Cheng Cheung Wang v. Lo Noi Yung and Others

Read the full judgment text of CACV 44/1986 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment.

1. By way of introduction I may refer to part of a judgment of this Court given on the 15 th October –

Case No.CACV 44/1986
Court
Court of Appeal
Date
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

1986, Nos. 44, 45, 156, 161
(Civil)

BETWEEN

CHENG CHEUNG WANG
applying upon behalf of self and co-owners hereinafter listed of 47 of the flats in the Han Palace Building
Plaintiff/
Respondent
and  
LO NOI YUNG 1st Defendant/
1st Appellant
PETER LAW 2nd Defendant/
2nd Appellant

KATHERINE WONG
3rd Defendant/
3rd Appellant

WONG PIK YIU
4th Defendant/
4th Appellant

JOHN LAW
5th Defendant/
5th Appellant
WONG CHING
(All members of the Management Committee of the Han Palace Building)
6th Defendant/
6th Appellant

SAM WO BROTHERS CO. LTD.
7th Defendant/
7th Appellant

______________

Coram: Hon. Cons, V.-P., Kempster & Hunter, JJ.A.

Date of hearing: 1st December 1987

Date of delivery of judgment: 1st December 1987

______________

JUDGMENT

______________

Cons, V.-P.

1.  By way of introduction I may refer to part of a judgment of this Court given on the 15th October –

“Finally we should add that this piece of litigation has already come before various divisions of this court in various guises. Each time the court then constituted has had to grapple with a very complicated task. We have been told this afternoon that four appeals are outstanding. We propose to give the following directions as to the hearing of those appeals, and any related applications.

2.  First they should be brought on at the earliest possible moment. Secondly that they should be brought on before a court constituted as the present court is constituted, - (i.e. Silke V.P. and Kempster and Hunter JJ.A.), - if that is possible. If that is not possible then they should be brought on before a court presided over by Silke, V.P.”

3.  That was not possible in the present instance because the order which this afternoon we are asked to vary is an order made by Silke V.P. himself.

4.  The present position is that the four appeals mentioned in that quotation are fixed to be heard on the 16th of this month and the following days. They were so fixed on the 25th September this year. That was presumably done with counsel’s commitments in mind, for this Court had so directed even earlier.

5.  On the 13th November a Notice of Motion was issued. It made two requests. Firstly, that the hearing dates of two of those appeals should be vacated and refixed to suit the convenience of counsel; secondly, that there should be a variation of the hearing date given to another motion originally taken out on the 18th August, and subsequently amended by order of this Court on the 16th September, which is this coming Thursday i.e. the 3rd December. The motion in effect asks that the further two appeals be struck out. The motion of the 13th November asked that that motion and – (I assume if the motion were rejected) – the two further appeals be heard instead on the 16th December.

6.  The reason given for the requested variations was that the Appellants wished to instruct London counsel who was not available on the dates set down.

7.  The motions came on for hearing before Silke, V.-P. It may be that he did not appreciate their true effect for he treated them as an application to vacate the hearing dates in respect of all the appeals. Indeed a document headed “Draft speech of counsel” which has somehow found its way into our papers indicates that counsel who appeared on that occasion was under the same misunderstanding. In any event Silke, V.-P. refused to vacate the hearing dates of any of the appeals. He felt that the Appellants had had sufficient time to do what was necessary; that the litigation had been in progress for a very considerable period; and that it should be accorded finality as soon as possible in accordance with the directions already given. However he accepted that the motion of the 18th August should be heard on the 16th December as a preliminary matter and further directed that the appeal bundles should be served and filed seven days before the hearing. That is of course in accordance with the general rules laid down, but he felt, not surprisingly, that a specific direction in the circumstances of this litigation might be helpful. He ordered that the Defendants should bear the costs of the application on an indemnity basis.

8.  That was on the 18th November. On the 26th November the 1st to the 5th Defendants inclusive and the 7th Defendant took out a notice to vary his order asking that the dates of all the appeals should be vacated and then refixed in accordance with the diary of their London counsel, and that the costs here and below – I assume it is meant of the previous hearing – he costs in the cause. A similar notice was issued the following day by the 6th Defendant. She added, as a further ground, that she was in ill health.

9.  In support of these notices three affirmations have been filed. The first is by the Attorney of the 1st-5th and 7th Defendants. Exhibited thereto is an affidavit from the London counsel in question. It was drafted in support of an application to be admitted to the local bar, although we understand that as yet no application has in fact been made.

10.  The second is an affirmation by the 6th Defendant adopting the first affirmation on behalf of herself and the 7th Defendant, who had authorized her so to do.

11.  The third is a further affirmation from the 6th Defendant which indicates, as we understand is now the fact, that she was going into hospital yesterday evening, and invites us to hear her application in her absence. W have no indication as to how long she is likely to remain in hospital.

12.  As I mentioned a moment ago no application has yet been made for the admission of London counsel. As I understand the position taken by the court with regard to the admission of London counsel for particular cases – other than silks – counsel will only be admitted if they possess some particular expertise which is lacking in the local bar and which is necessary for the proceedings in question. There is no evidence before us that the London counsel in question has any particular expertise. As far as I can see from the paper put before us, these appeals do not in any event require any particular expertise. In my view it is most unlikely that London counsel will in fact be admitted and delay for that purpose is unnecessary.

13.  As far as the 6th Defendant is concerned, again as I mentioned earlier, we have no indication as to how long she is likely to remain in hospital. However I note that she too relies on the need for London counsel so that, although at the moment she is unrepresented and has been so since two days after the last proceedings, it appears likely that she does intend to be represented on the appeals. In that circumstance it seems relatively unimportant, when set against the inordinate length of time already taken by this litigation, that she herself, should that be the case, will still be in hospital. I would echo the comment of Silke, V.-P., it is high time these matters were settled.

14.  For my part therefore I would refuse the motion.

(D. Cons)
Vice-President

Kempster, J.A.:

15.  I agree and have nothing to add.

(M. Kempster)
Justice of Appeal

Hunter, J.A.:

16.  I also agree.

(D.S. Hunter)
Justice of Appeal

Miss Margaret Austin (M/s Richard Bryson & Co.) for Plaintiff/Respondent

Jeffrey Lung (M/s Fred Kan & Co.) for 1st to 5th and 7th Defendants/1st to 5th and 7th Appellants

WONG Ching 6th Defendant, absent

Other Judgments in This Case

Further hearings and rulings under CACV 44/1986