Re Beelab Semiconductor Ltd
|
HCAL 151/2008 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 151 OF 2008 ----------------------
----------------------
---------------------- Before: Hon Reyes J in Court Dates of Hearing: 12 January & 13 February 2009 Date of Decision: 13 February 2009 ----------------------- D E C I S I O N ---------------------- I. INTRODUCTION 1.BeeLab seeks judicial review against:-
2.I have to decide whether to grant leave to apply for judicial review. II. BACKGROUND 3.In July 2005 BeeLab applied to ITC for a Patent Application Grant (PAG). This was for a “multiple mode charge pump based power supply apparatus” (the invention) developed by BeeLab. HKPC processed the application on behalf of ITC. 4.In processing BeeLab’s application, HKPC requested the Australian Patent Office (APO) to prepare a search report on the invention. The APO’s Report dated 18 August 2005 highlighted 7 prior art documents (that is, similar material to the invention available to the public before the date of patent application). 5.BeeLab was unhappy with the Report. It entered into a long correspondence with the APO criticising the Report. 6.HKPC proposed that, in light of the Report, advice be sought from a registered attorney on the patentability of the invention. Such advice (HKPC said) would have to be funded by BeeLab. BeeLab rejected the proposal. 7.On 6 January 2006 BeeLab complained to ITC about the Report and about “HKPC’s ignorance of [BeeLab’s] questions and failure to ensure the quality of the Report”. 8.On 7 April 2006 ITC refused BeeLab’s application for a PAG. This was because, in the absence of a favourable professional opinion on the patentability of the invention, HKPC could not recommend it. HKPC then refunded BeeLab’s assessment fee. 9.On 28 August 2006 BeeLab complained to the Ombudsman about maladministration by HKPC and ITC. BeeLab alleged that HKPC lacked the necessary professional knowledge to assess the patentability of the invention and that ITC had failed to monitor HKPC adequately in relation to the processing of BeeLab’s application and the running of the PAG scheme. BeeLab also queried the level of HKPC’s administration charge which (BeeLab suggested) could amount to 20% of a grant. 10.On 14 September 2006 the Ombudsman replied that she had no jurisdiction over HKPC. The Ombudsman further stated that there was no evidence that ITC had failed to monitor HKPC or had processed BeeLab’s application in an unfair manner. 11.On 4 October 2006 BeeLab replied that, HKPC being ITC’s agent, ITC had to assume responsibility for any deficiencies in HKPC’s conduct. BeeLab also demanded that the Ombudsman provide detailed reasons for refusing to take up the case. 12.On 27 October 2006 the Ombudsman signalled a change of mind, responding that there was enough evidence to substantiate further enquiries. 13.Lengthy correspondence ensued between BeeLab and the Ombudsman. 14.On 3 May 2007 the Ombudsman replied substantively to BeeLab’s complaints as follows:-
15.On 18 September 2007 BeeLab wrote to the Ombudsman accusing her of “sidestepping” BeeLab’s complaints and “ignoring the evidence”. In particular, BeeLab remained critical of the selection process by which HKPC was appointed as ITC’s agent. Further, BeeLab took the view that HKPC’s charges lacked transparency. It believed that the choice of APO to report on the patentability of the invention had been inappropriate and unduly expensive, given BeeLab’s interest in patenting the invention in China. 16.On 25 March 2008 the Ombudsman replied as follows:-
17.BeeLab then engaged BCC which wrote more letters to the Ombudsman. 18.The outcome was that by letter dated 13 August 2008 the Ombudsman agreed further to review BeeLab’s case. 19.On 9 September 2008 BCC wrote to the Ombudsman demanding that her office pay BeeLab’s costs (about $160,000) for engaging BCC to correspond with the Ombudsman. 20.On 16 September 2008 the Ombudsman denied that it had retracted anything. On the contrary, she stood by her original findings and conclusions, but her office had simply agreed to review the case “focusing on any fresh evidence or new angles”. 21.In respect of BeeLab’s request for reimbursement of BCC’s fees, the letter continued:-
22.On 20 October 2008 the Ombudsman wrote to BeeLab as follows:-
23.On 9 January 2009, however, the Ombudsman wrote to Beelab as follows:-
24.I initially heard oral submissions on this matter on 12 January 2009. At that time, for whatever reason, the letter of 9 January 2009 (which was not mentioned in Beelab’s application for judicial review) was not drawn to my attention. It was not until late on 15 January 2009, the day before (as the parties had been notified) I proposed to make a ruling on leave, that I was told of the 9 January 2009 letter. 25.BeeLab has now applied to amend its application for judicial review in minor ways to take account of the 9 January 2009 letter. It maintains that the letter does not go far enough. It says that the letter is unclear on whether the Ombudsman will or will not examine the qualification and appointment of HKPC as ITC’s agent in the first instance. III. DISCUSSION A. Ground 1: Ombudsman’s alleged refusal to investigate appointment of HKPC as ITC’s agent 26.The complaint here is in relation to §3 of the Ombudsman’s letter of 20 October 2008. There the Ombudsman stated that “it would be too far-fetched to relate [HKPC’s appointment as agent] to the ... alleged improper handling of your application by HKPC”. 