23, Greenpeak Villa, Lot No.1427 in D.D. 222, Sai Kung, New Territories, Hong Kong (“the Property”). The Property is a small or “Ding” house held under the General and Special Conditions of New Grant No.6796 dated 24 August 1984 (“the New Grant”).
Cited by 3 cases · Cites 2 cases
|
HCA 2387/2004 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO. 2387 OF 2004 ______________________ BETWEEN
______________________ Before : Mr Recorder Fok, SC in Court Date of Hearing : 15 - 16 February 2007 Date of Handing Down Judgment : 13 March 2007 ______________________ J U D G M E N T ______________________ Introduction 1.This action concerns a failed sale and purchase transaction in respect of a property known as House No.23, Greenpeak Villa, Lot No.1427 in D.D. 222, Sai Kung, New Territories, Hong Kong (“the Property”). The Property is a small or “Ding” house held under the General and Special Conditions of New Grant No.6796 dated 24 August 1984 (“the New Grant”). 2.The would-be purchasers were the Plaintiffs and the would-be vendor the Defendant. The parties entered into a provisional sale and purchase agreement dated 4 December 2003 in respect of the Property (“the Provisional Agreement”) and then, subsequently, a formal agreement for sale and purchase dated 19 December 2003 (“the Agreement”). 3.Under the Agreement, the Defendant agreed to sell and the Plaintiffs agreed to buy the Property at a price of HK$5,950,000. An initial balance of $300,000 had been paid on the signing of the Provisional Agreement. A further balance of HK$295,000 was paid on the signing of the Agreement. The balance of the purchase price, in the sum of HK$5,355,000, was to be paid on or before the date of completion, which was stipulated in the Agreement to be 30 January 2004. 4.For reasons that are addressed below, the sale was never completed. Relevant provisions of the Agreement 5.Clause 16.01 of the Agreement provided as follows:-
6.Clause 16.02 of the Agreement provided as follows:-
The Facts 7.Following the execution of the Agreement, the parties corresponded in relation to the sale through their solicitors. The Plaintiffs initially appointed Messrs Gary Mak, Dennis Wong and Chang (“GMDWC”) to act as their solicitors, whilst Messrs Li, Wong and Lam (“LWL”) acted for the Defendant. As from about 9 February 2004, the Plaintiffs appointed Messrs Tai, Mak & Partners (“TMP”) to act for them in place of GMDWC. 8.On 22 December 2003, GMDWC received the title deeds in respect of the Property from LWL. 9.On 31 December 2003, GMDWC wrote to LWL raising four requisitions. Only one of those requisitions is material for present purposes and it was in the following terms:-
10.On 26 January 2004, LWL responded to GMDWC and provided the following reply to that requisition:-
11.On 27 January 2004, GMDWC again wrote to LWL and made the following point in respect of LWL’s response to that requisition:-
12.On 28 January 2004, LWL further responded to GMDWC in respect of the requisition that had been raised as follows:-
13.On 28 January 2004, GMDWC reverted to LWL on that response as follows:-
14.I shall refer to the requisition addressed in the correspondence set out in paragraphs 9 to 13 above as the First Requisition. 15.On 5 February 2004, LWL wrote to GMDWC and stated:-
16.Shortly after TMP were instructed to act on behalf of the Plaintiffs in place of GMDWC, Mr Chong Ting Kin, a senior conveyancing clerk employed by TMP, telephoned Mr Clifton Wong, a partner of LWL. In that telephone conversation, Mr Chong told Mr Wong that, notwithstanding the notice in LWL’s letter of 5 February 2004 (“the Clause 16.02 Notice”), the Plaintiffs would not withdraw the requisitions raised by GMDWC and asked Mr Wong to withdraw the Clause 16.02 Notice as he would need more time to look at the title documents. Mr Chong also informed Mr Wong that the Plaintiffs would be raising further requisitions. 17.On 10 February 2004, TMP duly wrote to LWL raising four further requisitions, only the first two of which are material for present purposes. TMP also responded to the notice in LWL’s letter of 5 February 2004. So far as material, their letter stated:-
18.I shall refer to these two requisitions raised in TMP’s letter dated 10 February 2004 as the Further Requisitions. 19.On 12 February 2004, LWL replied to TMP in respect of the Further Requisitions as follows:-
20.On 13 February 2004, TMP wrote to LWL in respect of the Further Requisitions in the following terms:-
21.On 13 February 2004, LWL wrote to TMP, referring to their letter of 12 February 2004 (see paragraph 19 above) and subsequent telephone conversations between Mr Chong and Mr Wong, stating:-
22.On 14 February 2004, TMP replied to LWL, stating:-
