Joseph Francis Pereira and Others v. The Queen
|
CACC000938/1971 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 938 OF 1971 -----------------
----------------- Coram: Full Court (Briggs, Huggins and Leonard, JJ.) Date of Judgment: 20th July, 1972 ----------------- JUDGMENT ----------------- 1. Various grounds of appeal were put forward by each individual Appellant. We think that the grounds which are of real substance may be summarised thus:-
2. As to this, two points are taken:-
3. As we have indicated, the first ground is that the evidence did not support a finding of conspiracy in respect of each Appellant. 4. The conspiracy alleged against all the Appellants in support of the 1st and 2nd charges was an agreement between them and others on divers dates between the 1st October 1969 and the 18th April 1970 ("the longer period") to interfere with the true running of horses by the administration of stimulants or depressants; that alleged against the 4th, 5th and 6th Appellants was an agreement of the same nature between themselves, a person surnamed Fung and others unknown on divers dates between the 1st October 1969 and the 1st March 1970 ("the shorter period"). 5. In support of the 1st and 2nd charges there was ample evidence, if believed, as against the 1st Appellant that during the longer period he, an amateur jockey, had concerned himself to stir a horse's feed; had discussed with a prosecution witness, WONG Tang-ping, means of preventing a horse from winning; had given to another prosecution witness, YUEN Leung, a packet of drugs requesting that it be given to a horse in that witness's care; had referred yet another prosecution witness, the witness VONG Cheung-leung (whose evidence will be more particularly discussed hereafter) to the 2nd and 6th Appellants concerning the drugging of a horse; had been visited at his flat on another occasion by the witness VONG Cheung-leung when he instructed VONG Cheung-leung to obtain a drug from the 6th Appellant in order to dope another horse; had secured that a horse (ridden by himself) should win by arranging for yet another prosecution witness to dope an opponent's horse; had paid another prosecution witness $1,000 because of a misunderstanding (or double-cross) in connection with that particular race; had been visited at his flat by VONG Cheung-leung and the 2nd Appellant and, having told VONG Cheung-leung that one horse in a future race had already been doped, had requested VONG Cheung-leung to arrange that another horse running in the same race should also be doped. All this evidence went to show that the 1st, 2nd and 6th Appellants together with Vong, other prosecution witnesses and others were implicated in an agreement to dope horses over the longer period. 6. As against the 2nd Appellant there was in addition to the evidence mentioned above, evidence that he, the 2nd Appellant, had in February 1970 told a prosecution witness WONG Tang-ping (not in furtherance of any conspiracy) that there were two doping groups in operation in one of which he himself was involved. VONG Cheung-leung's evidence on this matter was that the two groups - that is the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Appellants and the prosecution witnesses YUEN Leung, WONG Tsz-yung and YAU Po-kwong commenced to co-operate together after a face run on the 7th March 1970, because on that day each group had doped a horse which the other desired to win. Prior to 7th March, 1970 according to the witness, VONG Cheung-leung, one group had consistel of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th and 6th Appellants, KAN Ling-chi, WONG Tsz-yung, LAI Kei-on and himself and the other group of the 4th, 5th and 6th Appellants, CHAN Yuk, KAN Ling-chi, YUEN Leung, YU Wing-kwai, WONG Tsz-yung, LAI Kei-on, YAU Po-kwong and CHIU San-hong and VONG Cheung-leung. The 5th and 6th Appellants, VONG Cheung-leung, KAN Ling-chi, WONG Tsz-yung and LAI Kei-on were therefore members of both groups. 7. VONG Cheung-leung, WONG Tang-ping, YU Wing-kwai, KAN Ling-chi, WONG Tsz-yung all gave evidence. They spoke of a large number of incidents involving many horses and their evidence, if accepted, showed that all Appellants were in agreement to affect, with stimulants or depressants, the true running of these horses. 8. As to the third Appellant it was clear from the evidence of WONG Tang-ping, if accepted, that the 3rd Appellant told him certain horses had been doped, and had asked him to dope at least one horse, giving him powder to enable him to do so, which WONG Tang-ping subsequently threw away, although he told the 3rd Appellant that he had given it to the horse in its feed but that the horse had refused to eat. The 3rd Appellant is a Chinese doctor or herbalist and when his premises were searched no trace of drug suitable for the doping of horses was found. When on an earlier occasion he had been taxed by WONG Tang-ping with having drugged a horse he had said according to WONG Tang-ping "Don't worry. This is the kind of drug that the veterinary surgeon cannot detect. One has no way of detecting it." 9. As to the 4th and 5th Appellants they are involved in the conspiracy relating to the longer period primarily by the evidence of VONG Cheung-leung and YAU Po-kwong. The latter's evidence was to the effect that on one occasion the 4th Appellant had given him drugs to give to a horse. VONG Cheung-leung's evidence on this aspect was that in the course of their conspiracy the 5th