HKSAR v. Cheng Hung Cheung
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CACC000088/2003 CACC 88/2003 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 88 OF 2003 (ON APPEAL FROM HCCC 139 OF 2002) ____________________
____________________ Coram: Hon Stuart-Moore VP, Burrell and Lunn JJ Date of Hearing: 9 January 2004 Date of Judgment: 9 January 2004 _______________________ J U D G M E N T _______________________ Stuart-Moore, VP (giving the judgment of the Court): 1.On 18 February 2003, the Applicant pleaded guilty in the Court of First Instance before Beeson J to manslaughter by reason of provocation. He was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment against which he now seeks leave to appeal. 2.The judge, in her comprehensive sentencing remarks, set out the full background which had led to this killing. Amongst other things, she said:
Then, dealing with the day of the killing itself, the judge continued:
3.The judge took into account several matters raised in mitigation including the Applicant's previous good character, his plea of guilty, and letters, including one from the Applicant's wife, requesting leniency. Importantly, the judge concluded that the attack, although a serious one on an unarmed man following which the Applicant had made no attempt to call medical assistance, had not been premeditated in the sense that the Applicant had not been armed with a weapon until he picked up the metal bar nearby. 4.The judge concluded by saying:
5.After giving consideration to six previous decisions of this court in other manslaughter cases, the judge then imposed a seven-year term. 6.Mr Paul Loughran, on the Applicant's behalf, brought to our attention four of the cases considered by the judge in support of his submission that the sentence was manifestly excessive. In particular, his grounds of appeal complained that insufficient regard was paid to:
7.Mr Loughran was unable to say that any of the matters most significantly in favour of the Applicant had been left out of the judge's consideration. Plainly, all of these factors had been taken into account. Mr Loughran's approach, however, was to lay emphasis on all material aspects of the mitigation and to suggest that insufficient weight had been given to them. 8.Mr Loughran laid particular stress, amongst other things concerned with the gravity of the provocation, on the length of time over which the deceased had been seeing the Applicant's wife and even telephoning her when she was in the Applicant's presence; the deceased's broken promises that he would no longer see the Applicant's wife; the Applicant's chance sighting of the deceased on 28 December 2001, followed by the "last straw" when the Applicant was able to hear the deceased speaking on a mobile telephone to the Applicant's wife. These factors gave rise, it was argued, to substantial provocation deserving greater recognition than the judge had given when passing a sentence of this length, particularly when considered with the Applicant's apparent remorse for what he had done. 9.Mr Kevin Zervos, SC, for the Respondent, on whom we did not need to call, submitted in his written argument that bearing in mind the long-term relationship between the deceased and the Applicant's wife, of which the Applicant had for some time been aware, and the callous nature of the attack on the deceased, the sentence was within the appropriate range. 10.The present case is not concerned with behaviour on the deceased's part which was designed to be deliberately provocative. This was a by-product of his relationship with the Applicant's wife of which the Applicant was well aware. When the Applicant discovered that this may have resumed, contrary to his hopes and expectations, he was no doubt disappointed. The Applicant appears to have been unable to accept that his marriage had broken down. What happened thereafter, with the Applicant following the deceased and launching an attack on him of great severity on a public pathway which ultimately led to his death, bearing in mind the sanctity of human life, called, in our opinion, for a substantial sentence. 11.We do not, therefore, feel inclined to say, on the present facts, that the sentence was inappropriate. We cannot overlook that this was, as the judge rightly described it, "a serious attack on an unarmed man". The nature of the weapon, and the obvious force of the blow which the Applicant delivered to the back of the deceased's head, left the deceased with no chance. If the Applicant was to have justified greater credit for his remorse thereafter, this might have been accomplished if he had called for immediate medical assistance. Instead, the Applicant went home leaving the deceased unattended. 12.As there are no grounds for interfering with the sentence, this application is dismissed.
Representation: Mr Kevin P. Zervos, SC, SADPP, of the Department of Justice,for the Respondent. Mr Paul Loughran, instructed by Director of Legal Aid, for the Applicant. |