Wong Ka Man v. Tang Ka Lun and Others

Case No.HCMP 1532/2011
Court
High Court CFI
Date11 Oct 2011
Judge
Case Document
100%

HCMP 1532/2011

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 1532 OF 2011

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM DCPI NO. 1720 OF 2009)

____________________

BETWEEN

  WONG KA MAN Plaintiff
and
  TANG KA LUN 1st Defendant
  FU KAM WING 2nd Defendant
  NG MAN 3rd Defendant
  WAH KEE SEA LAND TRANSPORTATION 4th Defendant
  LIMITED  
  SIT TIM MAU 5th Defendant
and
  CHEUNG TAK WAI 1st Third Party
  NG KAM SHEUNG 2ndThird Party

____________________

Before: Hon Tang VP in Chambers

Date of Judgment: 11 October 2011

_______________

JUDGMENT

_______________

1.In a collision which involved 7 vehicles, 6 of which were travelling along the 2nd left lane of Kowloon-bound Tuen Mun Highway, the Plaintiff, who was a passenger in the 5th Vehicle in the chain, a public light bus ("PLB"), suffered minor. As a result, she sued a total of 5 defendants. In turn the Defendants took out third party proceedings against the 1st and 2nd Third Parties.

2.Mr Joseph Vaughan, counsel for the 1st, 2nd and 5th Defendants, in his skeleton submissions, produced a diagram showing the line of vehicles involved in the chain collision.  It is reproduced below:

Line of vehicles involved in the chain collision

'1st Collision'
LR6924 ('1st Vehicle')


KE8236 ('2nd Vehicle')1

'2nd Collision'
KF6576 ('3rd Vehicle')


KX8860 ('4th Vehicle')2

'3rd Collision'3
CX7321 ('5th Vehicle')4

'4th Collision'
LS6808 ('6th Vehicle')5

1   Driven by D1 and owned by D2

2   Driven by D3 and owned by D4

3   In paragraph 8 of the Judgment, the learned Deputy Judge referred to the 3rd Collision as between the 4th and 3rd Vehicles.  It is understood that he must have been referring to the 4th and 5th Vehicles instead.

4   Driven by 1st TP and owned by 2nd TP

5   Driven and owned by D5

3.The 1st Defendant was the driver of the 2nd Vehicle (the 2nd Defendant, the owner) which was a medium goods vehicle bearing the registration number KE8236 ("2nd Vehicle"). The 3rd Defendant was the driver of another medium goods vehicle owned by the 4th Defendant with the registration number KX8860 ("4th Vehicle").  The 5th Defendant was the driver and owner of the 6th Vehicle – another medium goods vehicle bearing registration number LS6808.

4.The 5th Vehicle was CX7321, a bus which was driven by the 1st Third Party and owned by the 2nd Third Party.

5.As a result of the accident, the 1st, 3rd and 5th Defendants were charged with and convicted of careless driving.  The 1st and 5th Defendants pleaded guilty to the charge, and the 3rd Defendant was convicted after trial.

6.After trial, Deputy District Judge Victor Dawes found the 1st, 2nd and 5th Defendants to be liable in negligence to the Plaintiff.  He awarded the Plaintiff damages (agreed at) HK$140,000 to be apportioned as to 30% to the 1st and 2nd Defendants, and 70% to the 5th Defendant.

7.This is the 1st, 2nd and 5th Defendants' ("these Defendants") application for leave to appeal against the decision, leave having been refused by the learned Deputy Judge on 29 July 2011.  The learned judge's reason for refusing leave to appeal was handed down on 29 July 2011.

8.The hearing before the Deputy Judge took place between 11 and 13 August 2010.  The 1st Defendant did not give evidence.  The 3rd and 5th Defendants gave evidence.  So did the 1st Third Party.

9.This is what the learned judge said about the 1st Plaintiff's evidence which he accepted:

"(b)   The Collisions

5.   The plaintiff alleged that upon reaching near chainage 61.2 (Sham Tseng), the 1st Vehicle slowed down to cope with the road condition ahead.  There was suggestion that it was because a dog was running across the road.

