香港特別行政區 訴 李志軍

Case No.HCMA 288/2010
Court
High Court CFI
Date23 Dec 2010
Judge
Case Document
100%

HCMA288/2010

香港特別行政區

高等法院原訟法庭

刑事上訴司法管轄權

定罪上訴

案件編號:裁判法院上訴案件2010年第288號

(原沙田裁判法院傳票2010年第4號)

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  香港特別行政區  
   
上訴人 李志軍  
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主審法官:高等法院原訟法庭法官湯寶臣

聆訊日期:2010年7月27日及9月17日

判案日期:2010年12月23日

判案

背景

1.上訴人被票控一項「交通事例」即:“在快速公路上,無合理辯解,沒有在快速公路左邊行車線駕駛”。上訴人否認控罪,經審訊後,本席裁定被告罪名成立,罰款1,800 元。

2.上訴人不服定罪,向原訟庭提出上訴。

控辯雙方的證供

3.控方傳召了一名證人作供,即警署警長 23801,而上訴人也有作供。

4.裁判官在裁斷陳述書指出,本案就關鍵的事實方面並無太大爭議。上訴人承認他有在事發路段的左三線上行駛,即最快線,他亦承認他的前面並沒有其他車輛,他當時不是需要爬頭。

5.裁判官特別提到上訴人在被盤問時披露對法例的一些看法:他認為有關的法例不合情理,因為當時前面又沒有車輛,為甚麼不可以使用快線?路是讓車行駛的,他又沒有阻礙其他駕駛者或需要用快線的人,必要時他會讓路。上訴人亦表示不滿警長沒有去票控另一輛相同做法的貨車。當然,法例有這規定而上訴人的不滿不能構成抗辯理由。

6.除了上述的事情,上訴人基本所持的辯護理由是警長在現場填錯通知書表格 1,雖然錯誤在表格 2上已作更正,但上訴人認為這已構成法律上的抗辯理由。

裁判官對案情的評估

7.裁判官指出警長在表格 1上圈了的違例事項是編號 “56”,其實應該是“56A”。警長承認他有出錯。他在證人台上有如下的解釋:「我受了很大壓力......他(指被告)完全控制不到自己,不斷鬧,不斷鬧,我當了三十年差未試過這樣比人鬧法,他又不斷帶我亞媽出來,我忍他,他講粗口,又中又英,又話投訴高官,又話投訴什麼什麼人......他太激動,大力敲落我警車玻璃......嘭嘭聲打落我玻璃窗......我又不想和他再爭執,只有盡快開車離開。」(見裁斷陳述書第 5 段)

8.裁判官看來接納了警長為何會填錯表格 1的解釋。

9.裁判官提到他在開審前已向被告解釋過定額罰款(刑事訴訟)條例及Yeung Sit Fong[1]的案例。裁判官認為,基於條例的內容及O’Connor J在判詞中的分析,警長作出的錯誤並不構成抗辯理由。

10.裁判官所指的條例內容如下(第 3(1)、(2) 及 (3) 條):

“(1) If a police officer has reason to believe that a person is committing or has committed a scheduled offence, he may give that person a notice in the prescribed form offering that person an opportunity to discharge any liability to conviction for that offence by payment of the fixed penalty therefor at any place specified in the notice.

(2) A notice under subsection (1) shall be given by the police officer to the person concerned-

(a) by delivering it personally to that person; or

(b) by fixing it to the vehicle used or involved in the commission of the offence:

Provided that the operation of this section, section 3A and section 5 shall not be affected by a failure to comply with this subsection.

(3) Subject to subsection (4), where the Commissioner of Police is of the opinion that a person alleged to be guilty of a scheduled offence ought to be proceeded against under this Part in respect thereof, he shall, as soon as prarticable after the commission of the offence, serve on that person a notice-

(a) demanding payment of the fixed penalty; and

(b)   informing the person that if he wishes to dispute liability for the offence, he should so notify the Commissioner of Police.”

11.在證供方面,裁判官認為,PW1是誠實可靠的證人,他的證供可信可靠;又基於上訴人在證人台作供時都承認在高速公路的最快線上駕駛,又沒有合理辯解,因此裁定控罪在毫無合理疑點下成立。

上訴理由

12.上訴人在自己撰寫的上訴理據中提出以下幾點(原文為英文):

“1) The defendant was true and honest in the court. He honored his integrity by speaking truly the facts that were happened even that may put the defendant in a detrimental position. While the police was making a ‘perfect story’ to cover up any wrong doings or mistakes he made.

The magistrate has failed to consider and weight this as material in reaching his verdict.

