CRIMINAL CASE NO. 320 OF 2010
COURT: Each of the 1st and 2nd accused has been found guilty after trial of two counts of conspiracy to defraud and eight counts of making a false statement by a company officer. The 1st accused has been found guilty, in addition, of one count of conspiracy to use false instruments, whilst the 2nd accused has been found guilty of one count of dealing with property known or believed to represent the proceeds of an indictable offence.
Each of the 1st and 2nd accused absconded at the end of the prosecution case.
The 3rd accused has been found guilty on her own plea of the same two counts of conspiracy to defraud as well as eight alternative counts of conspiracy with the 1st and 2nd accused to publish a false statement by a company officer. She pleaded guilty to this offence rather than the substantive offence as she contended she was not an officer of the company. The prosecution accepted those pleas to the alternative counts.
She also pleaded guilty to the further conspiracy to use false instruments. Those pleas were tendered after the close of the prosecution case and only after the prosecution closing speech. Instead of making his closing speech on her behalf, her counsel, Mr Paul Leung, asked that she be re-arraigned.
The offences relating to the publication of a false statement by company officers and the conspiracy to commit that offence carry a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment each. The conspiracies to defraud and the conspiracy to use false instruments and the money-laundering offences carry a maximum of 14 years’ imprisonment each.
The trial was a fairly long one with evidence lasting some 20 days and involving testimony from in excess of 30 witnesses, two of whom travelled from the United States and the Netherlands to testify. Efforts were also made by the accused to exclude from evidence two depositions taken from witnesses in the Netherlands and Malaysia. The core bundle ran to six volumes which, in reality, represented a fraction of the documents contained in the committal bundle. There were a number of sets of Agreed Facts submitted in evidence both at the instance of the prosecution and of the 1st and 5th accused.
I acknowledge that there was a level of co-operation between counsel for the defence and the prosecution both during the pre-trial reviews and during the trial itself which shortened the proceedings. This was, of course, as much in the interests of the accused as it was the prosecution and the court and simply sensible case management. They were ordinary concessions which should have been made in view of the indisputable evidence available to the prosecution as disclosed to the accused. In the context of this case, I do not regard them as justifying a discount from the respective starting points.
In summary, the case against the convicted accused was that each was involved in different ways with a number of events which revolved around an application for the listing of Tungda Innovative Lighting Holdings Limited which had a number of other companies in its group on the GEM board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange during 2002 and, subsequently, in 2003/2004 on the Main Board.
There were certain stipulated requirements in order to secure the GEM Board listing. Tungda was unable to comply with some of those requirements. Sales figures to customers, in particular to a customer in the Netherlands, a company called Vezalux, were artificially inflated, specifically alleging that vast quantities of a newly invented product, an induction lamp, had been sold to it.
The artificially inflated figures were supplied to the stock exchange and, through it, the Securities and Futures Commission. They were also published in the prospectus relating to the listing and thus were published to potential shareholders. That gave rise to the 1st count of conspiracy to defraud, Count 1.
One of the requirements of a company listed on the GEM Board was to publish quarterly reports each financial year. That Tungda did but, in doing so, again it reflected turnover which had been artificially inflated by the inclusion of non-existent sales in order to reflect a greater profitability than in fact existed. Again, specific reference was made to the substantial sales and very high profitability of induction lamps.
That was done on eight occasions during the financial years 2003 and 2004. That gave rise to the offences of officers of the company publishing a false statement, the even-numbered counts from 2 to 16, and to the alternative counts against the 3rd accused of conspiracy to publish a false statement, the odd-numbered counts from 3 to 17.
During that same two-year period after its listing on the GEM Board, Tungda sought a listing on the Main Board of the Stock Exchange. There were requirements concerning profitability and, again, Tungda falsified its turnover figures by creating invoices and other documentation reflecting non-existent sales, once again of the induction lamps. Part of the falsified figures upon which Tungda relied also included the sales to Vezalux in the financial year 2002 as, for the purposes of this listing, the preceding three financial years were taken into account. In this sense, there was some overlap or duplication.
There were further misrepresentations made to the stock exchange and others, including a misrepresentation as to the number of induction lamps sold in contrast to the value of those sales, in an attempt to secure the listing which would not have been secured had they not been made. This gives rise to the second conspiracy to defraud, Count 18.
