Xu Shengheng and Another v. Cheung Kwan

Read the full judgment text of HCA 291/2009 on BabelCite. This High Court CFI judgment was delivered on 18 April 2012.

1. This application for leave to appeal against my decision dated 5 March 2012 is based on the argument that DI notice should be filed for executory or even contingent contracts for acquisition of shares.

Cites 1 case

Case No.HCA 291/2009
Court
High Court CFI
Date18 Apr 2012
Judge
Case Document
100%Judiciary

HCA 291/2009

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO. 291 OF 2009

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BETWEEN

  XU SHENGHENG 1st Plaintiff
  EVER SINCERE INVESTMENT LIMITED 2nd Plaintiff

and

  CHEUNG KWAN Defendant
  (By Original Action)  

AND BETWEEN

  CHEUNG KWAN 1st Plaintiff
  FINANCIAL INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS LIMITED (匯富國際控股有限公司) 2nd Plaintiff
  and  
  XU SHENGHENG (徐生恆) 1st Defendant
  NAVIN KUMAR AGGARWAL 2nd Defendant
  CHAN WAI KAY KATHERINE (陳蕙姫) 3rd Defendant
  SOO KOK BENG, PETER (蘚國明)
also known as PETER SOO
4th Defendant
  (By Counterclaim)  

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Before: Deputy High Court Judge L. Chan in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 18 April 2012

Date of Decision: 18 April 2012

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D E C I S I O N

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1.This application for leave to appeal against my decision dated 5 March 2012 is based on the argument that DI notice should be filed for executory or even contingent contracts for acquisition of shares.

2.I do not think this is the correct view of matters, as I have already pointed out the reasons in my decision.  If this argument is correct, it can result in misleading DI notices.  For example, A can contract to acquire at a future day, say two years later, the controlling amount of shares of a listed company from B when B has no such shares at the time of making the contract.  Nevertheless, on this argument of the applicant, A can and should immediately file a DI notice with the Stock Exchange, thereby informing the public that he is presently interested in the controlling shares of the company, when in fact he has none and can exercise no right as a shareholder of the company.

3.I do not think this argument has merit.  I think a DI notice should and should only be filed by a party when that party has a presently exercisable interest of the shares whether directly or by way of derivative.

4.There is another argument that the 1st plaintiff by counterclaim has committed material nondisclosure in not telling the ex parte judge that she did not have the necessary amount of shares to satisfy the alleged agreement of sale at the times when the alleged agreement should have been performed and at the ex parte application.  These matters involve discretion of the court, and I do not see any merits in them. 

5.I hold that the appeal does not have a reasonable prospect of success and there is no reason in the interests of justice that the appeal should be heard.  I therefore dismiss the application under section 14AA of the High Court Ordinance, Cap. 4, with costs to the 1st plaintiff by counterclaim.

(Discussion re summary assessment)

6.Costs be summarily assessed together with the costs occasioned at the last inter partes hearing.

(L. Chan)
Deputy High Court Judge

Mr Paul Mak, instructed by Hampton, Winter & Glynn, the 1st plaintiff (by original action) and 1st defendant (by counterclaim)  

Mr B K Ho, instructed by Lau & Chan, for the 1st defendant (by original action) and the 1st plaintiff (by counterclaim)