Lau Ming-lai and Others v. The Queen
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CACC000962/1981 Headnote Conviction : conspiracies to forge and to utter false identity cards. No simultaneous record of incriminating questions and answers interview with D1 : record made over 2 hours later not contemporaneous and impossible for it to be accurate : Pattinson [1974] 58 Cr. App. R. 417. Record not shown to D1 : not signed : denial by D1 : voluntary nature not in issue : Ajodha [1981] 73 Cr.App.R. 129 (P.C.) Record available if at all only for purpose of refreshing memory : not evidence itself : not corroborative : Virgo [1978] 67 Cr. App.R. 323. Conviction quashed.
BETWEEN
------ Coram: McMullin, V.-P., Li and Silke JJ.A. Date: 2 July 1982 ___________ JUDGMENT ___________ Silke J.A. : 1. The Appellants at trial faced two charges : the first being a conspiracy to forge Hong Kong Identity Cards : the second being a conspiracy to utter forged Hong Kong Identity Cards. 2. Lau Ming Lai, the first defendant, at trial - and I shall refer, to avoid confusion, to the persons before us by the defence numbering in the Court below - was convicted on both charges and now appears before us by leave of the Single Judge to appeal against both convictions. We reserved our consideration of his appeal. 3. Madam Tse Pui San, the second defendant, was also convicted upon both charges and was sentenced to one year's imprisonment on each, the sentences to run concurrently. She, being refused leave by the Single Judge in respect of her appeals against both conviction and sentence, sought to renew these applications before us. At the hearing of this appeal she asked for and was granted leave to abandon her application in respect of the convictions. She maintained her application in respect of her sentence and we in the course of the hearing allowed that application in part and varied her sentence to one of one year's imprisonment suspended for a period of two years in respect of both charges. 4. Cheung Tin Yau, the third defendant, was convicted on both charges and sentenced to two years on each concurrent. He was refused leave to appeal against both his convictions and sentence, he renewed his application in respect of both before us but at the hearing sought and was granted leave to abandon his application in respect of sentence. We refused his application for leave for reasons which will now be given. 5. Madam Chow Hill Wah, the fourth defendant, was convicted on the first count and acquitted on the second. She appeals by leave against that conviction. We allowed her appeal for reasons which will now be given. 6. Chan Shee Yu, the sixth defendant, was convicted on both counts and sentenced to three years' imprisonment on each the sentences to run concurrently. He was refused leave to appeal against both his convictions and sentence by the Single Judge and renewed his application before us in respect of his convictions. We refused his application for reasons now to be given. 7. It was the case for the Crown that the agreement to commit an unlawful act was instigated by one Yu the first prosecution witness. Yu had pleaded guilty before the appellants trial began to the offence of forging the identity cards and received a sentence of four years' imprisonment. He gave evidence - the main evidence - at the trial. 8. It was the case for the Crown that each of the appellants in his or her own way was a participant in the conspiracies charged and were thus parties to the agreement. 9. D1 was an agent for Yu and gave to him names and particulars of potential customers, got forged cards from Yu and received payment in a somewhat complicated form. He knew, it was alleged, from Yu exactly what it was that Yu was doing. Two forged identity cards were found in his premises at the time of his arrest. There was a confessional "verbal" said to have been made by D1. 10. D2, whose Chinese calligraphy was good, "out of kindness" wrote the necessary Chinese characters upon the partially completed cards and this she did in respect of at leas 100 forged cards. She received no set fee for this but did get a present of a handbag and her daughter was given a lai see packet containing $500. 11. D3 was a photographer running iris own studio. He had dealings over a period of time with Yu in the course of which he reproduced some one thousand photographs capable of being used in the making of forged identity cards. He photographed a height gauge - such gauge being an integral part of the background to the photograph of the person for whom an identity card is intended. Yu would paste a customer's photograph upon the photograph of the height gauge, bring the result to D3 who would in turn photograph the whole and reduce it to 2 cm in size so as to conform with the format of the photograph on a real identity card. He was paid a total of between $4,000 and $5,000 for his work. 12. D4 was the wife of D3. She clearly knew of that which her husband was doing. The only hard evidence to connect her with the conspiracies was the tearing up of tutu "forged" photographs which her husband had passed onto her at the time of their joint arrest. This was done in the presence of the investigating officers who were members of the Independent Commission Against Corruption. 