Jeremy Tung v. The Dental Council of Hong Kong
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HCAL 35/2011 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 35 OF 2011 ------------------------ BETWEEN
------------------------ Before: Hon Au J in Court Date of Hearing: 12 March 2012 Dates of Supplemental Written Submissions: 29 May, 18 & 25 June 2012 Date of Judgment: 14 August 2012 ----------------------- J U D G M E N T ----------------------- A. INTRODUCTION 1.The applicant was a registered dentist under the Dentists Registration Ordinance (Cap 156) (“DRO”). He was removed from the General Register of Dentists (“the General Register”) on 17 July 2008 for his failure to renew his practising certificate. 2.This is his judicial review against the decision (“the Decision”) of the Dental Council of Hong Kong (“the Council”) dated 21 March 2011, to reject his application for restoration of his name to the General Register. 3.In this judicial review, he asks for an order of certiorari to quash the Decision and an order of mandamus requiring the Council to reconsider his restoration application before a fresh panel appointed by the Council. B. THE FACTS B1. The DRO 4.The practice of dentistry in Hong Kong is governed by the DRO. Under the DRO, the registration and licensing of dentists are administered by the Council set up thereunder. 5.A person who wishes to lawfully practise dentistry in Hong Kong has to be:
6.In general, as a matter of practice, the Secretary of the Council (“the Secretary”) would:
7.Further:
B2. The applicant 8.The applicant became a registered dentist on the General Register in 2005. He had since then been employed by a medical and dental practice group as a dentist initially at its two clinics in Shatin. I will call this the Chanway Clinic and the Grand Central Plaza Clinic. He had provided to the Council the address of the Chanway Clinic as his primary contact address. It is his case that in later years, he had also worked at the employer’s clinic in Tuen Mun some days in a week. 9.The applicant duly applied for practising certificates for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. The relevant annual renewal fee for a practising certificate was about HK$505. 10.However, he did not apply for the same for the years 2008, 2009 or 2010. 11.Notwithstanding his failure to apply for practising certificates since 2008, the applicant had continued to practise as a dentist until April 2010. 12.On 15 April 2010, while making enquiry with the Dental Association over the phone about the renewal of his membership with the Dental Protection Ltd (the professional indemnity provider), he was informed that his name was not on the General Register. 13.He then immediately called the Council to make further enquiry. The applicant was then told that his name had already been removed from the General Register since 17 July 2008. 14.Apparently, in July 2008, the Council noted that the applicant had not applied for a practising certificate for the year 2008. Thus, by a letter dated 28 July 2008 (“the Removal Letter”), the Secretary sought to inform the applicant that, by virtue of s 15(3)(ba) of the DRO, his name was removed from the General Register on 17 July 2008. 15.However, the applicant did not receive the Removal Letter, as it was returned to the Council undelivered. This was so as the Chanway Address was not stated in its complete form by the Secretary on the letter, which rendered it undeliverable. 16.Be that as it may, after being told that his name had been removed from the General Register, the applicant immediately applied under s 22(3) of the DRO to restore his name to the General Register with the requisite fee. He also promptly informed his employer that his name had been so removed from the General Register but he had already applied for restoration. 17.Thus, since 17 April 2010 the applicant has ceased practising dentistry. His employment with the medical group was in any event subsequently terminated on 6 May 2010 after a newspaper reported the incident (“the Incident”) that he had been practising at the employer’s clinic without a valid practising certificate. B3. The inquiry 18.S 22(3) of the DRO provides as follows:
19.Thus, in determining whether to accept or refuse an application for restoration of a person’s name to the General Register, the Council in the exercise of its discretion may:
20.In light of the report in the newspaper, and after obtaining further information from the applicant relating to the Incident, the Council decided to hold an inquiry pursuant to s 22(3) of the DRO to consider (a) the said information about the Incident, and (b) the applicant’s application for restoration. 21.The inquiry was held on 21 March 2011 with a panel of four members appointed by the Council. The applicant was legally represented. He also personally attended the inquiry and the panel had asked him questions. 22.The inquiry was divided into two parts, the first part related to the complaint concerning the Incident made against the applicant (Part 1), and the second part related to his application for restoration (Part 2). 23.For the purpose of the inquiry, there was a statement of agreed facts made between the legal officer for the Secretary of the Council and the applicant. The relevant parts of the statement are as follows:
24.After the inquiry, the panel gave a written reasoned decision (“the Reasons”) on 22 March 2011. 25.In relation to Part 1, based on the agreed facts, the panel for the inquiry found the complaint against the applicant in relation to the Incident established[3]. 26.In relation to Part 2, the panel rejected the applicant’s application for restoration (ie, the Decision). It explained the Decision at paragraph 10 of the Reasons as follows: “10. Having considered all the matters advanced by the Applicant’s solicitor and the Applicant’s answer to our questions, we are not satisfied that he is a fit and proper person to be restored to the General Register, for the following reasons:
27.The panel then further observed at paragraphs 12 and 13 of the Reasons as follows: “12. In view of the clear evidence of criminal conduct under section 3(1) of the DRO, we direct the Secretary to report the matter to police for further investigation and enforcement action.
