Ho Yuen Ki Winnie and Another v. Ho Hung Sun Stanley and Another
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HCA391/2006 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE ACTION NO. 391 OF 2006 -------------------------- BETWEEN
--------------------- Before : Hon Poon J in Chambers Dates of Hearing : 8 and 9 May 2007 Date of Decision : 20 July 2007 ----------------------- D E C I S I O N ----------------------- A. Introduction 1.The 1st plaintiff is the 1st defendant’s sister. She is widely known as the “Tenth Sister” (十姑娘). The 2nd plaintiff is on the 1st plaintiff’s case a charitable foundation established by her in 2003. 2.The 2nd defendant is a casino in Macau. The 1st defendant is according to the plaintiffs its founder and managing director. He is frequently referred to as the “Casino King” or “King of Gambling” (賭王). 3.On 22 February 2006, the plaintiffs commenced the present action, suing the defendants for defamation. 4.By letter dated 24 March 2006, the solicitors for the defendants drew the attention of the plaintiffs’ solicitors to certain alleged defects in their pleadings and invited the plaintiffs to either discontinue the action or to amend their Statement of Claim. The plaintiffs’ solicitors gave a holding reply on 7 April 2006. 5.On 12 April 2006, the 1st defendant issued a summons for striking out and determination under Order 14A, Rules of the High Court (“the Original Summons”). 6.On 3 May 2006, the plaintiffs’ solicitors served on the defendants’ solicitors an Amended Statement of Claim (“ASOC”), which was amended without leave pursuant to Order 20, rule 3. 7.On 12 May 2006, the 1st defendant applied to amend the Original Summons by taking into consideration the amendments introduced in the ASOC (“the Amendment Summons”), which application the plaintiffs did not oppose. 8.By two letters dated 4 and 7 May 2007, the 1st defendant’s solicitors sought to raise additional questions for determination under Order 14A. 9.By letter dated 7 May 2007, the plaintiffs sought to re-amend certain paragraphs of the ASOC. 10.Consequentially, there are now before the court the following applications :
B. ASOC 11.In the ASOC, four alleged incidents of defamation are complained of. The pleas in relation to the first three incidents have similar pattern : the 1st defendant spoke allegedly defamatory matters to the press on three separate occasions, namely, 22 June 2005, 28 September 2005 and 20 October 2005. He intended that what he said or the substance thereof be republished widely in the media. On the following day, various newspapers reported what the 1st defendant had allegedly said. The 1st defendant is responsible for such republications. The 4th incident relates to a newspaper announcement allegedly published or caused to be published by the defendants on 24 November 2005 (“the Announcement”) which, the plaintiffs complain, is defamatory. 12.It is quite impossible to dispose of the Applications before me without substantially repeating those parts of the ASOC that are under scrutiny. For easy reference, a copy of the ASOC updated with the re-amendments introduced to paragraphs 15, 23 and 26, is annexed to this Decision. C. The Striking Out Application 13.Mr Shieh has helpfully put the various paragraphs of the ASOC objected to in different clusters. I will discuss the Striking Out Application accordingly. C.1 Paragraphs 5, 11 and 18 — “or substantially similar defamatory words” 14.Paragraphs 5, 11 and 18 all plead that the 1st defendant had on the date in question spoken “the following defamatory words in Chinese, or substantially similar defamatory words” to a group of assembled journalists. The Chinese words were then set out in verbatim. 15.Mr Shieh complained that the use of the expression “or substantially similar defamatory words” is embarrassing. He submitted that where an oral statement is relied on, the defendant is entitled to know with certainty the charge made against him. It is not sufficient to simply allege that “words to a certain effect” were used : Gatley on Libel and Slander, 9th edition, at para.26.13.[2] 16.Mr Lee SC, for the plaintiffs, submitted that the best particulars of what the 1st defendant had spoken have already been pleaded. However, given the transitory nature of speech, ascertaining the precise words uttered by a defamer could pose a problem at the trial if the 1st defendant disputes the publication of the words complained of. The express “or substantially similar defamatory words” is therefore added abundate cautela, in that even without them the result is the same so long as the plaintiffs succeed to prove at trial that the defamatory words spoken by the 1st defendant are substantially to the same effect : see Gatley (10th edn) at para.26.13, the commentary at footnote 56. The addition of the expression could not possibly have embarrassed or confused the defendants. 