HKSAR v. Yeung Hon Keung, Larry
Read the full judgment text of CACC 233/2006 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment.
1. On 5 June 2006, the applicant was convicted on Charges 1 and 4 after trial before Deputy District Judge Thomas. The judge had found that there was no case to answer in respect of the remaining three charges, Charges 2, 3 and 5. On Charges 1 and 4 the judge passed sentences of 12 months and 18 months’ imprisonment to be served concurrently.
Cites 1 case
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CACC233/2006 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 233 OF 2006 (ON APPEAL FROM DCCC 964 OF 2005) ------------------------ BETWEEN
------------------------- Before : Hon Stuart-Moore VP, Burrell J and Barnes J in Court Date of Hearing : 21 August 2007 Date of Judgment (Re : Conviction) : 21 August 2007 Date of Reasons for Judgment (Re : Conviction) : 6 September 2007 Date of Judgment (Re : Sentence) : 6 September 2007 -------------------------------------------------------------- REASONS FOR JUDGMENT -------------------------------------------------------------- Burrell J (giving the reasons for judgment of the Court) : 1.On 5 June 2006, the applicant was convicted on Charges 1 and 4 after trial before Deputy District Judge Thomas. The judge had found that there was no case to answer in respect of the remaining three charges, Charges 2, 3 and 5. On Charges 1 and 4 the judge passed sentences of 12 months and 18 months’ imprisonment to be served concurrently. 2.The applicant applied for leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence on Charges 1 and 4. At the conclusion of the application this court refused leave to appeal against conviction and reserved its decision on the application to appeal against sentence. We now give reasons for our refusal in respect of conviction and our decision on sentence. The charges and background 3.At the material time the applicant was a civil servant. He was a teacher in the Education Department. At the time of his conviction he was 41 years old. Since a young age and throughout his career as a civil servant the applicant had been driven by a desire to better himself. He had taken and passed many examinations, he had amassed a number of qualifications and he had acquired membership of a variety of professional bodies. This case concerns his attempt to join the legal profession in Hong Kong by dishonest means. The judge found that whilst employed as a teacher in the Education Department he applied for “no-pay study leave” in order to study for a Postgraduate Certificate in Education (“PCEd”). In fact he did not intend to study for such a certificate because he applied to study for a qualification which was unrelated to his current employment namely a Postgraduate Certificate in Laws (“PCLL”) on a course run by the School of Continuing and Professional Education (“SPACE”) at the University of Hong Kong. The Education Department would not have granted him unpaid leave to engage in legal studies. 4.The applicant wanted to join the PCLL course on a part-time basis. “Part-time” on this particular course simply meant that the course spanned two years instead of one. In all other respects it was the same course. However in order to be admitted on to the two-year part-time course the applicant had to satisfy the university that he fell into one of two categories. Either he was a civil servant who had the written support of his department to enter the course (which he did not) or he had been continuously employed in the private sector for at least five years, would suffer financial hardship if he had to cease working and had the written support of his employer who would grant the necessary time off to attend day time lectures. 5.As the applicant’s only route onto the course was via the second category he made a bogus application. He provided two letters of support claiming to be employed by the Tai Po Hotel as their “Legal Manager”. One of the letters had a signature of “Carey, Managing Director”. Carey Yeung, who did indeed work for the Tai Po Hotel, was his sister. 6.His application was granted. He completed the course, passed the examination and joined the legal profession as a barrister. He did not inform the Education Department that his unpaid leave was being spent studying law. 7.The above is an outline of his criminality. Arising out of it, he faced five charges, as follows :
8.Before turning to the grounds of appeal the following further background facts should be mentioned :
Grounds of appeal Charge 1 9.In respect of the 1st charge Mr Gary Plowman SC on the applicant’s behalf makes two complaints. First, that when considering whether the applicant’s conduct amounted to dishonesty the judge failed to take account of the fact that, having passed the CPE examination the SPACE literature “guaranteed” him a place on the PCLL course. The applicant was therefore doing no more than claiming his contractual right albeit by means of false pretences. Also, that he failed to consider Ms Whitford’s evidence that those who applied for the two-year (part-time) course were treated unfairly because they had to satisfy additional requirements (letters of support from their government departments or employers). 10.The main focus on appeal was that the applicant had a claim of right to his place on the course. If so it was not dishonest for the purposes of section 18A of Cap. 210 to claim that right albeit by employing a deliberate deception. 11.At trial the focus had been less specific. At trial counsel had submitted that the conduct, although morally blameworthy, fell short of dishonesty. Counsel’s final submission contained the following remarks :
