Thomas Francis Edwards v. Hong Kong Tramways Ltd
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF HONG KONG (ORIGINAL JURISIDICTION) ACTION NO. 674 OF 1972 ________________________
Coram: McMullin J. Date: 21st December, 1972. ________________________ JUDGMENT ________________________ 1. This is an action for damages for personal injuries arising out of an accident which took place on the 25th of September 1970 when the plaintiff was knocked down and injured by a tram owned and operated by the defendant company and driven at the time by one of the defendant’s servants. The plaintiff is Assistant Commissioner of The Rating and Valuation Department of The Hong Kong Government and was aged 50 years at the date of the accident. At about 1.00 p.m. on that day the plaintiff and his wife were making their way from the direction of his office at No.1, Garden Road to The Hong Kong Club for lunch. They walked along the pavement which leads from the Rating & Valuation Office, and which abuts upon the southern border of Queensway, to the pedestrian crossing which traverses Queensway between the westerly extremity of that pavement and the pavement which skirts the metal railings enclosing the Cricket Ground. The traffic in this area is normally heavy but it is a matter of some importance to note that at this hour on this day the condition of congestion which had developed was abnormal because of the overfilling certain fuel tanks belonging to the Hilton Hotel. The police anticipated that there might be some danger to the public and consequently a number of policemen were on duty to direct the traffic. The traffic lights at the pedestrian crossings at the bottom of Garden Road and at either side of Queensway had been switched off. No traffic was being permitted to pass either from Queensway or Garden Road into Queen’s Road and all the west-bound traffic was therefore being directed either into Des Voeux Road or Jackson Road. One of the effects of this situation was that the converging streams of traffic coming down Garden Road and along Queensway formed, at their point of confluence, a somewhat unstable delta composed of vehicles of all descriptions extending a little way beyond both pedestrian crossings in the direction of The Bank of China. It is clear that the police on duty were doing their best to dissolve this clot of congested traffic by controlling the westerly border of the delta in such a way as to permit vehicles to filter away into the permitted channels, drawing them as evenly as circumstances permitted from the two convergent streams. In that area only one stream of traffic is permitted to move in an easterly direction – the trams of the defendant company which move on the lower or more northerly set of tracks east-bound from Western Market towards Wanchai. Of the several police constables and other police officers taking part in this exercise we are concerned only with the acts and directions of two. There was evidence which is not disputed that there was one police constable on duty at the traffic lights sited on the spur of the pavement where Garden Road and Queensway meet and that he had assumed the duty of directing pedestrians across Queensway between the borders of the stud crossing there. Another police officer had evidently undertaken the task of directing the tram traffic going east and he was standing at the extremity of the long narrow safety island which runs parallel with the more northerly or east-bound tram tracks two-thirds of the way across Queensway towards the Cricket Ground. Judging from the distances described upon the scale map, exhibit P 1, this would put him about 60 feet from the westerly border of the stud crossing. 2. The plaintiff and his wife joined a small group of pedestrians which included P.W. 4, Mr. Mutimer, a solicitor practising in Hong Kong. The policeman on duty there blew a whistle and then moved out across the stud crossing signalling to the traffic moving along Queensway to stop. According to the plaintiff’s wife, this officer held up both his arms against the westward moving traffic facing westward himself towards the China Bank as he did so and then, with his left arm, beckoned to the pedestrians to cross. The plaintiff and Mr. Mutimer also gave evidence that the policeman beckoned them to cross in this way. None of these witnesses mentions having seen the police officer who was directing the east-bound trams from the western end of the narrow traffic island but it has not been disputed that there was an officer so employed there. The driver of tram No.21 (the tram involved in the accident), Wong Kin-kwan, who was the first defence witness, told the court that he had stopped at the tram stop between the Supreme Court and the China Bank and had there taken on some extra passengers. According to him, and according to the conductor who also gave evidence, the tram was then about 80% full. He then proceeded up the slight incline past the China Bank and rounded the corner at Queensway behind another tram which stopped at the white line some 60 or 70 feet westward of the western tip of the traffic island on which the police constable was stationed. After a short while this policeman beckoned to the trams to proceed on their way, the tram