17.In Best v. Charter Medical of England Limited & another [2001] EWCA Civ. 1588, 26 October 2001, the English Court of Appeal discussed the pleading requirements for statements of claim in defamation actions. There, it was contended on behalf of the plaintiff, whose pleading was struck out, that the authorities decided before the Civil Procedure Rules came into force did not require him to plead the exact words alleged or even to set them out reasonable certainty. The plaintiff relied on an earlier decision of that Court in British Data Management plc v. Boxer Commercial Removals plc [1996] 3 All ER 707 and argued that “reasonable certainty” referred to the nature of the defamatory statement rather than the words alleged to have been used. Rejecting this argument, Keene LJ said :
18.Here, the plaintiffs have set out the words alleged to have been uttered by the 1st defendant in verbatim. The expression “or substantially similar defamatory words” plainly refer to those words as set out in verbatim. It could not possibly have embarrassed or confused the 1st defendant who should have no difficulty in deciding how to plead his case to those paragraphs. 19.This objection fails. C.2 Paragraphs 5 and 9 —“brazenly told huge lies…” 20.Paragraph 9 refers to the words of republications by the newspaper set out in paragraphs 6.1 and 6.3 and then went on to plead that those words, in their innuendo meaning, mean that the 1st plaintiff brazenly told huge lies by “falsely telling the media and the public that the 2nd defendant owed her HK$3 billion which it was wrongly refusing to pay her.” Paragraphs 6.1 and 6.3 are said to be republications of words actually uttered by the 1st defendant and as pleaded in paragraph 5. 21.Mr Shieh submitted that whatever might have been the meanings conveyed by the words pleaded in paragraphs 6.1 and 6.3, if the originally uttered words are incapable of bearing the meaning pleaded in paragraph 9, then the plea in paragraph 9 must be struck out for the simple reason that the 1st defendant cannot be held responsible for what a third party had attributed to him. It is plain from a perusal of the words pleaded in paragraph 5 that they are incapable of giving rise to the meaning pleaded in paragraph 9. Nothing in paragraph 5 relates to the justifiability or truthfulness of the HK$3 billion claim. On the contrary, on the 1st plaintiff’s own plea, what the 1st defendant actually uttered was that he would not respond and the 1st plaintiff should go to court. Paragraph 9 should therefore be struck out irrespective of any meaning borne out by the republications pleaded in paragraphs 6.1 and 6.3. 22.The content of the declaration referred to in paragraph 5 is pleaded in paragraph 10. To recap, the 1st plaintiff stated in the declaration, when she visited Macau in 2002, the 1st defendant warned her not to return and that that the 2nd defendant owed her HK$3 billion for her contractual entitlements to remuneration as an executive director and retained dividends on her ordinary and preference shares. 23.In my view, what the 1st defendant allegedly said about the HK$3 billion claim has to be understood in the entire context of the words complained of which were uttered in response to the 1st plaintiff’sdeclaration. On a proper reading, it is plainly arguable (a) that when the 1st defendant allegedly said that the declaration was highly defamatory and that the accusations contained in the declaration were untrue, he was not confining himself only to the allegation that he had prevented the 1st plaintiff from entering Macau; and (b) that he referred to the entire declaration, which clearly includes the HK$3 billion claim. 24.Accordingly, I am unable to accept Mr Shieh’s submission that the words complained of in paragraph 5 are incapable of giving rise to the innuendo meaning pleaded in paragraph 9. 25.This objection also fails. C.3 Paragraphs 6.1 and 8 — “brazenly told huge lies…” 26.Mr Shieh submitted that paragraph 8 relies on the words pleaded in paragraph 6.1 which simply pleads that the 1st defendant had said that he had not said that he was not allowing the 1st plaintiff to step foot in Macau. No value judgment or words of critique were said of the 1st plaintiff. The words are therefore incapable of bearing the pleaded defamatory meaning of the 1st plaintiff brazenly telling huge lies by falsely telling the media and public that the 1st defendant had warned her not to enter Macau. 27.Again, the words complained of in paragraph 6.1 must be considered in their entirety. There the 1st defendant was reported to have said that the declaration posted by the 1st plaintiff was highly libellous. As noted, the declaration included the allegation that the 1st defendant had warned the 1st plaintiff not to enter Macau again. It is therefore incorrect for Mr Shieh to submit that paragraph 6.1 only pleads that the 1st defendant denied that he had told the 1st plaintiff not to enter Macau. And when the words complained of in paragraph 6.1 are considered in their entirety, it is clearly arguable that they are capable of bearing the meaning pleaded in paragraph 8. 