Lee Lok Koon v. Maxim’s Caterers Ltd
Read the full judgment text of HCPI 1129/2005 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 26 April 2007.
1. The parties settled this action by way of a Consent Summons dated 7 March 2007 for $285,000 inclusive of interest and in full and final settlement of the plaintiff’s claim herein.
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HCPI 1129/2005 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO. HCPI 1129 of 2005 ______________________ BETWEEN
______________________ Coram: Before Master B Kwan in Chambers (Open to Public) Date of Hearing: 17 April 2007 Date of Handing Down of Decision: 26 April 2007 _______________ D E C I S I O N _______________ 1.The parties settled this action by way of a Consent Summons dated 7 March 2007 for $285,000 inclusive of interest and in full and final settlement of the plaintiff’s claim herein. 2.The parties were unable to agree on the appropriate scale of costs to be applied, so directions were given for the matter to be set down for a half hour argument before me. At the time I alerted the parties to the latest judgment on scale of costs HCA 2132 of 2001, a decision of Deputy Judge Louis Chan. 3.At the hearing on 17 April 2007 it was common ground that HCA 2132 of 2001 did not apply in the circumstances of the present case, and counsel for the parties agreed that the appropriate test to be used was the one propounded in HCPI 63 of 2001, a decision of Mr Justice Seagroatt (hereinafter referred to as “the Seagroatt test”). 4.Therefore it was common ground that “where an action is brought in the High Court is settled in an amount within the jurisdiction of the District Court, the usual order will mean that costs will be on the District Court scale unless the High Court is, in the exercise of its discretion, persuaded that there was a reasonable prospect of obtaining an award in excess of the District Court jurisdiction”, see paragraph 21 of the Judgment of Mr Justice Seagroatt. 5.In Summary, the background of the claim is as follows:
6.The plaintiff’s solicitors issued the Writ in the High Court on 13 December 2005, and served the full set of pleadings on the same day. 7.Mr Mumford appeared for the plaintiff. He accepted that it was for the plaintiff to establish the “justification for starting the claim in the High Court”; and that the material time to consider that justification was at the date the plaintiff issued the Writ. The defendant did not argue with those principles. 8.Mr Mumford submitted that if everything was taken into consideration, this was a case which “clearly might exceed $2 million”. The defendant’s counsel argued that on a reasonable assessment of all the factors then known to the plaintiff, the matter should not have been commenced in the High Court, especially since the sick leave period had expired a year before the Writ was issued. 9.In my view, applying the Seagroatt test requires the nominal plaintiff for the plaintiff to objectively and reasonably assess, at the time of the issue of the Writ, whether he has a reasonable prospect of recovering a sum that exceeds the jurisdictional limit of the District Court, i.e. whether he has a reasonable prospect of recovering a sum that exceeds $1 million. 10.In order to apply the Seagroatt test and assess objectively and reasonably whether the claim will exceed $1 million, it must be assumed that the nominal solicitor for the plaintiff is reasonably experienced in the field of personal injury litigation, and one who is armed with a working knowledge of awards granted by the courts for similar injuries. 11.This is a Summary of the plaintiff’s claims as pleaded:
12.I shall now apply the Seagroatt test to each of these heads of damages. 13.According to the various case digests and reports, the level of awards for prolapsed intevertebral discs in the lumbar region are between $200,000 to $350,000. It is difficult to understand how the plaintiff’s nominal solicitor can have a “reasonable prospect” of an award of PSLA in the region of $400,000 in the present circumstances, taking into consideration the contents of the report of Dr Baldwin Chan. Dr Chan’s reference to the plaintiff ‘s inappropriate use of the walking stick at the top of page 8 of the report should have sounded warning bells in the mind of a reasonably competent solicitor experienced in personal injury litigation. Dr Chan conceded that the way the plaintiff walked with a stick was “not an antalgic gait”. If he was alert and reasonably experienced, the solicitor for the plaintiff should have known that an antalgic gait means a limp adopted so as to avoid pain on weight bearing. Therefore, the nominal solicitor would have realized that Dr Chan was saying that the plaintiff did not display a genuine limp and did not really need the use of the walking stick. The crucial part of his report is the 3rd paragraph on page 10. This reads:
14.In essence in that passage Dr Chan is providing reasons why the plaintiff should be believed when he alleged he suffered from severe pain even though there were no objective signs in support of genuine nerve root dysfunction. A reasonably competent solicitor should have noticed at this stage that Dr Chan did not make reference in his report to any of the usual words and phrases adopted when an orthopaedic expert discusses objective signs of radiculopathy, words and phrases such as “genuine nerve root dysfunction”, “muscle wasting”, “reflexes”, “sensory deficits” and so on. Therefore, a reasonable solicitor for the plaintiff should not have claimed a PSLA at the sum of $400,000. 15.A reasonable solicitor for the plaintiff would have vetted the documentary support for the special damages claimed before seeking $10,000 in the Statement of Damages filed together with the Writ. It must be implied that the plaintiff’s solicitor did not have sight of any documentary support for the amount of $10,000 claimed because such documents were not listed in the List of Documents filed on 24 April 2006, four months after the action commenced. 16.The sum for Post-trial loss of earnings was claimed at $1,532,906. It was calculated as if the plaintiff had totally lost his ability to ever work again. On a fair interpretation of the contents of the report of Dr Chan, the plaintiff was capable of working, even though the doctor was of the view he was unable to resume the pre-accident job. I suggest that the nominal solicitor should have calculated the claim on the basis that the plaintiff would have a reasonable prospect of being awarded a sum in the region of around $200,000 for example allowing a 24 month period on a full loss basis, say $7600 x 24 = $182,400. Since the sick leave awarded was 14 months and 6 days, I believe an allowance of 24 month in this respect id fair. 17.The sums claimed by the plaintiff for Pre-trial loss of earnings of $287,546 and Loss of Earning Capacity were not contested by the defendant, therefore I shall adopt the plaintiff’s figures for those heads of damages in the calculation for the sum that the plaintiff had a “reasonable prospect of obtaining an award in excess of the District Court jurisdiction”. My suggested calculations are as follows:
18.In the circumstances and for the reasons given, I find that there was no reasonable prospect of obtaining an award in excess of the District Court jurisdiction, and that this claim should not have been commenced in the High Court. Consequently, the scale of costs to be applied shall be the District Court scale. 19.There shall be an order nisi that costs of this application shall be to the defendant together with a certificate for counsel, which shall become absolute within 7 days of the handing down of this Decision.
Mr C Mumford SC instructed by Messrs Francis Kong & Co for the plaintiff. Ms J Chao instructed by Messrs Christine Koo & Ip for the defendant. |
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