Specific written confirmations from various customers of Tungda as to the genuineness, value and extent of the trading transactions between them and Tungda were required by the companies advising or representing Tungda in its application. Three separate exercises were conducted by three separate entities - the sponsors of the listing, Tungda’s own auditors, Deloittes, and a second firm of auditors, Nelson Wheeler, appointed to express opinions on the concerns expressed by Deloittes - to secure what were referred to as letters of confirmation from those customers.
Those exercises were subverted with the fabricated letters intended to be tendered to those three professional bodies in order to deflect their inquiries. The letters either were complete fabrications and had not been supplied by the customer concerned or, at the least, the turnover reflected in those letters was inflated and did not reflect genuine trading. That gave rise to the count relating to conspiracy to use a false instrument, Count 19.
Accountants involved with the listing exercises and audit would expect to see an inflow of money into Tungda’s various accounts equivalent to the sales claimed by it. This created a problem for Tungda as, because the sales were non-existent, it could hardly expect third-party customers to make payments. As a consequence, the 2nd accused, who was the brother of the 1st accused, took money from his personal account and paid that, in cash, into Tungda’s accounts in order to create the impression of cash flow consistent with the claimed sales.
Shortly thereafter, within days if not hours, amounts approximately equivalent to the sums paid into Tungda’s accounts were paid back into the account of the 2nd accused to be ready for the next batch of false transactions. It is these repayments to the 2nd accused which gave rise to the money-laundering count, Count 20.
There is no doubt that these were ambitious frauds on a grand scale. Although the charges were correct in the sense of reflecting separate and independent offences, the conduct of the accused, in reality, extended from November 2001 to August 2004. It was persistent, dishonest conduct of the highest order.
There was no evidence which quantifies the total loss to others occasioned by the frauds but there is illustrative evidence from two members of the public who were investors in Tungda, each of whom related how he or she sustained losses amounting to, between them, some $6.3 million. It was their testimony that each had relied upon the misrepresentations concerning Tungda’s turnover, its new product introduction and its projected growth based on those factors when deciding to make the investments.
The factor which has even more grave consequences than the loss to individual investors from the public, which I do not seek to minimise, is the effect on the stock market as a whole of the listing of a company based upon false materials but for which it would not otherwise have been listed, whether that listing be on the GEM Board or on the Main Board.
Hong Kong enjoys a reputation as an international financial centre, a part of which is due to the regulatory regime which prevails. The revelation of such a listing based upon fraud, apparently successfully designed to deceive the regulators, is suggestive of fallibility which may well shake investor confidence in the stock market generally.
There was a carefully planned exercise to secure the listing of Tungda on the GEM Board based upon material which the convicted accused knew to be false. That carefully planned exercise was then extended by falsehood being piled upon falsehood in an attempt, abortive as it happened, to secure a Main Board listing. There was no inadvertence involved.
The conduct of the three accused throughout their involvement demonstrates a cynical, calculated and persistent course of conduct designed to deceive the regulators in the exercise of their duty which necessitated deceiving Tungda’s own auditors as well as others advising and assisting it with the listing, as well as present and future shareholders of Tungda and, of course, its creditors.
It is quite clear that the accused, particularly in the context of the second conspiracy to defraud, were prepared to go to any lengths to secure a listing. A glaring example is the fact that the 1st accused created the impression that he was prepared to go along with Tungda’s own auditor’s suggestion of employing independent auditors to conduct a forensic examination of issues about which its own auditors were suspicious: yet, when Tungda engaged a second firm of auditors, the 1st accused proscribed the extent of their investigation to such an extent that even the second firm of auditors appreciated that their mandate would not permit them to address the issues which had been raised.
This was a profoundly serious course of conduct embarked upon by the accused. In my judgment, the two conspiracies to defraud come very close to a worst-case situation which would be deserving of the maximum sentence prescribed by law. I determine a starting point for these two offences of 10 years’ imprisonment.
In doing so, I have had regard to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Attorney General v Dominic Cheung Kai Man in which it was indicated that for serious fraud not quite up to level of worst offences, a starting point in the region of 10 years would be expected for a single offence after conviction following trial; the decision of the Court of Appeal for England and Wales in Cushnie & Clough which approved a starting point of 10 years, the statutory maximum, for a fraud involving “massive deception of the London Stock Exchange”; and HKSAR v Fu Chu Kan and Others, similarly a 10-year starting point in respect of each of two frauds remarkably similar to the case of which these accused are convicted was approved by the Court of Appeal which went on to observe that, at least in regard to the prime mover of the frauds, “had they been a year or two longer, we would not have upset them”.
