HKSAR v. Yau Mee Kwan and Others
Read the full judgment text of CACC 96/2003 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 18 December 2003.
1 These applicants were tried in the District Court before Deputy Judge M. Jenkins upon three charges. The first alleged conspiracy to defraud upon which they were acquitted. The third charge was an alternative to the first and it was as follows:
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CACC000096/2003 CACC 96/2003 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 96 OF 2003 (ON APPEAL FROM DCCC NO. 898 OF 2001) ____________________________________
_______________________________ Coram: Hon Stuart-Moore V-P, Stock JA and Jackson J in Court Date of Hearing: 18 December 2003 Date of Judgment: 18 December 2003 ________________ J U D G M E N T ________________ Hon Stock JA (giving the judgment of the Court): Introduction 1These applicants were tried in the District Court before Deputy Judge M. Jenkins upon three charges. The first alleged conspiracy to defraud upon which they were acquitted. The third charge was an alternative to the first and it was as follows:
2In the circumstances of this particular case the efficacy of the second charge, levelled only against the second, third and sixth applicants depended, in the event, upon the outcome of the third charge, for it was a charge of dealing with property known or reasonably believed to represent the proceeds of an indictable offence, contrary to section 25 of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 455, and once the charge of conspiracy to defraud had been dismissed by the judge, the indictable offence upon which the second charge depended was pyramid selling, or a conspiracy to effect such selling. 3The applicants were convicted on 10 March 2003 on the second and third charges, and sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging between 12 to 18 months' imprisonment. They are on bail pending this application which is an application for leave to appeal against conviction and sentence. The facts 4The facts can be shortly stated. 5The applicants operated a scheme through a company called Cheung Wo International Group Ltd. That company promoted and put into effect two schemes. One was called the "Interactive Increment Development Scheme", the second the "Property Purchase Appreciation Development Plan". 6Individuals were approached and asked if they wished to do part-time work at the company. Thereafter they went to the company premises with friends where the schemes were explained to them. But it transpired that there was in fact no part-time work. Instead, they were asked to become members of the schemes by opening an account through the payment of a fee of HK$3,500. A member was entitled to open more than one account. Upon joining the scheme he had a right to introduce other members to the scheme and, if others joined, the introducer would be paid a commission, 70% of which was paid by cheque upon the introduction of the new members, and the balance of 30% was accumulated as "electronic money" which could be used by a member purportedly in exchange for products of the company. 7Members of the second scheme were referred to as property purchasers and they were required to pay HK$3,500 to join the scheme and that sum of money was purportedly to be used as a deposit for "the subscription of property in advance" and could be used, so it was said, towards the purchase of a property within one year. 8Those who joined the second scheme were again entitled to earn commission for introducing new members. The method employed to calculate the commission payable to members of the second scheme was similar to that used to calculate the commission payable in relation to the first. 9It is unnecessary for present purposes to rehearse in any detail the role of each applicant. It suffices to say that each played an active part in the company's operations. The prosecution called twenty one witnesses to establish the modus operandi of the scheme. The true nature of the scheme was well described by the learned Deputy Judge in the Reasons for Verdict:
10The evidence showed that members did not sell nor were they expected to sell, nor did they expect themselves to sell any goods. In particular, they were not buying the right to sell goods nor did the scheme envisage the onward selling of such a right. In short, this was not a scheme for the distribution of goods. They had a right to purchase the goods but that was for their own benefit if they so chose, and the amounts paid by participants to the company did not include an amount for the right themselves to on-sell goods. So too the commission that was paid was not based on the value of goods sold by the members, but was instead paid for the introduction of new members, and solely according to the number of members thus introduced. The judge's finding 11In his Reasons for Verdict, the Deputy Judge recited the provisions of section 2 of the Pyramid Selling Prohibition Ordinance, Cap. 355 and said in relation to it and to the facts which had been established as follows:
12Accordingly, the judge convicted the applicants on charge three, and as to charge two he based his conviction of the second, third and sixth applicants upon the fact that "each of the defendants knew that the earnings were the proceeds of a pyramid selling scheme." Analysis 13It is contended by this appeal, and conceded by counsel for the respondent, that the judge erred in his finding that the scheme established and operated by the applicants was one proscribed by the Ordinance. 14Section 2 of the Ordinance provides as follows:
15We have heard Mr Turnbull this morning in justification of his concession for it seemed to us at first blush that it could be argued, given the wording of the section, that if there were no goods then the section bites. The section, we have to say, was hardly drawn with clarity, and we can see perniciousness in schemes the sole purpose of which is to make money from the recruitment of other participants with no element of trading in goods at all, for such schemes which involve no more than the ongoing introduction of members might be said to be objectionable in that loss down the line is inevitable. But we are persuaded that this section assumes a scheme which envisages the selling of goods by a participant and a reward for the selling of goods. It is clear on the facts of this case that there was no sale of goods by the members of the scheme, nor was any anticipated. All that was anticipated, if it was truly anticipated at all, was that members might themselves acquire goods, although that seems to have been a peripheral aspect of the matter. 16In so far as the wording of the section may well be said to be less than clear, one is entitled to look at the statement of the minister or official who introduced the legislation: see Pepper v Hart [1993] 1 A.C. 593. What the official said in this instance supports the interpretation for which Mr Turnbull contends. In moving this legislation, the Financial Secretary said, on 11 June 1980:
Conclusion 17It seems to us therefore that the ground of appeal is made out. Accordingly, we shall grant to each applicant leave to appeal, and treating the hearing of the application as the appeal, we allow the appeal and quash the convictions in relation to each applicant on charges two and three, and set aside the sentences imposed.
Representation: Mr Michael Blanchflower, SC leading Mr Eric Kwok instructed by Messrs Ng & Partners for D1, D2, D3 and D6 Mr John Halley instructed by Messrs C.K. Mok & Co for D4 and D5 Mr R G Turnbull, SADPP and Mr Eddie Sean, SGC of the Department of Justice for the Respondent |
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