HKSAR v. Easy Finder Ltd and Others
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HCMA 1125/2007 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MAGISTRACY APPEAL NO. 1125 OF 2007 (ON APPEAL FROM KTCC 7416/2006) ----------------------
---------------------- Before: Deputy High Court Judge Line in Court Date of Hearing: 29 April 2008 Date of Judgment: 29 April 2008 Date of Reasons for Judgment: 2 May 2008 ---------------------------------------------------- REASONS FOR JUDGMENT --------------------------------------------------- 1.This is an appeal by way of case stated against the dismissal, by Gary Lam Esq. Magistrate, of an information laid against the three respondents under section 3 (2) of the Prevention of Child Pornography Ordinance, Cap 579. 2.His material findings of fact were these:
3.The following questions were posed for this Court to answer:
4.In order for this appeal to succeed the appellant had to establish before me that no reasonable magistrate could have come to the conclusion that the relevant images were not child pornography as defined in the Prevention of Child Pornography Ordinance. Whilst there was no formal abandonment, senior counsel for the appellant in court made the concession that there was no real prospect of doing so and that they were not seeking to overturn the finding of the magistrate in this regard. 5.In my judgment that concession was realistic. The young girl pop singer in the images at all times wore a top of such a nature and extent that no reasonable person could say her breasts were depicted. However, the disposal of this appeal does not depend on my assessment of the images and I emphasise that it is to be dismissed because the side that brought the appeal does not now seek to overturn the decision of the magistrate who decided that the images were not child pornography. 6.The definition of child pornography is contained in section 2 of the Ordinance, the relevant part of which required the appellant to prove “a visual depiction that depicts, in a sexual manner or context, the genitals or anal region of a person or the breast of a female person”. 7.The magistrate found that the images in question here simply did not depict the female breast in a sexual manner or context. In my opinion, there was never any reasonable prospect of upsetting that finding. 8.Why this appeal was launched is therefore something of a mystery. It seems that the point of the proceedings is now for me to give an opinion on matters that cannot affect the result. It is not the function of the courts to resolve matters that are academic in the sense that they are non determinative. 9.I have been tempted merely to dismiss the appeal, giving no more reasons than I have thus far set out. It is a matter of regret that the respondents have faced the continued accusation of being child pornographers for a further year since their acquittal when they were no such thing. However, I am told that they would welcome the Court’s opinion on the issues that the appellant has raised. It is thus that I will do as I have been invited, though fully conscious of the limitations of the obiter dicta of a deputy judge. To do otherwise would be to add, if not insult, then disappointment to injury. 10.The first matter upon which the opinion of the court was sought was that reflected in the first question posed in the Case Stated, namely whether “the test in R v. Sharpe (2001) 194 D.L.R. was the proper test to be applied in interpreting the term “child pornography” for the purpose of the Prevention of Child Pornography Ordinance”. 11.Of course the test is an objective one when it comes to considering the nature of the material published. It is no defence for those accused to say that they believed the material was not child pornography if in fact viewed objectively it was. No such defence was ever suggested here. Basic principles provide for this and I can see no reason for this court to give its opinion on a test set out in a Canadian case dealing with differently worded legislation. 12.I am happy to restate what everybody already knew, namely that the relevant test is an objective one. 13.The second matter was whether or not the appellant had to establish the depiction of a female breast that was exposed or partially exposed. 14.In my judgment there can be no hard and fast rule concerning such a matter. It is a question of fact in each case whether or not a female breast has been visually depicted. It could be possible to depict a female breast in a sexual manner or context even though it was not partially or wholly exposed. 15.For instance, an image of the torso of a girl child in an overtly sexual context could be found to include a visual depiction of a female breast by having the outline of a breast drawn over some scanty, though opaque, covering of her actual breast. Or the covering of the breast, whether created by photo-manipulation or physical material when the photograph was taken, though opaque, could reveal so much of what lay beneath that common sense would tell an observer that the female breast was being visually depicted. To depict something is to portray or represent it. Depiction does not necessarily involve photographic reproduction of the thing, or part of the thing, in question. 16.It was said that the publishing industry would welcome guidance in this regard and that the position I adopted in argument would do little to help. Common sense tells one that images where the girl has her top on will not be found to depict the female breast when her breasts are thereby not visibly represented, but if the photograph is taken in such a way or if something is subsequently done to it that depicts a female breast, even though the actual breast is not exposed, wholly or in part, then, if done in a sexual manner or context, there will be a risk of prosecution. I would have thought that the circumstances which would give rise to a reasonable person finding a depiction of a female breast in the absence of some actual exposure of it would be such that any sensible editor would recognize them and beware. 17.The third question was whether or not evidence of the production process of a questioned image was admissible in evidence, the appellant’s contention being that it was totally irrelevant and so inadmissible. 18.Relevance depends upon what is in issue so there can be no blanket answer to this question. In this case there was an issue as to what could be seen in some of the images. The fact that evidence of the production process established that one could not have seen any part of the girl’s breast was capable of providing help in deciding that issue. Of course, it is no defence to establish that the girl’s breast was not to be seen in the image if the image did in fact depict her breast by making it appear to be so. It is appearance and not reality which matters when considering the nature of the image. The point is that reality is capable of being relevant to establishing the appearance. 19.The evidence of the fact that the girl’s mother was present throughout is capable of being relevant to the question of sexual context, as it could put the observer’s mind at rest as to any sexual impropriety actually occurring when the photographs were taken, dispelling any argument that the context of the taking of the image had to be sexual. 20.However, the relevance is truly marginal in both instances. 21.The fourth question concerned whether or not the accompanying text was relevant when judging if the image met the statutory definition. It was common ground that it was. That must be the case, especially when the court has to consider the manner and context of the depiction. 22.The matter gave rise to a related question as to whether the text, in order to be relevant and so fall to be considered, had to be in the photographic frame, or closely adjacent to it, or further away in the text of an article. In my opinion, all the text here is relevant though obviously where it occurs in relation to the image will have a very significant effect upon the impact that it has upon the image in question. The position or location of the text goes to weight and not admissibility. 23.Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed. 24.There will be an order that the appellant pay the costs of the respondents to be taxed if not agreed. I would ask the taxing Master to bear in mind that it is the view of this court that this was a case that was never going to succeed and accordingly the taxation should err in favour of the respondents such that they not end up out of pocket. I would only add that the appellant’s resistance to an order for costs being made in favour of the respondents, when they had not contested the result, on the basis that their views on the issues which were not determinative of the appeal largely coincided with those of the court, was never going to succeed.
Mr Robert S K Lee, SC, Senior Assistant Director of Public Prosecutions and Ms Agnes Chan, SGC, of the Department of Justice, for the Appellant Ms A P Campbell-Moffat and Ms B Bryce-Borthwick, instructed by Haldanes, for the Respondents |