HKSAR v. Cao Yue Hui
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CACC000065/1999 CACC65/99 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 65 OF 1999 (ON APPEAL FROM DCCC 1266 OF 1998)
------------------------------- Coram: Hon. Stuart-Moore, V.-P., Mayo & Leong, JJ.A. Date of Hearing: 23 June 1999 Date of Delivery of Judgment: 23 June 1999 ---------------------- J U D G M E N T ---------------------- Stuart-Moore, V.-P. (giving the judgment of the Court): 1. On 20th January 1999, following a trial in the District Court before Judge Wright, the Applicant was convicted on a charge of furnishing false information, contrary to section 19(1)(b) of the Theft Ordinance, Cap. 210. The Applicant was sentenced on the same day to 15 months' imprisonment and he now seeks leave to appeal against conviction. He has indicated that he does not wish to pursue his application relating to sentence and this application we have now dismissed. 2. The material particulars of the charge read as follows:
3. The long delay before trial was due to the fact that the Applicant, following his arrest on 8th April 1993, and interviews in May and June 1993, left Hong Kong for Mainland China on 24th June 1993. He was not re-arrested until 11th November 1998, almost 51/2 years later, when he tried to return to Hong Kong from Macau. 4. The judge in a most thorough review of the evidence, set out a summary of the prosecution's case in his Reasons for Verdict, much of which was undisputed. The majority of the evidence came from documentary evidence and from the two witnesses who gave oral evidence. These were Kim Won Sok (PW1) and Lai Lee (PW2), who was a former staff member of one of the Applicant's companies. Concentrating on the crucial evidence affecting events in November and December 1992, the judge set out the companies established by the Applicant and his wife ("the wife"), some of the accounts to which they were solely or jointly signatories and a company known as Lotte Trading (Hong Kong) Company Limited ("Lotte") of which PW1 was a director for about two years. In summary, the companies were New Star Industrial (Hong Kong) Company ("New Star") operated by the wife; Freeley Development Limited ("Freeley") where, before October 1992, the Applicant and the wife had been sole directors and shareholders and, after that month, a further director named Gao had joined them; and New Wave Group Company Limited ("New Wave") where the Applicant and the wife were sole shareholders and directors. Freeley and New Wave had accounts at Nanyang Commercial Bank Limited ("Nanyang") where the Applicant and the wife were both authorised signatories for New Wave and where the Applicant and Gao were authorised signatories for Freeley. 5. New Star had been trading with Lotte for about two years and, in respect of an earlier transaction, was indebted to Lotte in the sum of approximately US$770,000. 6. In November 1992, the Applicant, the wife and PW1 were all present at the discussions relating to the discharge of New Star's indebtedness to Lotte. The conclusion reached was that Lotte would open a Letter of Credit in an amount of US$400,000 with Koram Bank ("Koram") in favour of Freeley in respect of the purported sale by Freeley to Lotte of 1,031 tonnes of cast iron goods. The profits from the sale of those goods would be used to reduce New Star's debt to Lotte. As Lotte had not previously traded in such goods, PW1 was anxious to ensure the sale of the goods and an agreement was reached that they would be repurchased by New Wave for US$406,028.42, payable in two instalments. PW1 took the agreement he had drawn up (Exh. P1) to the Applicant on 3rd December 1992 which he duly signed on behalf of New Wave. 7. On 15th December 1992, Lotte received a faxed "contract" (Exh. P5) bearing the number FDL/92/068 from Freeley for the cast iron goods. This appeared to show that it had been despatched from New Star. The date of the shipment was shown as 28th December 1992, the terms of payment were "At Sight L/C" and the amount payable was US$400,028. The balance between this amount and that which was shown on Exh. P1, a difference of about US$6,000, was to cover Lotte's expenses, interest on the Letter of Credit and a small profit. 8. The Letter of Credit itself (Exh. P4) was arranged through Lotte's bankers, Koram. Payment was made on condition that various documents were first produced to Koram namely, a signed commercial invoice and a packing list, both in triplicate, a certificate of origin in duplicate and Bill of Lading. 9. On 24th December 1992, an application was made to Nanyang by Freeley for collection of the amount due under the Letter of Credit. Freeley's collection order bore the company stamp and was signed by the Applicant. There was a minor typographical error in the contract number but it clearly, in all other respects, related to the same transaction. The collection order was accompanied by a commercial invoice (Exh. P18), a Bill of Lading (Exh. P2), a packing list (Exh. P17) and the original Letter of Credit. The Bill of Lading had Freeley's stamp upon it and was signed by the Applicant. Exhibits P17 and P18 each bore a Freeley company stamp but the signatures on them were not the Applicant's. 10. Exhibits P2 and P18 are the documents to which reference is made in the charge. It is their use or production which form the basis of the allegation that to the Applicant's knowledge, they were or may have been misleading, false or deceptive in a material particular. The documents, including these two exhibits, were transmitted by Nanyang to Koram. They were accompanied by two drafts of Nanyang drawn by Freeley, each bearing the Freeley company stamp and the Applicant's signature. 11. The evidence revealed that the submission of these documents by Freeley to Nanyang was six days after the Letter of Credit had been issued and was, most importantly, four days before the "date of shipment" referred to in Exh. P5. 