ahead of him moved on and he followed it keeping, he said, a distance of about two tram lengths i.e. about 60 feet between him and the other tram. He said that as he approached the stud crossing his view of it was obscured somewhat by the traffic which extended across it. But more important than that, he alleged that a west-bound tram had been held up as it crossed the stud crossing and that it was then stationary its rear and still one or two feet inside the western border of the stud crossing. The effect of this, according to him, was that he was unable to see the pedestrians as he started across the pedestrian crossing in answer to the signal of the other police officer, nor could he see that officer himself. I accept this evidence, indeed it was not seriously challenged. It is common ground that there were vehicles obstructing the pedestrian crossing because both the plaintiff and his wife and Mr. Mutimer described how they had to weave in and out between motor cars as they went across the road in answer to the policeman’s signal. The plaintiff was the first of the pedestrians and he was followed closely by his wife and Mr. Mutimer. The driver of the tram was very familiar with this stud crossing and he was aware that pedestrians do cross when the traffic lights have held up the western flow of traffic but he stressed the fact that the conditions were on this occasion peculiar in that no lights were operating, the stud crossing was covered with stationary vehicles and everybody both the pedestrians and drivers of vehicles were relying upon police hand signals. According to him as he followed the other tram towards the stud crossing the police officer upon the traffic island continued to beckon him and other trams to proceed. The tram which had been ahead of him then went across the crossing and he drew level with the stationary tram which had been west-bound before it was held up. Of three pedestrian witnesses only Mr. Mutimer could give any information concerning this stationary term. He said that a tram did pass the pedestrians going westward as they left the pavement to cross the road and that they all passed behind that tram as they proceeded on their way. He added that it was his impression that that tram had thereafter drawn to a halt a little bit to his left. 3. According to the driver of tram No. 21, it was this stationary tram which primarily unsighted him for events upon the crossing so that by the time he drew abreast of it and began to pass it he was not aware either of the police officer directing the pedestrian traffic or of any pedestrians in the process of making their way through the cars jammed upon the crossing. He said that while he was passing the other tram, the lever which controls the speed of the tram and upon which he keeps his left hand while driving had been fixed in the second speed notch which would give him a speed of about four miles per hour. He said that he rang the tram bell as he approached the stud crossing. At this moment the plaintiff had just cleared the southerly set of tracks i.e. the west-bound tracks and was looking steadily to his right i.e. towards the west-bound traffic and so doing stepped right in front of tram No. 21 as it reached the stud crossing. The driver said that he first saw the plaintiff when the latter was about two feet to his right and about two feet to the front of the tram. He at once activated two of the three brake systems with which the tram is equipped, thrusting the drive lever into the off position and pressing a lever with his right hand which activated the air brake and then thrusting the driver lever beyond the “off” position, anti-clockwise, which has the effect of causing the engine to function as an electric generator thus exerting an inhibiting force on the rotation of the wheels. Coupled with this last manoeuvre he pressed the button which releases sand which is held in boxes above the four wheels which then dropped upon the tracks thereby increasing the grip of the wheels upon the tracks. These manoeuvres, however, although carried out as swiftly as they could be were not of the slightest avail in avoiding the accident because, according to the driver, although he was travelling dead slow immediately before the accident the plaintiff appeared from behind the other tram with such an abrupt suddenness, and was at first sight so close to the tram, being indeed actually between the tram tracks ahead of him, that nothing he could have done with any of the devices at his call could have prevented the tram from striking the plaintiff. Some support is given to this version of the affair by the plaintiff’s wife who said that, as she followed her husband, she suddenly saw him being hurled to the ground by a tram and that at the moment she saw this her husband was so close to the tram that it was unable to stop. It appears that the plaintiff’s elbow was caught by some part of the front of the tram and he was pitched on to the tracks in front of it so that his head came in contact with the bracket which hangs down from the front of the tram and which is known as the “life-guard gate”. This gate, as it is designed to do, gave, upon the impact, and activated a wooden tray known as the “life-guard tray” suspended in front of the foremost wheels which then dropped upon the ground thus preventing the wheels from coming in contact with the plaintiff’s body. When his wife and other rescuers came to his assistance immediately afterwards he was lying face down between the metal “life-guard” and the wooden “life-guard tray” underneath the tram. He was unconscious and bleeding from the left ear. A police inspector in the vicinity with the assistance of some of his officers managed to remove the plaintiff to his motor car and he arrived the Queen Mary Hospital about 20 minutes later where he was admitted at once for treatment. 