HKSAR v. Wong She Wa
Read the full judgment text of CACC 58/1998 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 30 April 1999.
1. The applicant was originally charged with three offences of conspiracy to defraud officers of the Immigration Department and thirty charges of causing false statements to be made in documents furnished to an Immigration Officer, contrary to s.42(1) of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115.
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CACC000058/1998 CACC 58/1998 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 58 OF 1998 (ON APPEAL FROM DCCC 588, 590 and 591/1996)
---------------------- Coram: Hon. Power, V.-P., Mayo and Stuart-Moore, JJ.A. in Court Date of hearing: 18 and 31 March 1999 Date of delivery of judgment: 30 April 1999 ---------------------- J U D G M E N T ---------------------- Mayo J.A. (giving the judgment of the Court): 1. The applicant was originally charged with three offences of conspiracy to defraud officers of the Immigration Department and thirty charges of causing false statements to be made in documents furnished to an Immigration Officer, contrary to s.42(1) of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap. 115. 2. The conspiracy charges related to contracts of employment which were allegedly made by the applicant with three sub-contractors in relation to imported foreign workers recruited from the mainland. The workers were to work on the South Kowloon Expressway part of the Chek Lap Kok airport project. 3. Originally all three conspiracy charges were framed in a similar manner save for the relevant details of conspiracies. 4. The first charge reads: "1st Charge Statement of Offence
5. The three sub-contractors all pleaded guilty to the offences they were charged with. The prosecution then opted to proceed on the conspiracy counts rather than the thirty immigration charges against the applicant which were in the alternative. 6. The three sub-contractors gave evidence for the prosecution. PW17 Tse Fu Keung of the 3rd sub-contractor gave evidence to the effect that he did not have a criminal meeting of minds with the applicant until 11th March 1995. This being the case only particulars (d) and (e) of the charges could have been acted upon dishonestly. This being the case the Judge amended charge 3 by adding a 4th and 5th charge in the alternative so as to reflect this and also to take cognisance of the fact that it might have been the Labour Department rather than the Immigration Department which had been deceived by the applicant's misconduct. 7. The applicant pleaded not guilty of the charges in the District Court but after a trial before H.H. Judge Line was found guilty. The applicant now seeks leave to appeal from these convictions. 8. Judge Line has most helpfully set out the background to this case in his Reasons for Verdict.
9. The factual issue was stated by the Judge in this way: "Were the agreements reached with the sub-contractors and the defendant ones whereby the difference between the two wages (leaving aside deductions) was due to their collection of the foreign exchange income which they had agreed to collect and to account for annually on behalf of the Chinese exporting units; or was the agreement one to pay the workers less wages with the sub-contractors putting the net difference in their own pockets?" 10. It is however necessary to consider this in conjunction with para. 4 of the defence case which will be referred to later. In particular it is necessary to relate the issue back to the particulars of the conspiracy charges as it was essential for the prosecution to prove that the applicant by his conduct defrauded an officer or officers in the Immigration Department. 11. The prosecution case placed heavy reliance upon the evidence of the three sub-contractors. Essentially it was their evidence the agreement which they had concluded with the applicant was that they would pay the salaries at a lower rate than provided for in the Hong Kong agreements and that they would be beneficiaries in respect of the moneys. 12. At this point it has to be said that it was extremely unfortunate that a decision was made by Judge Hawkes to sentence the sub-contractors before the commencement of this trial. Indeed it can be said that many if not most of the problems which will be referred to in due course arose as a consequence of the premature sentencing of these men. It is always desirable where offences have a common basis the trial Judge should sentence the offenders who have pleaded guilty and those who have been found guilty after trial. One good reason for this is that it minimises the risk of there being wide disparities in sentences passed. Perhaps even more important the Judge passing the sentences will have a much greater knowledge of the relevant facts. 13. There is a further advantage in deferring the sentencing process if, as in this case, it is anticipated that the defendants who pleaded guilty will be witnesses at a future trial. There is, otherwise, always a possibility that they may change their minds and decline to go into the witness box. 14. Be that as it may the sub-contractors did give the evidence earlier referred to. It should perhaps be added that as a consequence of their having already been sentenced they had much less incentive to give false testimony than might otherwise be the case. 15. There was also the evidence contained in the cautioned statement made by the applicant which the Judge admitted after a voire dire. In this statement the applicant admitted that he had entered into an agreement with the sub-contractors to pay less than the amount stipulated in the Hong Kong agreements. He had also informed them that the workers were quite willing to work at the lower rate. He referred to the possibility of the workers going back on their word and that he would attend to matters on the mainland. He denied any suggestion that the difference in wages would be paid over to the state. 16. The defence case has been summarised by Mr. Lok, S.C. in his skeleton in this way:
17. As has been noted earlier the Judge accepted the prosecution evidence and rejected the defence case. He gave detailed reasons in support of this. 18. Ground 1 of the Perfected Grounds of Appeal contains a complaint that:
19. Mr. Lok submitted that it was incumbent upon Mr. Donald, who represented the prosecution when the sub-contractors pleaded guilty to inform the defence at the trial below of the mitigation which had been advanced by Mr. Hoo, S.C. who had acted for the sub-contractors. 20. He based this submission on his contention that the main thrust of Mr. Hoo's plea in mitigation was inconsistent with the evidence which the sub-contractors gave to the effect they were pocketing the difference between the amount payable under the contract which had been approved by the Immigration Department ("the Hong Kong contract") and the lesser amount payable under the contract which had been concluded in China ("the Chinese contract"). 21. At the hearing before us we considered in some detail the submissions which had been made by Mr. Hoo in mitigation. 22. What is immediately apparent is that Mr. Hoo placed heavy reliance upon a Report which had been commissioned by the Panel on Manpower of the Legislative Council. The Report was published in July 1996. The title of the Report is an "Enquiry into the circumstances surrounding the labour dispute involving imported workers under the Special Labour Importation Scheme for the Airport Core Programme Projects and related issues". 23. The Report contains criticisms of the Government on the subject of the amount of control exercised over the importation of workers from the mainland. It is even suggested that it was well known that workers from the mainland entered into contracts of employment at lower rates of pay than the minimum amount stipulated in the contracts which were approved by the Immigration Department. 24. There was, however, nothing in the Report to support the submission made by Mr. Hoo that copies of the Chinese contracts were ever submitted to the Immigration Department. His submission to this effect would seem to be nothing more than a bare assertion made by him. His submission, insofar as it was based upon the Report, was not justified. 25. Can Mr. Donald properly be criticised for not informing counsel at the trial below of the existence of the mitigation Mr. Hoo had advanced when the sub-contractors had pleaded guilty? It is at least implicit from page 60 of the transcript of the proceedings involving the sub-contractors that he accepted much if not all of the submissions which had been advanced by Mr. Hoo.
26. During the course of his lengthy plea of mitigation Mr. Hoo had made repeated references to the Chinese contracts and had claimed that the Immigration Department had received them from the Chinese Authorities. 27. It would appear that some support for this claim was derived from para. 2(6) of the admitted facts upon which each of the sub-contractors was sentenced.
28. Presumably Mr. Hoo formed the view that the "other relevant documents" would necessarily have included the Chinese agreements. There was no warrant for this assumption. 29. Mr. Lok also drew our attention to the fact that Mr. Donald had apparently accepted without demur the submission by Mr. Hoo that the offences which had been committed by the sub-contractors had only been of a technical nature. It is however fair to add that Mr. Donald did distinguish the role which had been assumed by the applicant from that of his clients. 30. The other main submission made by Mr. Lok was that there was a significant disparity between the mitigation and the case which was being made out against the applicant on the subject of what was done with the moneys representing the difference between the salaries payable under the Hong Kong contract and the Chinese contract. 31. As has been indicated earlier this was a critically important issue. At the trial the applicant was running his defence along the lines that he was a duly authorised representative of the Chinese Authorities and that any payments he received would be accounted for to the Chinese Authorities. 32. In broad terms the case against him was that he shared with the sub-contractors the moneys representing the difference between the contracts and that they were applied for their own use. 33. Although in the plea in mitigation Mr. Hoo did not directly say that the sub-contractors had not received any money from the arrangements which had been made it is nonetheless true to state that Mr. Hoo attempted to shift almost all of the blame onto the applicant. 34. It is however apparent that when the plea of mitigation is read in conjunction with the evidence given at the trial of the applicant there was no serious inconsistency between the different versions. 35. At the end of the day the real issue which had to be resolved was whether the sub-contractors were holding their portion of the proceeds of the difference between the contracts for themselves or in trust for the Chinese Authorities. 36. It was common ground that a deduction of $1,200 was made from the moneys and that the applicant applied this to the Chinese Authorities. So far as the balance was concerned there was no specific statement in the mitigation plea that none of the sub-contractors had obtained any advantage. 37. We are, however, satisfied that Mr. Donald should have disclosed to the defence the nature and extent of the agreement and concessions he had made in respect of the mitigation. 38. It is not enough for Mr. Reading, S.C. who appears before us for the HKSAR, to argue that as the pleas had been made in open court they were in the public domain. The deviation between what the prosecution had erroneously accepted in mitigation (which ought never to have been advanced before the applicant's trial began) and the case which was advanced at the trial, made it incumbent upon the prosecution to alert the defence of the position. Failure to do so amounted either to a material irregularity or to an abuse of process giving this court a discretion if it considers injustice was or might have been done to quash the conviction. 39. So far as the submission that the Chinese contracts had been sent to the Immigration Department was concerned little damage appears to have occurred. 