Lau Yat Ming v. The Queen
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG (APPELLATE JURISDICTION) CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 636 OF 1972 -----------------
----------------- Coram: Huggins, McMullin and Pickering, JJ. ----------------------------- JUDGMENT ----------------------------- Huggins, J.: 1. This is an appeal against a sentence upon a breach of a probation order. The Appellant was convicted on three charges of robbery with aggravation in 1970. They were violent robberies, as is admitted by the Appellant, and the first charge involved the robbery of three Japanese tourists. The Appellant pleaded guilty to the three offences with which he was charged. There were other charges against his four Co-accused, and the Appellant was very co-operative and extremely helpful to the police. He had apparently been persuaded to join this gang because he had a wife and young family and was in financial difficulties because he had hurt his hand. Having received a favourable probation officer’s report, the learned judge on that occasion felt able, as I say, to place this Appellant on probation for two years. The other Defendants, who were convicted on charges of robbery, were all sentenced to three years’ imprisonment. 2. Three months before the end of the period of probation the Appellant committed a further robbery. He was convicted before a magistrate and his appeal to the Supreme Court was dismissed. The Appellant has repeated what he said on the appeal in that case before us – to the effect that he was not guilty of that further robbery. That is not an argument to which we can listen in this appeal. 3. When he was brought again before a District Judge he was sentenced to two years on the first charge and eighteen months on each of the other two charges, those sentences to run concurrently with each other but consecutively, of course, to the sentence which was imposed in respect of the further robbery – namely two years’ imprisonment. 4. The learned judge who imposed the new sentences observed that he was imposing a higher sentence on the first charge because a great deal of money was involved and he thought that this must be reflected in the sentences. Having regard to the evidence which was before him we cannot, with respect, agree with that. The amount of property taken in a theft is, save possibly in a most exceptional case, material only where the thief knows in advance, or has reason to anticipate, that there will be a substantial amount of property available as a result of his crime. Where a victim is selected in the street from a number of people who may be there, it is usually pure chance whether the crime produces a large sum of money or not: in the further robbery which this Appellant committed he knew that his victim had a large sum of money because he had seen him withdraw money from a bank. So far as we are aware this Appellant had no reason to believe that the victims of the first charge had substantial sums of money or property with them. 5. Nevertheless, we think that there is no reason to interfere with the sentences which have been imposed. The Appellant may well be lucky that sentences of two years’ imprisonment were not imposed on each of the three counts and if it is necessary to justify the differentiation, it can be done on the basis that these must obviously have been Japanese tourists and that it is the duty of the courts to ensure that people who visit this Colony are not subjected to this type of attack. Even bearing in mind that the sentences are to run consecutively to the other term of two years, we see no reason to interfere. The Appellant was treated with great leniency on the first occasion in 1970 and has not taken advantage of the leniency which was shown to him. 6. The application is dismissed. 13th February, 1973. |