4. It is clear that the plaintiff was very fortunate to survive this accident. He sustained a number of injuries to the skull, neck, spine and left side of the body including fractures of the left parietal bone and of the left petrous bone and a long and gross fracture at the base of skull the latter being, it would seem, the most serious of the injuries and the one which occasioned the major part of the subsequent ill-effects. For the greater part of the next nine or ten days the plaintiff remained unconscious in hospital with short spells of lucidity, noted by his wife, who remained constantly in attendance with him at the hospital, but which he himself cannot recall. He can remember nothing of the events between the moment of the impact and the moment, some sixteen days later, when he recovered full consciousness, nor can he recall the actual moment of the impact itself. 5. It is clear from the evidence of the several doctors who treated him in Queen Mary Hospital that at the odd moments when he did surface into consciousness he was in considerable pain. After consciousness fully and finally returned he continued to suffer from severe headaches and was partially deaf in the left ear. He was also suffering from the disagreeable symptom known as “tinnitus” which the plaintiff himself described as being a continuous noise in that ear rather like the filling of a cistern with water, coupled with an unpleasant sensation as though the ear itself was waterlogged. At this stage he was also suffering from dizziness and severe diplopia i.e. double vision which was so bad on the day when he quitted the hospital that he went at once to consult a Dr. Singh in Pedder Building but was told that it was too soon after the accident, and the damage resulting therefrom, for any remedial work to be done to alleviate this disability. This diplopia gradually improved over the next 15 months and in early 1971 he went to a Dr. Heffernan for further eye tests as a result of which all his glasses were changed. That treatment, however, does not appear to have materially altered the situation and, although the condition steadily improved, thereafter, at the present time it is still not possible for the plaintiff to read for any length of time without suffering some loss of focus in the eyes. 6. The plaintiff continued to attend Queen Mary Hospital as an out-patient for many months after his discharge and was treated to spinal traction to alleviate pain in the back which had resulted from the accident. Later in the summer of 1971 he was subjected to some rather painful treatment for the purpose of determining whether any deterioration had taken place in the bowels, bladder and intestines generally. He also attended the ear, nose and throat clinic at Sai Ying Poon for audiograms and other procedures which were carried out in connection with a suspected infection of the eustachian tubes. Six months after his discharge from Queen Mary Hospital he was re-admitted for an operation to the left ear in the course of which some blood clots were removed from the middle ear but his hearing did not improve as a result of this treatment. The ear-drum would appear to have been ruptured by the accident and that was repaired although there is still a small scar thereon. 7. Because his headaches were persisting the plaintiff consulted Dr. Wen at The Hong Kong Sanatorium and was there subjected to testing by the method known as pneumoencephalogram, a treatment which according to the plaintiff occasioned the worst pain he has ever experienced and which remained severe for several days then gradually diminishing although it did not clear up for many months. The plaintiff told the court that at the present time he continues to suffer from the following effects of the accident: partial deafness and uncomfortable congestion in the left ear; tinnitus in both ears but somewhat worse in the left ear; a difficulty in maintaining his balance particularly after he stoops to pick something up; occasional dizziness; intermittent headaches, continual pain in the occipital region of the skull and neck; episodes of “loss of focus” when he reads for more than half an hour or so; a numb sensation over the left upper face and cheek; some pain in the lower part of the back. In addition the plaintiff, who formerly had an exceptionally good memory, according to his own account and that of his wife, now is inclined to forget small matters and in general finds that he has to concentrate harder at his work in order to get the same amount of work done or to remember the same quantity of data. He also says that he has a tendency to more irritable over matters which formerly would not have troubled him greatly although this, he adds, is a tendency which he has so far managed successfully to combat. 