12. On 4th January 1993, payment, after the deduction of bank charges, was made under the Letter of Credit by Koram to Nanyang in the sum of US$399,435.46. Two days later, this amount was credited to one of Freeley's accounts with Nanyang. On 12th January 1993, US$399,000 from the proceeds were transferred to an account of New Wave. The withdrawal slip was signed by the Applicant and chopped with a Freeley company stamp. On the same date, US$400,025 was telegraphically transferred from the New Wave account to an account operated by Lotte. In February 1993, New Wave were due to make an initial payment of US$150,000 under the terms of Exh. P1. PW1 attempted to contact the Applicant and, on 23rd February 1993 managed to speak to him. The Applicant said that the wife was missing. PW1 went to the Applicant's office only to be informed by the Applicant that the cast iron goods were non-existent, that the Bill of Lading was a forgery or a fraud and that no goods had ever been shipped. The Applicant said that in consequence he was not liable to make payment to Lotte. 13. The remainder of the relevant events, which are set out in the Reasons for Verdict, at page 21 of the appeal bundle, were as follows:
14. The Applicant elected not to give evidence in his own defence at trial. 15. It has been necessary to set out the prosecution's case in some depth because of the nature of the perfected grounds of appeal settled by Mr. Mitchell-Heggs which he was prepared to concede were in the style more of a skeleton argument than grounds of appeal. Although they occupy about six pages and purport to give four separate grounds they are, in essence, a complaint that the trial judge erred in drawing certain inferences from established facts. 16. Mr. Mitchell-Heggs was in the course of developing his arguments when the Applicant interrupted the proceedings by asking for an adjournment. At the conclusion of the adjournment, he indicated that he wished to proceed with the appeal himself, and because of this, Mr. Mitchell-Heggs remained in court to act as amicus should the need arise. In fact, the Applicant then began to give us a very long account of matters which he had chosen not to give evidence about in the District Court. We indicated to him that it was not acceptable to hear evidence that should have been given in the court below if it was to be given at all. We made it clear to the Applicant that this was not a retrial of events that had already been tried in another court. The Applicant then curtailed his long history of events, indicating that he was innocent of the charges. 17. In these circumstances, we have thought it right to return to the grounds of appeal that Mr. Mitchell-Heggs advanced. He had appeared on behalf of the Applicant in the court below and essentially Mr. Mitchell-Heggs had pointed to the absence of the wife from the trial itself and to her significant role in the background to this fraud. Effectively, it was submitted that the inferences to be drawn from the evidence at trial were equally consistent and, in the light of the wife's disappearance, perhaps more consistent with the wife being the true culprit in the commission of the crime. 18. Mr. Mitchell-Heggs also referred in his perfected grounds of appeal to the Applicant's exculpatory remarks made to PW1 on the one hand and to the police on the other which he suggested were given insufficient weight by the judge when concluding the Applicant was guilty. He complained also that the judge convicted upon suspicion that the Applicant was involved and that the conduct of the Applicant after the fraud had been carried out was consistent with innocence on his part, as contrasted to the wife's complete disappearance. 19. We have given a sufficient outline of the nature of the case to demonstrate that there was a strong prima facie case against the Applicant, which he chose not to contradict or to explain by giving evidence himself. That was, of course, his perfect right if he so wished. 20. There was overwhelming evidence that the Applicant was instrumental in furnishing the two false documents referred to in the charge. If he did so, the questions to be addressed by the judge were, firstly, did the Applicant know the information was false when he furnished it? If the answer to this was in the affirmative, then secondly, did the Applicant act dishonestly when he furnished the false information? 21. The judge addressed these issues in precise terms. Starting at page 23 of the appeal bundle, he said:
22. The judge then embarked with meticulous care upon the subject of the statements made by the Applicant to PW1, and nowhere, before the Applicant jumped his bail, did he say that his wife was responsible for the crime when speaking to the police. He first alleged this to the police on his return to Hong Kong about 51/2 years later. At this stage, when shown a number of documents signed by him, he gave answers to police that the judge did not find credible. In conversation with PW1, on the other hand, the Applicant had referred to his wife as having "taken all the money", but this also was not a sensible answer in the mind of the judge as the proceeds of the Letter of Credit had gone to Lotte. 23. The judge reached his conclusions eventually in this way, when at page 27, he said:
24. It may well be said that there was strong evidence that the wife was also implicated but there is nothing in our judgment about the verdict, based as it is on the flawless reasoning of the judge, which leaves this Court able to say that the Applicant's conviction was unsafe or unsatisfactory. On the contrary, all the evidence pointed to his complicity in the crime. 25. Accordingly, the application is dismissed.
Representation: Mr. Graham D. Goodman, S.G.C. for D.P.P./Respondent. Mr. A.B. Mitchell-Heggs instructed by D.L.A. for Applicant. |