Insofar as the offences of publishing, or conspiracy to publish, a false statement are concerned, I note the substantial period of imprisonment provided as the maximum sentence which is an indicator of the seriousness with which the legislature regards offences of this nature. That is understandable and is well illustrated in this matter by the evidence of two members of the public that they relied upon material published by Tungda and statements from Tungda, or publicity based on it, on which to base their investment decisions.
The publication was false, to the knowledge of the accused, in probably the single most material matter of interest to a potential investor, the profitability of the company. It would have been perfectly plain to the accused that even though their plan primarily may have been to deceive the stock exchange, they would inevitably also deceive any other person relying on the material published by Tungda. I judge 5 years’ imprisonment to be the appropriate starting point for these offences.
The 1st and 3rd accused have been convicted of the offence of conspiracy to use false instruments which were the false letters of the confirmation which were intended to be relied upon by the sponsors and two firms of auditors and were designed to mislead them as to the genuineness of trading transactions. It would be fallacious to suggest that this offence is less serious than any of the others due to the fact that there was no public element in the use of the false instruments.
They were tendered to the three organisations concerned specifically to mislead them as to the genuineness of sales which otherwise, in one form or another, they would inevitably have invited to the regulators or other authorities which would have acted in the interests of members of the public. Similarly, I regard 5 years’ imprisonment as the appropriate starting point.
Insofar as the money-laundering charge only against the 2nd accused is concerned, the evidence is that $44,437,900 passed through his bank account between 6 February and 20 August 2002. It has to be said that this is not a run-of-the-mill money-laundering exercise where different substantial sums of cash are received from a third party into a bank account and then passed onto another third party.
Although the deposits into the 2nd accused’s account amounted to over $44 million, the conclusion of the expert witness called to testify in regard to these counts was that the transactions took place in order to conceal the falsification of the turnover figures by purporting to be payments for genuine sales and that the money used to create that false impression was then paid back into the 2nd accused’s account in order to be available for the next set of false payments.
Thus, although the deposits amounted to over 44 million, the actual amount of cash that was used to create those deposits was substantially less. Even so, the conduct satisfied the essential elements of the offence. In my judgment, a sentence lower than that that would normally be imposed for money-laundering of the more common kind involving this sum of money would be justified in these circumstances. I take a starting point of 4 years’ imprisonment.
I turn now to the involvement of each of the three accused. I pause to note that each of them has no previous criminal convictions although, in the circumstances where there are sophisticated frauds carried on over an extended period, that is a matter of little moment. In regard to the 1st and 2nd accused, I have considered such as appears in their antecedent statements. There is nothing in the personal circumstances of any of the accused which justifies a reduction in sentence.
The 1st and 2nd accused and their father, who was not involved in these proceedings, between them held the entire issued share capital of a company known as Tungda Industrial Limited, with the 1st accused holding one more share than the other two. That company held 100 per cent of the shares in another company known as Standard Exceed Company Limited which, in turn, held 71.28 per cent of the shares in Tungda. In effect, therefore, the three of them controlled Tungda. The 1st accused was the chairman and a director of Tungda, whilst the 2nd accused was the vice-chairman and a director of it.
It appears that when Tungda was listed on the GEM Board, that listing raised some $64 million. There was evidence that, on 5 September 2003, Standard Exceed sold 177,600,000 shares in Tungda for which a net amount of $50,722,362.80 standing to the credit of its account with the brokers, Kingsway, was withdrawn on the authority of a withdrawal slip signed by the 1st accused.
There was no evidence as to the dissemination of those moneys thereafter, although it would be naïve to suggest that it was not the 1st and 2nd accused who benefited, particularly in the light of the assertion of the 3rd accused concerning the fact that she paid over to Tungda the profits she apparently made on the sale of her shares.
Insofar as the 1st accused is concerned, there was evidence that he was in charge of all the decision-making processes that involved Tungda. He was the chairman of the group. From the evidence, it was clear that he made a point of attending audit committee meetings of the company, even though his right to attend was queried. This demonstrated his eagerness to maintain control over events and to ensure that he was always up to date with developments. He needed to be, of course, in order to ensure the smooth running of the frauds.
There was evidence that when the discovery was made that one of the companies to which Tungda was supposed to have sold millions of dollars of goods, SARL Koran in France, had actually ceased trading altogether, the 1st accused promptly made a very rapid trip to France in order to have a purported meeting with that company and returned brandishing some form of agency agreement.