8. According to Dr. Hunter, the neurological specialist, who examined him on the 2nd of December this year none of these residual symptoms is likely to clear up and some of them may get worse with age. All of these effects, according to the doctor, result from the injury to the head and trunk caused by the accident and the doctor gave it as his opinion that the head injury is of a type which is frequently fatal. He said that the disturbance in equilibrium and the dizziness and permanent effects which may conceivably become worse. He takes the view that the loss of memory and concentration which is clearly not of a very significant degree at the moment is not likely to improve. The intermittent headaches he thinks will recur from time to time and may become worse. The ache in the back of the skull and the top of the neck, which appear to be associated with a previous episode in which nerves in the region of the cervical vertebra were pinched, may progressively get worse. The numbness of the face is likely to be permanent and might conceivably develop into a painful condition later on. 9. The plaintiff was formerly a very keen golfer and although he can still play golf his capacity to withstand the exertion of a long game has been reduced. Whereas formerly he could play 36 holes without a break, he now can do no more than 18 holes and generally finds that he tires at this form of exercise, and at work and play generally, more quickly than he did before the accident. The plaintiff was an extremely candid and balanced witness who, notwithstanding the long rigours of his treatment and convalescence, has contrived to retain a notably fair and objective attitude towards the accident and its results. I have no hesitation in accepting his account of these residual disabilities nor have I any difficulty in coming to the conclusion that Dr. Hunter gave in general a fair estimate of the possible future developments. Mr. Ching for the defendant objected that Dr. Hunter’s opinion was based upon what might happen rather than what probably would happen in most of the findings in which he forcasts a worsening of the plaintiff’s condition. That is undoubtedly true but as Mr. Donnelly points out the court must have regard not merely to probabilities in such matters but also to possibilities. I also dissent from the view that the suffering caused by the pneumoencephalogram treatment in the Hong Kong Sanitorium should be discounted as not having been entirely necessary in view of the plaintiff’s then condition. I take the view that he was entitled to seek whatever remedial treatment he could obtain the further to alleviate the residual and still distressing symptoms from which he then suffered. Indeed it was no more than common prudence to do so. It is unfortunate that he was put to the expenses so considerable a period of suffering for no appreciable amelioration of his condition. 10. I turn now to the question of liability. Not unnaturally both sides in this action, relying in the main upon the behavior of the two police officers concerned, have sought to maintain that no blame could attach to them for acting in accordance with properly given directions by those police officers. Mr. Ching indeed puts the matter somewhat higher for he says that the tram driver was not merely entitled to proceed upon receiving the signal of the police officer but was by law obliged to do so. He also suggested that if any blame attaches to any person in respect of the occurrence of this accident it should attach to the police officers on the basis that it was their unco-ordinated signals which were the primary cause of the collision. I have some sympathy with this view for it seems to me very unlikely that either the driver of the tram or the plaintiff would have behaved in quite the way they did had they not received these signals. So far as the interior disposition of the mind of each of them is concerned there appears to be a remarkable similarity. Both of them were used to passing that way several times in the course of the day. Both are fully familiar with the nature of the traffic and of the pedestrian crossing. Both were aware on this occasion that the situation was an anomalous one and that the ordinary pattern of traffic control had been superseded by special police procedures. Both must be presumed to have realised that there was a special necessity to act with care under the unusual traffic conditions then prevailing. Both purported to do what they did in answer to express signals given by persons in authority whom they might reasonably have supposed to have considered the total situation and the possible effect of the giving of such signals. If to say all this were, in effect, to say that no negligence had been shown in the conduct either of the tram driver or of the plaintiff the result would amount to a finding of “inevitable accident”. If that were the case plainly the plaintiff could not recover. I cannot, however, take that view. Although the plaintiff and the driver of the tram were perfectly justified in following the signals given to them