23.On 16 February 2004, TMP wrote to LWL to indicate they were instructed that the Plaintiffs and the Defendant had agreed the completion of the sale and purchase of the Property be postponed until 20 February 2004. As regards the requisitions, TMP stated:-
24.On 19 February 2004, TMP wrote chasing for a reply to their outstanding requisitions and putting on record their view that good title to the Property had not yet been proved. 25.On 20 February 2004, in the absence of any reply from LWL, TMP wrote to LWL stating:-
26.On 27 February 2004, TMP wrote again to LWL demanding repayment of the deposits in the sum of HK$595,000 and threatening legal proceedings against the Defendant if these were not refunded to the Plaintiffs. 27.On 3 March 2004, TMP wrote to LWL giving final notice that unless the Defendant refunded the deposits to the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs would institute proceedings for their recovery. 28.Despite further chasing letters from TMP to LWL dated 4 March 2004 and 11 March 2004 the Defendant did not repay the deposits to the Plaintiffs. 29.These proceedings were commenced by writ issued in the District Court on 16 March 2004. By consent, the proceedings were transferred to the Court of First Instance of the High Court by order dated 2 October 2004. Overview of the Plaintiffs’ claim and the Defendant’s counterclaim 30.The Plaintiffs claim that the Defendant failed to show a good title to the Property and failed satisfactorily to answer the First Requisition and the Further Requisitions. 31.Accordingly, the Plaintiffs seek declarations that the Agreement has been rescinded and that they have been discharged from any further performance or obligation thereunder. They also seek the return to them of the deposits paid by them to the Defendant in the total sum of HK$595,000 and damages for breach of the Agreement. 32.For her part, the Defendant contends that the First Requisition raised by the Plaintiffs was withdrawn as a condition of the Defendant herself agreeing to withdraw the Clause 16.02 Notice served by her solicitors. 33.However, the Defendant also says that in any event, her solicitors satisfactorily answered the First Requisition raised by the Plaintiffs. 34.The Defendant contends that the Further Requisitions raised by the Plaintiffs were raised out of time and so she was not obliged to answer them. She says that her solicitors did in fact satisfactorily answer the Further Requisitions in any event. 35.The Defendant says that the completion date was extended by mutual agreement of the parties but that, notwithstanding this extension, the Plaintiffs failed to complete the purchase of the Property. She contends that the Plaintiffs’ failure to complete the purchase was a repudiatory breach of the Agreement which she was entitled to accept and thereupon forfeit the deposits paid by the Plaintiffs. 36.Accordingly, the Defendant contends she is not liable to the Plaintiffs on their claim and, on the contrary, counterclaims against the Plaintiffs for a declaration she is entitled to forfeit the deposits paid by the Plaintiffs. The Issues 37.The following issues fall to be considered:-
Issue 1: Was the First Requisition withdrawn? 38.In support of the Defendant’s contention that the First Requisition was withdrawn by the Plaintiffs, Mr Matthew Chong, counsel for the Defendant, relies on the TMP letter of 10 February 2004. He submitted that the fact that in that letter the Plaintiffs requested the Defendant to withdraw her Clause 16.02 Notice must mean that the Plaintiffs accepted the Defendant’s condition for such withdrawal. 39.Mr Chong developed this submission along these lines. Following the service of the Clause 16.02 Notice, the Defendant was ready to annul the sale and return the deposits to the Plaintiffs. However, she did not do so but instead withdrew her Clause 16.02 Notice and forfeited the Plaintiffs’ deposits when they later did not complete the Agreement. The only reason this happened was because the TMP letter of 10 February 2004 amounted to a withdrawal of the First Requisition. 40.Mr Chong also submitted that the Plaintiffs, having changed solicitors and having been advised that the First Requisition had not been satisfactorily answered, it would only be logical for them to accept the annulment of the Agreement unless they were prepared to withdraw the First Requisition. 41.I reject the Defendant’s contention that the First Requisition was withdrawn. 42.In my view, far from indicating that the First Requisition was being withdrawn, the TMP letter of 10 February 2004 made it very clear that the Plaintiffs considered it to be outstanding and that they required it to be answered properly:-
