Lawrence Louis Levy v. Attorney General

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

1987 No.8
(Civil)

BETWEEN:

Coram: Roberts, C.J., Fuad, J.A. & Power, J.

Date: 14th April, 1987.

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JUDGMENT

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Roberts,C.J. -

1. This is an application for conditional leave to appeal to the Privy Council from the judgment of this Court delivered on 6th March, dismissing the applicant's appeal against the refusal of Mortimer, J. to grant an order of certiorari.

2. Those proceedings were brought by the applicant to quash an order of 15th October, 1986 by a magistrate that the applicant be committed to prison to await surrender to the U.S.A. for trial on various offences.

3. It is contended for the applicant that there is an important question of law and public policy which should be determined by the Privy Council, namely, whether it was intended that the effect of R. v. Nielsen[1] and Government of the United States of America v. McCaffery[2] would be that a unique statutory offence in the requesting state, unknown in the requisitioning state, could be divided so as to permit the return of a. fugitive on one or more of its component parts, when the offence for which extradi tion was sought. for by the requesting state was not an offence known to the law of the requisitioning state.

4. This is, in effect, an attempt to revive the old argument about double criminality. Until Nielsen and McCaffery it was thought that it was necessary to establish that the offence for which extradition was sought was an offence under the law of both countries. This is now no longer the position.

5. It is clear from both Nielsen and McCaffery that what is in issue, as described by Lord Diplock in McCaffery is simply this -

“The right test, as stated by the Divisional Court in the Nielsen case was: whether the conduct of the accused, if it had been committed in England [for which I substitute Hong Kong] would have constituted a crime falling within one or more of the descriptions included in that list.”

6. The Magistrate approached it in that manner. He found that that condition was satisfied. On appeal, we agreed with him. We . do not think there is any seriously arguable point. In our view, the law is well settled in the manner described by Lord Diplock in the passage which I have quoted.

7. We are bound by Nielsen⁽¹⁾ and McCaffery⁽²⁾, both decision of the House of Lords. In our view, there is no a point of law of “great general or public importance” which requires to be further debated before the Privy Council and we refuse the application for leave to appeal.

Mr. G. Alderdice (Gordon D. Oldham & Co.) for Appellant

Mr. M.C. Blanchflower, Crown Counsel, for Respondent.

[1] [1984] 1 A.C. 606 (H.L.)

[2] [1984] 1 W.L.R. 867 (H.L.)