13. Mr. Van Buuren who appeared in this Court for her, and for D1, D3 and D6, submitted, following his grounds of appeal, that that evidence was not sufficient to ground a conviction. Mr. Cotsen, who appeared for the Crown both here and below, conceded that it was not and he did not seek to uphold the conviction. In those circumstances, and being in agreement with Mr. Van Buuren's contention tae alloyed her appeal and quashed the conviction. She passes out of this matter. 14. D6, the Crown contended, had discussions with Yu as to the forging and uttering. He gave Yu $3,000 to help him buy the equipment necessary to set himself up as a forger. He produced customers for Yu sold him, at a profit to himself, certificates of identity booklets and helped, again at a profit to himself, to dispose of the completed cards. 15. Before dealing with each of the three, that is D1, D3 and D6, individually it is necessary to consider generally the nature and quality of the evidence upon which the Crown based their contentions. 16. The prime evidence was that of Yu, a several times convicted prisoner whose life style left something to be desired. He was not only an accomplice but the moving spirit of the whole criminal matter. He had pleaded guilty he said, having agreed to co-operate with the Commission by giving evidence against the Appellants, in order to get a "lesser sentence". 17. He was of that class of witness whose evidence must be considered with the greatest care and in respect of whom any Court must have clearly in the fore front of its mind the dangers inherent in that evidence before placing sufficient reliance upon it to safely proceed to a conviction. The Court must warn itself, and be seen to do so, of the possibility of such a witness of his nature giving false evidence to seeking advantage for himself. And further it must warn itself of the need to look for corroboration though it can, if it has no doubt of the truthfulness of the witness, convict without such corroboration. 18. Here the trial Judge had clearly in mind all the disadvantages that the evidence emenating from such a witness bears. He warned himself on several occasions in his very full and detailed Reasons for Verdict of the need for corroboration and of the inherently dangerous nature of such a witness. Having done so he came to the conclusion and to this we shall refer later, that he could act upon yu 's evidence without corroboration though he thought there to be in fact "corroborative aspects" of that which Yu had told the Court. 19. He said of Yu, having set out in detail his evidence, his manner of giving it and his stated reasons for the giving of that evidence:
20. Mr. Van Buuren mounted his main attack upon Yu on the basis that a witness of such a nature should never be relied upon. All very well but unfortunately where an open ended conspiracy such as this is involved those whose duty it is to investigate such matters have considerable difficulty in bring to book the conspirators without tainted evidence. 21. We invited Mr. Van Buuren to indicate to us where, if at all, the trial Judge went wrong in his evaluation of Yu and where, if at a11, he incorrectly evaluated his nature as a witness and where, if at all, he had left unconsidered matters which would have gone to Yu's credibility. He was unable to do so. 22. We accept that a witness such as Yu creates an uneasy feeling in the mind of any Court but this is not to say that his evidence must be excluded in all cases. It depends on the individual witness and the individual case and above all upon a trial Judge's assessment of the witness and of his evidence. 23. Mr. Van Buuren did seek to rely on one factor not considered by the trial Judge - that being the pending appeal of Yu against his sentence. Prior to the start of the trial Yu had been refused leave to appeal by the Single Judge and had renewed his application. This was not considered by the trial Judge for the very good reason that he was not told about it. 24. Mr. Van Buuren seeks to persuade us that if he had known he might have taken a different view of yu 's evidence. For to paraphrase Mr. Van Buuren, Yu, having said he would hang his co-conspirators has carried out his promise and might ask the Court of Appeal to treat him more leniently than did the sentencing Judge. The fallacy in this argument is that the sentencing Court passed the sentence it did in the full knowledge of Yu' s co-operation and of his intention to give evidence. Had he resiled from that intention it might well be that the Court of Appeal would come to the conclusion that Yu had acquired a lesser sentence under false pretences and would have taken that into consideration in the determination of his appeal. We do not think the contrary to be the case. In the event, and for the record, Yu's application to appeal against sentence was refused. 25. We do not think considering the reasons he gave that the conclusions reached by the trial Judge as to his evaluation of Yu's evidence can be faulted. Nor do we think the unknown factor would have affected these conclusions had the trial Judge been aware of it. Though we do express some surprise that it was not drawn to his attention. 26. We shall deal with the applications of D3 and D6 before going on to consider the appeal of D1. 27. D3 Cheung Tin Yau 28. He was as I have said the photographer. 