Chow Wun Sing Winston v. Yiu Chun Luk
Read the full judgment text of CACV 295/2006 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 6 March 2008 before Tang VP, Yuen JA, Barnes J.
Money Lenders Ordinance, Cap. 163 – whether plaintiff carrying on business of money lending – test is whether at the time of the loan, the business of the person was that of making loans, a question of fact (Conroy v Kenny [1999] 1 WLR 1340) – personal loan of $2.5 million secured by mortgage on Kowloon property – interest 15% p.a. (6% above best lending rate) – handling fee $25,000 and valuation fee $1,000 – five extensions of loan by subsequent Chinese agreements – defendant defaulted on interest from about October 2001 – loan arranged through assistant leasing manager of CSS Nominees – only two personal loans made by plaintiff (to defendant and to Mr Yeung Chak Lung) – fact that loans were well-documented and business-like did not establish money lending business where sophistication attributable to experienced assistant who applied practices of related finance companies – system and continuity a relevant but not determinative factor – proper preparation of documents, payment of fees, interest rate above best lending rate, and insurance arrangements not sufficient to displace trial judge's finding – plaintiff not carrying on business of money lending – appeal dismissed with costs.
Legal issues: Whether the plaintiff was a money lender within the meaning of the Money Lenders Ordinance, Cap. 163
Outcome: Appeal dismissed with costs.
Cited by 8 cases
|
CACV 295/2006 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 295 OF 2006 (ON APPEAL FROM HCMP NO. 2923 OF 2002) _______________
_______________
_______________ Before: Hon Tang VP, Yuen JA and Barnes J in Court Date of Hearing: 20 February 2008 Date of Judgment: 20 February 2008 Date of Reasons for Judgment: 6 March 2008 __________________________________ REASONS FOR JUDGMENT __________________________________ Hon Tang VP (giving the reasons for judgment of the Court): Introduction 1.The sole issue in this appeal is whether the plaintiff was a money lender within the meaning of the Money Lenders Ordinance, Cap. 163 (“the Ordinance”). If so, being unlicensed, the plaintiff’s claim, inter alia, for the repayment of the loan of $2.5 million would have to be dismissed unless the court is prepared to exercise its discretion under section 23 of the Ordinance in his favour. 2.Chu J, after the trial, decided that the plaintiff had not carried on a business of money lending. That being the case, she did not go on to consider how she might have exercised her discretion under section 23. The loan 3.By a Chinese agreement dated 26 April 1995 (“the 1st Agreement”), the plaintiff agreed to lend $2.5 million to the defendant to be secured by a mortgage on the property known as Flat D on 1st Floor and Car Parking Space No. 14 on Ground Floor, Hillsea Court, No. 10 Cornwall Street, Kowloon (“the Property”). 4.The loan was to be drawn down by 20 May 1995 and to be repaid within 24 months. The interest on the loan was fixed at 15% p.a. which appeared to be 6% above the best lending rate, to be paid on a monthly basis. The 1st Agreement also provided for the payment by the defendant of a handling fee of $25,000 and a $1,000 valuation fee. 5.On 8 May 1995, a mortgage of the Property was executed in favour of the plaintiff by the defendant at Messrs KC Tsang & Co (“KCT”). As at the material time the Property was mortgaged to the Hang Seng Bank, $837,221.47 was paid to the Hang Seng Bank to redeem the mortgage. After deducting the redemption money and the fees and charges of KCT, a sum of $1,640,113.53 was paid to the defendant. 6.The defendant had duly paid the interests, and the handling and valuation fees to the plaintiff. However, at the end of 24 months, the defendant did not repay the principal. By a Chinese agreement dated 8 May 1997 (“the 2nd Agreement”), the loan was extended for another 12 months on the same terms. Similar extensions were made in subsequent years by four Chinese agreements dated 8 May 1998, 8 May 1999, 8 May 2000 and 8 May 2001 respectively (“the 3rd to 6th Agreements” respectively). The last extension was up to 7 May 2002. The new agreements were on same terms as before except that under the 5th and the 6th Agreements, the annual interest rate was reduced to 5% above the best lending rate. 7.Since about October 2001, the defendant has defaulted in the payment of interests which eventually led to the claim by the plaintiff against the defendant. 8.The defendant is a university graduate and has some 30 to 40 years of experience in business. It appeared that he was in the business of the import and export of toys as well as owning a factory in the Mainland. It is the defendant’s case that in about April 1995, he was in need of capital for his factory in the Mainland. He wanted a second charge on the Property with the Hang Seng Bank, but it was suggested to him that he should approach Chow Sang Sang Finance Limited (“CSS Finance”). In that connection, he met a Mr Lee Yik Moon, Alex (“Alex Lee”). Alex Lee was and is the assistant leasing manager of Chow Sang Sang Nominees Limited (“CSS Nominees”). 