28.This objection must fail. C.4 Paragraphs 11, 12 and 15 — “Money will go back to her” 29.The part that is objected to is in paragraph 15 which pleads that “Any money that [the 1st plaintiff] will supposedly donate to charity will in fact go back to her via her own company, [the 2nd plaintiff], which receives her donations.” 30.Mr Shieh submitted that the said words complained of in paragraph 15 are not the words originally uttered by the 1st defendant but republished words. If the originally uttered words are incapable of bearing the defamatory meaning alleged, the 1st defendant cannot be held responsible for whatever defamatory embellishments newspapers chose to put on any word that he had uttered. The words complained on in paragraph 11 are not capable of bearing the meaning pleaded in paragraph 15 which is not being objected to. The fact that the 2nd plaintiff is said to be the 1st plaintiff’s company is incapable of carrying with it the meaning that the money would “go back to her”. 31.Mr Shieh next submitted that the republished words in paragraph 12 are not capable of bearing the meaning pleaded in paragraph 15 either. 32.In my view, on a fair reading of the words complained of as pleaded in paragraphs 11 and 12, the sting is that the purported donation to be made by the 1st plaintiff to the 2nd plaintiff is a sham arrangement. It follows that either the 1st plaintiff lied when she said she would donate HK$6 billion to the 2nd plaintiff or even if she indeed would make the donation, the monies received by the 2nd plaintiff would go back to her. Thus the words complained of in both paragraphs 11 and 12 are capable of bearing the meaning pleaded in paragraph 15 which is now being objected to. 33.This objection fails. C.5 Paragraphs 16 and 17 — “sham charitable foundation” 34.The innuendo meaning pleaded in paragraph 16 is based on the words pleaded in paragraph 12. The plaintiffs further plead that such meaning arose out of the matters pleaded in paragraph 17. 35.Mr Shieh submitted that the sting pleaded in paragraph 16 is that the 2nd defendant falsely portrays itself as a charity when in fact it would retain money for the 1st plaintiff’s use. But the most that could be derived from the pleaded words in paragraph 12 is that the 2nd plaintiff was “her company”, that is, the 1st plaintiff’s company. This does not impute any act or omission on the part of the 2nd plaintiff. No act of portraying by the 2nd plaintiff was mentioned or suggested in those words. 36.Turning to paragraph 17, Mr Shieh submitted that the matters in support of innuendo do not show that the readers with the alleged “special knowledge” would have understood the words as meaning the 2nd plaintiff had been doing any act sort of “portraying”. The charity status of the 2nd plaintiff was allegedly announced by the 1st plaintiff at a press conference. But that was not an act of portrayal by the 2nd plaintiff. Nor was it pleaded as such. Mr Shieh therefore submitted that the words pleaded in paragraph 12 are not capable of bearing the meaning pleaded in paragraph 16 by way of innuendo pleaded in paragraph 17. 37.As noted, the sting in paragraph 12 is that the purported donation by the 1st plaintiff to the 2nd plaintiff is a sham. In my view, the words complained of, read together with the matters pleaded in paragraph 17, are capable of bearing the innuendo meaning pleaded in paragraph 16. The attack on the lack of matters pleaded in support of the alleged “portrayal” by the 2nd plaintiff may well support an application for further and better particulars. But it is not a case for striking out. 38.This objection fails as well. C.6 Paragraphs 18 to 23 — Girl Guide award and “routine matter” 39.Here, the actual words allegedly used by the 1st defendant were set out in paragraph 18. Paragraph 19 then pleads various versions of republication. 40.Mr Shieh first submitted that the alleged defamatory meanings pleaded are not defamatory at all :
41.Mr Shieh’s objection to paragraph 23 is that neither the originally uttered words pleaded in paragraph 18 nor the republications in paragraph 19 are capable of bearing the alleged defamatory meaning pleaded there. Mr Shieh first submitted that no particulars had been identified in paragraph 23 in support of the plea of innuendo. But that has been cured by the re-amendment introduced to paragraph 23 by deleting the plea of innuendo meaning. It is now pleaded that the defamatory meaning arose by implication and/or inference. Mr Shieh next submitted that there is nothing in any of the words pleaded in paragraph 19 which are capable of supporting the meaning that the 1st plaintiff had actually done anything, let alone done any acts by way of deceiving the public. 