薛 訴 孫

FCMC 8663 / 2009

香港特別行政區

區域法院

婚姻訴訟案件編號 2009 年第 8663 宗

主審法官: 區域法院陳振國法官內庭聆訊 (非公開)

審訊日期 : 2010年 6 月 22-23 日

頒下判案書日期 : 2010年 7 月 9 日

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判案書

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1.這是一宗有關管養權的審訊。

2.本席將稱呈請人為「母親」；答辯人則為「父親」。

背景

3.訴訟雙方於1998年結婚。

4.雙方婚後育有一名女兒，現年7歲，是一名小學二年級學生，現與母親同住。

5.訴訟雙方於2006年分居。母親於2009年提出離婚呈請，法庭於2009年10月13日頒發暫准離婚令。

6.至於管養權方面，由於雙方在案件過堂期間未能取得協議，因此案件押後至今天進行正式的審訊。

雙方各自的立場及爭議

7.在審訊開始時，訴訟雙方各自的立場是：母親要求女兒的單獨管養權及照顧及控制權，但她並不反對父親於每週末有一個留宿探視權；而父親則剛剛相反，他要求女兒的單獨管養權及照顧及控制權，他亦不反對母親於每週末有留宿探視權。

8.但當案件去到後期時，母親決定作出重大的讓步。她透過代表律師向法庭表示，為了能與父親達成協議，以免女兒須要面對兩難的決擇，她同意將女兒的照顧及控制權交給父親，而她只要求一個共同的管養權，以及每逢週末及學校長假期的一半留宿探視權。換句話說，母親現時同意的實際安排是逢星期日晚至星期五下午，女兒將會與父親及祖母一起居住。由星期五下午至星期日晚上，以及學校長假期的一半，女兒則會與母親同住。

9.至於父親方面，除了有關共同管養權方面，他並不反對母親的建議。

10.換句話說，本案現時主要的爭議，就是法庭應否頒發一個共同的管養權命令。

法律

11.法庭就有關家庭子女管養權發出命令的權力，是基於香港法例第192章《婚姻法律程予與財產條例》第19條的規定：-

「19. 對受婚姻訟案影響的子女提供管養及教育的命令

(1) 法庭可在下列時間，作出其認為是適宜的命令，以便為任何18歲以下的家庭子女提供管養及教育─

(a) 在任何離婚、婚姻無效或裁判分居的法律程序中，於作出最後判令之當時、之前或之後；

(b)                ……。」

12.至於法庭在考慮管養權時所依賴的準則，則是依據香港法例第13章《未成年人監護條例》第3條的規定：-

「3. 一般原則

(1) 有關未成年人的管養或教養問題，以及有關屬於未成年人或代未成年人託管的財產的管理問題，或從該 等財產所獲收益的運用問題─

(a) 在任何法院進行的法律程序中(不論該法院是否第2條所界定的法院)─

(i) 法院須以未成年人的福利為首要考慮事項，而考慮此事項時須對下列各項因素給予適當考慮─

(A) 未成年人的意願(如在顧及未成年人的年齡及理解力，以及有關個案的情況後，考慮其意願乃屬切實可行者)；及

(B) 任何關鍵性資料，包括聆訊進行時社會福利署署長備呈法院的任何報告；及

(ii) 在上述管養、教養、財產管理或收益運用等問題上，法院無須從任何其他觀點來考慮父親的申索，是否較母親的申索為優先，或母親的申索是否較父親的為優先；

……。」

13.從以上條文可見，本席在裁決有關子女管養權或探視權的爭議時，首要的考慮是該些家庭子女的福利。而在考慮子女的福利時，亦須考慮他們的意願及其他關鍵性的資料，包括社會福利署的報告。

第一份社會調查報告

14.社會調查主任曾姑娘曾準備了兩份社會調查報告。在第一份報告中，曾姑娘報了這家庭的背景。她說女兒由出生至兩個月大由母親照顧，但後來母親要返回內地，女兒便交由父親的媽媽 (即祖母) 照顧。雖然祖母是一名聾啞人士，但她仍能提供足夠的照料給女兒。母親於2009年5月起，將女兒接回由她親自照顧，直至現在。

15.她在總結的段落中說，訴訟雙方都愛惜女兒，並希望可以承擔起養育女兒的責任。她說女兒由2009年5月起由母親全職照顧，雖然女兒的學業成績是出現了問題，但母親承諾會加強管養。至於父親方面，他則計劃將女兒接回與他及祖母一起居住。在他工作期間，祖母會提供協助；在他下班後，他便會親自教導女兒的功課。

16.曾姑娘最後認為，母親在處理女兒的學業方面並不太理想，而父親在這方面則可為女兒提供比較好的輔導。加上女兒與祖母關係親密，因此曾姑娘在報告的結論中建議將女兒的管養權交給父親。

