HKSAR v. Lee Wan Lung
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CACC 190/2006 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 190 OF 2006 (ON APPEAL FROM DCCC NO. 1209 OF 2005) ------------------------------ BETWEEN
------------------------------ Before : Hon Stuart-Moore VP, Stock JA and Yeung JA in Court Date of Hearing : 22 January 2008 Date of Judgment : 22 January 2008 ------------------------------ J U D G M E N T ------------------------------ Hon Stock JA (giving the judgment of the Court): 1.On 11 October 2007 we quashed this applicant’s conviction for indecent assault upon a young girl. We subsequently received written submissions on the question of a retrial. Reasons for Judgment were handed down thereafter on 26 November 2007 and we ordered a retrial. The applications before us relate to that order. 2.The notice of motion itself asks for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal and, as Mr McGowan on behalf of the applicant today recognized, there is no power in this Court in criminal cases to grant leave, and that application is accordingly dismissed. 3.There is then a document entitled: “Additional grounds for point of law for certification” which asks for a certificate and which we will treat as an application made in proper form for a certificate in the following terms:
4.One might have thought that the answer to that question was obvious and if so the only remaining issue is whether we have applied the principle correctly. That in truth is what is challenged by the applicant. 5.Be that as it may, the basis of the application appears to be founded on the assumptions:
6.These assumptions are incorrect. It is, we believe, perfectly clear, from the Reasons for Judgment that we addressed in some detail several areas of concern that had been placed before us, and came to a conclusion in respect of them, in particular:
7.Whether each ground on its own would have been such as to persuade us to allow the appeal in the absence of the others we cannot at this stage say and it is correct that the one that exercised us most was the last. But having expressly analysed and come to conclusions about the other grounds in our judgment, it is odd now to suggest that we did not address them when we came to consider the issue of a retrial. The issue that we did not address in the Reasons for Judgment was the effect of the medical evidence, and that is because it was not in the circumstances necessary to do so. The only evidence we had before us which cast doubt on the evidence at trial as to the transmission of gonorrhoea through sexual contact was fresh evidence filed for the purpose of the appeal which we had admitted de bene esse. In the course of oral argument, it was made clear that counsel for the respondent would wish, if the matter became determinative, to have the opportunity of cross-examining the deponent who lived in Australia. 8.It is noteworthy that in his written submissions on the question of retrial, counsel for the applicant addressed a number of these matters, that is to say, the various issues we dealt with in our judgment, in particular the unsatisfactory nature of the complainant’s evidence and the suggested improper influence in the interval between her two interviews. 9.To give a flavour of the submissions before us, it is contended in relation to the illogicality of some of the judge’s thought processes that: “Given the principle that any benefit of the doubt must be resolved in favour of an accused, the conviction was therefore unsafe in any event and thus no retrial should have been ordered.” This, with respect, is not logical for if the conviction was based upon an error by the judge, it does not follow that a retrial should not have been ordered. A similar point is made in relation to the judge’s failure to satisfy himself that the reliability of the second interview had not been contaminated. Again, this was a failure in approach by the judge. 10.If it be said that, despite the fact that at the appeal hearing counsel agreed to make submissions as to a retrial before we handed down our Reasons, we ought nonetheless, strictly speaking, to have afforded counsel the opportunity of making further representations about the retrial after they had received the Reasons for Judgment, the proposed certificate, as we read it, does not go to that point. But, in any event, in this particular case counsel did in his written submissions address points of concern about the reliability of the verdict other than the single point upon which it has been assumed we relied and, as our judgment makes clear, we in fact addressed in our Reasons the weight of those points, save for the medical one, although we in fact considered that one in deciding whether or not to order a retrial. 11.In the circumstances, we refuse the certificate sought.
Mr James McGowan instructed by M/s Peter W.K. Lo & Co, assigned by DLA for the Applicant Mr David Leung, SGC of the Department of Justice for the Respondent |
Further hearings and rulings under CACC 190/2006