42.In my view, the words allegedly uttered by the 1st defendant and reproduced by the press must be understood in context. They were allegedly said at the Hong Kong Girl Guides Association Annual Dinner and the 90th Anniversary Opening Ceremony where, apparently, the 1st plaintiff was presented by the Association with a 20 Year Service Award. The sting of the words complained of is obviously that the 1st plaintiff did not deserve the award because she had not done any charitable deed or made any donation. Hence the routine-ness of the award. I am of the view that the meanings pleaded in both paragraphs 21 and 22, understood in their proper context, are arguably defamatory. 43.Paragraph 23 refers to the innuendo meaning of the words complained of. Bearing in mind the sting which I have identified above, I am of the view that as the pleadings now stand, they are just arguably capable of bearing the innuendo meaning pleaded. Further and better particulars are in order. But the lack of those particulars does not justify a case for striking out. 44.This objection also fails. C.7 Paragraphs 24 to 28 — the Announcement 45.Paragraph 24 pleads the content of the Announcement, which on its face, was the 2nd defendant’s announcement. 46.Mr Shieh complained that no facts or materials have been pleaded to support the averment that the Announcement, which on its face was published by the 2nd defendant, can be said to have been published or caused to be published by the 1st defendant as well. The plea that he is the founder and managing director of the 2nd defendant is not sufficient to affix him with responsibility of acts done by the 2nd defendant. The defendants have before taking out the Striking Out Application, invited the plaintiffs to plead the necessary particulars but the plaintiffs have declined the invitation. 47.In my view, further and better particulars of the 1st defendant’s involvement in the publication of the Announcement is called for. It is not sufficient to argue, as Mr Lee did, that because the 1st defendant is Dr Stanley Ho and because he is its founder and managing director, the 2nd defendant could not have issued the Announcement without his involvement. That said, the proper course open to the defendants is to apply for further and better particulars and not striking out. 48.Mr Shieh then submitted that the defamatory meaning pleaded in paragraph 25, as a matter of ordinary and natural meaning, is not supportable by the words pleaded in paragraph 24 because the denial of what the 1st plaintiff had said are not capable of bearing the meaning that the 1st plaintiff had lied in making her accusation. I disagree. It is in my view certainly arguable that the words are so capable. 49.Mr Shieh also submitted that the defamatory meaning pleaded in paragraph 25, as a matter of innuendo meaning, is not supported by the matters pleaded in paragraph 27. He complained that the content of the letter in the Hong Kong Economic Times dated 23 November 2005 (“the Letter”) has not been pleaded and there are no pleaded materials for the court to assess how the words in paragraph 24 would be understood by the notional reasonable reader who had read that Letter. The short answer to this complaint is that further and better particulars (and not striking out) should be sought. 50.At the hearing, I was provided with a copy of the Letter. Mr Shieh submitted that a perusal of the Letter will put it beyond doubt that the Announcement is incapable or meaning that the 1st plaintiff had lied. I disagree. The substance of the Letter is that the plaintiff was entitled to the dividends referred to and she strongly demanded the 1st defendant to supervise and urge the 2nd defendant to return the same to her. The Announcement is not just a denial of what the 1st plaintiff had said in the Letter. It went on to say that all dividends that she was entitled to had been verified, approved and distributed to her. When it is read together with the Letter, the Announcement is clearly capable of bearing the innuendo meaning pleaded in paragraph 27. 51.As to paragraph 26, Mr Shieh first raised the objection that the inclusion of the 2nd plaintiff is not justified. That objection has now been cured by the re-amendment introduced to paragraph 26 by deleting the reference to the 2nd plaintiff. 