Lau Kin Nam Carmel and Others v. The Incorporated Owners of Nin Fung Building, Homantin and Others
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LDBM 256/2006 IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION Building Management Application No. LDBM 256 OF 2006 ______________________ BETWEEN
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_______________ DECISION _______________ 1.This is an application made by Over And Above Limited (“O&A”) by way of inter partes summons dated 20 June 2007. O&A is not a party to these proceedings, but applies for the following orders in this application:-
2.The application is made pursuant to rule 11 of the Lands Tribunal Rules, Cap. 17, which reads as follows:-
3.Mr. Li, counsel for O&A, submits that rule 11 of the Lands Tribunal Rules is the same jurisdiction as those under Order 15, rule 6 of the Rules of the High Court. Order 15, rule 6(3) stipulates that:-
4.Thus, to entitle a person not a party to an action to intervene and to be joined as a party, the rule requires that the would-be intervenor should have some interest which is directly related or connected with the subject-matter of the action (see para. 15/6/8 of Hong Kong Civil Procedure). 5.However, from the wordings of the inter partes summons, it seemed that O&A wanted to join in as an intervenor for a limited purpose, which was to set aside the Order dated 2 November 2006 (“the Order”). On the first day of the hearing, Mr. Li submitted that it was not necessary for O&A to be joined as an applicant or a respondent, but simply as an intervenor. However, he had no objection for O&A to be named as a respondent. Mr. Li also indicated that once the Order was set aside, O&A would not be interested in the proceedings. I therefore queried whether the tribunal had jurisdiction to join a party who had no interest in the proceedings except for a limited purpose. Mr. Li submitted that the tribunal had such jurisdiction and would try to find more authorities on this issue. Nevertheless, at the adjourned hearing, Mr. Li confirmed that O&A would like to be joined as a respondent and would take part in the proceedings even after the Order was set aside. Thus, the issue on whether the tribunal has jurisdiction to add a party for a limited purpose is no longer a live one. 6.The Applicants are 24 out of 38 owners of Nin Fung Building, 65A-65B Waterloo Road, Kowloon, Hong Kong (“the Building”). O&A is also an owner of the Building. The 1st Respondent is the owners’ corporation of the Building. According to the Applicants, as stipulated in the Affirmation of Yuen Chan Wah filed on 1 November 2006, the 2nd to 5th Respondents are all and the only registered members of the 1st Respondent, that is, the 2nd to 5th Respondents are respectively the registered chairman, the registered vice chairman, the registered secretary and the registered treasurer of the 1st Respondent. 7.Paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the Order are in the following terms:-
8.The Applicants and the Respondents obtained the Order by way of a consent summons dated 31 October 2007. O&A’s objection is in relation to the purported consent made on behalf of the 1st Respondent. In the consent summons, the 2nd and 3rd Respondents signed on behalf of the 1st Respondent. O&A contends that the 2nd and 3rd Respondent had no authority to sign the consent summons on behalf of the 1st Respondent on the following grounds:-
9.O&A alleges that at an owners’ meeting on 8 March 2004, 9 persons were elected as members of the management committee (see minutes in pp. 55 to 57 of Bundle B). They included the 2nd to 5th Respondents and Madam Wu Chuk Kwan, the administratrix appointed under the Order. By letters dated 30 October 2004, 1 November 2004 and 5 November 2004 (see pp. 59, 60 and 62 of Bundle B), the 2nd to 4th Respondents respectively resigned from their posts as chairman, vice-chairman and secretary of the management committee. Their resignations were the subject matters raised in a notice issued to all the owners by the management committee on 10 November 2004 (see p. 58 of Bundle B). The resignations were also one of the businesses to be reported at the 3rd management committee meeting on 19 November 2004 (see p. 64 of Bundle B). O&A also discovered that the 2nd Respondent had ceased to be a registered owner of the Building since 31 December 2004 (see land search in p. 118 of Bundle B). 10.The Applicants do not seem to dispute O&A’s allegations, but contend that the signing by the 2nd to 5th Respondents on the consent summons in their respective capacities in the management committee must indicate that even they themselves were uncertain about the effectiveness of their earlier resignations, particularly when they are still recorded in the Land Registry as holding such posts. The Respondents were absent at the hearing and did not put forward any evidence to rebut O&A’s allegations. So there is nothing to contradict O&A. In the absence of contrary evidence, I have to accept O&A’s allegations that the 2nd to 4th Respondents had resigned from their respective posts in the management committee and the 2nd Respondent had ceased to be an owner of the Building when they signed on the consent summons. 11.I do not accept the Applicants’ submission that the 2nd to 4th Respondents were uncertain about the effectiveness of their resignations. There is no evidence to that effect and I do not think that they would have any doubt at all. By tendering their resignation letters, they must know that the effects were to resign from their posts. There is nothing to show that their resignations were not accepted. They must also know that the records in the Land Registry have not been updated. There is absolutely no reason for them to think that they are still holding the posts. In the case of the 2nd Respondent, he should also know that he was no longer an owner of the Building. It is inconceivable that the 2nd Respondent would still think that he had the authority to sign on behalf of the 1st Respondent. 