Appellant would tell him (VONG Cheung-leung) which horses were depressed and VONG Cheung-leung would pass on that information to the 4th Appellant. VONG Cheung-leung also stated that the 4th Appellant had told him about the co-operation of the two groups which took place after the 7th March, 1970 and of his having got drugs from the 3rd Appellant. Their involvement in the conspiracy, the subject of the 3rd and 4th charges, was shown by the evidence of YAU Po-kwong to whom the 4th Appellant handed two packets to enable him to dope two horses. According to YAU Po-kwong the 5th Appellant had asked him to telephone the 4th Appellant so as to arrange the meeting at which these drugs were handed over. YUEN Leung also gave evidence involving the 4th and 5th Appellant stating that he met them on yet another occasion when the 4th Appellant gave him two packets to give to yet another pair of horses. 10. The case against the 6th Appellant was dependant almost entirely on the evidence of the witness VONG Cheung-leung but WONG Tsz-yung places him at a conversation specifically connecting the 1st, 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Appellants and the witnesses WONG Tsz-yung and LAI Kei-on over the longer period. The evidence against him in relation to the 3rd and 4th charges is again almost entirely that of VONG Cheung-leung. Evidence was led to the effect that on the 18th November, 1970 (that is after the longer period) this Appellant gave to CHIU San-hong, a mafoo, two sugar cubes asking him to give one to each of two horses. They had been hollowed out and were found to contain arsenic trioxide. This evidence was led with the permission of the Court and its having been led was not the subject of comment on the appeal. 11. When considering the effect and sufficiency of the evidence as to the two conspiracies alleged it is important to remember that the essential witnesses of incriminating circumstances are all riding boys or mafoos. They are, therefore, not persons of any considerable education and their primary interests in life necessarily revolve around horses and stables. Although they were alleged to be accomplices and co-conspirators, their evidence was of individual incidents rather than of any plan of campaign and the participation of the Appellants became apparent in the first instance as participation in a series of individual conspiracies, and double-crosses rather than as participation on two "over all" conspiracies. It is only when the evidence is examined as a whole that the picture of the two conspiracies postulated emerges. It seems to us that it must have been the picture as an entirety that the learned trial judge found convincing after his detailed examination of the brush strokes making it up. For it is from the entirety of the evidence that a common design is to be seen rather than from any one of its several parts. It is perhaps unfortunate that in considering the involvement of the Appellants with individual horses or incidents the learned judge repeatedly said that because the Appellants were co-conspirators the acts or declarations of one were evidence against the others. As this Court pointed out in CHAU Sau-tai v. Reg.(1):
The question is always whether there was evidence which could, and did, satisfy the jury (or in this case, the judge) that each of the Accused conspired in the manner charged. In a sense, therefore, the judge appeared to be assuming the very thing which the evidence under consideration was intended to prove. However, he was clearly satisfied on the evidence that each Accused was involved in the over all conspiracy and we see no reason to differ from his conclusion. 12. The defence of each of the Appellants was an outright denial of those parts of the two conspiracies in which they were alleged to have been engaged, together with, for example, in the case of the first Appellant, alibis for various times in which he was alleged to have committed overt acts from which it was sought to infer participation and planning. The several defences offered and the independent witnesses called on behalf of the defence punched some holes in the canvas of the case for the prosecution without weakening or destroying the fabric as a whole. Moreover, the evidence of the riding boys and mafoos regarding several of the individual incidents of doping "dove tails" in a way well-nigh impossible to fabricate in concert, having regard to their background. 13. We now turn to what we have called the second ground of appeal, which deals with the quality of the evidence relied upon for the conviction. 14. It is common ground that the evidence relied upon is evidence of accomplices or fellow conspirators and that that evidence was not corroborated. 15. The Trial Judge in a long and carefully prepared judgment warned himself more than once of the danger of relying on the uncorroborated evidence of accomplices. And he came to definite findings of fact as to the truthfulness or otherwise of each of the witnesses, whose evidence he accepted, both as regards those witnesses whom he found to be accomplices, and those whom he did not so find. 16. Counsel for the Appellants complain that not only were the witnesses accomplices but that their evidence was so inconsistent, reckless and unreliable, that the Trial Judge was wrong to rely upon it. In effect we are asked to say, on the strength of the printed word, and in the face of so many contradictions it was unsafe for any judge to say that he could perceive the true reason for most of them and that he was satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that he could be sure which version was true. Bearing in mind the characters of the witnesses with whom we are concerned there is a formidable argument in favour of the Appellants and it is buttressed by some slips made by the Judge. 