43.The oral evidence is also consistent with the conclusion that the First Requisition was not withdrawn. In his oral evidence, the 1st Plaintiff, Mr Mark Turner, denied that the Plaintiffs withdrew the requisitions raised by GMDWC. More specifically, Mr Chong of TMP gave oral evidence concerning his telephone conversations with Mr Wong of LWL. Mr Chong stated categorically that there was never any withdrawal of the requisitions raised by GMDWC in those conversations. Instead, Mr Chong made it clear that he told Mr Wong that the Plaintiffs were reserving their rights in respect of the GMDWC requisitions. Mr Wong was not called to give contrary evidence for the Defendant. I accept the evidence of both Mr Turner and Mr Chong that the Plaintiffs did not give instructions to TMP to withdraw the GMDWC requisitions. 44.Finally, I would add that the evidence does not support the Defendant’s case that the Clause 16.02 Notice was withdrawn as a result of the Plaintiffs withdrawing the GMDWC requisitions. In particular, the letter from LWL to TMP of 12 February 2004 was at pains to reiterate the Defendant’s asserted right to annul the Agreement in accordance with Clause 16.02. If the Defendant was withdrawing her Clause 16.02 Notice in return for the Plaintiffs’ withdrawal of the GMDWC requisitions, it would have made no sense for LWL to write in these terms. 45.In the circumstances, I find that the First Requisition was not withdrawn by the Plaintiffs. Issue 2: Was the First Requisition satisfactorily answered? 46.It was not in issue between the parties that, in a sale and purchase of property, a vendor’s obligation is not only to give a good title to the property at completion but also, at an earlier stage, to show a good title by satisfactorily answering requisitions properly raised by the purchaser. 47.In the context of the First Requisition, it is necessary to set out Special Condition 6 and General Condition 8 of the New Grant. 48.Special Condition 6 provided as follows:-
49.General Condition 8 provided as follows:-
50.The title deeds of the Property showed an obvious prima facie breach of the New Grant. By a Memorandum dated 9 February 1988 and a Conditional Agreement dated 28 March 1990, the grantee, through its attorney, entered into agreements for the sale and purchase of premises built on the lot covered by the New Grant. This was before the deletion of Special Conditions 4, 5 and 6 of the New Grant following the payment of an additional premium on 5 July 1990. 51.The GMDWC letter of 31 December 2003 raised a legitimate requisition in respect of the unauthorised alienation of the lot by the grantee. 52.The answer provided by LWL by its letter of 26 January 2004 was, in my view, misconceived. On a plain reading, Special Condition 6 not only prohibits the alienation of any interest in the lot but also prohibits the grantee from entering into any agreement to do so. The Memorandum and Conditional Agreement were therefore both expressly prohibited by Special Condition 6. 53.When GMDWC pressed the First Requisition, LWL responded in their letter of 28 January 2004 that, because of the modification of the New Grant, no enforcement action could be taken by the Government. 54.In my view, this further answer was also misconceived for the reason set out in GMDWC’s letter of the same date: the Modification Letter dated 5 July 1990 was stated to take effect only from its date and did not amount to a waiver of any pre-existing breach. 55.Mr Sean Fang, counsel for the Plaintiffs, submitted that, bearing in mind the Defendant’s duty to prove her title so that the Court could be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the Plaintiffs would not be at risk of re-entry by the Government (per Kan Wing Yau & Anor. v. Hong Kong Housing Authority [1988] 2 HKLR 187), what the Defendant could and should have done was to seek confirmation from the District Lands Office that enforcement action would not be taken in respect of the unregistered Memorandum and Conditional Agreement. 56.I agree. This would have been a simple and appropriate way to respond to the First Requisition and would have put any doubts over the Defendant’s title to rest. Instead of doing so, however, the Defendant purported to annul the sale by serving the Clause 16.02 Notice. On her evidence, both in her witness statement and in her oral testimony, she explained that, since property prices were rising at the time and she was very busy, she was not prepared to waste further time and costs in dealing with the Plaintiffs in respect of the Property but preferred to sell it to someone else instead. Be that as it may, as a matter of law, she was obliged satisfactorily to answer the requisitions raised. That, so far as the First Requisition was concerned, she did not do. 57.I therefore conclude on this issue that the First Requisition was not satisfactorily answered by the Defendant. 