Ooi Yen Khim v. The Immigration Tribunal and Another
Read the full judgment text of HCAL 133/2006 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 6 March 2008.
1. Ms. Ooi entered Hong Kong on a Malaysian passport in March 2003. She was permitted to stay for 90 days. While here during that period, she married Mr. Ng, a Hong Kong permanent resident. She gave birth to a child by Mr. Ng in November 2003. In January 2004 Ms. Ooi’s application to remain in Hong Kong as a dependent of her husband was approved, subject to a limit of stay of one year. A Hong Kong Identity Card was issued to her.
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HCAL 133/2006 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 133 OF 2006 _____________
_____________ Before: Hon Reyes J in Court Date of Hearing: 6 March 2008 Date of Judgment: 6 March 2008 _______________ J U D G M E N T _______________ INTRODUCTION 1.Ms. Ooi entered Hong Kong on a Malaysian passport in March 2003. She was permitted to stay for 90 days. While here during that period, she married Mr. Ng, a Hong Kong permanent resident. She gave birth to a child by Mr. Ng in November 2003. In January 2004 Ms. Ooi’s application to remain in Hong Kong as a dependent of her husband was approved, subject to a limit of stay of one year. A Hong Kong Identity Card was issued to her. 2.In June 2004 Ms. Ooi was arrested on suspicion of possessing and using a forged Malaysian passport, that is, the very passport which she had used to enter Hong Kong in March 2003. The Immigration Department alleged that Ms. Ooi was in actuality Ms. Zhu Fang, a PRC national. Ms. Ooi’s Malaysian passport and Hong Kong Identity Card were confiscated. 3.Ms. Ooi was interviewed several times under caution, but opted to remain silent on all occasions. She was released on bail shortly after her arrest and in November 2004 was unconditionally released from bail. 4.In August 2006 the Director of Immigration made a Removal Order against Ms. Ooi, requiring her to leave Hong Kong. Ms. Ooi appealed to the Immigration Tribunal against the Removal Order. In her Notice of Appeal, Ms. Ooi submitted that “the grounds of removal as stated in the Removal Order [were] not supported by concrete evidence”. In September 2006 Ms. Ooi was told that the Tribunal had dismissed her appeal without a hearing. The reason given was that the Tribunal was “satisfied that the facts or matters on which [Ms. Ooi was] seeking to rely [were] not matters which would entitle [Ms. Ooi] to succeed in the appeal”. 5.By this application, Ms. Ooi seeks judicial review of the Tribunal’s rejection of her appeal. She says that the Tribunal’s decision was Wednesbury unreasonable, procedurally unfair, and outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under the Immigration Ordinance (Cap.115) (IO). II. BACKGROUND 6.The IO provides as follows:-
7.In coming to its decision, the Tribunal had before it the following documents:-
8.The Summary (with paragraph numbers in square brackets inserted for easier reference) stated the following:-
9.Ms. Ooi’s Notice and Grounds of Appeal essentially denied the Director’s allegations, stating that the “grounds of removal ... are not supported by concrete evidence”. 10.Since Ms. Ooi’s judicial review application, the Director has provided additional information in support of the Removal Order. In particular, the Director has adduced affirmation evidence to the following effect:-
11.The additional details just summarised in the preceding paragraph had not been placed before the Tribunal. III. DISCUSSION A. Ms. Ooi’s case 12.Mr. James Collins (appearing for Ms. Ooi) accepts that the sole basis for Ms. Ooi’s appeal against the removal order is IO s.53A(1)(b). He also accepts that, as far as IO s.53D(1) is concerned, Ms. Ooi neither enjoys the right of abode nor the right to land in Hong Kong. 13.But Mr. Collins stresses that, before it could dismiss her appeal, the Tribunal had to satisfy itself that (ignoring the Removal Order) Ms. Ooi did not have the permission of the Director to remain in Hong Kong. Acting reasonably, the Tribunal (Mr. Collins argues) could not have been satisfied of this. 14.On the material before it, the only basis (Mr. Collins says) upon which the Tribunal could have come to any conclusion would have been the Summary. But (Mr. Collins comments) the Summary consists of bare assertion with references to information received from Malaysian and Mainland authorities. The primary evidence upon which those assertions were based were not exhibited to the Summary and were never produced to Ms. Ooi or her solicitors. 15.As a result, according to Mr. Collins, there was no cogent material upon which the Tribunal could have rejected Ms. Ooi’s appeal. 16.Further, Mr. Collins contends that Ms. Ooi was denied the chance to deal adequately with the allegations levied against her by the Director. Ms. Ooi could not herself investigate or test the evidence upon which the Director was inviting the Tribunal to come to a decision. 17.The foregoing occurred (Mr. Collins says) despite the fact that the burden of proof rested upon the Director and, the case involving the liberty of a person, such burden had to be discharged on a higher degree than a mere balance of probability. 18.Mr. Collins criticises the Tribunal for giving inadequate reasons. Even if the Tribunal was not required to do more than give outline reasons, at the very least it had to (but did not) explain why it came to the decision which it did on the scant material before it. 19.Accordingly, Mr. Collins’ submissions may be summarised as follows:-
B. Evaluation of Ms. Ooi’s case 20.In my view, Mr. Collins is rightly critical of the procedure followed by the Tribunal. 21.The crux of the case against Ms. Ooi is that she entered Hong Kong under a false Malaysian passport. If that is right, Ms. Ooi obtained leave to stay here by fraud. Any leave she obtained would have been vitiated by such fraud and she accordingly has no right to remain here. 22.But the Summary relies on bare assertion in making out its case that Ms. Ooi’s Malaysian passport was a forged one and that Ms. Ooi is really none other than Ms. Zhu. 23.Let me be specific by examining the Summary more closely:-