27.Ms. Jessica Chan (appearing for BeeLab) submits that the stated reason is unintelligible. 28.First, she observes that the appointment by a principal of an agent is an administrative act and thus capable of being done improperly. If improper, an appointment could be an act of maladministration within the Ombudsman’s purview. Thus, ITC’s appointing HKPC (if improper) would be within the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. 29.Second, she argues that it may or may not be the case that BeeLab’s complaint is the only one relating to HKPC’s appointment. But that would not render the complaint any more or less valid. It would still have to be investigated. 30.Third, it is unclear (Ms. Chan contends) why the appointment is unrelated to any improper handling of BeeLab’s application. 31.Finally, Ms. Chan says that the Ombudsman has failed to explain why BeeLab’s complaint is “far-fetched”. 32.In my view, Ms. Chan’s submissions are untenable as a basis for judicial review on the present facts. 33.Either HKPC processed BeeLab’s application properly or it did not. The Ombudsman agreed in August 2008 to look further into that question. If HKPC acted incompetently in relation to BeeLab’s application (whether due to a lack of knowledge or for whatever reason), the Ombudsman’s further investigation will presumably ferret that out. 34.More importantly, by her letter of 9 January 2009, the Ombudsman has now agreed to conduct a “full investigation”, including “reviewing [ITC’s] engagement of HKPC”. By any yardstick, that means that the Ombudsman will be looking into the appointment of HKPC and whether the same was appropriate whether now or at any time. There is no ambiguity or lack of clarity. To the contrary, the Ombudsman could not be clearer: a “full” investigation means a “full” investigation. B. Ground 2: Failure to provide detailed reasons for refusal to investigate 35.This ground falls away (it seems to me) in light of the 9 January 2009 letter. There was an initial refusal by the Ombudsman to conduct a full investigation. But that has now changed. 36.Any judicial review now in advance of a final report by the Ombudsman, stating her considered findings and reasoned conclusions, would be premature. It is not the function of the Court in a judicial review to tell the Ombudsman what precisely to investigate or how to investigate the same. At the very least, one should await the Ombudsman’s final report. At that stage, there may or may not be a basis for a judicial review of the way that she has carried out her statutory duties. C. Ground 3: Refusal to reimburse BCC’s fees 37.The Ombudsman Ordinance (Cap.397) (TOO) s.12 (entitled “Proceedings of Ombudsman”) provides as follows:-
38.Ms. Chan construes the reference to TOO s.12(4) in the Ombudsman’s letter of 16 September 2008 as a ban against BCC representing BeeLab. She submits that s.12(4) only applies to the subject of an investigation, not to a complainant. 39.I am unable to construe the 16 September 2008 letter in the manner suggested. Nor do I see anything in the TOO that justifies the restricted reading given to s.12(4) by Ms. Chan. 40.The Ombudsman, in my view correctly, rejected BeeLab’s application to pass on its legal costs to the taxpayer through the Ombudsman’s office. The reasons given by the Ombudsman for this stance were unimpeachable. 41.First, TOO s.18A gives the Ombudsman acting in good faith immunity from any civil claim (including reimbursement of legal fees) in respect of any act done or omitted to be done. There is no suggestion here of bad faith on the Ombudsman’s part. 42.Second, it is up to a complainant to decide whether to engage solicitors (or anyone else) when dealing with the Ombudsman. But the complainant cannot expect the Ombudsman to foot the bill for legal costs incurred as a result of any such engagement. 43.Read in context, by referring to TOO s.12(4) in her letter of 16 September 2008, the Ombudsman was merely stating that in the future she would correspond with BeeLab directly and not through BeeLab’s solicitors. This was clear from §10 of the Ombudsman’s letter. The Ombudsman was entitled so to decide as a matter of discretion by reason of TOO s.12(4). 44.All the Ombudsman has determined is “to communicate directly with Beelab from now on as regards [her] review of its complaint”. Nothing is said about how BeeLab is to communicate with the Ombudsman. As far as I can see, nothing prevents BeeLab (which as a company can only act through agents) from writing to the Ombudsman through BCC or any other agent. Contrary to Ms. Chan’s submission, there is no interference with Beelab’s right to consult whatever legal advisor of its choice. Obviously, BeeLab may continue to employ BCC for private advice if BeeLab so wishes, but that must be at BeeLab’s own expense. IV. CONCLUSION 45.In my judgment, none of the 3 proposed amended grounds of review are arguable with any reasonable prospect of success. Leave to apply for judicial review is accordingly refused.
Ms Jessica Chan, instructed by Messrs Boase, Cohen & Collins, for the Applicant Appeal by the Applicant to Court of Appeal dismissed. Please refer to CACV35/2009 dated 20 November 2009 |
Other judgments that cite this case
Further hearings and rulings under HCAL 151/2008