58.My conclusion on this issue is ultimately sufficient to dispose of this matter. However, for the sake of completeness and in case I am wrong in concluding that the First Requisition was not satisfactorily answered, I shall briefly state my conclusions on the other issues. Issue 3: Were the Further Requisitions raised out of time or was the Defendant obliged to answer them? 59.Under Clause 16.01 of the Agreement, requisitions were to have been raised by the Plaintiffs within 7 working days after the date of receipt of the title deeds by the Plaintiffs’ solicitors. As noted above, the title deeds were received by GMDWC, as the solicitors for the Plaintiffs, on 22 December 2003. 60.Plainly, the Further Requisitions, which were raised on 10 February 2004, were raised more than 7 working days after 22 December 2003. 61.Prima facie, therefore, the Further Requisitions were deemed by operation of Clause 16.01 of the Agreement to have been waived on the expiration of the 7 working days’ period. 62.Mr Fang contended, in reliance on Giant River Ltd. v. Asie Marketing Ltd. [1990] 1 HKLR 297, that a requisition that goes to the root of title may be raised out of time. He submitted, relying on Century Legend Ltd. v. Chu Chung Shing Investment Co. Ltd. (unreported, HCMP 606/1998, 2.8.99, Beeson J) that a potential title defect that gives rise to possible Government re-entry is one that goes to the root of title. 63.For his part, Mr Chong prayed in aid the Court of Appeal judgment in Hillier Development Ltd. v. Tread East Ltd. [1993] 1 HKC 285 in support of the proposition that a purchaser may only make requisitions out of time where the requisitions go to the root of title and where the requisition could not have been expected to have been raised within time by the exercise of due diligence. 64.Mr Chong submitted that the Further Requisitions were both requisitions which could and should, by the exercise of due diligence by the Plaintiffs and their solicitors, have been raised within time. 65.In my view, Mr Chong is correct in this submission. The matters with which the Further Requisitions are concerned could, in my judgment, have been raised within 7 working days of the delivery of the title deeds to the Plaintiffs’ solicitors. In the case of the first of the two Further Requisitions, the need to raise the question of whether certificates of exemption for the lot were required was a requisition that was an obvious inquiry to make in respect of the Property. As for the second of the two Further Requisitions, the possibility there might have been a breach of Special Condition 9 of the New Grant because of a side window and the need to raise a requisition as to whether the side window had been authorised is a question that could have been raised on behalf of the Plaintiffs by their solicitors simply asking the Plaintiffs if they had inspected the Property and seen any side windows. 66.I am fortified in the view I have reached in the preceding paragraph by the fact TMP raised the Further Requisitions on 10 February 2004, one day after they were instructed by the Plaintiffs. Although not decisive on this question, it seems to me that the Plaintiffs’ submission that the Further Requisitions could not have been raised within 7 working days notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence does not sit well with the actual time taken by TMP to raise them. 67.Although LWL addressed the Further Requisitions in their letter of 12 February 2004, they made it very clear that their doing so was without prejudice to their contention that the requisitions were out of time by reason of Clause 16.01 of the Agreement. There was no waiver of the Defendant’s right to rely on Clause 16.01 of the Agreement and, in the circumstances, the Further Requisitions having been raised out of time, the Defendant was not obliged to answer them. Issue 4: If she was obliged to answer the Further Requisitions, did the Defendant do so satisfactorily? 68.As noted above, the Further Requisitions concerned two matters: (i) whether certificates of exemption for the lot were required, and (ii) whether the side windows were authorised. 69.As to the first matter, I agree with Mr Fang’s submission that TMP raised a legitimate requisition as to the absence of certificates of exemption. 70.The response from LWL to this requisition in their letter of 12 February 2004 was essentially a speculative answer, namely that it was possible the existing house on the lot had been erected and completed before October 1987 (when the Buildings Ordinance (Application to the New Territories) Ordinance came into effect) so that no certificates of exemption would be required. 