12.Even assuming that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents had the doubt of the effectiveness of their resignations, it does not mean that they had the authority to sign on behalf of the 1st Respondent. There is no resolution or letter of authorization of the 1st Respondent or the management committee to authorize the 2nd and 3rd Respondents to sign the consent summons on behalf of the 1st Respondent. It is stipulated in paragraphs 4(2)(d) and (e) of Schedule 2 of the Building Management Ordinance, Cap. 344, that a member of a management committee shall cease to be a member of the committee if he resigns his office by notice in writing delivered to the secretary or ceases to be an owner. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents had clearly ceased to be members of the management committee and had no authority to act on behalf of the 1st Respondent at all. 13.The Applicants, however, argue that there is no evidence that the resignation letters were delivered to the secretary. From the contents of the resignation letter issued by the 2nd Respondent, it indicates that the letter was addressed to the 1st Respondent. The contents of the resignation letter issued by the 3rd Respondent, on the other hand, indicate that the letter was addressed to the secretary of the 1st Respondent and all the owners. In fact, in the resignation letter issued by the 4th Respondent, i.e. the secretary, it states clearly that the 4th Respondent had received the resignation letter of the 3rd Respondent. In the absence of any contradictory evidence, I think it is reasonable to assume that the letters, or at least the one issued by the 3rd Respondent, had been delivered to the secretary. After all, there was a management committee meeting on 19 November 2004 to report their resignations. Even if the 2nd Respondent’s resignation letter had not been delivered to the 4th Respondent, the 2nd Respondent had ceased to be an owner of the Building and could not be a member of the management committee in any event. Thus, I think O&A has at least established a prima facie case that the 2nd and 3rd Respondents no longer had any capacity or authority to sign the consent summons on behalf of the 1st Respondent. The Order was therefore irregularly obtained. 14.O&A, being an owner of the Building, clearly has an interest in the present proceedings and in having the Order set aside. The Order in fact gives the same reliefs as applied by the Applicants in the main application. O&A is clearly affected by the appointment of an administratrix replacing the existing management committee. There are still some other remaining members of the management committee. They could have appointed some other owners to fill the vacancies in the management committee (see paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 of the Building Management Ordinance, Cap. 344). O&A is entitled to contend that the management committee is not defunct and should not be dissolved at all. Even assuming that there would be no other owners willing to join the management committee, O&A is still entitled to challenge the invalid appointment of the administratrix. O&A is also affected by the costs order against the 1st Respondent, as the owners would ultimately be responsible for paying the costs. 15.The Applicants suggest that the 1st Respondent was joined as a nominal party, and it was not necessary for the 1st Respondent to give its consent to the consent summons and/or to be a signatory to the consent summons. There is however no indication that the 1st Respondent was joined simply as a nominal party. The 2nd and 3rd Respondents had in fact signed the consent summons purportedly on behalf of the 1st Respondent. The 1st Respondent was also ordered to pay costs to the Applicants by the Order. The Applicants’ submission in this regard is plainly without any foundation. 16.The Applicants also suggest that the appointment of the administritrix was legitimate and in the best interest of the owners, and that the appointment became necessary because of O&A’s own actions in High Court Action No. 10016A of 1995. I do not see how an order that was obtained irregularly could be regarded as legitimate and in the best interest of the owners. I also fail to see how O&A’s actions in another case could have any relevancy in the present application. I should just be concerned with whether the 1st Respondent had given its true and proper consent and whether the 2nd and 3rd Respondents had the capacity or authority to sign the consent summons. I therefore reject the Applicants’ submission in this regard. 17.Both the Applicants and O&A have raised many other points in the course of arguments, including whether the Order was obtained by ex parte application, whether there are other ways to set aside the Order instead of making the present application and the practical considerations if the Order was to be set aside. I do not find them to be relevant to the questions of whether O&A should be joined as a respondent or whether the Order should be set aside in the present application. Thus, I will not deal with these other points. Suffice to say is that whether there were other ways to deal with the Order or whether the setting aside would cause any practical problems should not form part of the considerations at all. As aforesaid, I am of the view that O&A has an interest in the proceedings and should be joined as a respondent. The Order was irregularly obtained and should be set aside. 18.As to the question of costs, I think it is very likely that the Applicants and O&A will argue the same. I will not therefore make a costs order nisi, but adjourn the question of costs to a date to be fixed by the listing officer with consultation of counsel’s diaries. 19.I therefore order as follows:-
Mr. Lawrence CHEUNG, instructed by M/S C.W. Yuen & Co., for the 1st to 24th Applicants The 1st to 5th Respondents absent Mr. C.Y. LI, instructed by M/S Burke, Fung & Li, for Over And Above Limited |