12.Counsel for the respondent, Mr William Tam, complains that the “claim of right” argument was never raised at trial and should not be entertained by this court. Whilst we accept that the specific submission that the applicant was exercising a right in contract was not spelt out at trial we are prepared to entertain this ground as being a more specifically defined consequence of the words that appeared in the SPACE brochure, namely that successful candidates in the CPE course earned a guaranteed place on the PCLL course. 13.In any event, this ground fails. It is unnecessary to consider whether or not the SPACE brochure created a contractual relationship between the university and a student because, even if it did, the known facts were that it was not a blanket guarantee in relation to the part-time course. In order to apply for the part-time course, a candidate was required to apply for the full-time course and, at the same time, fill in a supplementary application form to do the two-year course instead of the one-year course. The supplementary application included the letters of support from the government department or employer. The fact that these additional requirements were not identified in the brochure does not mean that the applicant is entitled to regard his right to a place as unqualified and therefore employ a deliberate deception to circumvent valid conditions simply because they had not been in print in the brochure. As already stated, the conditions were in place for good reason. Ms Whitford’s opinion that they could lead to ‘unfairness’ is an opinion, which although no doubt genuinely held, must be considered in the wider context which the judge clearly did (paragraph 8(3) herein). 14.It is fundamental to Mr Plowman’s argument that SPACE had “no right to impose conditions” on the part-time course. This submission we consider to be untenable. The only basis for the submission is that the brochure or leaflet did not refer to them and, as a consequence, the university has entered a narrowly defined and restrictive contract with a student. The only additional words which actually appear in the brochure are : “… offered by SPACE in the academic year immediately following completion of the CPE”. The applicant’s application was (a) not in the following year and (b) was not for the full-time course. 15.The judge was fully alive to this issue. He said :
16.Later, having correctly directed himself on the principles laid down in R. v. Ghosh [1982] QB 1053, he said :
17.It is true that these extracts do not refer to the “claim of right” issue in terms. This is simply because, it was not specifically canvassed at trial. It is nonetheless clear that the judge addressed and properly evaluated the evidence in relation to each ingredient of the offence. 18.Mr Plowman’s second complaint with regard to the 1st charge is that the “benefit” of being able to undertake the PCLL course part-time was not a benefit that was to be “paid for” and therefore was not a “service” within the meaning of section 18A of Cap. 210. Section 18A(2) of the Ordinance provides that :
It is argued that the only “benefit” flowing from the deception was in being granted a place on the two-year course rather than the one-year course. 19.This ground fails for two reasons. First, we have already decided that the university was not contractually bound to provide the applicant a place on the two-year course unconditionally. It cannot be argued therefore that the deception only led to a place on the two-year course and not the education provided thereby. Secondly, the inescapable reality is that the only avenue open to the applicant, to fulfil his ambitions, was to apply for the two-year course and he would not have received the education had he not deceived the authorities in the way he did. 20.On any sensible view there is a direct causal link between the deception he practised and the education he received as a result. That the education is a benefit is not an issue. If he had been offered a place on the two-year course but decided not to take it up he would not have been guilty of the 1st charge. Charge 4 21.Under Charge 4, grounds 3 and 4 can be dealt with together. Ground 3 complains that Charge 4 is bad for duplicity, in that it alleges two distinct offences and ground 4 complains that the judge’s reasons for verdict relies on a third, further alternative basis. 22.Three parts of the particulars of the charge are relevant to these submissions :
23.Prior to the trial there was a preliminary argument as to whether Charges 1 and 4 were duplicitous. This was in part, the same issue that is now being advanced on appeal. Submissions were made and the judge (not the trial judge) ruled that they were not duplicitous. On appeal, Mr Plowman places reliance on an exchange which took place between prosecuting counsel and the court in the course of that preliminary argument. The court asked “when does the prosecution say that the act of fraud took place?” The prosecutor answered “On the date of the approval he was granted the no-pay leave …”. 24.Mr Plowman submits therefore that one offence was complete on the day of the approval. Whereas, inducing the Education Department to continue to grant no pay leave by later concealing the fact that he was attending the PCLL course is a second offence. He complains that in spite of Mr Tam’s answer in the preliminary argument the prosecution in fact ran the case on the “continuing deception” basis and therefore alleged two offences within one charge. 25.We agree with the judge that Charge 4 is not duplicitous and we reject this ground for the following reasons. 26.Taken in context the prosecution did not commit itself to a single act of fraud on a single day during the preliminary submissions. We see no point in reciting the entire exchange in this judgment, however the context in which Mr Tam gave his answer (as relied on by Mr Plowman) is important :