71.Mr Fang submitted this answer was not satisfactory because it was equally possible the house was built on the lot after October 1987: in this context, he referred to the point made by TMP in their follow-up letter of 13 February 2004 that the certificate of compliance was only issued on 25 January 1990, indicating that the building works might well have been carried out after October 1987. Mr Fang submitted that it would have been a simple matter for the Defendant to refer the question of whether certificates of exemption were required to the District Lands Officer, as indeed LWL did after the sale fell through. 72.As to the second matter, it is clear from Special Condition 9 of the New Grant that the construction of windows and openings, save in the front or rear of the building, required the consent and approval of the District Lands Officer. This requisition was properly raised. 73.The response from LWL to this requisition in their letter of 12 February 2004 was also speculative. They referred to fact that a certificate of compliance had already been issued and so surmised that the District Lands Officer must have been satisfied that all conditions of the Grant had been complied with and must have approved the opening of any side window. 74.Mr Fang submitted this answer was not satisfactory because the certificate of compliance in respect of the Property merely states “that all the positive obligations imposed on the Grantee of the [Lot] have been complied with …”, whereas Special Condition 9 is a negative obligation. 75.Mr Chong submitted that there was no evidence that there was a side window, the opening of which required the approval of the District Lands Officer. I do not accept this submission: if there was in fact no side window, this would have been the response one would have expected LWL to give to this requisition. The fact that this was not LWL’s answer provides a basis for inferring that there was a side window. 76.Mr Chong also submitted that the issue of the certificate of compliance showing that the District Lands Officer had examined the Property and was satisfied all positive obligations had been complied with made it fanciful to suggest that the Government would take enforcement action in respect of any side windows. I do not think this follows at all. There is no evidence the Government was aware of the existence of any side windows. It was confirmed by the District Lands Officer after the sale fell through that no consent for any side window opening had been issued. It was by no means clear as things stood in February 2004 that no enforcement action would be taken. 77.I agree with Mr Fang’s submissions as to the inadequacy of the Defendant’s responses to both of the Further Requisitions. Had the Defendant been required to answer them, I would have concluded that she did not answer them satisfactorily. Issue 5: What was the effect of the Clause 16.02 Notice? 78.I can deal with this issue briefly because Mr Chong accepted, on behalf of the Defendant, that the Clause 16.02 Notice served on 5 February 2004 was not effective since the Defendant would not be regarded as having acted reasonably in serving the notice in the face of the requisitions raised by GMDWC. 79.This was also the Plaintiffs’ position and, accordingly, it was common ground that the Clause 16.02 Notice was ineffective to annul the Agreement. 80.Instead, as I understood him, Mr Chong submitted that the relevance of the Clause 16.02 Notice was its withdrawal by the Defendant because the Plaintiffs had withdrawn the requisitions raised by GMDWC. 81.For the reasons set out above, however, I have rejected the contention that those requisitions were withdrawn. I have also rejected the contention that the Clause 16.02 Notice was in fact withdrawn by the Defendant. On the contrary, as I have said above, I find that it was not withdrawn. Had it been effective, the Clause 16.02 Notice would have brought the Agreement to an end and obligated the Defendant to repay the deposits paid to her by the Plaintiffs. This did not happen. Instead, the transaction continued up to the extended completion date for the sale of the Property and the point when (as explained below) the Plaintiffs accepted the Defendant’s repudiatory breach of the Agreement. Issue 6: Was the Defendant in breach of the Agreement in failing to show a good title to the Property by failing to answer the requisitions raised by the Plaintiffs or were the Plaintiffs in breach of the Agreement in failing to complete? 82.In the light of my conclusions above, it follows that the Defendant was in breach of the Agreement in that she failed to show a good title to the Property by failing to answer the First Requisition satisfactorily. This was a repudiatory breach of the Agreement, which the Plaintiffs accepted by TMP’s letter of 20 February 2004. 83.It also follows that the Plaintiffs were not obliged to complete the sale and purchase of the Property. Issue 7: The appropriate relief 84.In the circumstances, the Plaintiffs are entitled to declarations that the Defendant failed to answer the First Requisition satisfactorily and that the Agreement has been rescinded and that they have been discharged from any further performance or obligations thereunder. 