There was evidence that when she had finished printing out false bills of lading and invoices, the 3rd accused took them into the 1st accused’s office where she held a meeting with the 1st and 2nd accused, as well as the 1st accused’s son who, also, was not involved in these proceedings. There was evidence that even though others may have spoken out at audit committee and Board of Directors meetings more than the 1st accused, it was his voice that actually counted. As I have just noted, it was he who withdrew the 50-plus million dollars from the brokers who sold Standard Exceed’s shares in Tungda.
I am satisfied from the evidence that I have heard that it would be proper for me to conclude that it was he who was the prime mover behind the two listing frauds which, between them, inevitably led to the commission of each of the other offences. There is no justification for reducing any of the sentences in respect of the 1st accused below the starting point I have indicated.
The 2nd accused was the vice-chairman and a director of Tungda. There is not as much evidence concerning his involvement in the planning of the conspiracies. Indeed, there is evidence that he played little role in the actual meetings relating to either of the listings, it being suggested that he was mainly concerned with manufacturing and sales activities in the mainland.
However, what evidence there is shows that he was deeply involved in the execution of the frauds. He was present at the meetings in the office of the 1st accused immediately following upon the preparation of false bills of lading and invoices by the 3rd accused; he played a very active role in the creation of the false impression of payments for non-existent sales through the bank account in his name, the evidence being that he as well as the 3rd accused gave explicit instructions to staff members concerning banking procedures to be followed. That was a vital part of the scheme.
Be that as it may, I am prepared to accept that his role was not so extensive as that of the 1st accused in regard to the two conspiracies to defraud, but there is no difference in his role in regard to the publication of false accounts or use of false instruments. (I regard a starting point of 9 years on Counts 1 and 18 as appropriate in his case?).
The 3rd accused was employed by Tungda as sales manager specifically in charge of its sales to overseas customers. There was a representation in the prospectus relating to the GEM Board listing that she was part of the senior management of Tungda. In mitigation, she seeks to distance herself from that position by saying that, in reality, she was the personal assistant or secretary to the 1st and 2nd accused and the title of sales manager had been conferred on her only to create a false impression of the prosperity of the company.
Despite that submission now, the fact is that witnesses were challenged as to the basis of their assertions during their evidence-in-chief that she had been secretary to those two accused. Furthermore, there was evidence that she exercised exclusive control over the records, the fake records, of course, of the overseas sales. If indeed she merely had loaned her name to the title, it is yet a further illustration of her willingness to participate in ongoing dishonesty designed to mislead outsiders.
She was granted an option over more than 10.5 million shares which she duly exercised. She then sold those shares on the same day, making a profit of a little over $2 million. I am told in mitigation that she paid over these moneys to Tungda at the request or insistence of the 1st accused. I have been referred in this connection to a statement from the stockbroker who handled the transaction contained in the committal bundle. I see nothing in that statement that supports this submission. Even if it were to be true, whilst it may remove the element of personal gain, it reinforces the depth of her complicity.
The evidence against the 3rd accused as it emerged from the witnesses during the trial was, in a word, overwhelming. It demonstrated that she was deeply involved in the day-to-day management and running of the offices and affairs of Tungda. It demonstrated that she was deeply involved in the money-laundering exercise conducted by the 2nd accused by instructing staff to carry out banking activities. It demonstrated that she was deeply involved in attempting to subvert the exercises involving the letters of confirmation for it was she who, the documents and testimony of witnesses show, was responsible for their completion and, in two instances, despatch and to follow up on them.
It demonstrated that so deep was her involvement that it was she who was producing false bills of lading and false invoices and possibly other documents in order to support the non-existent sales. It demonstrated that, after producing these documents, she then had meetings with the 1st and 2nd accused and others. The evidence was that it was she who ventured the extraordinary explanation to the auditors that the bills of lading were not, after all, bills of lading but were simply proof of delivery.
In mitigation, she says that she acted as she did at the direction of what was carefully described as ‘the Chu family’. It was specifically said on her behalf that she completed the false documentation at their behest. That may be. I have already indicated that I regard the 1st accused as the kingpin of these frauds but the evidence clearly shows that she willingly and enthusiastically loaned herself to them. There is no suggestion in the evidence that she displayed the slightest reservations or reluctance.