29. It is correct that Yu said that he did not inform him in terms of the reason why he wanted the somewhat unusual photographs. It is however quite clear both from Yu's general evidence in respect of this defendant and from the defendant's own statement - the voluntary nature of which was uncontested - that D3 must have known exactly what was going on and participated in it. He gave no evidence in the course of the trial. 30. In his statement made on the 14th March 1981 commencing at 11.01 a.m. he told of Yu's bringing in July or August 1980 several negatives and of his asking D3 to develop 1½" x 1" or 1" x 1¼" photographs for him. 31. Also in August Yu brought two negatives, one depicting the front the other the reverse of an identity card, to D3. He wanted clearer negatives but D3 was unable to carry out his wishes. 32. In October 1980 two photographs with a height chart shown on them were brought by Yu and D3 was asked to photograph the photographs and produce negatives and front those negatives develop three photographs of the same size of each. 33. D3 "felt that this hind of photograph was used to make identity cards". He asked Yu about this and was told not to bother. 34. From then on every one or two days photographs which contained a height gauge were brought by Yu and the same system of getting a negative and developing photographs from that negative was followed. In December, suspecting that his photographs were "probably used" to make forged identity cards, D3 asked Yu was this so and was told to mind his own business. 35. In about January 1981 Yu brought photographs of a height gauge and D3 went through the seine process with these. 36. All this is very much in line with the evidence given by Yu. 37. Two grounds of appeal were advanced by Mr. Van Buuren. The first is clearly misconceived and is based on a misreading of the evidence. The second was to the effect that the trial Judge erred in finding corroboration of Yu's evidence against D3 in D3's cautioned statement. It was submitted that this statement revealed mere recklessness which, of itself, would not be sufficient to prove the guilt of D3 on the charges of conspiracy. Further it did not prove that D3 pros aware of the use Yu would make of the photographs. 38. We do not think there is any substance in this ground. If D3 pretended to close his eyes to the consequences of his acts his attempt at self deception was unsuccessful. There was ample evidence to show that he knew full well what he eras doing and of his participation in the unlawful act. His statement is clearly corroborative in its tendency to implicate him in the crimes with which he was charged. 39. We find the Judge was correct, having fully considered the possibility of D3's innocent involvement, in coming to the conclusion that D3 was a conspirator. We refusedhis application for leave to appeal against conviction. 40. D6 Chan Shee Yu 41. The evidence against D6 consisted of that from Yu and that contained in his contested cautioned statement. 42. Apart from the general ground as to Yu 's unreliability as a witness the specific grounds argued on D6's behalf related to the admission of that cautioned statement. 43. Without setting out in full all nine grounds the substance of them is first : that the trial Judge did not seem to consider all the objections raised as to its voluntary nature but based his ruling on the one ground that it had not been made as a result of something said or done by a person in authority : this related to D6's evidence - he gave evidence both in the trial within a trial and on the general issue - that he was induced to make his statement by a promise that he would become a Crown witness; second, that he gave fuller reasons for his refusal to admit the statements of a co-accused than he did in admitting those of D6 thus failing to exercise "proper care and caution"; third, that the incriminating statement was the last in a line of four statements made at intervals over a period of two days and that it tress made as the result of persistent and oppressive questioning; fourth, that the Judge did not state, having warned himself of the necessity of seeking corroboration in respect of Yu's evidence, whether or not the incriminating statement, Exhibit P15, afforded such corroboration. 44. The evidence as to what had happened was this : 45. D6 was arrested on the 2nd April. The first statement was a record of an interview by the investigators with D6 and taken in the form of question and answer with a caution being administered. It commenced at 10.35 a.m. and concluded at 12.30 p.m. - two hours duration. It related to the reason for his arrest, to his working places and his habits, to his pager and its history, his knowledge of Yu and his meetings with him and the attempted borrowing by Yu's girlfriend of money from him to pay a lawyer to appear on behalf of Yu. 46. That which Yu had said in a statement concerning D6 was brought to his attention and he denied its truth. D6 signed the record. 47. The next statement was the notes of an interview begun at 14.55 on the 2nd April and ending at 15.50 - one hour. It is in abbreviated question and answer form and was not made contemporaneously with the interview itself. It was not signed. 48. The third was a record of an interview begun at 15.25 hours and concluding at 16.20 hours on the 3rd April - again one hour. Again a caution was administered and it concerned D6's pager, which object always seems to have a fascination for investigators, his knowledge of Yu, the attempted borrowing by Yu's girlfriend, D6's own occupation and it ended with the request for bail made by D6. It tress signed. 