85.The Plaintiffs also seek a declaration that they are entitled to the return of the deposits paid by them in the total sum of HK$595,000 together with interest thereon to which, in the light of my conclusions, they must be entitled. 86.The Plaintiffs also claim damages for breach of the Agreement. These have not been particularised in the Plaintiffs’ pleadings, which simply claims that these are “to be assessed”. Mr Fang therefore submitted that the appropriate relief, if the Plaintiffs were successful in their claim, would be to direct that damages be assessed by a Master. Mr Chong, on the other hand, submitted that it would be inappropriate to direct damages to be assessed separately because the Plaintiffs had never sought a split trial and therefore should have proceeded to prepare for a trial of all issues in the action, including the quantum of any damages they alleged they had suffered as a result of any breach of the Agreement by the Defendant. 87.I do not think it would be inappropriate to make the direction urged on me by Mr Fang. It is true there was no direction for a split trial but, in my opinion, this does not mean that it is not open to the Court to direct an assessment of the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs as a result of the Defendant’s breach of the Agreement. The Plaintiffs plead in the Statement of Claim that they have suffered loss and damage “including the costs of investigating the Defendant’s title and other expenses incurred by the Plaintiffs in and about the sale and purchase of the Property”. The assessment exercise should be limited to the quantification of these items of costs and expenditure that the Plaintiffs may have incurred. This is simply a matter of quantification of these pleaded items of loss and damage (as opposed to an inquiry into what heads of loss and damage may have been sustained) and I do not see any good reason not to direct that the quantum of the damages suffered by the Plaintiffs as a result of the Defendant’s breach of the Agreement be assessed by a Master. Conclusion and costs 88.The Plaintiffs’ claim succeeds and there will be declaratory relief in the terms described above. 89.The Plaintiffs are entitled to the return to them of the deposits in the sum of HK$595,000 together with interest thereon (which will run from the dates on which the various elements of that total sum were paid by the Plaintiffs to the Defendant). 90.I direct that the Plaintiffs’ damages be assessed by a Master. 91.The Defendant’s counterclaim is dismissed. 92.As to costs, Mr Fang invited me, relying on Town Planning Board v. Society for Protection of the Harbour Ltd (No.2) (2004) 7 HKCFAR 114, to order that the Plaintiffs be entitled to tax their costs on a higher scale than the normal party and party basis. Mr Fang submitted that the Defendant had acted in a selfish manner and in total disregard of her own contractual duties in declining or failing to answer satisfactorily the requisitions raised. He pointed to the fact that the Defendant prayed in aid her own unreasonableness to argue that the Clause 16.02 Notice was invalid. 93.Having considered Mr Fang’s submissions on costs, I do not think it is right to order that the Plaintiffs’ be entitled to tax their costs on a higher scale. As matters stood at the trial, the contest between the parties was whether the Defendant had failed to show a good title by properly answering requisitions raised by the Plaintiffs (as the Plaintiffs contended) or whether the Plaintiffs had failed to complete the Agreement (as the Defendant contended). Although I have found the Defendant did not satisfactorily answer the First Requisition, she did provide an answer through her solicitors, albeit one that I have concluded was insufficient. I have concluded that she was right in her contention that the Further Requisitions were out of time. I do not think the serving of the abortive Clause 16.02 Notice is so unusual a feature as to justify a higher scale of taxation of the Plaintiffs’ costs. I would add that the circumstances in Town Planning Board v. Society for Protection of the Harbour Ltd (No.2) which were relied upon in justification of the indemnity basis of taxation were very different to those pertaining in the present case. 94.I therefore make an order nisi that the Defendant pay the Plaintiffs the costs of the action to be taxed on a party and party basis, if not agreed.
Mr Sean Fang, instructed by Messrs Tai, Mak & Partners, for the 1st and 2nd Plaintiff Mr Matthew C S Chong, instructed by Messrs Li, Wong & Lam, for the Defendant | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment