Lok Shau Investment Co Ltd v. M. P. Surtani
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ACTION NO. 2831 OF 1971 ----------------- BETWEEN
----------------- Coram : Briggs, J. in Court ------------------------ J U D G M E N T ------------------------ 1. By a tenancy agreement in writing dated October 11th 1968 the Plaintiff leased the fourth floor of No.97A Robinson Road to the Defendant. The rent was $800 per month. 2. The Plaintiff’s case is that the lease was for two years from November 1st 1968 to October 31st 1970 with the option to the Defendant of a renewal of a lease for the further term of one year. The Defendant exercised his option to renew. On May 24th 1971, the Plaintiff served the Defendant with a Notice to Quit under the provisions of the Tenancy (Notice of Termination)Ordinance, which provided for the termination of the lease on November 30th 1971. The Defendant has held over and these proceedings are brought for the recovery of possession of the premises. 3. Nothing turns on the validity of the Notice of Termination of the lease. The sole point at issue is the true meaning of the lease itself. 4. The Defendant says that the lease gave him an option to reduce a lease of two years to a lease of one year. And that this means that the lease is too vague to enforce. Since he has been in occupation paying his rent month by month, he has become and must be treated as a monthly tenant. He is therefore entitled to the benefit of the provision of the Rent Increases (Domestic Premises) Control Ordinance. The Notice to Quit with which he has been served has no relevance since the Tenancy (Notice of Termination) Ordinance has no application. 5. The agreement for the lease states that the Plaintiff shall let the premises to the Defendant - and I quote:‑ “for the term of two (option 1 year) yearsfrom the 1st day of November 1968 to the31st day of October 1970 ….” 6. The Agreement is endorsed with the names of the parties, and a description of the premises. In addition the term of the lease is expressed to be for 2 years. The dates of the length of the period of the lease are given and the amount of rent mentioned. In addition it is stated that there is an option for a lease for a period of oneyear. 7. It is obvious to me that the agreement for a lease provides for a term of two years certain with an option to renew for one year. 8. But the matter is put beyond all reasonable doubt by the fact that on June 3rd 1970, when the second year of the lease had more than 6 months to run, the Defendant wrote a letter to the Plaintiff seeking to exercise his option. 9. This letter unequivocally states that the Defendant had an option for the renewal of the lease for one year from November 1st 1970 to October 31st 1971. The agreement itself is referred to and it is stated that the option is on the same terms as are contained in the original lease. 10. The Defendant said that this letter was too vague to be binding. In my view that is not so. It is a clearly expressed wish to exercise the option under the lease. 11. That option was exercised and the Defendant has had the benefit of it. He was never a monthly tenant of the Plaintiff. And it follows that the Rent Increases (Domestic Premises) Control Ordinance does not apply. A proper Notice to Quit has been served. And the Plaintiff is entitled to possession of the premises. 12. The Plaintiff produced evidence to show that immediately before the date on which the Notice of Termination became effective they entered into an agreement to lease the flat for three years from December lst 1971 at the rent of $2,150 per month. They have not been able to carry out their part of this bargain as the Defendant has remained in possession. They have therefore lost the benefit of this bargain. In my view they are entitled to recover damages at the rate of $2,150 per month and not merely mesne profits at the rate of $800 per month as from December 1st 1971 until the date possession is given up. 13. There will be judgment for the Plaintiff for possession of the premises with $17,200 damages; there will be a stay of execution untilAugust 1st 1972. The Plaintiff is to have the costs.
M. Asome (S. Lo & Lo)for Plaintiff Defendant in Person |