17. The most important witness called for the prosecution was one VONG Cheung-leung. He was a mafoo. Part of the judgment consists of an appendix in which the Trial Judge lists no less than 41 alleged inconsistencies in his evidence. These include inconsistencies between this witness' evidence and the evidence of another Crown witness, as well as inconsistencies between different parts of his own evidence. Counsel also drew our attention to several further inconsistencies or contradictions in his evidence not included by the Judge in his list. 18. Some of the inconsistencies are of a trivial nature. Some are not. It was conceded by counsel for the first Appellant that each inconsistency standing alone would in his words, 'not merit a mention'. But what he complains of is that there were so many inconsistencies, that a verdict based on such evidence is an unsafe verdict. At one stage we thought that the integrity of the Trial Judge was in question. Counsel referred to the appendix to the judgment which deals with the various inconsistencies of this witness as "the Judge's apologia" - a most unfortunate phrase. Any such suggestion of improper motive, we are glad to say, was unreservedly withdrawn. 19. Counsel's real point was that the Trial Judge was 'injudicial' - and again, that was Counsel's word - in accepting the evidence of this witness. We will say at once that we cannot and do not agree with this. We consider that the judgment most clearly shows that the Trial Judge examined the evidence and assessed the evidence of this witness - indeed of all the witnesses both those called by the Crown as well as those called by the defence, with meticulous care. He only accepted part of the evidence of this witness, as was the case as far as other witnesses were concerned. This is a proper exercise of his judicial function. We can find no fault here. We do not intend to enter upon a detailed analysis of all the alleged inconsistencies and contradictions, although we have carefully considered them individually and together, but we would mention briefly several matters which were particularly emphasised. 20. Counsel for the 3rd Appellant contended that in respect of one contradiction the learned judge had accepted one version as against the 2nd Appellant and the contrary version as against the 3rd Appellant. If that were so it would be a very serious error, but counsel has not persuaded us that the judge did any such thing. We have studied the passages in the judgment to which we were referred and find no evidence to support this contention. Nevertheless there is a somewhat similar matter which we have had very much in mind. In relation to the alleged doping of a horse Nekayah by the 2nd Appellant, the 7th prosecution witness, VONG Cheung-leung, having said in examination-in-chief that the 4th Defendant told him about it and in cross-examination that the 2nd Defendant told him about it, the judge accepted the second version given in cross-examination although in relation to another horse the judge had said:
It is the reason given which is open to question, rather than the fact that the judge has chosen in the one instance to believe the evidence in examination-in-chief, and in another to believe the evidence in cross-examination. 21. On p.1547 of the Record the learned judge says in relation to the horse Happy Years:
With respect this was a non sequitur. However, we think there was ample evidence aliunde to show the 5th Appellant's involvement in the conspiracy. 22. The learned judge referred to three inconsistencies by the 1st Appellant as being "unexplained". Two of these (numbered by the judge 15 and 37) on closer examination turn out not to be inconsistencies at all. Another issue relating to the 1st Appellant was whether he was present at the race-course on the morning of 5th January 1970. The judge believed the evidence of VONG Cheung-leung that he was, in preference to the 1st Appellant's own evidence that he was not. It is contended that that finding was against the weight of the evidence, because it was said that the 1st Appellant was a lazy jockey, who would not attend the race-course in the morning unless he had to do so, and that there was evidence that on that day he did not ride in the morning gallops, which would be the only likely purpose of his attending at the race-course in the morning. Therefore, the argument runs, if he was there he must have ridden in the morning gallops, yet KAN Yee-ching, a witness who had been recording details of the gallops for twenty years, must have been assumed by the judge to have made a mistake. It is not necessary for us to speculate upon the reason why the 1st Appellant might have been at the race-course that morning. The judge may or may not have thought that Mr. Kan was mistaken. We see no reason to believe that he did not fully appreciate the significance of Mr. Kan's evidence, and the fact remains that the judge believed the 1st Appellant was present at the race-course. We cannot say he was wrong. 23. The witness, VONG Cheung-leung, was undoubtedly a member of the conspiracy. He had much to hide. He was in the witness-box for more than 32 hours and was examined by counsel for the Crown, cross-examined by the three counsel and one solicitor appearing for the Appellants and then re-examined by Crown counsel. 24. The Trial Judge therefore had an exceptionally lengthy period of time to observe his demeanour, to assess him as a person and to weigh the value of his evidence. That he did this very carefully is shown by the appendix to the judgment, to which we have already referred. 25. Except in the three cases in which the Judge found that an inconsistency was 'unexplained' with which we have already dealt, the Judge deals with each inconsistency or mistake in the appendix and makes a finding. In some instances he rejects the evidence of the witness, in others he concludes that the inconsistency is more apparent than real, or is trivial, or is due to a confused recollection owing to the long time the witness had been in the witness-box. In several instances the Judge refers to the inconsistency and accepts one version rather than another. For example during the investigation into the case by the police the witness gave a statement. This contained statements of facts of which he gave a different version when giving evidence in Court on affirmation. The Trial Judge accepted the latter and not the former version. This the Judge was certainly entitled to do. 26. When dealing with several instances of inconsistency the Trial Judge made use of an unfortunate phrase. He said more than once that he found that a particular inconsistency or mistake was trivial and "therefore" unimportant and so could be disregarded. In the context of this judgment we do not think that the Judge was dismissing from his mind all those minor matters, which are put to a witness when giving evidence to test his veracity, as was suggested by counsel. The matters referred to are questions such as - whether the witness was introduced to one of the Appellants by another accomplice before the 1969 - 70 racing season had begun, or after it had begun: or the exact date at which the witness was given his first permanent horse, and similar matters, which it must be admitted are barely relevant to the issues raised in this case. We think that what the Judge meant here was "in the event" or "in the particular instance" the inconsistency was trivial or could be disregarded. 27. In some sense the Judge laid himself open to a criticism of this nature by reason of the manner in which he dealt with the inconsistencies in his judgment. 28. In our view the Judge assessed the evidence of VONG Cheung-leung with especial care. He found him to be a witness of truth in the main and accepted his evidence after, but only after, a thorough analysis of that evidence. We accept that this was done in a proper judicial manner and we see no reason to upset this finding of the Judge. 29. What we have said above applies but to a minor extent to the other accomplice witnesses called by the prosecution. Again there were certain inconsistencies in their evidence. These were not noted individually in the case of each witness as in the case of VONG Cheung-leung but were noted and dealt with by the Judge in his judgment. It is unnecessary therefore to deal with these witnesses separately. 30. The Prosecution called a senior riding boy called WONG Tang-ping. The Judge made an express finding of fact that he was not an accomplice. The witness VONG Cheung-leung stated in evidence that the fourth Appellant had told him, Vong, that WONG Tang-ping was an accomplice. And another witness mentioned his name to the police "in connexion with the doping of horses". There was no substantive evidence that WONG Tang-ping was a member of the conspiracy. Although this was not made a separate ground of appeal counsel for the defence, Mr. P. Woo, urged that WONG Tang-ping was an accomplice and should have been treated as such. 31. It is evident from his judgment that the Judge considered this matter carefully. In a passage headed 'Assessment of Witnesses' he says speaking of this witness, WONG Tang-ping, "On the evidence as a whole I am of the view that he was suspected by his colleagues in the stables as a member of a doping group probably because of his unique position, to wit his close association with its members, and also the fact that he enjoyed the confidence of the members of the alleged conspiracy ...... . In my opinion he was not a member of any doping group nor a co-conspirator or accomplice. However it does not necessarily follow that he is therefore a completely disinterested and independent witness. He was clearly a suspect, and it is natural that he is anxious to clear his name. A witness in his position may become over zealous and exaggerate his evidence so as to present himself in a more favourable light. I accordingly warn my self that I should treat his evidence with the utmost caution. Having thus warned myself, I unhesitatingly accept him as a "witness of truth". 32. We can find no fault with this. What the Trial Judge is saying, in effect, is that the facts that the witness is a suspect and that he associates with persons who are conspirators, are not enough to make him a conspirator. Association by itself is not enough. 