2) With this unfair adjudication, it’s too obvious that the honest man punished for telling the truth while the liar got away with reward. The court is helping to cultivate a common haired against the police.

3) The court has observed a loophole which causes injustice to the defendant but refused to correct it by invalidating the defective demand note. With the verdict the magistrate given in favour of the police he SUSTAINS the loophole and this will further encourage the police force to act relentlessly in their own will.

4) While giving his verdict the magistrate largely relied on a ruling of criminal appeal No.57 of 1979 (related to parking ticket???) saying that serving a notice in Form 1 is not a condition precedent to serve a notice under Form 2. In my opinion the exercise of due care by the police is a CONDITION PRECEDENT regardless whether he is serving a notice under Form 1 or Form 2 to the defendant.

5) The court is sending a strong but WRONG message to the police: ‘You folks out there can do whatever you want when prosecuting people as long as you amend the mistakes even they were purposely/intentionally made by you on the demand note, you are FREE of any legal liabilities and consequences. You are unconditionally backed by this court for doing so.’

6)           Last but not least this is a typical bad example of how the police ruthlessly use the court ruling as a shield/defense for his wrong doings. Without imposing any restrictions on applying this No 57 of 1979 verdict, the court is helping to create an environment for infringe the right of the defendant.”

13.上訴人在書面陳詞中亦批評裁判官不適當地引用了Yeung Sit Fong一案。本席不打算在這裡覆述細節(見日期為2010 年9 月3 日的書面陳詞)。

討論

14.上訴人所提出的理據之中,包含了一些偏激的表達,例如是他認為裁判官的錯誤判決會導到市民憎恨警察。本席當然要考慮裁判官的決定是否有錯,但如果沒有錯,其決定是否會令市民憎恨警察則不屬本案的討論範圍。

15.上訴人說不滿警長在庭上說謊作故事,而他(上訴人)在庭上說出真相則被判有罪,對他並不公平。本席要指出,裁判官曾向上訴人解釋過他有箴默權,他可以不作供(見上訴綜卷第 40 頁 N至O 行)。上訴人也表示明白自己的權利。其實裁判官主要是基於接納警長證供而作出判決,在這方面,沒有對上訴人不公平之處。就案情事實方面的裁決,本席並無機會親自見過雙方作供,所以除非裁判官在裁決原則上犯錯或是不合常理,否則本席不會隨意推翻。

16.以本案而言,爭辯的事情並不複雜。控方指上訴人在快速公路上沿著最右邊線行駛,因此違犯交通條例。上訴人就說警長對事發過程方面不盡不實,而警長向他發出通知書時指他干犯了第 56 項,他已即時向警長指出其錯誤,但警長只說沒有錯就離開,之後的表格 2又修正為56A。在這情況下,檢控程序出錯,因此他不該被定罪。

17.在相關的問題上,裁判官主要引用了上述Yeung Sit Fong一案。在考慮相同條例時,O’Connor J(當時的官階)有以下的分析:

“ It appears clear to me that subsection (1) is providing that a police officer ‘may’ give a notice under that subsection ‘offering’ the opportunity to discharge the offender’s liability. He is not obliged to do so. However if he decides to do so, the manner of his so doing is laid down in subsection (2) which provides that in the event that he decides to give a notice he ‘shall’ do so in one or other of the ways set out in subsection (2). What is provided for in subsection (3) is the procedure where the Commissioner of Police forms the opinion that proceedings ought to be taken in respect of an alleged offence. The procedure in those circumstances is that he ‘shall’ serve a notice under subsection (3) ‘demanding’ payment of the fixed penalty and he ‘shall’ serve such a notice ‘whether or not a notice has been given under subsection (1).’ In my opinion the serving of a notice under subsection (1) is not a condition precedent to the service of a notice under subsection (3). It is because a sub-section (1) notice is not a condition precedent to the serving of a subsection (3) notice, that the following words appear on p. 2 of the prescribed notice under sub-section (3):

‘Please note:

A notice under section 3(1) of the Ordinance number may already have been served on you in this case. If you have paid the Fixed Penalty specified by that notice, you should ignore this demand.’

The validity of a notice issued under subsection (3) is in no way dependent on or affected by whether a good, bad or indeed any notice has been issued under subsection (1). I consider the answer to the second question is no.” [My Emphasis]

18.本席先要指出的是,O’Connor J是在控方要求下表達進一步意見,而他也接受邀請說明他的看法。這並非是不尋常的做法,也不構成上訴人說法官是在「非自願的情況下」表達意見。本席也不認同O’Connor J是在沒有深思熟慮的情況下表達看法。

19.上述這段判詞的中心意思是,警長在現場向上訴人所發出的通知書與後來的正式定額罰款通知書可獨立發出,前者並非後者的先決條件。本席認同O’Connor J的觀點。

20.上訴人反駁指本案情況有別,他在現場已即時向警長作出澄清,但警員卻置之不理。如果這也不影響通知書的有效性那豈不是法庭在助長警員的蓄意失誤?

