Guangdong Native Produce Co Ltd v. Tam Tze Ying t/a Sun Ying Trading Co
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CACV 304/2006 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 304 OF 2006 (ON APPEAL FROM HCA NO. 11053 OF 1999) ____________ BETWEEN
____________ Before: Hon Tang VP, Yuen JA and Fung, J in Court Date of Hearing: 27 April 2007 Date of Judgment : 10 May 2007 _______________ J U D G M E N T _______________
Hon Tang VP (giving the Judgment of the Court): 1.At the request of the defendant, the plaintiff procured the opening of letters of credit for the purchases of video cassette recorders (“VCR”) parts for shipment from South Korea to Jiangmen city in the Mainland. 2.After trial, Deputy Judge L Chan ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff:
3.This is the defendant’ s appeal. 4.Mr Ronny Wong, SC, appeared for the defendant in the appeal, but not at the trial. 5.Two points were taken on behalf of the defendant. First, the defendant contended that there had been a novation or transfer of the liability of the defendant to a Mainland entity called Sun Kong (“Sun Kong”) such that the defendant has been discharged thereby. The full name of Sun Kong is Guangdong Jiangmen Sun Kong Trading Company. 6.Secondly, that the plaintiff’s claim has been barred by limitation and that the judge ought not to have found that the defendant had acknowledged its indebtedness by the confirmation letter dated 19 July 1994. Background 7.The defendant is a sole proprietorship, and one Mr Tam Tze-ying is the sole proprietor. 8.The judge held that Mr Tam also owned and controlled Sun Kong. 9.The request to procure the opening of letters of credit was made by the defendant to the plaintiff in return for which the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff 1% of the amount as handling fee. The defendant would be responsible for all expenses including bank charges and interest. As a result of the letters of credit issued, a large quantity of VCR parts were purchased. 10.The defendant’s case at trial was that it had merely lent its name to be used by the Reception Department of the Jiangmen City People’s Government, and it was not liable for repayment. 11.Moreover, it was common case that in respect of the quantities of VCR parts purchase, it was only in relation to the last 9,000 sets, that full payment had not been made and that was the result of certain policy changes in the Mainland. Furthermore, in relation to these 9,000 sets it was the defendant’s case that it was not involved at all. 12.On such factual issues, the learned judge, after a trial which lasted 7 days, held against the defendant. Mr Wong was right in not trying to re-open such factual issues which have been resolved against the defendant. The only issues on appeal are the two points to which we have already referred. Novation 13.The basis of the novation argument is a document dated 4 January 1993 which was signed by the plaintiff and Sun Kong. It is in the following terms:
14.Briefly stated the effect of this document is that, Sun Kong agreed to pay the plaintiff, US$4,248,822.00 by instalments over 5 years starting from 1993. 15.The defendant submitted that the 4 January 1993 document should be considered together with the agreement dated 30 May 1988 which was made between Sun Kong and the defendant. 16.We need only refer to the first paragraph of the agreement dated 30 May 1988, which is as follows:
17.Essentially, the 30 May 1988 agreement purported to record that Sun Kong would be entitled to all rights and be responsible for all liabilities regarding the shipment of VCR parts. We should also mention that this document also purported to show that the defendant was merely acting as agent in the matter, a contention which the learned judge had rejected. 18.In relation to the 4 January 1993 agreement, the evidence of PW1, Mr Liu Wangsi, who was at the material time, the general manager of the plaintiff, as well as PW3, Liu Baiyue, who was in charge of recovery of this indebtedness, was that the plaintiff never agreed that Sun Kong would replace the defendant as the debtor. 19.In relation, in particular, to the evidence of PW3, the learned judge said:
20.The learned judge then concluded:
21.In all the circumstances of this case, we see no reason to disagree with the learned judge. 22.Mr Kenneth Chan, who appears for the plaintiff, has referred us to Chitty on Contracts, (29th ed), at para. 19-085:
23.It is true that as Mr Wong submitted novation occurred by operation of law, often not expressed as such, but by drawing inference from conduct of the parties, which gave rise to the making of a substitute contract, replacing the old, either between the same parties, or between different parties. This happened most often in the past due to the changes in partnerships or winding up of insurance companies. 24.Mr Ronny Wong relied on the dictum of Lord Selborne LC in Scarf v Jardine (1882) 7 AC 345 at 351 where he said:
25.Looking at the agreement dated 4 January 1993, we are not satisfied that the parties intended that on the making of the agreement, the liability of the defendant towards the plaintiff should be discharged. The agreement did not expressly so provide. Nor would its language require such a reading. In the circumstance of this case, as explained by the learned judge, there was really no reason why the plaintiff should have agreed to the substitution of Sun Kong for the defendant. The learned judge’s view that the plaintiff was in fact trying to get payment from anyone who was willing to agree to pay was the more probable explanation. Confirmation letter 26.The confirmation letter is dated 19 July 1994 and is a document addressed to the defendant which requested the defendant to confirm that it was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of US$2,683,726.39 by way of principal and interest up to the end of 1992. It is a two-page document and contained calculations which supported the figure of US$2,683,726.39. 27.The judge held as a matter of fact that the confirmation letter had been chopped with the authority of the defendant. In this respect, he relied principally on the evidence of PW2, Madam Tsui Kin-king, who was the plaintiff’s Deputy Accounting Manager from 1992 to 1995, although she later worked for the defendant from 1995 to January 1998. This is what the judge said about her evidence:
28.The learned judge found her to be a truthful witness. He also accepted the evidence of PW3, Mr Liu Baiyue, who was in charge of the recovery. The learned judge described him as a straightforward witness and accepted his evidence that:
29.Mr Wong submitted that the learned judge was wrong in so finding. Mr Wong accepted that on the evidence available to the defendant, he could not suggest that the confirmation letter was a forgery. However, he submitted that there were two versions of the confirmation letter. One version, which also bore the date, 19 July 1994, did not bear the chop of the plaintiff or the defendant (“the unchopped version”). The other version is that relied on by the plaintiff which bore the chops of both the plaintiff and the defendant. 30.We will just give a few examples of the differences between the two versions identified by Mr Wong. 31.In the unchopped version, the name of the defendant did not appear. It appeared on the chopped version. There are also typographical errors, for example
32.Whereas, in the chopped version, the defendant was asked to chop to confirm:
33.Mr Wong made the point that having regard to the differences, though minor, it is obvious that the two documents were not produced from the same file. We do not know that is obvious at all. Mr Wong submitted that the confirmation letter was designed to meet the limitation point. However, Mr Wong has rightly accepted that on the available evidence, it would be irresponsible to put forward a positive case of forgery. We do not believe the careful comparison between the two versions threw any doubt on the correctness of the learned judge’s conclusion. 34.Mr Wong referred us to the evidence of PW2 where she said in respect of the confirmation letter:
35.It was never suggested to her in evidence (and quite rightly so) that the confirmation letter was a forgery. We do not believe that the differences between the two versions has undermined the reliability of PW2’s evidence. 36.Mr Wong submitted that the learned judge was wrong in concluding that the defendant had a good reason to agree to the confirmation letter because the amount shown in the confirmation letter was actually less than what the defendant was liable to pay to the plaintiff. 37.The learned judge said:
38.For that conclusion, the judge relied on Exhibit P2, which as Mr B K Ho, who appeared for the defendant in the court below, informed us, was the result of the joint effort of the plaintiff and the defendant, and that Exhibit P2 was designed to show as close as possible actual payment by the plaintiff of bank interest in respect of the letters of credit, and hence the amount due and payable by the defendant. According to Exhibit P2 the amount payable by the defendant exceeded the amount stated in the confirmation by more than US$1 million. 39.In any event, it was not Mr Wong’s case that the defendant could demonstrate that the figure shown in Exhibit P2 was incorrect. So, on the material before us, we have no reason to doubt the general accuracy of Exhibit P2. Nor the correctness of the judge’s conclusion that the amount which the defendant was required to confirm to be owing to the plaintiff was indeed less than the defendant’s actual indebtedness to the plaintiff at the material time. 40.Furthermore, the fact that PW3 had threatened to take proceedings against the defendant if the confirmation letter was not confirmed, might have provided a good incentive to the defendant to actually confirm. 41.For the above reasons, we are of the opinion that the learned judge’s judgment cannot be faulted. We therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs, such costs to be taxed if not agreed.
Mr Kenneth C. L. Chan, instructed by Messrs Jimmie K.S. Wong & Partners, for the Plaintiff. Mr Ronny F. H. Wong, SC, instructed by Messrs Cheung Fung & Hui, for the Defendant. Appeal dismissed: see FACV18/2007 dated 18 April 2008 |