33. One additional ground of appeal, common to each individual Appellant, is that the Judge failed to give sufficient weight to answers elicited in cross-examination because he did not understand the nature or purpose of cross-examination in a criminal trial. We regret that this ground of appeal was put forward. It contains a reflexion upon the Trial Judge which was not only not substantiated but of which there is no evidence. Indeed the contrary is the case. Again and again the Trial Judge in his analysis of the evidence referred to and relied upon matters raised in cross-examination. 34. We also note that a substantial portion of the closing address of counsel for the 1st Appellant was devoted to an exposition of the purposes of cross-examination, so the matter was squarely before the Court. 35. The Judge clearly did not entirely approve of the manner in which some of the cross-examination was conducted and, in consequence, he attached less weight to some of the answers obtained in cross-examination. It is complained that he did not indicate his disapproval of the cross-examination at the time and thereby misled counsel. He was in a difficult position. Much evidence was led by the Crown which, though not irrelevant, was of minimal weight. It is true he could have remonstrated with counsel for the Crown and it might have been better had he done so. Once that evidence was in he had to give considerable latitude to the defence. It is not possible to adjourn legal proceedings every time a witness shows signs of being tired or confused and, as has been pointed out, there was one occasion where counsel for the defence objected to an adjournment on those grounds. A judge's duty is merely to see that the witness is treated fairly and to discourage repetition. If a witness contradicts himself it is the function of a judge sitting alone to consider whether he is, nevertheless, able to be sure of the truth. He is not obliged to tell counsel at the time what effect the evidence is having upon him. He may not stop a cross-examination, even though in his opinion it is doing the cross-examiner's case no good, if the witness is not being unfairly treated. It is often difficult to know where the line should be drawn and the judge will be slow to interfere with counsel's conduct of his case. A witness may appear to be confused, and may in fact be confused, although he does not himself realise that and although the questions put to him leave nothing to be desired in the way of clarity. Everything then turns upon the integrity, perception and wisdom of the Judge. And we have no fault to find with the integrity, perception or the wisdom of the Trial Judge in this case. 36. The next point is that the individual Appellants were prejudiced by the course the trial took. Counsel for the first Appellant quoted from the case of Daws on and Wenlook(2). The real point of the case is that to try a charge of conspiracy together with other charges of substantive fraud may be prejudicial to the defence. 37. In the present case there are no charges other than charges for conspiracy, so that case has little bearing on the present case. However it was pointed out in that case that an accused person may be prejudiced if a mass of evidence is called at his trial, the greater part of which has but little or nothing to do with the case against him. And it was for this reason that counsel referred us to that case. 38. The present trial lasted from March 22nd 1971 to December 7th 1971, but there was a break of more than six weeks from August 1st 1971, of which more anon. 39. On the first day of the trial we do not think that it was in any one's contemplation that it would last nearly as long as this. 40. The opening of the case for the Crown took up the whole of March 22nd. Counsel for the Crown outlined his case, referring to the performance of certain horses in more than seventy races. By the end of that day it must have been apparent that the case would at any rate last for a long period of time. 41. And so it did. 67 witnesses were called for the Crown: all the Appellants gave evidence and there were 8 other witnesses called for the defence. Evidence was given on the form and condition of about seventy horses, and in all, some seventy three races were dealt with. The Judge made specific findings of fact as to this in fifty one cases. 42. It is here, we think, that the case went wrong. And the fault lies with the way the case was presented. Basically this was not a difficult or a complex case. Simply put, the allegation is of a conspiracy to dope horses in order to obtain an advantage. Both stimulants and depressants were used. A conspirator knowing that a certain horse had been depressed or stimulated would be in an advantageous position when contemplating bets on the other horses running in a race in which the doped horse was running. In such a case it is the conspiracy to dope the horse which must be proved: it is of secondary importance whether a horse was or was not doped. 43. We can find nothing in the record to indicate that any objection was made to the method of conducting the case for the prosecution. Indeed there would appear to be no suggestion from the bench or by the Defence that the evidence called by the Crown as to particular races or particular horses was irrelevant. We think that it was not irrelevant. But its relevance is of such a minor nature that it can have been of but little assistance to the Court in arriving at its decision. 44. As has been pointed out above, not all the blame for the inordinate length of this trial can be placed on the shoulders of the prosecution. 