Cheung Mei Yin v. Postmaster General
Read the full judgment text of CACV 209/2007 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 22 July 2008.
1. This is an appeal from a judgment of A Cheung J given on 5 July this year. In that judgment, the judge refused to grant leave to bring judicial review proceedings which had been sought by the applicant by a notice dated 14 June 2007. The applicant seeks to challenge the decision of the Postmaster General which was made on 23 May 1997 or, it is said, alternatively on 6 June 1997, by which the Postmaster General indicated that stamps which bore the head of Queen Elizabeth II could be exchange
Cites 1 case
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CACV 209/2007 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 209 OF 2007 (ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 66 OF 2007) ----------------------
---------------------- Before: Hon Rogers VP and Le Pichon JA in Court Date of Hearing: 22 July 2008 Date of Judgment: 22 July 2008
Hon Rogers VP: 1.This is an appeal from a judgment of A Cheung J given on 5 July this year. In that judgment, the judge refused to grant leave to bring judicial review proceedings which had been sought by the applicant by a notice dated 14 June 2007. The applicant seeks to challenge the decision of the Postmaster General which was made on 23 May 1997 or, it is said, alternatively on 6 June 1997, by which the Postmaster General indicated that stamps which bore the head of Queen Elizabeth II could be exchanged during July of 1997 but thereafter would be unusable. 2.There are two points which clearly arise in this case. The first is that the decision which is sought to be impugned was more than 11 years prior to today and approximately 10 years prior to the date of this application, and the second is as to the merits of the application. The short facts of the case are that the applicant had bought some stamps in late 1996 or early 1997. Unbeknown to her, it had been previously announced on 23 May 1996 that postage stamps bearing the Queen’s portrait and the royal cypher would no longer be valid for postage as from 1 July 1997. 3.It appears that the applicant still has some $200 worth of stamps in her possession but has not had cause to use those up until recently. When she found that she could not use them, she wrote to the Postmaster General asking that the stamps be exchanged. On behalf of the Postmaster General, a letter was sent back pointing out that not only had notice been given in 1996 but that notice was widely publicised in the media and the letter attached copies of some of the notices which had appeared and reports which had appeared in the press. The letter went on:
and a copy of that notice was enclosed with the letter. The relevant part of that notice reads:
4.I have to say, given the circumstances and the change of sovereignty, that it is my considered view that that decision of the Postmaster General was wholly proper and cannot be criticised in any way. I do not consider that there are any grounds for criticising the Postmaster General’s conduct as being unreasonable. But, be that as it may, the first problem which is faced by the applicant is the question of delay and it appears to be simply impossible for this court to grant leave to bring judicial review proceedings after such a lengthy period has expired from the date of that decision. 5.The applicant seeks to proffer the excuse that she was unaware of the decision until very recently. But it seems to me that the decision of the Postmaster General not to accept stamps bearing the royal cypher and so forth was wholly to be anticipated on the change of sovereignty and it would be most surprising if letters were allowed to be posted in Hong Kong which bore the royal portrait or the royal cypher or the crown after 30 June 1997 and it cannot have been supposed that that would be allowed to happen. 6.Mr Lam, who has appeared on behalf of the applicant in this court and has said everything that he could possibly say, seeks to rely on section 21K(6) of the High Court Ordinance, Cap. 4, and that reads:
7.That section on its own, of course, permits the court to extend time but it has to be read in the context of what is considered a reasonable time and reference can also be made to Order 54, rule (4)(1) which reads that:
8.It is in that timeframe that one must read section 21K(6) because that is the way it has always been interpreted. In my view, it would clearly be detrimental to good administration to allow this matter to be aired so long after the decision were taken. There must, in short, be some limit to the court’s power to extend time for bringing judicial review. 9.The only other matter which I would mention is that it was mentioned in the skeleton argument that this appeal was being heard by two judges. Mr Lam has indicated that he is not pursuing any point that it should have been heard by three judges but I make it quite clear that, in my view, an appeal in respect of a refusal to allow the bringing of judicial review proceedings is an interlocutory appeal and not a final appeal and, therefore, may be heard by two judges. 10.This appeal must therefore be dismissed. Hon Le Pichon JA: 11.I agree.
Mr Andy Lam, instructed by Messrs Ivan Tang & Co., for the Applicant/Appellant |
Cases cited in this judgment
Further hearings and rulings under CACV 209/2007