第二份社會調查報告

17.曾姑娘在2010年6月1日準備了第二份社會調查報告。

18.曾姑娘在第二份報告中報了個案的近況。她說在與女兒會面時發覺女兒因父母的爭拗而受到困擾，她表示她很愛父母，並想與他們一起居住，但她亦表示對自己學業的退步有所擔心。總括來說，女兒因害怕傷害父母任何一方，因而並沒有明確表示想與那一方一起居住。

19.曾姑娘在報告的結論中表示，其實父或母任何一方都有能為女兒提供身體上的日常照顧，但她在女兒的學業方面則比較擔心。她在考慮過這案件的所有情況後，她最後仍然維持第一份報告中的建議，即將女兒的管養權交給父親。

社會調查主任的証供

20.曾姑娘在審訊中有出庭接受盤問。

21.她作供時基本上是重複了兩份報告中的內容建議。在有關女兒的學業方面，她說雖然女兒的學業成績並不是考慮女兒福利的唯一指標，但她擔心如果情況在短期內未能得到改善，這會影響到女兒升學，甚至女兒將來的前途。而由於父親在教育女兒方面比較優勝，他及祖母亦能提供適當的照料給女兒，因此她認為將女兒交給父親及祖母管養是為適合。

討論

22.本席在考慮本案的証據時，本席提醒自己現時唯一的主要爭議是法庭應否如母親的要求，頒發一個共同的管養權；或是如父親所要求，頒給一個給予父親的單獨管養權。至於照顧及控制權、留宿探視權、學校假期的安排等，其實雙方都是沒有任何爭議。

23.本席在考慮是否共同管養權的問題時，本席不得不提及高等法院上訴庭一個非常近期的案例，即PD v KWW(unreported, CACV 188/2009，頒下判案書日期：2010年6月9日)。在該案例中，夏正民上訴庭法官就管養權 (custody) 和照顧及控制權 (care and control) 有過非常深入的探討。他在案例的第31至41段詳細解釋了管養權及照顧及控制權的概念：-

“30. At a practical level, a convenient way of understanding the two concepts is to compare the nature of the decision-making that is required to put them into practice.

31. The decisions to be made by a custodial parent are those of real consequence in safeguarding and promoting the child's health, development and general welfare. They include decisions as to whether or not the child should undergo a medical operation, what religion the child should adhere to, what school the child should attend, what extracurricular activities the child should pursue, be it learning a musical instrument or being coached in a sport. A parent vested with custody has the responsibility of acting as the child's legal representative.

32. By contrast, the decisions to be made by a parent who (at any time) has care and control of the child are of a more mundane, day-to-day nature, decisions of only passing consequence in themselves but cumulatively of importance in moulding the character of the child. They include a host of decisions that arise out of the fact that the parent has physical control of the child and the responsibility of attending to the child's immediate care. They include decisions as to what the child will wear that day, what the child may watch on television, when the child will settle down to homework and when the child will go to bed. They also include the authority to impose appropriate discipline.

33. We have spoken of the misunderstanding that exists as to the nature and extent of the two concepts. This is most often manifested in the misperception that, if sole custody is given to one parent, that parent thereby 'wins' the right to determine all matters big and small in the upbringing of that child whilethe parent who is not given custody 'loses' the right to have any say in the child's upbringing. The present case is a prime example.

34. The mother seeks sole custody because, to use her words, she wants to leave behind the conflict that has marked her relationship with the father since the breakdown of the marriage and wants to be left in peace to be able to raise the child as she thinks best, that is, to be able to determine such matters as the child's education, religious upbringing and choice of activities free of any disturbance from the father. She is happy to let the child spend time with the father and is happy to keep the father informed of matters relevant to the child's well-being but she wishes to reserve absolutely to herself the manner of her child's upbringing.

35. Equally, the father fears being deprived of joint custody because it is his view that society will perceive that he has thereby forfeited the rights and responsibilities of a father, being left only with the residual right to spend time with his daughter and the residual responsibility of making a financial contribution to the cost of her upbringing.

36. It is to be emphasised in the strongest terms that if one parent only is given custody, that parent is not thereby given an absolute and independent authority to act without further reference to the non-custodial parent. Any such potential misunderstanding was quashed in Dipper vDipper [1980] 3 WLR 626 in which Ormrod LJ said:

"It used to be considered that the parent having custody had the right to control their children's education, and in the past their religion. This is a misunderstanding. Neither parent has any pre-emptive right over the other. If there is no agreement as to the education of the children, or their religious upbringing or any other matter in their lives, that disagreement has to be decided by the court."

37. In the same case, Cumming-Bruce LJ, another experienced family judge, said:

" .... it (is) a fallacy which continues to raise its ugly head that, on making a custody order, the custodial parent has a right to take all the decisions about the educationof the children in spite of the disagreements of the other parent. That is quite wrong. The parent is always entitled, whatever his custodial status, to know and be consulted about the future education of the children and any other major matters. Ifhe disagrees with the course proposed by the custodial parent he has the right to come to the court in order that the difference may be determined by the court."