49. None of these statements were incriminating and the Crown did not seek to rely upon them - nor indeed to produce them in evidence. They were introduced, through the witnesses concerned, at the request of the defence. In the course of his evidence in the wire dire the Applicant had no complaints to make in respect of the first two. 50. The fourth statement (Exhibit P15), and the one upon which the Crown sought to rely and the admissibility of which was contested, was in the form of a record of an interview which began at 20.20 hours and was completed at 23.05 hours on the 3rd April. It was signed by D6. Shortly after it was completed D6 was bailed out. 51. On the face of it the question asked did not amount to cross-examination or anything like it. 52. The objections raised at trial were these : that the statement was in the form of question and answer : that continued questioning over the 2nd and 3rd April had sapped the will of the accused : that it was induced by an offer of bail which would be granted only after D6 had signed : that D6 was bullied generally by different investigators from the Commission : that it was induced by the promise of being a prosecution witness : that it was a fabrication at least in part. 53. It was the Crown's case that immediately prior to the recording of D6's answers in the 4th interview he had been seen by Mr. Chan Chor Keung (PW15), the Officer-in-Charge of the investigation. Certain matters were drawn to the attention of D6. He was asked to comment and his reply was in the form of a question as to whether he would be charged or not. He was told that that decision rested with the Legal Department. He asked if he could be a witness if he told the truth and again was told that this was a matter for the Legal Department. 54. D6 then said he would like to think it over - this being about 8 p.m. After a little time for thought D6 said he would like to tell the truth and the interview under caution then took place. 55. In the course of his evidence in the trial within a trial D6 spoke of the first three "statements", supported the allegation that he was induced to sign Exhibit P15 by promises and stated that which appeared in Exhibit P15 was dictated by the investigators and was not his own words. 56. All these were maters considered and rejected by the trial Judge. While he did not specifically refer to oppression he had, in the course of his ruling which covered both the statement of the co-accused which he ruled out and that of D6 which he admitted, directed himself on the law as it is contained in Ibrahaim v. Rex (1), in Prager (2) and in LoSun Wah (3). He clearly had the question of long interrogation and oppressive questions in mind. 57. He rejected the offering of an inducement. He gave his reasons for finding the statement to be voluntary and he clearly rejected the allegation of pressure or oppression. 58. Nothing that has been advanced to us in argument shows the Judge to have been wrong in doing that which he did. Each case depends on its own circumstances and, while that which was said in Lo Sun Wah v. The Queen (3) bears repetition :
we think the trial Judge adopted the right criteria in his consideration of the voluntary nature and the admissibility of D6's statement. 59. That statement clearly implicated D6 in the offences charged. That the trial Judge did not apparently seek its aid expressly as corroboration is neither here nor there. He was aware of it and of its contents, he put weight upon it while at the same time ruling that he accepted Yu as a truthful witness upon whom he was prepared to rely even without corroboration. 60. That being the case there was ample evidence upon which he could reach the conclusion that D6 was a part of the conspiracies charged. We would refuse D6 leave to appeal against his conviction. 61. D1 Lau Ming Lai 62. This defendant is in a somewhat different position. 63. He was implicated in the conspiracies as charged by Yu' s evidence. There was then introduced into evidence a record of an interview which took place over a period of half an hour on the 15th March - from 10.35 a.m. to 11.02 a.m. This was incriminating and the Crown sought to rely upon it. Immediately upon this interview, which was by way of question and answer, concluding there was recorded a cautioned statement marked provisionally as PP10. The Crown neither sought to rely upon nor to produce this statement. It should have been handed back and nothing more heard of it. For some reason, which is not clear, the prosecution witnesses were cross-examined upon it and upon the circumstances of its making. Its "admission", if I may use that term, is the subject of a ground of appeal - the second ground - of which more later. 64. No record was made of the 10.30 a.m. interview at the time it took place. Sometime after 1 p.m. the same day and after the statement PP10 had concluded the interviewers - there had been interpretation by one of them - got together and from their joint recollection entered up the notebook, Exhibit P9, with that which purported to be a correct record of the questions asked and the answers given some two and one half hours beforehand. Fourteen questions, some lengthy, and an equal number of answers all detailed, were set out. These covered, including the recording of the caution, some one hundred and eight lines or 9¼ pages, of a notebook similar to a police notebook. The record was not signed by D1 and he was later to say that he had never seen it until its production in Court. 65. Mr. D.P. Whelan (PW5) gave evidence as to the taking of the "statement" and made reference to the 10.35 a.m. interview. He sought to tender the notebook, which was in fact his, to the Court. 66. The sequence then was that objection was taken by Counsel then appearing for D6 as to the voluntary nature of the "statement". The Court took its mid morning break and upon the resumption Mr. Cotsen requested that the witness "read out his notebook all that was said in the questions and answers interview with D1." 67. The defence said - and we think it should be set out in full-