28.On 23 May 2011, the applicant applied for leave to apply for judicial review against the Decision. 29.On 30 May 2011, this court granted leave. On 14 July 2011, the applicant amended its Form 86. C. THIS JUDICIAL REVIEW 30.Mr Huggins SC for the applicant raises a number of grounds in support of the judicial review. I would deal with them as follows. C1. Procedural irregularity, unfairness and/or irrationality in the reasoning of the Decision C1.1 Paragraph 10(i) of the Reasons 31.As I mentioned above, the panel came to the conclusion that the applicant was not a “fit and proper person” to be restored to the General Register. It explained this conclusion on three bases, which were set out at paragraph 10 of the Reasons. 32.First, under paragraph 10(i), it was the panel’s view that the applicant had a “causal attitude towards the legal provisions governing the practice of dentistry”. This was because the applicant had “ignored” (a) “the repeated reminders to apply for the practising certificate”, and (b) “the possibility of losing his registration if he did not do so”. 33.Mr Huggins submits the panel’s conclusion that the applicant had ignored the repeated reminders in this reasoning was reached under a procedural unfairness. This is because (Mr Huggins further says):
34.On the same basis, Mr Huggins further submits that the conclusion at paragraph 10(i) of the Reasons is also or alternatively irrational, as it was reached without the necessary evidential basis. 35.For the following reasons, I think Mr Huggins is right in his submissions. 36.The conclusion at paragraph 10(i) of the Reasons that the applicant had “ignored” the “repeated reminders” to apply for the practising certificate had to be premised on the fundamental basis that the applicant had in fact received these repeated reminders. 37.At the same time, paragraph 5 of the Reasons says as follows:
38.Reading these two paragraphs together, the “repeated reminders to apply for the practising certificate” referred to by the panel at paragraph 10(i) must at least include those payment reminders and reminder letters sent out by the Council as described under paragraph 5(iii) and (iv). 39.However, given the applicant’s evidence that either (a) he had not received these reminders, or (b) he had received them but had never read them or had misplaced and forgotten about them, if the panel was to make a finding that he had in fact received them, I accept Mr Huggins’ submissions that it was procedurally unfair that this was not put to applicant, and that he was not cross-examined on this part of his evidence. The applicant had not been given an opportunity to respond to it. 40.The unfairness is in my view further underlined by three matters in the present case. First, there was in fact the incident (which is common ground) that the applicant did not receive the Removal Letter, as it was returned to the Council undelivered due to the fact that the Council did not put a complete address (of the Chanway Address) on that letter. Thus, it is not wholly improbable that the applicant might not have received other documents sent to him. Second, it must also be noted that it is the panel’s own statement at paragraph 5(iii) and (iv) of the Reasons that the payment reminders and reminder letters are only sent to registered dentists. Given that the applicant was no longer a registered dentist after July 2008, in the Council’s own position, no such reminders would have been sent to him in 2009 and 2010. The “repeated” reminders must thus also be understood in the context that these were only sent to the applicant in relation to the renewal application for 2008. Third, the panel in any event has not set out its reasons to explain why it rejected the applicant’s alternative case that he had not received the reminders. 41.For the same reasons, I also accept Mr Huggins’ alternative submissions that the panel’s conclusion that the applicant had ignored the repeated reminders is without proper evidential basis. 42.On this basis, I will allow the judicial review on this ground. This is particularly so, as in concluding that the applicant was not a fit and proper person to be restored to the General Register, the panel apparently relied on all three reasons set out under paragraph 10 of the Reasons, as they were not expressed as alternatives. As such, I cannot for the present purpose come to the view that the panel would have come to the same conclusion (that the applicant was not a fit and proper person) even if without the “finding” that the applicant had ignored the repeated reminders. 43.I will therefore quash the Decision and remit it back to the Council for a fresh reconsideration under a new panel. C1.2 Paragraph 10(ii) and (iii) of the Reasons 44.Mr Huggins also contends that at paragraph 10(ii) of the Reasons, the panel had wrongly treated the applicant’s evidence and submissions made in mitigation as matters adverse to his application. This is (counsel says) irrational. 