HKSAR v. Chan Chi Ming
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CACC000083/1997 IN THE COURT OF APPEAL 1997, No. 83 (Criminal) _____________________
_____________________ Coram: Power, V.-P., Wong & Stuart-Moore, JJ. Date of hearing: 23 July 1997 Date of judgment: 23 July 1997 _____________________ J U D G M E N T _____________________ Stuart-Moore J. (giving the judgment of the Court): 1. On 17th January 1997, the Applicant was convicted of wounding with intent contrary to s.17(a) of the Offences Against the Person Ordinance, Cap.212, following a trial before Deputy Judge Barnes in the District Court. As a result the Applicant was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment. He now seeks leave to appeal against conviction. 2. The basis of the allegation is set out on pages 1 and 2 in the Reasons for Verdict, part of which reads in the following way:
I interpose to say that PW5 was an ex-girl friend of this Applicant.
3. The Grounds of Appeal state that the learned Deputy Judge failed to evaluate the defence case properly or fairly in two specific ways. Firstly, it is said that the silence of the Applicant on arrest has been used against him, and secondly, that erroneous findings of fact led to a failure on the part of the learned Deputy Judge to consider self defence and that the flawed findings have rendered the verdict unsafe and unsatisfactory. 4. Taking each of these matters in turn, particular emphasis is placed by Mr. Buchanan on his first point of appeal in support of this application to a passage which is to be found at page 9 of the Reasons of Verdict (page 13 in the Bundle). It reads:
Mr. Buchanan has identified a passage in the evidence where the Applicant in cross-examination said that he had told the police he had been attacked. This was not believed by the trial judge. On the evidence, she was quite entitled to reach that conclusion. It was not the Applicant's silence to the police which told against him. It was the fact that it has never been a part of the Applicant's case until cross-examination that he had complained to the police of being the victim, coupled with the fact that his injuries did not tally with his version that he was the victim and not the attacker. In any event, the learned Deputy Judge was fully aware of the rule that a person's silence is not usually to be held against him. This is apparent from a passage in the transcript at p.125 where she pointed out to counsel who was then appearing on behalf of the prosecution, not counsel in this appeal, that an arrested person under caution does not have to explain why he exercised his right to silence. The learned Deputy Judge had interrupted cross-examination to deal with that point specifically. There is no substance to the first ground. 5. Turning to the second ground of appeal, we have been urged to listen to further evidence from a medical witness in support of this application to refute what Mr. Buchanan calls an erroneous finding of the learned Deputy Judge that 'the Applicant would have sustained very serious injuries if he had been attacked by PW2'. We have refused leave to call evidence under s.83V of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance. The learned Judge was, in our opinion, drawing an inference based on all the circumstances which she set out in detail in her reasoned judgment. It was an inference to which she was fully entitled to come. It was perhaps a little inelegant the way that she expressed her findings in saying:
But it is clear to us that the learned Judge was meaning by that to say that if the second prosecution witness had attacked this Applicant, the likelihood is that the Applicant would have received more serious injuries than the very minor ones he in fact did receive. The facts as she found them were consistent with the prosecution's allegation and not with the story told by this Applicant. In those circumstances, there were no matters upon which a medical witness could have helped us and for that reason the opinion of a doctor was not sought by this court. 6. All we need to say finally is that, having disbelieved the Applicant in evidence as a man who was 'making up his evidence as he went along', self defence never got off the ground as a viable defence capable of belief, and in those circumstances the learned Judge did not need to consider it further. 7. There is no merit to the application and it is refused.
Representation: Mr. Zervos, S.G.C. for Director of Public Prosecutions. Mr. Robert B. Buchanan instructed by Messrs B. Manek & Co. for the Applicant. |