It was suggested on her behalf that much of the evidence against her had not been vigorously challenged and the point was made particularly that there had been no challenge concerning the typing of the bills of lading. That is hardly surprising given the evidence of the prosecution witnesses relating to her having been seen to be carrying out that production and of the evidence that she provided the explanation that these documents were not, after all, bills of lading.
One aspect of cross-examination deserves mention. It was specifically suggested, on behalf of the 3rd accused, to each of the two witnesses who had travelled from overseas to testify in this matter that they were lying in their evidence, Mr Bootsma when he said that the Tungda documents did not properly reflect the purchases made by him. That does not sit easily with the submissions made in mitigation.
The role of the 3rd accused was at least equal to that of the 2nd accused. In regard to Count 19, there is no distinction to be drawn between her conduct and that of the 1st accused.
There now arises the obvious question. It is submitted on behalf of the 3rd accused that the fact that she entered pleas of guilty entitles her to a discount from the starting point. Let me repeat, these pleas were entered not only after the prosecution case had closed but after the 3rd accused had heard the prosecution’s closing speech. This was after 20 days of evidence. The pleas can hardly be described as ‘timely’, a consideration that the Court of Appeal has repeatedly indicated is at the core of the awarding of a discount.
What remained insofar as her case was concerned was her counsel’s speech to the jury and, of course, the deliberation of her case by the jury. It is said that prosecuting counsel were informed after the close of the prosecution case and before the speech was made that she intended to plead guilty but would not do so for another two or three days to enable her to put her personal affairs in order. That is her decision. But the hard fact remains that she did only change her plea before the court, as opposed to changing her mind, at the time when her counsel should have been giving his speech on her behalf.
I recognise that in connection with the awarding of a discount for pleas, the Court of Appeal has said that there is no such thing as an open and shut case and inevitable conviction. Those comments, from what I am able to see, have always been passed in regard to pleas entered at the beginning of a trial, usually on the first day, not at the 59th minute of the 11th hour as in this instance.
In this case, there can be no doubt that the 3rd accused would have realised, even without the benefit of legal advice, that absent a complete aberration on the part of the jury, her conviction truly was inevitable. She had sat and listened to witness after witness testifying as to her involvement, her intimate involvement, with any number of the fundamental aspects of the conduct which gave rise to all of these charges. She had seen the credibility and reliability of the witnesses fully tested in front of her by a parade of counsel appearing for her and other accused. She could not have been under any illusion that she was staring conviction firmly in the face.
I am mindful of the observation by Ognall J in R v Byrne, that a plea of guilty:
“First...is generally perceived as being the most cogent token of remorse and regret; secondly, it is reinforced by the view that by pleading guilty a defendant inevitably forfeits whatever prospect he may have, however exiguous, of being acquitted by a jury; thirdly, he saves a considerable amount of public time and expense by his plea; and lastly, he demonstrates by his plea an acceptance of the justification that he should be punished for his wrongdoing.”
That comment was passed, of course, in regard to a plea entered before evidence was led. The 3rd accused’s pleas were not motivated by remorse or contrition; they were simple recognition of the inevitable. Stuart-Moore J observed in HKSAR v Abdallah Anwar Abbas:
“It has sometimes been said that a full discount of one-third is given in order to reflect a defendant’s ‘remorsefulness’. Perhaps these days this is more to be regarded as a convenient, if not antiquated, label to describe the attitude of someone who, by pleading guilty, not only shows some degree of remorse but also provides himself powerful mitigation by reason of the saving of court time and public funds which would otherwise be expended on a trial and by obviating the need on the part of witnesses to testify which may often represent for them a considerable ordeal.”
The 3rd accused’s pleas did not lead to those benefits. A miniscule amount of time was saved. The prosecution was obliged to call a large number of witnesses, albeit not only in respect of its case against the 3rd accused. Two of those witnesses were from overseas, a factor which it is proper to take into account in this connection - see HKSAR v Hashimi Habib. Their evidence was devastating against the 3rd accused.
A further underlying feature of the principle of affording a discount to a plea of guilty is that it illustrates to other accused persons that a benefit will accrue if a plea is offered. If that message is to have any import at all, then it must be made clear that to plead guilty at such a late stage as happened here will result in a very substantially reduced discount.
I am aware of the decision of the Court of Appeal in HKSAR v Wong Kam Tat which related to a trial in the District Court and is to the effect that even after the calling of nine witnesses during four days of trial and the close of the prosecution case, a discount is still appropriate. That is comparable with the situation in this case. I am bound by that decision.