27.Put simply, the fact that fraud (the charge alleged) can be a continuing offence and is invariably commenced by an act of deception is not a difficult concept. The prosecution was plainly not saying that the fraud ended on the day of the approval of the grant, it was saying that the deception which started the fraud occurred on that day. 28.In further support of his argument, Mr Plowman contends that there was an evidential basis for finding that the applicant may have originally intended to study for the PCEd course but later changed his mind and changed to the PCLL idea and only then did he fail to inform his employer. That evidential basis concerned a letter found at the applicant’s home, which suggested that in August 2001 the applicant had in mind the possibility of registering for both courses, the PCEd on a full-time basis and the PCLL on a part-time basis. Whether or not this letter was ever sent was unclear because HKU had no record of it. 29.Mr Plowman complains that, as a result of this evidence, the prosecution invited the judge and convict on an alternative basis. In his final submission Mr Tam had said :
30.Convicting on an alternative basis does not make the charge duplicitous. In our case the judge did not convict on an “alternative” basis in any event. Given that as a matter of construction we find the charge, as drafted, not to be duplicitous, the judge was entitled to convict if he found one or both of the alleged deceptions proved within the time frame, which is what he did. In his reasons for verdict he made no reference to the “alternative” basis referred to above, he merely made a passing reference to the letter itself. 31.However, the fact that the judge did make a reference to what Mr Plowman described as “a third alternative basis” forms the foundation of the final complaint under the general heading of duplicity. That part of the written reasons which is relied on is as follows :
32.We are invited to interpret this as meaning that the judge convicted on the basis that the applicant might have had a genuine intention of studying for the PCEd at the time he applied for the leave and therefore he had no intent to defraud at the material time. The argument continues that using the leave to study law was not part of the charge. 33.There is no merit in this ground. The judge did not convict on this basis. The passage is no more than a description of the continuing dishonesty which flowed from his dishonest acts and intentions at the outset. There is no substance in the argument that this passage represents a “third” or different basis upon which the applicant was convicted and a basis upon which he had not been charged. Charge 4 (Ground 5) 34.By this ground, it is argued that the applicant’s deception did not cause a “benefit” to the applicant, neither did it cause a “prejudice” to the Education Department which are necessary ingredients of the offence of fraud under section 16A(3). 35.The “benefit” was described by the judge as follows :
36.We are satisfied that having one’s employment, pension rights and pay level preserved is a clear benefit and an attempt to argue to the contrary cannot be seriously made. 37.Likewise, the prejudice to the Education Department was clearly and correctly stated. The judge said :
38.There is no merit in this ground. 39.The application in regard to conviction is dismissed. APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL AGAINST SENTENCE 40.Mr Plowman urges the court to conclude that 12 months’ imprisonment on Charge 1 and 18 months’ imprisonment on Charges 4 to be served concurrently is manifestly excessive. He reminds us of the following factors :
41.He referred us also to the case of AG v. Tai Chin Wah [1994] 2 HKCLR 81 in which the court stated that a starting point of 18 months to 2 years was proper in case where an unqualified man forged academic qualifications which resulted in him being admitted as a solicitor. It was submitted that such a case was “far more serious” than the present case. 42.On the other hand, a carefully planned fraud on a government department involving deceit and forgery for entirely selfish ends must be viewed seriously. As a result of the deception, the legal profession of Hong Kong admitted a fraudster. In all the circumstances whilst we accept that he was afforded no leniency, we do not consider the overall sentence is manifestly excessive. 43.Accordingly, leave to appeal against sentence is refused and this application is dismissed.
Mr William Tam, Ag SADPP of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent Mr Gary Plowman, SC and Mr Derek Chan, instructed by Messrs Fung & Fung, for the Applicant |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under CACC 233/2006