52.Mr Shieh next submitted that the sting in paragraph 26 is that the 1st plaintiff had acted unreasonably to cause financial loss to the 2nd defendant and its shareholders. However nowhere in the actual words used in paragraph 24 is there any reference to financial loss. A mere reference to damaging is incapable of carrying the ordinary and natural meaning of her causing financial loss. I disagree. The reference “she keeps on damaging the company and other shareholders through unreasonable acts” is plainly capable of including financial loss. 53.Finally on the innuendo meaning of paragraph 27 arisen from the matters pleaded in paragraph 28, Mr Shieh submitted that even assuming that the readers would have known that matters relied on in paragraph 28, namely, the 1st plaintiff had gifted her shares in the 2nd defendant to the 2nd plaintiff, the words pleaded in paragraph 24 are still incapable of suggesting any act, omission or conduct of the part of the 2nd plaintiff. Similarly, this objection has now been cured by the deletion of the reference to the 2nd plaintiff by the re-amendment to paragraph 26. C.8 Conclusion 54.For the above reasons, the Striking Out Application fails and I dismiss it accordingly. D. The Disallowing Application 55.The Disallowing Application falls together with the Striking Out Application. I will dismiss it as well. E. The O14A Application 56.The O14A Application is a fall-back of the Striking Out Application. It seeks a determination from the court that those paragraphs of the ASOC being objected to are either not capable of bearing the meaning or defamatory meaning alleged. Mr Shieh relied on the same arguments as advanced in the Striking Out Application. 57.Mr Lee submitted that the court does not have jurisdiction under Order 14A to determine if the words complained of in a defamation action are capable of bearing the meaning as alleged. Contrast the position under Order 82, rule 3A of the English Rules of the Supreme Court under which the court may determine whether or not the words complained of are capable of bearing a particular meaning attributed to them in the pleadings. Rule 3A was introduced in England in 1994 but Hong Kong did not follow suit. So there is no equivalent provision in the Rules of the High Court which confers on the court jurisdiction to determine if the words complained of are capable of bearing the meaning as alleged. 58.However, in England, even after the introduction of Order 82, rule 3A, at least in one case, an application had been brought under Order 14A for a determination by the court whether the words complained of were capable of bearing any defamatory meaning : see Berkoff v. Burchill [1996] 4 All ER 1008, CA. It is not apparent from the judgment why the application was brought under Order 14A and not Order 82, rule 3A. And no issue had been taken on jurisdiction under Order 14A. 59.For present purposes, it is not necessary for me to make a definite ruling on this jurisdiction point. For even assuming that the court has jurisdiction, in light of my ruling in the Striking Out Application that the various paragraphs in question are capable of bearing the meaning alleged, the O14A Application must fail. I will dismiss it accordingly. F. The Re-Amendment Application 60.I will allow the Re-Amendment Application. G. Costs 61.Finally on costs, I will make an order nisi that :
Mr Martin Lee, SC, leading Mr Erik Shum, instructed by Messrs Ho, Tse, Wai & Partners, for the Plaintiffs Mr Paul Shieh, SC, instructed by Messrs Herbert Smith, for the 1st Defendant [1] The Amended Summons is couched in such terms that it covers all paragraphs 5 to 28 of the ASOC. But in his submissions, Mr Shieh SC, for the 1st defendant, confirmed that the Striking Out Application does not apply to paragraph 14 of the ASOC or any matter that is not covered by his submissions. [2] Mr Shieh cited the 9th edition of Gatley because it refers procedurally to the old English equivalent of the Rules of the High Court. Annex Re-Amended STATEMENT OF CLAIM 1. The First Plaintiff is the First Defendant’s sister and is widely known as the “Tenth Sister”. The Second Plaintiff is a charitable foundation established by the First Plaintiff in 2003 in order to establish, operate and manage schools, elderly institutions, clinics and hospitals and to carry out non profit making art and cultural studies internationally. 2. In June 2005 the First Plaintiff donated her 6,000 shares consisting of both ordinary and preference shares in the Second Defendant to the Second Plaintiff. Those shares are valued at not less than HK$6 billion and, in the view of experts instructed by the First Plaintiff, considerably more. The First Plaintiff is waiting for the Second Defendant to register the transfer of ownership from her to the Second Plaintiff. The First Plaintiff is owed approximately HK$3 billion by the Second Defendant for her contractual entitlements to remuneration as an Executive Director of the Second Defendant and retained dividends on her ordinary and preference shareholding in the Second Defendant that should have been distributed to shareholders in accordance with Article 46 of the constitution of the Second Defendant (“Article 46”). 3. The First Defendant is the founder and the managing director of the Second Defendant. The Second Defendant is a gambling casino in Macau. 4. The Apple Daily, Oriental Daily, Sing Tao Daily,Ming Pao, We Wei Po, Hong Kong Daily News and The Sun are widely read and influential newspapers published within the jurisdiction of the court.