68. Mr. Cotsen then addressed the Court making reference to "voluntary" and "admissible". I suspect this portion of the record may be corrupt for he went on, which was perfectly correct "allegation that conversation never took place is purely a matter of evidence for you to decide in due course." 69. The Judge, having correctly set out the defence objections, ruled:
70. The witness proceeded to do just that and it was then that Counsel for the Crown informed the Court that he did not intend to seek to admit the statement PP10 but did seek to admit the notebook. 71. All this, with respect to all concerned, was the wrong course to take. 72. First of all the voluntary nature of that which was alleged to have been said at the interview was not in issue. It fell squarely within the fourth category set out in Ajodha (4) where Lord Bridge, in setting out the opinion of the Board, said at page 139 :
73. It may be that the trial Judge appreciated this here, for he does not appear to have held a voire dire, but the Ruling which I have earlier quoted is somewhat unclear and, in the course of his Reasons for Verdict, he did make reference to finding Exhibit P9 "admissible". 74. What should have happened was for the Crown to seek the Court's permission for the witness to refresh his memory from the notebook. This request would immediately have led to the issue of the contemporaneous nature of the recording coming into being. Had this been done the mind of the trial Judge would have been alerted to the unsatisfactory nature of the recording of the so called verbal. No matter how close to the time when the interview took place the record was made it must be and manifestly was unreliable as being a correct record. We do note in his evidence on the general issue that D1 said some of it was correct and some was not. 75. In Pattinson(5) the Court of Appeal in England had a similar issues for consideration. 76. Pattinson, who had gone to Mexico soon after a robbery, returned to England. He was arrested and while in custody and after being charged asked if he could have a shave. He was told he could and two policemen supervised him. While shaving Pattinson started to talk in a disjointed fashion. The police listened, made no comment and when he finished, they went away. In the course of that disjointed conversation, which took place over a twenty minute period, Pattinson had, for the first time, made admissions. About an hour or so later the police wrote in their notebooks what they remembered Pattinson as having said. 77. Of this Lawton L.J. at p.423 said:
78. At p.426 the Lord Justice, having considered the provisions of the Criminal Appeal Act 1966, similar to ours, said :
And Pattinson' s conviction, based as it was solely on the shaving admissions, was quashed. 79. This Court does not like this sort of evidence either. No note was made by either of the investigators at the time that D7 was speaking. We feel, strongly, the sheer impossibility of recording with any accuracy the questions asked and answers made to them, in particular of such length as is for consideration here, two and one half hours later or, indeed, even immediately after the conversation. And it must be remembered that the interview took place through interpretation. We do not see how it could possibly come any way close to being the ippissema verbs of either the questioner or the one making the replies. 80. It is unclear from Pattinson(5) whether or not the prosecution there sought to introduce into evidence the notebook record. But be that as it may we do not think here it could have or should have been admitted. Its sole purpose was and should have been the refreshing of the memory of the witness concerned. The danger of admitting such a record into evidence is amply illustrated in Virgo (6) 81. There a witness was permitted to refer to diaries to refresh his memory as to dates. Copies or the diaries were before the jury. The trial Judge directed the jury that the diaries were the most important documents in the case against the appellant, pointing to a corrupt relationship between him and the witness and that although they did not amount to corroboration in law, they were very important in relation to the witness' evidence. The witness was an accomplice and corroboration was important. 82. Virgo appealed and it was held:
The appeal was allowed. 83. We feel here that there was a very real danger that the notebook itself, having become the evidence, was considered as corroboration whereas it should merely have been available for the refreshing of the memory of the witness. It was the witness' oral evidence, should he have been able to give it, and only that which would have been the evidence to be considered. 84. Before considering the actual use the trial Judge made in his Reasons for Verdict of both the notebook and the statement, there are two further grounds of appeal for consideration. The first is that the trial Judge misdirected himself in fact and the Crown concede that he did so. 85. What the Judge said was this :
86. In making this finding of fact, upon which in part at least he based his finding of guilt, the trial Judge was wrong as to the arrangement for a loan. The evidence was that D6 arranged such a loan not D1. 87. It is the context of this misdirection that makes it of moment and it will fall to be considered in a moment in the light of the overall safety of the conviction of D1. 88. The second is that Yu, in the course of his examination in chief, volunteered the information he had met D1 in prison. The passage is as follows:
He later identified Sai Ngan as D1. 89. No objection was taken by Counsel and it must be remembered that this was a trial before a Judge sitting alone. 90. In the course of his cross-examination Counsel then representing D1 asked questions which elicited from Yu answers which gave much greater detail of the prison and other meetings between D1 and Yu. Yu said he had met D1 in prison in Chimawan in 1974, in 1975 outside prison, in 1976 inside prison, in 1979 inside prison and in 1980 outside prison. 91. There seems little doubt that Counsel had a purpose to serve by asking the questions which elicited those answers. Had there been a jury present he might well have hesitated but appearing before an experienced Judge he would have been entitled to expect these matters not to be weighed in the balance as against his client. We have little doubt that his expectation was fulfilled though it might have been better had the trial Judge expressly said so. 92. We do not think this to be a ground which would afford much relief to the appellant. 93. Now to consider the use the trial Judge made of the evidence which should never have been before him in the first place. 94. In the middle of his consideration of the evidence of D1, in particular that as to his lack of knowledge of the presence of two forged identity cards in his home which D1 said he had never seen before their discovery, the trial Judge said:
95. At its lowest this passage would appear to indicate that the trial Judge had at least in mind a piece of evidence which had not been placed before him by the prosecution. 96. The Judge then went on over the next several pages to consider the rest of the evidence in chief and of the answers in cross-examination of D1. 97. Then comes the reference to Exhibit P9 - the notebook - and that which D1 said in respect of it and its contents. It was after this that the trial Judge stated his capability of acting on Yu's evidence without corroboration but made reference to the "corroborative aspects " he believed to exist. 98. He absolved the ICAC of any impropriety in their dealings with D1 after his arrest and went on to make certain findings one of them being as to the voluntary nature and admissibility of the notebook - a finding to which we have already referred. He used these terms :
He went on :
99. It appears to us from the passages just quoted that while the Judge was prepared to accept that Yu was a witness of credit and that he was prepared to act upon his uncorroborated evidence he nevertheless looked for and found "corroborative aspects" of Yu's evidence from that which, in the case of D1 in any event, was in no way capable of being corroboration. He had earlier looked for, and quite properly found, corroboration of Yu's evidence as to D3 in D3's confessional statement which fortifies, to an extent, the view we take. The Judge then misdirected himself on fact in the manner I have mentioned earlier. In the context this was a material misdirection. 100. While the evidence of Yu might well of itself have been sufficient to ground the conviction of D1, the trial Judge clearly made use of that which was inadmissible and that which was factually wrong to fortify his findings that D1 was guilty of the conspiracies charged. 101. We find ourselves unable to say that without such fortification he would inevitably have come to the same conclusion. 102. We think D1's conviction to be unsafe and not to be one to which the proviso should be applied. 103. While we have considered the question of a retrial we do not think, given the nature of the witness Yu and the type of offence here charged that it is in the public interest to so order The appeal of D1 against his convictions on both charges is therefore allowed. 104. The net result of this appeal is that the convictions of D1 are quashed and his sentence set aside : the convictions of D2 are affirmed but her appeal against sentence is allowed in part : the application for leave to appeal by D3 is refused and his convictions affirmed : the appeal against conviction by D4 is allowed and her conviction quashed : the application for leave to appeal by D6 is refused and his convictions affirmed. (1) [1914] A.C. 599 (2) [1972] 56 C.A.R. 151 (3) [1980] H.K.L.R. 253 (4) [1981] 73 C.A.R. 129 (P.C.) (5) [1974] 58 Cr.App.R. 417 (6) [1978] 67 Cr.App.R. 323 Representation: Brian Van Buuren Esq. (Wing Sum Lo & Co.) for A1, 3, 4 and 6. Thomas Khan Esq. (Philip S.W. Wong & Co.) for A2 S.H. Cotsen Esq. for Crown/Respondent. |