I do not believe that it would be helpful to prescribe a particular percentage as the discount that should be allowed in a situation such as this, particularly given that the quantum of such a reduction is an exercise of discretion. In respect of each of Counts 1 and 18, I reduce the starting point relating to the 3rd accused by 9 months and in respect of each of the other counts by 5 months in recognition of the pleas of guilty.
I was urged to take into account, for the 3rd accused, the delay between the date of commission -- I am sorry, I have forgotten to indicate that in respect of Counts 1 and 18 in respect of both the 2nd and 3rd accused, I reduce the starting point to 9 years from 10 years. I must have skipped that passage.
Let me repeat. I do not believe that it would be helpful to prescribe a particular percentage as the discount that should be allowed in a situation such as this, particularly given that the quantum of such a reduction is an exercise of discretion. In respect of each of Counts 1 and 18, I reduce from the starting point relating to the 3rd accused, 9 months, and in respect of each of the other counts, 5 months, in recognition of the pleas of guilty.
I was urged to take into account, for the 3rd accused, the delay between the date of commission of the offences and this prosecution. I have regard to this submission also on behalf of the other two accused. The offences occurred between 2002 to mid to late 2004. However, two queries had been raised by the stock exchange during that period as to the question of falsity of turnover figures and genuineness of invoices submitted to it.
In each instance, the accused went to considerable length to conceal the truth from the stock exchange, to divert its inquiries. In early 2005, the SFC referred its suspicions to the police. Given that the accused had done their best to conceal the offences, it hardly lies in their mouths to complain if, as a result of their machinations, extended investigations, including the taking of evidence overseas, was necessary. The chronology supplied by the prosecution in reply to this submission shows that the investigation was carried out diligently and with as much speed as sensibly could have been expected. There is nothing in this point.
That leaves the question of whether the sentences should be served consecutively or concurrently. It is self-evident that the counts relating to the publishing or conspiracy to publish the false statements, the use of the false instruments and the money-laundering charge were all inextricably interwoven with one or other of the two conspiracies to defraud. They were part and parcel of the execution of those frauds and were necessary in order to both further and conceal them. Each of those sentences should be served concurrently with one another and with the sentences on the two conspiracy to defraud charges.
Counts 1 and 18, however, represented two separate and distinct frauds carried out at two entirely separate times. The first related to a listing on the GEM Board. Once that was complete, a separate and distinct decision was taken to attempt to perpetrate a further fraud, this time to secure the listing on the Main Board. In principle, those sentences should be served consecutively to one another.
That raises the issue of totality. In my judgment, in respect of the 1st accused, a period of 2 years of the sentence on Count 18 should be ordered to be served consecutively to that on Count 1, whilst in respect of the 2nd and 3rd accused, 18 months of the sentence on Count 18 should be ordered to be served consecutively to the sentence on Count 1.
The orders then are as follows:
The 1st accused is to undergo imprisonment on count 1 for 10 years; on each of counts 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 and 16, for 5 years; on Count 18, for 10 years; and on count 19, for 5 years. Two years of the period of imprisonment on Count 18 is to be served consecutively to that on Count 1. Each of the sentences on the other counts is to be served concurrently with one another and with the sentences on Counts 1 and 18. The aggregate sentence is 12 years’ imprisonment.
The 2nd accused is to undergo imprisonment on Count 1 for 9 years; on each of Counts 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14 and 16, for 5 years; on Count 18 for 9 years; and on Count 20 for 4 years. Eighteen months of the period of imprisonment on Count 18 is to be served consecutively to that on Count 1. Each of the sentences on the other counts is to be served concurrently with one another and with the sentences on Counts 1 and 18. The aggregate sentence is 10 years 6 months’ imprisonment.
The 3rd accused is to undergo imprisonment on Count 1 for 8 years and 3 months; on each of counts 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15 and 17 for 4 years 7 months; on Count 18 for 8 years 3 months; and on Count 19 for 4 years 7 months. Eighteen months of the period of imprisonment on Count 18 is to be served consecutively to that on Count 1. Each of the sentences on the other counts is to be served concurrently with one another and with the sentences on Counts 1 and 18. The aggregate sentence is 9 years and 9 months’ imprisonment.
In addition, each of the 1st and 2nd accused is disqualified from being a director of a company pursuant to the provisions of section 168E of the Companies Ordinance for a period of 10 years.
Please refer to CACC362/2011 for the relevant appeal(s) to the Court of Appeal.