Chow Yat Tim v. Tang Hing Keung and Others

Case No.HCCW 396/2007
Court
High Court CFI
Date06 Mar 2008
Judge
Case Document
100%

HCCW 396/2007

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

COMPANIES (WINDING-UP) NO. 396 OF 2007

____________

 

IN THE MATTER of HING MING GONDOLA (HK) COMPANY LIMITED

and

IN THE MATTER of the Companies Ordinance, Chapter 32

____________

BETWEEN
  CHOW YAT TIM (周日添) Petitioner
  and  
  TANG HING KEUNG (鄧興強)   1st Respondent
   HING MING GONDOLA (HK) COMPANY LIMITED
(興銘吊船(香港)有限公司)
 2nd Respondent
   AU FUNG YEE (區鳳怡) 3rd Respondent 

____________

Before: Hon Kwan J in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 6 March 2008

Date of Decision: 6 March 2008

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

1.This is an application by Tang Hing Keung, the 1st respondent herein, to strike out the prayer for winding up in the amended petition presented by Chow Yat Tim against Hing Ming Gondola (HK) Company Limited (“the Company”), on the ground that there is no reasonable cause of action to justify a winding-up order under section 177(1)(f) of the Companies Ordinance, Cap. 32 and that the petitioner is acting unreasonably in insisting on winding up the Company instead of restricting himself to alternative available remedy under section 168A for his shares to be bought out by the Company or the 1st respondent.

2.The question is whether at this stage, assuming that the petitioner proves all the facts in the amended petition, there is or is not a real possibility of the court making a winding-up order on the amended petition.  If it is clear there is no real possibility of that happening, the winding-up prayer should be struck out as winding up is a remedy of last resort and it would be unfair and unjust to have the threat of winding up hanging indefinitely over the head of the Company.

3.The power to strike out is to be exercised in a plain and obvious case, so the court should always act with circumspection.  I bear in mind that the onus is on the 1st respondent to establish that the petitioner is acting unreasonably to have the Company wound up instead of pursuing his remedy under section 168A.

4.I first set out the relevant background matters.

5.The Company was incorporated on 22 September 1997 with a nominal capital of $1 million divided into 1 million shares of $1 each, all of which were issued and paid up.  The petitioner was issued 100,000 shares, the 1st respondent 800,000 and the 3rd respondent who is the 1st respondent’s wife 100,000.  All three were appointed directors of the Company.

6.The Company is engaged in the business of hiring out, buying and selling gondolas and lifting equipment.  The petitioner was employed as a supervisor in the Company, the 1st respondent was and is its managing director.  It is alleged by the petitioner that the Company was a quasi partnership between him and the 1st respondent, and owing to the matters complained of in the petition, there has been complete loss of trust and confidence between them.

7.The complaints relied on by the petitioner to found his petition to wind up the Company and for relief under section 168A are the same and may be summarised as follows:

  (1) The relationship of the petitioner and the 1st respondent deteriorated when the 1st respondent accused the petitioner’s younger brother of stealing money from the Beijing operation and conducted an investigation which did not reveal any impropriety.
  (2) The petitioner’s salary was reduced to $17,000 a month in 2003, although it was subsequently increased.  The 3rd respondent, who did not work in the Company at all was paid $25,000 a month since 2001 or 2002.
  (3) The 1st respondent had on several occasions issued cheques of the Company for substantial sums to his personal account and the personal account of his relative.
  (4) The petitioner was dismissed as a supervisor in September 2006.
  (5) The petitioner resigned as a director in October 2006 when it was apparent that he would be out-voted in a resolution proposed to dismiss him as a director.
  (6) The share capital of the Company was increased by $5 million in May 2007 and as the petitioner did not subscribe for new shares in the value of $500,000, his shareholding was diluted from 10% to 1.66%.
  (7) There were unusual features in the audited accounts being substantial advances made by the 1st respondent to the Company in 2000 and 2001; the disposal of fixed assets at a substantial loss in 2002, and the substantial increase of administrative expenses in 2001.
  (8) The Company brought an action against the petitioner to recover alleged loans of $2 million made in 2001 and the petitioner has disputed liability.
  (9) The petitioner offered to sell his shares to the 1st respondent at a value to be assessed without discount for minority shareholding in July 2007 and the 1st respondent made no response to this offer before the presentation of the petition in August 2007.

8.Mr Dawes submitted for the 1st respondent that it is plain and obvious there is no real prospect that a winding-up order would be made for these reasons.

9.Firstly, it is common ground that the Company is solvent and doing very profitable business.  I have before me the audited accounts for the years ended March 2001 to March 2007 and the management accounts from April to August 2007.

10.According to the audited accounts for the year ended March 2007, the turnover was $29 million, gross profit was $15.9 million and net assets were $19 million.  In the management accounts from April to August 2007, the Company recorded fixed assets of $11.7 million, current assets of over $18 million and retained profits carried forward of $22.3 million.

11.In my view, it is not relevant that no dividends were declared.

12.The Company was established for 10 years and has reputation in the field of gondola rental, it has been providing gondola services to major contractors both local and overseas.  The total contract sums for large scale projects in the next 12 months amounted to $14.6 million.

13.The Company is now engaged in temporary gondola business and has been exploring opportunities to go into permanent gondola business which requires building maintenance units.

14.It is clearly not in the interest of any of its members to wind up the Company.

15.Secondly, the court has wide discretion under section 168A to order the 1st respondent or the Company to buy out the petitioner’s shares and this would provide a sufficient remedy to the petitioner.

16.There is no suggestion that the 1st respondent or the Company is not financially capable of buying out the petitioner at a fair value of his shares on a proper valuation.  The fact that the 1st respondent did not make any response to the petitioner’s offer to be bought out prior to the presentation of the petition is immaterial, nor is it relevant that, to date, the 1st respondent has not come up with an offer to the petitioner’s satisfaction.

17.Thirdly, there is an innocent shareholder who would be affected if the Company were to be wound up.  The 3rd respondent holds 10% of the shares prior to the increase of share capital in her own right.

18.In my view, the above are cogent reasons.

19.It was asserted by Mr Ho for the petitioner that winding up is the primary or preferred relief for the petitioner.  However, no explanation was given as to why the relief of winding up is preferred.  Nor can I see what prejudice would be suffered by the petitioner if he is confined to his remedy under section 168A.

20.Mr Ho further submitted that the question whether the petitioner has acted unreasonably in insisting on winding-up relief should only be considered at the trial.  I disagree.  This is wholly contrary to well established authorities.

21.Lastly, Mr Ho submitted that as allegations were made by the petitioner against the 1st respondent that the 1st respondent had issued cheques to his personal account and the personal account of his relative, these alleged irregularities might not be taken into account properly in a share valuation exercise.  Again, I beg to disagree.

22.In my judgment, this is a clear case that there is no real prospect a winding-up order would be made on the petition.  I strike out the prayer for winding up with costs to the 1st respondent in any event.

  (S Kwan)
Judge of the Court of First Instance
High Court

Mr B K Ho, instructed by Messrs Cheung Fung & Hui, for the Petitioner

Mr Victor Dawes, instructed by Messrs Johnny K K Leung & Co, for the 1st Respondent