24.Since the Summary only alludes to (but neither exhibits nor particularises) the “information” upon which the Director drew his conclusions, there was no material before the Tribunal upon which it could have evaluated such conclusions. The Tribunal could not have decided one way or the other whether the Director was right. 25.To have determined the matter in favour of the Director on the Summary alone was tantamount to rubber-stamping the Director’s assertion that the underlying evidence supported his conclusion. There could have been no independent assessment by the Tribunal of the underlying evidence. That is contrary to the requirement in s.53D(1) that the Tribunal make its own assessment of the facts in order to determine whether an appellant does or does not have permission to remain in Hong Kong. See Li Fu Shan v. Director of Immigration [2002] 4 HKC 284 (Hartmann J) (at §59). 26.Ms. Ooi was similarly not provided with the evidence underlying the Director’s conclusions in the Summary. All she had was the Summary. 27.She was not in a position to comment on the unparticularised “information” mentioned in the Summary. She could not (say) make submissions on whether such evidence was hearsay, whether any weight such be put on the material, or simply whether such material even taken at face value supported any conclusion being asserted. 28.It is true that she made no representations to the Immigration Department. But I am unable to infer much from her silence. This is because I doubt whether, the underlying “information” not having been provided to her, she was in a position to make any meaningful representations. 29.The denial of the underlying material was in my view procedurally wrong. It was unfair and so a denial of natural justice. 30.That the Tribunal decided to dismiss Ms. Ooi’s appeal on the basis of the Summary meant in effect that it accepted the Director’s bare assertion. No reasons (even outline reasons) are given to suggest otherwise. All that is said is that Ms. Ooi’s Notice and Grounds of Appeal would not entitle her to succeed. 31.That, in my view, was equivalent to placing the burden of proof on Ms. Ooi. In practical terms the Tribunal required the Director to do no more than assert, while it presumably expected Ms. Ooi to rebut the Director’s conclusions. 32.That seems to me to have been procedurally wrong. It is contrary to principle. Where the Director has originally granted permission to stay in Hong Kong on the basis of a document initially accepted as lawful, the burden is on the Director to show that the document was in fact false. See Li Fu Shan (at §§70-71), citing Re Chen Huan Qiong [1994] 2 HKLR 394 (Kaplan J) (at 397). 33.Mr. Collins observes that the Tribunal’s reasons simply track the wording of IO s.53C. It may conceivably be that, where self-evidently the grounds of appeal on which a party relies are woefully inadequate, such a terse statement of reasons may suffice. But that is not the situation here. There was no adequate substantive material before the Tribunal on which it could evaluate the rights or wrongs of the Director’s decision to remove Ms. Ooi. In such case, merely repeating the wording of s.53C cannot have been enough to discharge the Tribunal’s duty to outline its reasons. 34.Mr. Jin Pao (appearing for the Director) argues that there is ample evidence to support the Tribunal’s conclusion. For this proposition, he relies heavily on the additional details adduced through the affirmation evidence filed by the Director in this judicial review. 35.But the additional details were not before the Tribunal. The Tribunal had no opportunity to evaluate the same, much less come to any view on their cogency for or against the Removal Order. 36.Mr. Pao criticises Ms. Ooi for raising a “highly vague and non-specific ground of appeal” when she complained of the Removal Order not being “supported by concrete evidence”. 37.But, reading Ms. Ooi’s Notice and Grounds of Appeal as a whole, it would have been apparent that she was denying the entirety of the Director’s adverse conclusions. Her ground of appeal was complaining about the fact that she had not been provided with the underlying evidence. 38.In principle, such underlying material should have been furnished to her and the Tribunal: to her, for any comment; to the Tribunal, to enable it to form an independent conclusion. 39.Lastly, Mr. Pao observes that Ms. Ooi has so far not mounted any positive case. Mr. Pao suggests that, accordingly, I should not set aside the Tribunal’s dismissal of Ms. Ooi’s appeal. I ought instead (Mr. Pao says) uphold the rejection in the exercise of my discretion. This is because (Mr. Pao submits) the additional details now provided are so overwhelmingly against Ms. Ooi that any Tribunal can only conclude that the Removal Order was justified. 40.I am not persuaded. 41.It is for the Tribunal to form its own view. I am not in position to substitute my opinion for that of the Tribunal. 42.Let me given an example to illustrate why. 43.Some of the case against Ms. Ooi depends on a comparison among photos. One must contrast photos of the Ms. Ooi who applied for the Malaysian passport with photos of the present Ms. Ooi. One must likewise consider contemporary photos of the present Ms. Ooi and photos of Ms. Zhu. 44.The photos would have been taken over different times. People change in appearance over time. One would inevitably need guidance, in the form of submissions as to what facial features are common or different in the photos, in order to form any opinion. That exercise is not straightforward. It may be time-consuming. It is not an appropriate investigation to conduct in the context of a judicial review. IV. CONCLUSION 45.The Tribunal’s decision against Ms. Ooi’s appeal is quashed. Ms. Ooi’s appeal is to be remitted to the Tribunal for re-consideration. 46.The parties agree that it would be premature in these proceedings to quash the Removal Order. It is for the Tribunal to decide whether or not the Removal Order is justified. 47.I shall hear the parties on costs and any consequential orders.
Mr. James Collins, instructed by Messrs Henry Wan & Yeung, for the Applicant 1st Respondent in person - absent Mr. Jin Pao and Mr. Casper Chu, SGC, instructed by the Department of Justice, for the 2nd Respondent |
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