45. What then should have been done? It is no part of the duty of a Trial Judge to tell the parties how to present their case. But some guidance can be given: particularly as here, when there was so much repetitive evidence. There is no doubt that counsel for the prosecution conducted his case with scrupulous fairness. This was freely acknowledged at the trial. But, as we have said, counsel in his opening speech referred to over 70 races. We think that the Trial Judge should at least have asked whether it was necessary to deal with so many races, whether it would not be enough for his case for evidence to be called as to say, ten or fifteen races only. Similarly we think that defence counsel should have objected to and refrained from repetition. 46. The point we have to decide is whether the enormous length of this trial has prejudiced the Appellants or any of them. 47. We cannot say that it has. 48. The judgment of the Trial Judge deals with the evidence for and against each Appellant separately. He followed the prosecution method of dealing with the evidence in this case, by dealing with each race and horse in which an Appellant was said to be involved - the method followed by Counsel in this Court when prosecuting this appeal. It is abundantly clear that when considering the case against each individual Appellant the Trial Judge relied on the evidence which referred to that particular Appellant and to no other evidence. The format and tenor of the whole judgment supports this view. 49. We find therefore that there is nothing in this aspect of the appeal. 50. There is one ground of appeal which is peculiar to the third Appellant. 51. It was objected by the third Appellant that the Judge allowed witnesses to refresh their memories from some race calendars. These were records, the accuracy of which was never in issue, but which were neither made by, nor contemporaneously checked by, the witness. The ruling of the Judge was:
It is a little difficult to know just what the Judge had in mind because the books contained no references to such conversations. What it was apparently sought to do was to assist a witness who could remember that there was a conversation about horses running in a particular race but who could not remember the horses actually mentioned nor even the names of the horses running in that race: but if he saw the names of the horses in the race he hoped to be able to recall the names of the horses actually mentioned. That, presumably, is what the Judge was prepared to allow because that is what in fact was done. On a strict view we have no doubt that the use of the books was open to objection. It was not for the purpose of refreshing memory in the usual sense but rather a form of prompting. It was the equivalent of a leading question - or, rather, of a number of leading questions. Leading questions are allowed every day where they are necessary to bring a witness to the point, but never where the effect is to put the substance of the witness's evidence into his mouth. It is a matter for the Judge's discretion. Although objection was taken at the trial by all the counsel engaged, only the third Appellant has taken the point on the appeal and we think rightly so. Even if the Judge was wrong the damage was not such as to entitle the third Appellant to a new trial. Had counsel for the Crown sought in the first instance to introduce the conversation by bringing to the mind of the witness the names of the horses which ran in the race in question, it is doubtful whether anyone would have objected. When he discovered that the witness could not remember the conversation directly he had to retrace his steps, thereby prompting the witness. It was the case for the Defence that the conversation had never taken place and the witness was, if the Defence were right, assisted to remember a fabricated story. On the other hand, counsel agreed at the trial that the witness could not possibly be expected to remember the dates of every race meeting. A fortiori he could not be expected to remember the names of all the horses which ran in a particular race. Although we might ourselves have excluded the books we are not prepared to say that the Judge was wrong. We find that there is nothing therefore in this point. 52. There is one matter to which we think it is necessary to refer. On June 21st 1971 it was agreed between the Judge and counsel that the Court would not sit from August 1st 1971 until September 20th 1971. It appears from page 916 of the transcript that this was for the benefit of counsel. It is proper to add that it is stated in the transcript that such an agreement was "subject to any objections from the accused themselves". The Appellants were then on bail, and there was no such objection. 53. To adjourn a criminal case for six weeks and more, in the middle of the case is a practice of which we do not approve. It is unfair to the accused, whether they are on bail or not, and it is unfair to the witnesses. It also imposes an additional strain on the trial judge whose recollection of the demeanour of a witness may well be affected. We think that in the circumstances of this case it was wrong of the Judge to accede to counsel's request, and indeed, that it was wrong of counsel to make such a request. 54. The appeals are dismissed.
Representation: Jackson-Lipkin (Woo & Kwan) for 1st Appellant Patrick Woo (T.M. Chow & Co.) for 2nd, 4th, 5th and 6th Appellants K.H. Woo (C.P. Lin & Co.) for 3rd Appellant (1) 1969 H.K.L.R. 214, 222 (2) 1960 1 All E.R. 558 |