HKSAR v. Yau Shui Kwan Bonnie and Another
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HCMA532/2007 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (Appellate Jurisdiction) MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 532 OF 2007 (ON APPEAL FROM TWCC 200 OF 2007) --------------------- BETWEEN
---------------------- Before : Hon McMahon J in Court Date of Hearing : 3 August 2007 Date of Judgment : 6 August 2007 ------------------------- J U D G M E N T ------------------------- 1.This is an appeal against each appellant’s conviction only. The two appellants, who I will refer to respectively as D2 and D3, were convicted after trial of a joint offence of possession of infringing copies of computer programs, contrary to section 118(1)(d) of the Copyright Ordinance. The charge was in the following terms.
2.The facts of the case were that in the afternoon of 7 August 2006, Customs officers of the Copyright Investigation Team went to premises in the On Dak Industrial Building in Kwai Chung. Those premises were occupied by a company “Teamworld” which produced comic books. There they met D3 who was the creative director of the company. The Customs officers showed him a search warrant and D3 made a telephone call to D2, the company accountant, who then came to the premises. In the premises were approximately 14 computers. The Customs officers asked D2 to produce the copyright licences for the animation and other programs the computers were running but D2, though able to produce some licences, was unable to produce licences for 10 of the programs running on the computers in the office. Those computers containing those programs were then seized. The unlicensed software was subsequently shown to be various versions of Microsoft Window Professional Edition, Microsoft Office Professional Edition, Adobe Macromedia Freehand, Adobe Illustrator and Adobe Photoshop. 3.Neither appellant gave evidence at trial. 4.Both appellants were represented before me by Mr Stephen Hung who advanced the following grounds of appeal on behalf of both :
5.Both grounds can be dealt with together, as Mr Hung accepts that the appeal centres on one issue only, i.e. whether the magistrate was entitled, on the evidence, to find the appellants were in possession, i.e. had custody or control, of the infringing computer programs particularized in the charge. 6.He does not dispute the magistrate’s findings of fact which underlay the drawing of the inference of possession but simply argues that those facts were insufficient to allow any drawing of an irresistible inference of possession so far as each appellant was concerned. 7.The reasoning behind the magistrate’s findings as to the appellants’ possession of the infringing computer programs was set out by him in paragraphs 12 to 14 of the Statement of Findings. The salient ones are :
8.Mr Hung makes various complaints about the magistrate’s reasons in this regard. In essence they can be summarized as follows : Mr Hung argues that the magistrate wrongly inferred that each appellant could issue instructions in relation to the use of the infringing computers (and therefore their programs) where there was no evidence of that. He says that the nature of the appellants’ jobs within the company, i.e. that of a creative director and an accountant militated against them having custody or control of the computers. He says there was no evidence at trial to show how D3, particularly, performed his job as creative director of the company, and nor was there evidence that D2 had any authority over the computers in the company. 9.Before proceeding it should be said that Teamworld was a relatively small company. It had a somewhat shadowy corporate structure whereby it was owned by two British Virgin Island companies, one of which was also a director of the company together with a person Yeung, who was not present when the Customs officers entered the premises. The company had little formal documentation. Its staff hierarchy was established by a “staff list” produced in evidence which was somewhat ambiguous in its descriptions and ranking of staff within the company. 10.I will deal firstly with the appeal of D3. 11.D3 was the creative director of the company. He ranked No.2 on the apparent hierarchy of the “staff list” produced by D2 to the Customs officers. Importantly, he was described as a director of the company on that list. I must say I struggle to see any realistic possibility of a director, whether he be a creative director or some other director, in a small company which publishes comic books, such as the present company, not having authority over the computers and their programs used to produce the artwork he was responsible for. The computers were, from the nature of their programs, used to produce the artwork for the comics produced by the company. That is apparent from the names of certain of the computer programs seized. 12.And it was D3 to whom the Customs officers were taken when they entered the premises. He was in charge or apparently in charge of the company at the time the officers arrived. D3 did not have a computer in his office, which was in what may be called the “executive suite” of the company’s rather small premises. To my mind it is somewhat incomprehensible that the comic producing company’s creative director would not have used, or have had direction of the use of the companies computers which contained as I say unlicensed programs apparently relating to artwork for the purpose of the publishing company. 13.Given D3’s rank, reinforced by his description as director on the staff list (that being though as I say a somewhat ambiguous list), and the nature of his work, I am satisfied that the magistrate was right to find him to have been in possession of the unlicensed programs. His appeal is dismissed. 14.So far as D2 is concerned, I have considerable reservations concerning her conviction. She was an accountant of the company. Though she, from the nature of her office and her ranking, was one of its executives I accept her duties may have been narrowly defined, as an accountant, in dealing with the financial documentation and other paper work of the company. As Mr Hung says there was no evidence which suggested her duties went further than that. 15.The fact she signed a tenancy agreement for the company in my view, while it does establish her as someone of authority in the company, does not go so far as proving her custody or control of the computer programs in the company. Nor does the fact that she was responsible for keeping the copies of licences issued for those programs in respect of which the company was licensed. While no doubt engendering some suspicion, these matters do not go so far, as I say, to establish her control over the computers and their programs in use in the company. I note also she was described as a clerk in the company’s staff list. 16.Her appeal is allowed, her conviction is quashed and her sentence is set aside.
Mr David Leung, Acting SADPP, of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent Mr Hung Wan Shun Stephen of Messrs Pang, Wan & Choi, for the 1st and 2nd Appellants | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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