The following is a true and accurate translation into English of those words:
6. The First Defendant spoke and published the said words with the intention that they or their substance or their gist or sting would be republished widely in the media. Alternatively, it was the natural and probable or reasonably foreseeable result of his speaking such words that they would be so republished. Accordingly the First Defendant authorised or caused and is legally responsible for the republication of his defamatory words which occurred in the following newspapers in their editions dated 23 June 2005: 6.1 the Apple Daily in an article entitled Casino King pointed out that the Tenth Sister’s advertisement defamatory which contained the following words in Chinese a true translation of which is as follows:
a true translation of which is as follows:
6.2 Oriental Daily in an article entitled Stanley Ho intended to accuse the Tenth Sister and Ming Pao of defamation contained the following words in Chinese a true translation of which is as follow:
a true translation of which is as follows:
6.3 Sing Tao Daily in an article entitled Casino King dissatisfied with the contents of the advertisement and intended to sue the Tenth Sister contained the following words in Chinese a true translation of which is as follows:
a true translation of which is as follows:
7. The words set out in paragraphs 5, 6.1 to 6.3 referred to the First Plaintiff by reason of the description of her as the First Defendant’s “Tenth Sister”. 8. In their natural and ordinary meaning and/or in their innuendo meaning the words complained of in paragraphs 6.1 to 6.3 meant and were understood to mean that the First Plaintiff brazenly told huge lies and acted irresponsibly by falsely telling the media and the public that the First Defendant had warned her not to enter Macau; and that the Second Defendant owed her HK$3 billion which it was wrongly refused to pay her. 9.10. The innuendo meanings set out above arises from the fact that a significant but unquantifiable number of the publishees would have known either directly or indirectly that on 22 June 2005 the First Plaintiff published what the First Defendant referred to as a “declaration” in two Hong Kong newspapers, Ming Pao and We Wei Po, the contents of which were also widely summarised elsewhere in the media, in which she stated that when she had visited Macau in 2002 the First Defendant had warned her never to return and that the Second Defendant owed her HK$3 billion for her contractual entitlements to remuneration as an executive director and retained dividends on her ordinary and preference shares that should have been distributed in accordance with Article 46. In the premises, the First Plaintiff will ask the court to infer that the words complained of in paragraphs 6.1 to 6.3 were understood by those persons who read them with the requisite knowledge set out herein to bear the meanings set out at paragraphs 8 and 9 above. 10.11. On 28 September 2005 the First Defendant spoke the following defamatory words in Chinese, or substantially similar defamatory words, to a group of assembled journalists at the CRC Open, a tennis tournament held at Causeway Bay:
a true translation of which is as follows:
11.12. The First Defendant spoke and published the said words with the intention that they or their substance or their gist or sting would be republished widely in the media. Alternatively, it was the natural and probable or reasonably foreseeable result of his speaking such words that they would be so republished. Accordingly the First Defendant authorised or caused and is legally responsible for the republication of his words which occurred in the media following newspapers on 29 September 2005: 11.112.1.Apple Daily in an article entitled The King of Gambling asked the Tenth Sister to go for a blow at Castle Peak contained the following words in Chinese a true translation of which is as follows:
11.212.2Sing Pao in an article entitled Stanley Ho suggested the Tenth Sister to go for a blow from the sea at the Castle Peak. Does not believe that his full younger sister had donated six thousand million contained the following words in Chinese a true translation of which is as follows:
11.312.3The Sun in an article entitled Does not believe the donation of six thousand million contained the following words in Chinese a true translation of which is as follows:
記者：報道仲話十姑娘話你阻佢做善事喎？
a true translation of which is as follows:
11.412.4Ming Pao in an article entitled Don't care much about the report on the Tenth Sister's disclosure of information. The King of Gambling: May be she has the start of Alzheimer's Disease contained the following words in Chinese a true translation of which it is as follows:
a true translation of which is as follows:
12.13. The words set out in paragraphs 10 11 and 11.1 12.1 to 11.4 12.4 referred to the First Plaintiff by reason of the description of her as the First Defendant’s “Tenth Sister”. 13.14. In their natural and ordinary meaning the words complained of in paragraphs 11.1 to 11.4 12.1 to 12.4 meant and were understood to mean that: the First Plaintiff is experiencing the first signs of a degenerative brain disease which is impairing her ability to reason and to think. 13.1 The First Plaintiff is experiencing the first signs of a degenerative brain disease which is impairing her ability to reason and to think. 13.215.In their natural and ordinary meaning the words complained of in paragraphs 12.1 to 12.4 meant and were understood to mean that tThe First Plaintiff is clearly lying when she says that by her donation of shares in the Second Defendant to the Second Plaintiff. She has donated at least $6 billion to charity. she intends to donate $6 billion to charity. Any money that she will supposedly donate to charity will in fact go back to her via her own company, the Second Plaintiff, which receives her donations. 14.16. In their innuendo meaning the words complained of in paragraphs 11.1 12.1 to 11.4 12.4 meant and were understood to mean that: the Second Plaintiff is a sham charitable foundation which falsely portrays itself as a charity which will distribute money and spend money on charitable good deeds principally donated by the First Plaintiff, when in fact it will not distribute that money or use it for charitable causes and instead it will retain it for the First Plaintiff’s use. It is thus a vehicle by which the First Plaintiff deceives the public into believing that she is a philanthropist when in fact she never actually donates any money to charitable beneficiaries, keeping it all for herself. 14.1 The First Plaintiff is experiencing the first signs of a degenerative brain disease which is impairing her ability to reason and to think and that the First Plaintiff should go to the Castle Peak to see a doctor in the mental hospital located there. 14.2 The Second Plaintiff is a sham charitable foundation which falsely portrays itself as a charity which distribute money and spend money on charitable good deeds principally donated by the First Plaintiff, when in fact it will not distribute that money or use it for charitable causes and instead it will retain it for the First Plaintiff’s use. It is thus a vehicle by which the First Plaintiff deceives the public into believing that she is a philanthropist when in fact she never actually donates any money to charitable beneficiaries, keeping it all for herself.
16.18. On 20 October 2005 the First Defendant spoke the following defamatory words in Chinese, or substantially similar defamatory words, to a group of assembled journalists at the Hong Kong Girl Guides Association Annual Dinner and 90th Anniversary Opening Ceremony at Tsimshatsui:
A true translation of which is as follows:
17.19. The First Defendant spoke and published the said words with the intention that they or their substance or their gist or sting would be republished widely in the media. Alternatively, it was the natural and probable or reasonably foreseeable result of his speaking such words that they would be so republished. Accordingly the First Defendant authorised or caused and is legally responsible for the republication of his words which occurred in the following newspapers on 22 October 2005: 17.119.1 Hong Kong Daily News in an article entitled Homosexual? Just for fun! contained the following words in Chinese a true translation of which is as follows:
A true translation of which is as follows:
17.219.2 Apple Daily in an article entitled Casino King continues to mock the Tenth Sister contained the following words in Chinese a true translation of which is as flows:
A true translation of which is as follows:
17.319.3 Ming Pao in an article entitled Tenth Sister receives the Girl Guides Service Award, Casino King: Have not seen her doing any charitable good deeds contained the following words in Chinese a true translation of which is as follows:
A true translation is as follows:
17.419.4Sing Tao Daily in an article entitled Stanley Ho appeals for a worthy act each day contained the following words in Chinese a true translation of which is as flows :
A true translation is as follows:
17.519.5 The Sun in an article entitled Beloved daughter Sabrina breaks up with intimate friend; Casino King is relieved contained the following words in Chinese a true translation of which is as follows :
A true translation is as follow:
17.619.6 Oriental Daily in an article entitled Stanley Ho: Completely relieved! contained the following words in Chinese a true translation of which is as follows:
A true translation of which is as follows:
18. 20. The words set out in paragraphs 18 16 and 19.1 17.1 to 17.6 19.6 referred to the First Plaintiff by reason of the description of her as the First Defendant’s “Tenth Sister”. 1921. In their natural and ordinary and/or innuendo meaning the words complained of in paragraphs 17.1 to 17.6 19.1, 19.2, 19.5 and 19.6 meant and were understood to mean that the 20 Years Service Award rewarded to the First Plaintiff was only a routine matter as the First Plaintiff has not done any charitable good deeds at all nor has she donated any money to the Hong Kong Girl Guides Associations or in general. The First Plaintiff cannot help the others to cross the road as she herself cannot walk. First Plaintiff cannot walk herself and therefore, how could she do charitable good deeds such as helping others to cross the road. 22. In their natural and ordinary meaning the words complained of in paragraphs 19.1, 19.3, 19.5 and 19.6 meant and were understood to mean that the 20 Years Service Award given to the First Plaintiff was only a routine matter as the First Plaintiff had not done any charitable good deeds nor had she donated any money to the Hong Kong Girl Guides Association or elsewhere. 23. Further, by implication and/or by inference, In their innuendo meaning the words complained of in paragraphs 19.1 to 19.6 meant and were understood to mean that: the First Plaintiff has deceived and continues to deceives the public into believing that she is a philanthropist in Hong Kong and Macau when in fact she has never actually donated any money to the Hong Kong Girl Guides Association nor does any charitable good deeds, even as minor as helping others to cross the road because she is not physically fit to walk by herself. The 20 Years Service Award rewarded to the First Plaintiff was thus only a routine matter which does not represent an award to someone who has done a lot of charitable good deeds. The First Plaintiff will ask the court to find that the words complained of in paragraphs 19.1 to 19.6 were understood by those persons who read them to bear the meaning set out in paragraphs 21, 22 and this paragraph. 20.24. On 24 November 2005 the Defendants published or caused to be published the following words in Chinese in Sing Tao Daily, Hong Kong Daily News, Apple Daily, Oriental Daily, The Sun, Ming Pao, Shun Pao, We Wei Po, Tai King Pao, Hong Kong Economic Times, Hong Kong Commercial Daily and Sun Sing Pao which defamed the First Plaintiff. A true translation of which is as follows:
21.25. In their natural and ordinary and/or innuendo meaning the words complained of in paragraph 20 24 meant and were understood to mean that the First Plaintiff has lied or is reasonably suspected of lying by alleging that the Second Defendant owes her a few billion dollars. for her contractual entitlements to remuneration as an executive director and retained dividends on her ordinary and preference shares that should have been distributed in accordance with Article 46. 22.26. In their natural and ordinary and/or innuendo meaning the words complained of in paragraph 20 24 meant and were understood to mean that not only has the First Plaintiff failed to discharge her duties as a shareholder in the Second Defendant, she and the Second Plaintiff have has positively set out deliberately to damage the Second Defendant and unreasonably to cause financial loss to its shareholders to such an extent that the Second Defendant is having to take steps to protect itself and its shareholders from her them. 27. The innuendo meaning set out in paragraph 25 arises from the fact that a significant but unquantifiable number of publishees would have read a letter from the First Plaintiff to the First Defendant published in the Hong Kong Economic Times on 23 November 2005. The Plaintiffs will ask the court to infer that the words complained of in paragraph 24 were understood by those persons who read them to bear the meaning set out in paragraph 25. 23.28. The innuendo meaning set out in paragraph 26 arises from the fact that a significant but unquantifiable number of the publishees would have known that the shares formerly owned by the First Plaintiff were donated to the Second Plaintiff in June 2005. As a result of this donation, the Second Plaintiff is entitled to the outstanding retained dividend on the First Plaintiff’s ordinary and preference shares of a few billions dollars that the Second Defendant owes to the First Plaintiff in accordance with Article 46 and the First Plaintiff’s contractual entitlements to remuneration and executive director and retained dividends on her ordinary and preferences shares and should have been distributed in accordance with Article 46. An announcement to this effect had been made in Ming Pao on 30 June 2005 and would consequently have become well known within the jurisdiction of this court. In the premises, the Plaintiffs will ask the court to infer that the words complained of in paragraphs 24 20 were understood by those persons who heard and read them to bear the meaning set out at paragraph 26 22 above and to refer to the Second Plaintiff. 24.29. In consequence of the publications complained of, the First Plaintiff’s reputation has been substantially damaged and she has been caused extreme embarrassment and upset and the Second Plaintiff’s reputation has similarly been damaged and its goodwill impaired. 25.30. Unless restrained by this Honourable Court the Defendants will further publish or cause to be published the said or similar words defamatory of the Plaintiffs. AND the Plaintiffs claim:
Dated the 22nd day of February 2006
Dated the 3rd day of May 2006
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Further hearings and rulings under HCA 391/2006