Secretary for Justice v. Yuen Oi Yee Lisa
Read the full judgment text of HCMP 2390/2008 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 28 July 2010.
1. There are before the court three applications taken out by the respondent. They are: (1) the summons dated 16 July 2010; (2) the summons dated 19 July 2010; and (3) the summons dated 22 July 2010 (referred to as “the 1 st , 2 nd and 3 rd Summons” respectively).
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HCMP2390/2008 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 2390 OF 2008 ---------------------------
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--------------------------- Before : Hon Chu J in Chambers Date of Hearing : 23 July 2010 Date of Decision : 28 July 2010 ----------------------- DECISION -----------------------
1.There are before the court three applications taken out by the respondent. They are: (1) the summons dated 16 July 2010; (2) the summons dated 19 July 2010; and (3) the summons dated 22 July 2010 (referred to as “the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Summons” respectively). Relevant legal principles 2.Before dealing with the three Summonses, it is necessary to set out several matters of principle:
Summons dated 16 July 2010 3.I turn now to the 1st Summons. It seeks the following relief:
4.The subject matter of the relief sought (except relief (5)) had already been considered and refused by the court in previous applications made by the respondent: see the Decision handed down herein on 22 July 2010. Additionally, relief (1) is outside the scope of these proceedings. 5.In the case of relief (2) and (3), the affidavit and statement given by Mr Boulton relate to the commencement of HCA189/2008 by the respondent but in the name of Mr Boulton. As the institution of HCA189/2008 is the subject matter of a criminal prosecution against the respondent in ESCC5404/2008, it was ordered to be excluded from these contempt proceedings by Fung J’s order dated 13 January 2009. The order is valid and binding on all parties. It is not for this court to reverse it, which in effect is intended by the application for relief (2) and (3). 6.As for relief (4), the applicant has agreed to make Miss Lee Yuk Yin available at the trial for cross-examination on certain matters whereas the respondent’s application to cross-examine the other court staff (Miss Chung and Miss Cynthia Lee) had been refused: see paras. 22 to 24 and 27(B) of the Decision handed down on 22 July 2010. It is up to the respondent whether she wishes to carry out cross-examination of Miss Lee Yuk Yin. It is, however, not open to her to impose a condition on the order made. 7.The application for relief (5) is out of order. At the trial, the court will have to decide whether the application’s allegations are substantiated. The respondent cannot, while the trial is adjourned part-heard, made an interlocutory application demanding one of the allegations to be withdrawn. 8.Finally, on relief (6), the respondent cannot make use of these proceedings to obtain production or discovery of documents from a person who is not even a party. 9.In conclusion, the 1st Summons fails. Summons dated 19 July 2010 10.The 2nd Summons seeks the following relief:
11.On the application for leave to appeal, the order in question is a refusal of leave to issue a witness subpoena to compel Mr Robert Lam to attend the trial of these proceedings. Mr Lam has not made any affidavit in these proceedings. The decision refusing leave to issue the subpoena and the reasons for it were communicated to the respondent by letter from the court dated 12 July 2010. 12.In order to obtain leave to appeal, the respondent must show that there are arguable grounds of appeal. It would appear from the respondent’s affirmation and submissions that the reason for subpoenaing Mr Lam is that the respondent considered him to have forged his wife’s signature. This is entirely extraneous to the matters in these proceedings. The respondent has failed to show what are the intended grounds of appeal or that there are arguable grounds of appeal. The application for leave to appeal must be refused. 13.As to the second and third relief, they are incapable of being the subject matter of proper applications in legal proceedings and are also irrelevant to the issues to be determined at the trial herein. The applications are both irregular and misconceived and must be dismissed. 14.The 2nd Summons should be dismissed. Summons dated 22 July 2010 15.The 3rd Summons applies for leave to appeal against the order dated 22 July 2010 refusing leave to the respondent to cross-examine seven of the eight people named in the respondent’s summons dated 12 July 2010 (i.e. excluding Miss Lee Yuk Yin). 16.No draft grounds of appeal have been provided by the respondent. The affirmation in support of the leave to appeal application basically makes cross references to various letters written by the respondent to a number of people and other documents. At the hearing, the respondent argued that it is in the public interest that the eight people named in the summons should be cross-examined. The thrust of her argument runs as follows:
17.When refusing to grant the application of cross-examination in respect of Mr Boulton, Miss Miranda Lam, Miss Anita Lam and Miss Jenny Fung, I had said that the applications were made for collateral purposes and as means of retaliations against them. This is further confirmed by the materials and arguments put forward to support the application for leave to appeal. To the extent that the respondent had at the hearing repeatedly accused Miss Lee Ching Mei as the culprit behind the scene, there must be grave doubts as to the respondent’s real purpose and reason in seeking to cross-examine Miss Lee. As to the other two court staff, the respondent said it would be unfair to Miss Lee Yuk Yin to be the only person to be cross-examined when the petition in HCB9860/2007 had also passed through the hands of other court staff. I am unable to see how this affords an arguable ground of appeal. 18.In short, the respondent has not shown there are arguable grounds of appeal. Leave to appeal should be refused. Conclusion 19.In summary, all the three summonses are dismissed with costs to the applicant to be taxed if not agreed.
Mr Eric Ko, Government Counsel, of the Department of Justice for the applicant. The respondent, unrepresented, appeared in person. Application by the applicant for leave to appeal dismissed by the Court of Appeal. Please refer to HCMP1465/2000 dated 17 August 2010 |
Further hearings and rulings under HCMP 2390/2008