45.I am unable to accept these submissions. Although the applicant did in mitigation seek to rely on his emphasis that it was his oversight and administrative mistake in his failure to renew the practising certificates and that he had paid a high price of losing his employment, I do not think there is any practice or principle of law that mandated the panel to consider this only as a question of mitigation. In my view, it was open to the panel to treat this part of the applicant’s submissions and evidence in the way it did and to reach the conclusion reached at paragraph 10(ii) of the Reasons, which cannot be said to be irrational (in the public law sense) and which has not infringed any principles of law. 46.Mr Huggins also contends that it was neither procedurally fair nor rational for the Council to say at paragraph 10(iii) of the Reasons that the applicant “does not appreciate the seriousness of the criminal conduct of illegal practice of dentistry without registration”, as there was no basis for that criticism. The applicant emphasised that he did not practise knowing that he was no longer registered. That (says Mr Huggins) did not mean that the applicant did not appreciate the seriousness of committing a criminal offence under s 3(1) of the DRO. This conclusion is thus irrational and unfair. 47.I similarly reject this contention for the following reasons. 48.At paragraph 3 and 4 of the Reasons, the panel said the following:
49.These statements are not (and in my view cannot be) challenged. In the present case, even if the applicant’s failure to apply for practising certificate for 2008, 2009 and 2010 was due to (as he said) his own and administrative oversight, he had still failed in his responsibility to ensure that he was registered to practise given the criminal liability for practising without registration. In failing to so ensuring himself of registration, it is reasonably open to the panel to form the view that the applicant did not appreciate the seriousness of criminal conduct of illegal practice of dentistry without registration. 50.Finally, Mr Huggins says the panel at paragraph 10(iii) and some other parts of the Reasons[5] described or referred the applicant’s conducts in practising dentistry without registration as “criminal” or “unlawful” conducts. This (Mr Huggins further submits) amounted to the panel effectively finding against the applicant a criminal conviction, when at that time he was not even subject to any criminal prosecution. This is also procedurally unfair for the applicant. 51.I also do not accept these submissions. In my view, properly reading the Reasons as a whole, the panel’s references to the applicant’s “criminal conducts” in those relevant paragraphs in the Reasons were only a reference to the fact that it was a criminal offence under s 3(1) of the DRO for the applicant to practise after his name had been removed from the General Register. I do not read these as the panel itself holding that the applicant was criminally convicted. In fact, the panel at paragraph 9 of the Reasons expressly referred to the fact that the police had not taken prosecution action against the applicant. There was no procedural unfairness for the panel to so referring the fact that the applicant’s practice of dentistry without registration was a criminal offence under the DRO, even though there was yet to be a conviction. 52.I therefore reject all these grounds of judicial review. C1.3 Other parts of the Reasons 53.Mr Huggins also submits that there are other parts of the Reasons which are also tainted with procedural unfairness and/or irrationality. In gist, Mr Huggins says it is common ground that Part 1 of the hearing was not a disciplinary hearing of professional misconduct of the applicant, and there was never any finding of professional misconduct against the applicant by the Council. However, at paragraph 9(iii) of the Reasons, the panel said it must consider in the restoration application whether the applicant had rehabilitated from the “misconduct”. This amounted to the panel treating the applicant as if he had committed a professional misconduct (when there was none) in considering his restoration application. This is procedurally unfair. 54.I disagree. 55.Properly and objectively read, the panel’s reference to the applicant’s “misconduct” at paragraph 9(ii) of the Reasons was a general reference to the conduct that the applicant had not applied for his practising certificates and that he continued to practise thereafter. As far as I can see, this was not used to denote a “professional misconduct” as specifically understood in the context of a disciplinary hearing. I therefore also see no merits in this part of the applicant’s complaint about procedural unfairness. C1.4 Procedural unfairness in preventing the applicant's legal representative from developing a relevant point 56.At the inquiry, the applicant’s legal representative, Ms Lam, sought to bring to the attention of the panel a case relating to the ruling by the Medical Council in May 2010. In that case, a medical doctor was successful in his application to have his name restored to the relevant register of medical practitioners after his name had been removed from the register without his knowledge. 57.Mr Huggins submits that Ms Lam was however prevented by the Council’s legal adviser from developing and elaborating in her submissions on the relevance of this case. This is procedurally unfair as the applicant had thus been prevented from properly developing relevant submissions to the panel at the inquiry. 58.I have gone through the relevant part of transcripts of the inquiry relating to this complaint. It involved a very short exchange between Ms Lam and the legal adviser. For convenience, I would quote it in full as follows:
59.As far as I can see, when Ms Lam started to address the inquiry on that case, what the legal adviser did was to raise the point that (a) the case related to proceedings before the Medical Council, which the Council was independent from, and (b) it might not be appropriate to ask the Council to follow the practice of the Medical Council. He then asked Ms Lam to bear these in her mind. Ms Lam in response appreciated that the ruling of the Medical Council was not binding on the Council and remarked that all she wanted to do was to draw to the attention of the Council that the Medical Council in a similar case had allowed the restoration application. She then on her own moved on to other parts of her submissions. 60.Fairly reading this, I do not see any substance in the complaint that the Council’s legal adviser prevented Ms Lam from developing her submissions. The legal adviser was entitled to advise the panel and make known his view on the relevance of the case that Ms Lam wished to rely on. However, there was no insistence on the part of the legal adviser to stop Ms Lam from continuing to submit on that case. I also did not see anything in the transcript to show that, after acknowledging the legal adviser’s view, Ms Lam attempted to continue her submissions by going into the details of the case, but was not allowed to do so by the panel or the legal adviser. As I said above, it was Ms Lam who decided to move on to other parts of her submissions. 61.I therefore also reject this ground of the judicial review. C2. Proportionality 62.On the court’s own motion, the parties were directed on 21 May 2012[6] to provide supplemental written submissions on the question of whether the Decision could be justified on the basis of proportionality as understood in public law. It is noted that this ground was not relied on in the Amended Form 86. 63.The parties have since submitted written supplemental submissions prepared by counsel for that purpose. 64.However, given my above conclusion to remit the restoration application to the Council for a fresh consideration by a new panel, I do not think it is appropriate now for me to decide on the question of proportionality, save that I would make a few observations as follows. 65.First, I appreciate that the test of proportionality is not necessarily recognised available as a free standing ground in judicial review in cases outside human rights and constitutional challenges. There may thus be a question as to whether this ground should apply independently in the present judicial review application. 66.Given that (a) this question has not been fully argued by the parties, and (b) it is now not necessary for me to decide on this proportionality ground on merits, I believe it is only right for this court to reserve this question to be determined in another more appropriate occasion. 67.Second, in its submissions, the Council raises the preliminary objection that the applicant was not entitled to rely on the ground of proportionality in this judicial review as it had not been raised in its Amended Form 86. Further, it would be prejudiced if the applicant is allowed to now rely on this ground, as it has been deprived of the chance of provide relevant evidence. 68.However, as pointed out by the applicant in his reply submissions, the Council has not identified in its skeleton what evidence (or what is the nature of the evidence) that it would want to and could provide if this ground had been raised in the Amended Form 86. 69.As such, I agree with the applicant that no real prejudice has been demonstrated by the Council if this ground is allowed to be raised now. This is particularly so as, for the present purposes, this ground should and would only be examined in light of all the evidence that was made available at the inquiry. 70.Therefore, I would have allowed this ground to be fully argued. 71.Finally, if I had to decide on merits whether the Decision meets the proportionality test, I believe it would have been relevant for me to take into account the factor that under s 22(3) of the DRO, the Council was entitled to consider whether to attach any conditions in allowing or refusing the restoration application. D. CONCLUSION 72.For the above reasons, I allow this judicial review application. I would quash the Decision and further make an order of mandamus to require the Council to reconsider the applicant’s application for restoration before a fresh panel appointed by the Council. 73.I would also make an order nisi that costs of this application be to the applicant, to be taxed if not agreed. This order shall become absolute 14 days from today unless any of the parties applies to vary it by summons.
Mr Adrian Huggins SC, instructed by Mayer brown JSM, for the applicant Mr Gerard McCoy SC, instructed by the Department of Justice, for the respondent | |||||||||||
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