6.   The 1st defendant failed to stop in time causing the front part of 2nd Vehicle to hit the rear of 1st Vehicle ('1st Collision').  The 2 vehicles stopped on the Lane after the 1st Collision.

7.   The 3rd Vehicle was immediately behind the 2 vehicles and it had stopped in time to avoid any collision with the 2nd Vehicle.  However, for reasons that are in dispute, the 3rd defendant did not manage to avoid the collision between the 3rd and 4th Vehicles. ('2nd Collision'). 

8.   The last 2 vehicles involved also failed to avoid collisions.  It is common ground that: (i) 4th Vehicle collided with the (5th Vehicle) ('3rd Collision'); and (ii) the 6th Vehicle collided with the 5th Vehicle ('4th Collision'). 

9.   It should be noted that the abbreviations '2nd Collision', '3rd Collision' and '4th Collision' are used for convenience only as the causes and sequences of the collisions are in dispute.  Both the 3rd defendant and the 1st Third Party claimed that they managed to stop their vehicle in time to avoid hitting the vehicle in front.  However, as a result of being hit by the vehicle from the back, their respective vehicle was pushed forward which resulted in a further collision with the vehicle in front.

10.   On the other hand, the 5th defendant argued that although he had failed to stop the 6th Vehicle in time to avoid hitting the 5th Vehicle, the impact of the collision was mild and he had almost managed to stop in time.  In any event, the 5th Vehicle had already collided with the 4th Vehicle before it was hit by the 6th Vehicle from the back.  In other words, the 4th Collision had nothing to do with the 3rd Collision."

10.In discussing the liability of the 1st and 2nd Defendants, the learned judge was influenced by the fact that so far as the 1st Defendant was concerned, although he did not give evidence, when he pleaded guilty to the charge of careless driving, he had admitted that:

"… the vehicle in front (i.e. the 1st Vehicle) merely slowed down and did not come to a complete stop and the problem was caused by the 1st collision. …"

11.On that basis that he found the 1st Defendant negligent in failing to keep a safe breaking distance which resulted in the 1st collision.

12.Although the 3rd Defendant was convicted after trial, he found that there was no causal link between the 2nd collision (and the conviction of the 3rd Defendant) with the so-called 3rd collision.

13.So far as the 5th Defendant is concerned, he found that the 5th Defendant liable because of his failure to keep a safe braking distance and to stop his vehicle in time thereby contributing to the injuries suffered by the Plaintiff.

14.So far as the 1st Third Party was concerned, the learned judge was not satisfied with the evidence of the 5th Defendant, whom he found to be an unreliable witness.  He acquitted the 1st Third Party of negligence because he found that he

"33.   … had managed to stop the 5th Vehicle in time and the 3rd Collision was the result of it being hit from the back by the 6th Vehicle because the 5th defendant had failed to stop in time."

15.Mr Vaughan submitted that there is a duty of care of high standard imposed on drivers following other vehicles in a line of traffic to drive with such care as to be prepared for foreseeable emergency, to enable him to avoid colliding with vehicles in front, and to avoid creating a situation of danger for other vehicles.  He referred to the well-known cases of Thompson v Spedding [1973] RTR 312 (CA); and Mugford v Ames [2000] SASC 241.  Mr Vaughan relied on the fact that the 1st Third Party was involved in the 3rd collision. 

16.With respect to Mr Vaughan, the learned judge had found as a fact that the 1st Third Party had managed to stop his bus in time, but that the collision was caused when the vehicle travelling behind him collided with the bus and pushed it forward.  So the 1st Third Party had failed to stop in time.

17.In the case of the 3rd Defendant, as I have mentioned, the learned judge found that there was no causal link between the 2nd collision (and the conviction of the 3rd Defendant) with the so-called 3rd collision.

18.On the basis of such findings of fact, I do not believe that the proposed appeal has a reasonable prospect of success.  I agree with Mr Gidwani for the 3rd and 4th Defendants that there is no reasonable prospect of these findings of fact being overturned.  See Ting Kwok Keung v Tam Dick Yuen (2002) 5 HKCFAR 336.  That being the case, leave to appeal is refused.  I also make an order nisi that the 1st, 2nd and 5th Defendants pay the 3rd and 4th Defendants' costs.

(Robert Tang)
Vice-President