40. As has already been indicated there was nothing to establish that the Immigration Department ever received copies of the Chinese contracts. Further the evidence plainly indicated that the Immigration Department was deceived by the material which it did receive. 41. Mr. Lok contended that had there been full disclosure of what had occurred when the subcontractors were sentenced to counsel at the trial below it would have provided rich material for cross examination. 42. This is not necessarily the case. It is most unlikely that any of the prosecution witnesses would have been able to provide any assistance concerning the suggestions of Mr. Hoo in his plea in mitigation. They would, undoubtedly, we are satisfied, have disclaimed all knowledge of what was or was not known by the Immigration or Labour Departments. 43. The position concerning the moneys held by the sub-contractors is rather different. The subcontractors could have been cross-examined upon the basis that their mitigation had suggested that they had not received any real monetary benefit which was contrary to their evidence which was that they had. We are, however, not persuaded that such cross-examination would have had any material effect on the outcome. They would, undoubtedly, have said that whatever their counsel, doing the best he could for them, had said in mitigation the truth of the matter was that they had received their share of the money. 44. After giving the matter careful consideration we have come to the conclusion that this is a situation where there has been no miscarriage of justice and that we should either exercise the proviso or refuse to exercise our discretion in the applicant's favour whichever be appropriate. 45. When so doing we bear in mind the damaging admissions contained in the inculpatory cautioned statement made by the applicant. These admissions were entirely consistent with the evidence which was given by the sub-contractors to the effect that any excess moneys they had been holding were being held for their own benefit and not for the Chinese Authorities. 46. Over and above this the thoughtful Reasons for Verdict given by the Judge and his careful scrutiny of the evidence satisfy us that even if there had been full disclosure the result would have been the same. 47. This ground cannot be sustained. 48. Ground 2 complains that:
49. Having regard to the observations made in relation to the first ground this ground also cannot succeed. 50. It has never been established that none of the sub-contractors deceived the Immigration Department. 51. This ground also must fail. 52. Ground 3 is as follows:
53. It has to be borne in mind that the purpose of the voire dire was to ascertain whether the prosecution had succeeded in satisfying the Judge at the appropriate level that the applicant had freely and voluntarily made the statement in question. 54. Although the Judge was not bound to do so he did give fairly detailed reasons as to why he was prepared to accept the testimony of the police officers that the statement had been made voluntarily. The police witnesses had impressed him favourably whereas the Judge for the reasons he gave rejected the applicant's testimony. This he was fully entitled to do. It is however necessary to make short comment upon the matters complained of in 3(1) and 3(2). 55. 3(1). It is correct that the Judge did make it clear that PW2, the officer in charge of the case, should not discuss the case with officers who would be giving evidence in court. 56. It is by no means clear from the record that this allegation can be substantiated. An issue arose as to what discussions or decisions might be subject to privilege. What emerges from the record is that PW2 discussed this question with Chief Inspector Li. There is however nothing to suggest that there was any impropriety concerning this conversation. Certainly there is nothing to suggest deliberate flouting of the direction given by the Judge that there must be no discussions concerning the evidence which was going to be given by any of the officers. This complaint is without substance. 57. 3(2). This was a matter which did occasion the Judge some concern. He said this at p.48 of the appeal bundle:
58. What is important is that the Judge was mindful of the position and notwithstanding this error on the part of the officer was nonetheless prepared to treat him as a truthful and reliable witness. There is no reason why we should interfere with the Judge's findings in this connection. 59. Ground 4 is as follows:
60. There is no merit at all in this complaint. If the interventions are read in their context it is apparent that the Judge was merely seeking clarification. There was nothing in any way hostile or oppressive in the questions which were asked and nothing whatever to indicate that the Judge had in any way 'stepped into the arena and cross-examined some of the applicant's defence witnesses". 61. This ground is wholly without merit. 62. It is not necessary to condescend into particularity regarding Grounds 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9. 63. In each of these grounds a complaint is made that the Judge did not make findings on factual matters favourable to the applicant. It is clear from the Reasons for Verdict that the Judge very carefully evaluated all of the available evidence in respect of the issues which were before him. 64. No convincing reason has been put forward to justify any interference with the Judge's findings of fact. The Judge was fully entitled to reach the conclusions he did on the evidence. 65. None of these grounds have any merit. 66. As stated earlier in respect of Ground 1 of the Perfected Grounds of Appeal we are satisfied that there was either a material irregularity or an abuse of process but notwithstanding this we were of the view that the conviction is safe and satisfactory and we either apply the proviso or refuse to exercise our discretion whichever be appropriate. 67. For this reason the application is allowed. However treating it as the substantive appeal we dismiss it.
Representation: Mr. John Reading, S.C., S.A.D.P.P. (D.P.P.) for Respondent Mr. Lawrence Lok, S.C. and Mr. Joseph W.Y. Tse instructed by M/S Jesse H.Y. Kwok and Co. for Applicant |
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