9.The plaintiff is a director of Chow Sang Sang (“CSS”) Holdings International Limited (“CSS Holdings”), which is a listed company and has a number of subsidiaries. He is also a director of CSS Finance and CSS Nominees, which are companies within the CSS group of companies. The plaintiff’s father and uncle are also the directors of these companies. 10.Between 1988 and 2001, CSS Finance held a money lender licence. According to the plaintiff, the borrowers were mainly purchasers of properties developed by the CSS group. Also according to the plaintiff, since about 1993, it had scaled down its lending business and very few new loans were made. 11.CSS Nominees was engaged in the sale and purchase, management and leasing of properties for the CSS group. It also provided services to the directors of the group, including the plaintiff and his father and uncle and their companies. 12.The plaintiff’s uncle is also a shareholder and director of a company called Happy Family Limited (“Happy Family”), which was not a company within the CSS group. Between 1994 and 2003, Happy Family held a money lender licence. It did not actively solicit customers, but only took on referral customers, for example, borrowers referred by solicitors firms. 13.This is what the learned judge said in her judgment:
14.The learned judge was satisfied that the plaintiff and Alex Lee were reliable witnesses and that their evidence were to be preferred to that of the defendant. In particular, she said:
15.In considering the defence under the Ordinance, the learned judge correctly pointed out that the test for determining whether a person was carrying on the business of a money lender was whether at the time of the loan, the business of the person was that of making loans, which is a question of fact to be decided by reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. Conroy v Kenny [1999] 1WLR 1340. 16.Then she correctly pointed out that the fact that there was a certain degree of system and continuity was a relevant factor but not determinative. 17.The learned judge went on to say:
18.She then concluded that the facts were consistent with an individual making an investment by lending at remunerative interest rates and with proper security. She concluded that the defendant has failed to prove by direct or indirect evidence that the business of the plaintiff at the material time was making loans. 19.Mr Roy Lau, for the defendant, acknowledged that unless the learned judge’s conclusion could be shown to be clearly wrong, we are not entitled to interfere. 20.Mr Lau submitted that the learned judge was wrong in her assessment of the evidence. In particular that she had paid no or insufficient regard to the fact that handling fees and the valuation fees had been paid. Nor that the interest rate was 6% above the best lending rate, and there was an insurance policy taken out with nominated insurers to cover the security. Mr Lau also emphasised the business-like administration of the loan both initially and ongoing. 21.We accept that the plaintiff was business-like in his approach towards the loan. That is a relevant factor in deciding whether or not he was carrying on a business money lending. But being business-like is not in itself conclusive evidence that he was carrying on a business. Nor can we agree that the learned judge had given no or insufficient consideration to the handling and valuation fees. It is clear from the repeated references to the payments of such fees in the judgment that the learned judge could not have overlooked them. Nor do we agree the fact that she had not expressly referred to them when dealing with the money lending defence meant that she had failed to have regard to them. 22.Although the fact that the plaintiff only made two loans (to the defendant and Mr Yeung) does not mean that he could not have been carrying on a business of money lending, the small number of loans is consistent with his evidence, which was accepted by the learned judge, that he was not carrying on a business of money lending. Indeed, given the plaintiff’s background, if he was running a business of money lending on the side, it is surprising that he should have made so few loans. 23.In all the circumstances, we were clearly satisfied that there was no basis upon which we could interfere with the decision of the learned judge. For that reason, we dismissed the appeal with costs.
Mr. Roy Lau, instructed by Messrs Tang & Lee, for the Defendant. Mr. Walker Sham, instructed by Messrs Robertsons, for the Plaintiff. |
Other judgments that cite this case