HKSAR v. Ng Ping Chi
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CACC317/2009 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 317 OF 2009 (ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO. 40 OF 2009) -------------------------- BETWEEN
-------------------------- Before : Hon Ma CJHC, McMahon and Saw JJ in Court Date of Hearing : 30 June 2010 Date of Judgment : 30 June 2010 Date of handing down Reasons for Judgment : 2 August 2010 ------------------------------------------------------- REASONS FOR JUDGMENT ------------------------------------------------------- Saw J (giving the judgment of the Court) : 1.On 18 September 2009 the applicant was convicted after trial before Beeson J and a jury of murder contrary to common law and punishable under section 2 of the offences against the Person Ordinance, Cap. 212. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. 2.On 15 December 2009 the applicant was granted legal aid and Mr Gerard McCoy SC was assigned, instructed by Messrs Henry Wan and Yeung. On 18 December 2009 Mr McCoy advised that there were “no arguable grounds of appeal”. As is the usual practice he advised that he would attend the hearing of the application and assist the court, if necessary. On 23 June 2010 the Legal Aid Department advised that Mr Phillip Ross had been assigned in lieu of Mr McCoy to attend the hearing. He like Mr McCoy had determined that there were no arguable grounds of appeal. 3.On 30 June 2010 we dismissed the application for leave to appeal conviction and indicated we would hand down our reasons in due course. These are our reasons. 4.The victim named in the indictment was Miss Wong Wing-In (we shall refer to her as “the deceased”). She was aged 36 when she died. At the outset of her summing up the judge outlined the issues in the trial she said :
5.It was an admitted fact in the trial that the applicant had caused the death of the deceased. 6.Subsequent to being advised of Mr McCoy’s opinion the applicant wrote to the court. In a letter dated 23 April 2010 he provided his grounds of appeal. As that document in part complained of the conduct of his counsel in the trial that letter and a certified translation were forwarded to his counsel (Mr John Hemmings) for his comments. 7.On 3 June 2010 Mr Hemmings provided an affidavit setting out his response to the applicant’s complaints which were referable to his conduct of the trial. We accepted the contents of that affidavit and did not need to hear from Mr Hemmings in person. T he grounds of appeal 8.The applicant’s homemade grounds of appeal, which are contained in his letter dated 23 April 2010, can be summarized as follows :
Item (a) 9.In his affidavit Mr Hemmings explained that he objected to the prosecution eliciting from PW2 hearsay evidence of a conversation that the deceased had had with her. We have looked at the witness statement of PW2 and agree with Mr Hemmings that the evidence of that conversation could have given support to the prosecution’s case that the applicant owed the deceased money, which explained why she went to the applicant’s work place that night. The exclusion of that part of her testimony was therefore to the benefit of the applicant. The fact that his counsel did not seek his approval to object to that part of her evidence does not assist the applicant. This was a decision, a proper one we consider, taken by counsel in the course of the trial in the exercise of his judgment. No valid criticism can be made of it. Item (b) 10.At the commencement of the summing up the judge pointed out that, after he was arrested, the applicant was alleged to have said he owed money to the deceased and that he later retreated from that position. In his video recorded interview and in his evidence he insisted that it was the deceased who owed him money. 11.When dealing with this aspect of the applicant’s evidence the judge succinctly put it in perspective she said :
We considered that nothing more was required. The applicant’s complaint was misconceived. Item (c) 12.There was no merit in this complaint. The CCTV footage was part of the circumstantial evidence which went to show that the applicant was the killer — unnecessary as it transpired because that was an admitted fact. It, however, shed no light on how the dispute, if any, arose between the deceased and the applicant. Item (d) 13.The applicant did not spell out clearly what the objection was or how the cross-examination affected his defence or in what way it was improper. It is apparent that the applicant’s relationship with his employer was marginally relevant to one issue in the trial namely the source of funds obtained by him to support his admitted gambling habit. It was therefore proper in the circumstances for the prosecution to explore that relationship in cross-examination. Item (e) 14.Counsel for the applicant had advised the applicant, that in view of what the applicant said in the cautioned interviews, “self-defence” was a live issue and that a plea of not guilty was open to him on arraignment. The applicant instructed counsel he was willing to plead guilty to manslaughter on the ground of provocation. This was not acceptable to the prosecution. The applicant’s complaint was that the jury were not told of this. It has been a practice for many years in murder trials in the High Court that where a defendant wishes (no doubt on the advice of and through his counsel) to inform the jury that he is willing to admit and plead guilty to the offence of manslaughter, then that is done. That is because in such circumstances the issues will often be narrow and their resolution in favour of the defendant will be consistent with his defence. This approach is not a principle of law but a rule of practice and as such will, as to whether it is allowed by the court or not, depend upon the circumstances of the case. In the present case adopting that practice would not have been to the benefit of the applicant. Such a plea would entail an admission on the part of the applicant that he had the intention to unlawfully kill or to cause grievous bodily harm to the deceased which, in the circumstances of the case, would have been inconsistent with “self‑defence”. If the jury had been alerted to his proposed plea this defence would have been undermined. The summing up 15.The jury were directed to first consider self-defence and to acquit the applicant if this had not been disproved by the prosecution. If self-defence had been disproved they were directed next to consider the issue of the applicant’s intention at the time he killed the deceased. 16.The jury were directed that if the prosecution had not established that the applicant intended to kill or cause grievous bodily harm to the deceased their proper verdict, if they had rejected self-defence, should be manslaughter. However if the prosecution had established the requisite intent for murder the jury were directed to consider the partial defence of provocation. 17.Given the evidence and the issues, we were satisfied that these directions were appropriate, in the context of how the defence case was presented at trial and that, where necessary, suitable reference to the relevant evidence was given. 18.In short, no valid criticisms could be made of the summing up. 19.On his behalf at the hearing of the application Mr Phillip Ross brought to our attention matters raised by the applicant with him in addition to the above. It suffices to say that given it was an admitted fact that the applicant had killed the deceased those were irrelevant. 20.There was one matter that initially concerned us. In the summing up the judge referred to the evidence of PW1 — who was the boyfriend of the deceased she said :
21.This was hearsay and inadmissible. Standing alone it could have supported the prosecution’s contention that the applicant had a motive to kill the deceased namely to avoid the repayment of monies she had lent to him. 22.However in the passage cited in paragraph 11 above and the direction shortly after where the judge said :
The judge was effectively telling the jury that that the issue of who owed money to who was not the critical issue for them to determine. Immediately after these passages she said this :
23.Taking the summing up as a whole and these passages in particular we were satisfied that the jury’s attention was properly focused by the judge not on the question of money owed by one to the other but rather the fact that there was that night a dispute between the deceased and the applicant. 24.Given this we were satisfied that whilst there was an irregularity in the admission into evidence of this hearsay conversation the irregularity was in all of the circumstances immaterial. Conclusion 25.There was no substance in the complaints made by the applicant. The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.
MrAlex Lee, SADPP of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent Mr Phillip Ross, instructed by Messrs Henry Wan & Yeung, assigned by DLA, for the Applicant | |||||||||||||||