21.本席認為重要的是警長對錯誤的解釋。警員指出上訴人當時的情緒看來失控,又不停用中英文駡他;警長說,他是有圈錯但考慮到上訴人當時的情況是如此激動,不想與他爭吵,所以離開。他說上訴人的行為,對他的執勤構成影響(見上訴綜卷第 59 頁)。

22.上訴人作供時說他沒有說過粗口,沒有大吵大鬧,他祇是說警長very creative及very stupid(見上訴綜卷第 58 頁 R至 T)。但最後裁判官並不接納他的證詞。上訴人當然可以批評警長不應出錯,甚至在被罵時也不應該出錯。但如果警長真的是因被罵時出錯,那就不可以說他是蓄意地犯錯而誤導。

23.當警長在盤問時作出為何寫錯的解釋時,上訴人即時就提出質問如下(上訴綜卷第 60 頁 B至 F,G至K):

「問:我係“totally completely against what he told here, okay?”嗰個事實就係話,冇錯,我係講我走去投訴,警察投訴科投訴,我亦都係mention過,我係會—就算係高級督察,如果佢係犯咗—我認為係犯咗係不當行為,我都會去投訴,我係完全冇佢所謂帶佢阿媽出嚟,我唔明佢咩嘢意思,『帶佢阿媽出嚟』’okay?我亦都係冇好似佢講,打個玻璃窗會打到爛嘅,呢樣嘢,係完全係冇可能嘅一樣嘢嚟嘅,如果我打爛咗玻璃窗,我為乜打爛佢個玻璃窗?係完全係doesn’t make any sense,如果我打爛佢玻璃窗嘅話,我自己手都會受傷。

……

問:    我點樣激動法呀?我完全係,我係verbally係同你喺度講緊嘢,係,我係冇any violent acts, okay?如果係個violet act,你應該即刻call台,ask for support,啱唔啱呀?同埋你側邊係有個同事喺度嘅,你可以即場arrest me for insulting police,啱唔啱呀?你警察一定有條咁嘅條例嘛?你亦都可以開你架警察通訊器,通知你個同事,叫佢錄低我所講嘅嘢嘛,啱唔啱呀?你係完全係nonsense,乜嘢叫police integrity?你哋處長不嬲喺面前講緊嘅,我亦都係question你嘅integrity,你當差當成—82 年,已經十七年喇,啱唔啱呀?」

24.其實上訴人向警長提問時,一直都是以很長,又夾雜了評語、指責及英文字眼的問題去質疑對方。客觀來看,上訴人在裁判法院時的表現都尚且如此激動,裁判官接納警長的證供說他被罵而出錯就並非出奇,本席也沒有理由去質疑。

25.問題是,如果警員當時的錯誤是因為上訴人的激烈反應及指罵而受影響所致,上訴人又根本知道警長當時對他的真正投訴是甚麼,他的利益就不會受到影響。在這情況下,警員不能行使上訴人所指的due diligence是有原因的,並非是他蓄意作故事來誣告上訴人。

26.上訴人在書面陳詞中提到表格 1和表格 2的發出有不同時間,而當巿民收到表格 2後仍可根據表格 1去交罰款而不用理會表格 2,因此,雖然表格 1和表格 2是根據不同條款發出,但表格 1對表格 2有效與否應有決定性影響。

27.本席認為,簡單來說,當巿民收到表格 1時如發覺內容有錯,他當然可以提出抗辯;但當他見到表格 2時發覺所指條款已作出修正,而他也知道他確有干犯的話,他就可根據表格 2去交罰款。本席不認為會有表格「失效」的問題。當然,如果該巿民是否認有在快線上行駛或有其他理由,他有權到法庭提出抗辯。

28.本席認同答辯方的陳詞,上訴人的理據並不成立。

結果

29.本席會駁回上訴,維持原判。

(湯寶臣)
高等法院原訟法庭法官

答辯人: 由律政司檢控官莊君如代表香港特別行政區。
(於2010年7月27日)
由律政司高級檢控官曹任文代表香港特別行區。
(於2010年9月17日)
上訴人: 無律師代表,親自出庭。


[1] The Attorney General v Yeung Sit Fong Crim.App.No.57 of 1979.