38. A non-custodial parent therefore has the right to be consulted in respect of all matters of consequence that relate to the child's upbringing. While the right to be consulted does not include a power of veto, it is nevertheless a substantial right. It is not merely a right to be informed, it is a right to be able to confer on the matter in issue, to give advice and to have that advice considered.

39. While therefore a parent who is given sole custody is given the authority, in the event of disagreement with the non-custodial parent, to make the final decision, it should only be made after due consultation and, if the final decision that is made is considered by the non-custodial parent to be inimical to the child's best interests, the court may be called upon to determine the matter.

40. Invariably, therefore, the giving of sole custody to one parent does no more than recognise that, in the circumstances of the breakdown of the marriage, the best interests of the child are secured by giving to that parent the authority, if necessary, to make a final decision concerning matters of consequence in the upbringing of the child but only after the other parent's views have been given full and rational consideration. In summary, an order of sole custody does no more than add a qualification to the otherwise joint endeavour of both parents in raising their child, that qualification being that the final decision will rest with one parent.

41. For this reason it is often said that there is a thin line between sole custody and joint custody.”

24.本席明白到父親現時反對共同管養權的理據，主要是建基於他認為雙方就女兒的重大問題或福利上未能取得有效的溝通。他說從歷史可見，他們雙方在過往完全沒有溝通，就算有所討論，事情很快就會演變成互相指摘，甚至爭吵，雙方亦因此多次驚動警方，甚至鬧上法庭。他認為這樣的每次爭吵，只會對女兒造成傷害。

25.就這方面而言，本席完全理解父親的心情。但就這個案而言，本席的看法並沒有父親般的悲觀。本席明白到雙方過往事實上是有所爭吵，甚至鬧上法庭，但從社會調查報告及各方面的情況來看，情況在近期是有所改善。

26.首先，父親過往在探視女兒方面是出現困難，但在近幾個月間這問題基本上已經解決。

27.更重要的是，母親就管養權的態度問題上是有重大改變。在過往當雙方都堅持自己擁有女兒單獨的管養權時，大家在每個問題上寸土必爭的表現是可以理解的。但現時母親已經接受女兒將會在星期一至五由父親方面提供照料，她已作出極大的讓步，本席認為雙方爭論的機會已大為減少。因此，本席是有信心過往雙方爭議不休的情況將會大為改善。

28.就共同管養權的問題上，本席完全同意夏正民上訴庭法官在PD v KWW中第52至56段的看法：-

“Joint Custody: the proper approach

52. Today, although there has been no change in our law similar to many other common law jurisdictions, orders of joint custody are in no way exceptional. This is because it is accepted that, in principle, such orders are in the interests of children.

53. In all but the most exceptional circumstances, the effect of divorce on the children of the marriage, especially children of tender years, is deeply felt. In all but the most exceptional circumstances, such children desire that they should continue to be protected and guided by both parents. The case before us is an example.

54. In the result, in the best interests of the child, the fact that, as a result of the breakdown of the marriage, relations between the parents are strained is not of itself a reason to refuse to make a joint order of custody. Nor is the fact that the parent to be given care and control does not agree. Such orders look to the future. They will govern a limited area of exchange between the parents, albeit one of the greatest importance.

55. Accordingly, the issue for the judge is whether, with the court proceedings concluded, it is reasonably anticipated that the parents will be able to agree on the questions of importance that will determine the upbringing of their child, both recognising that, as difficult as it may be for them, this process of co-operation is in the best interests of the child.

56. In determining this issue, the judge is entitled to proceed on the presumption that competent, loving parents possessed of sufficient objectivity to be able to make rational decisions in the interests of the child will be- able to co-operate with each concerning matters of importance in the upbringing of the child. ”

總結

29.基於以上的理由，本席現會頒發以下命令：-

(1) 訴訟雙方擁有女兒的共同管養權；

(2) 女兒的照顧及控制權 (care and control) 交給父親；

(3) 母親有合理的探視權，包括留宿探視。有關的探視安排如下：-

(i) 母親在每星期五下午女兒放學後，可接女兒，並有留宿探視至星期日晚上9時，將女兒送回父親及祖母的居所。

(ii) 女兒在星期日晚至星期五放學期間，在父親及祖母處居住。

(iii) 在學校長假期間，如暑假、聖誕假、農曆年假及復活節假，母親可有一半時間的留宿探視，詳細安排由雙方協議。

訟費

30.雙方同意訟費方面應不作命令。本席認為這是一個合理的安排，因此訟費方面，包括保留的訟費，不作任何命令。至於雙方本身的訟費，則根據法援規則進行評定。

呈請人：由林玉成律師行林律師代表

答辯人：由利承峰事務律師行利律師代表