and, perhaps may even have been obliged to do so, the circumstances as a whole were so unusual that neither one of them was justified in regarding the intervention of the police as absolving them from any further necessity to have regard to his own safety or that of other persons in proceeding in the direction indicated by the police signal. There was still, in the conditions which then prevailed, a duty cast upon pedestrian and tram driver alike to keep a weather-eye open for unusual or unexpected intrusions in the line of travel. The fact that both were aware that this was so is borne out by certain parts of the testimony. Mr. Edwards so far from merely directly his gaze to the other side of the road in threading his way between the cars was looking steadily to his right notwithstanding that the policeman was already holding up the traffic from that direction. This must be taken as showing some degree of concern over the possibility that, notwithstanding the policeman’s control, some vehicles from the west-bound stream might offer a threat to his security. The tram driver on the other hand, who also gave his evidence very fairly, said in answer to questions by Mr. Donnelly that it had occurred to him, after he received the police officer’s signal, that it might be better to stop before he reached the crossing. He said, however, that his speed was so slow that he did not think it necessary to do so. I accept the evidence that he was unsighted by a stationary tram immediately to the west of the westward border of the pedestrian crossing and that he did not see the policeman directing the pedestrians or the pedestrian until it was too late. As far as his speed is concerned it is as Mr. Ching remarked, immaterial whether he was travelling faster or even slower than the speed he alleges since it is common ground between the parties that the matter fell out in such a way that, by the time the tram driver became aware of the presence of Mr. Edwards, he could not, have brought his tram to a halt at any speed which he was then doing. I have come to the conclusion therefore that some degree of blame attaches to both the plaintiff and the driver of the tram. The only question of difficulty is the percentage apportionment of that blame. Mr. Ching asks me to say that if blame attaches to the tram driver at all it can scarcely be higher than 20% and the major blame must rest with the plaintiff in the causing of the accident. I was not referred to any case laid on this particular point and undoubtedly the circumstances were special but I have derived considerable help (albeit by way of an approach to an “a fortiori”) from the decision of the house of Lords in the case of Baker v. Willoughby([1]). In that case the appellant was knocked down by the respondent’s car. He was at the time, crossing a road which was about 33 feet wide. He was not upon a pedestrian crossing. The car which struck him was not travelling at an excessive speed. Both parties were in a position to have seen each other for about 200 yards and traffic was light at the time. The appellant had looked to his right before crossing the road and had seen only one car approaching from the right which he apparently did not consider put him in any danger. At the centre of the road he looked to his left and at that moment he was struck by the respondent’s car which had overtaken the car which the appellant had previously noticed. The trial judge found the motorist 75% of the blame and the pedestrian 25%. On appeal to the Court of Appeal these findings were reversed. The judges in that Court held that it was impossible to differentiate as to liability where both parties had a clear view for 200 yards and both failed to take evasive action and found therefore that the parties were each 50% to blame. The case then went to the House of Lords where the original finding was restored. At page 1530 delivering the leading judgment of the House, Lord Reid said as follows:-
11. I read the final observation in that passage as meaning that where no other distinguishing feature can be found to differentiate between the negligence of a motorist and that of a pedestrian the intrinsic difference in their situation which makes the motorist of necessity more potentially dangerous than the pedestrian will be enough to fix the motorist with a higher degree of blame. Although in that case no question arose concerning the use of a pedestrian crossing, and although we are here concerned with a tram and not a motor car, the principle appears to me to be perfectly applicable to the present case. In that case as in the present one the negligence of both parties consisted in a failure to advert sufficiently to a known or perceptible source of danger. On the principle of Baker alone, if the cases were otherwise identical, I think it must be said that the greater negligence lay with the driver of the tram. But the cases are sharply differentiated in one very important respect, for although a momentary unsighting appears to be a vital factor in both of them the plaintiff in the present case unlike the plaintiff in Baker v. Willoughby was struck down upon a pedestrian crossing. The fact that the tram driver and the plaintiff each made a legitimate response to what appeared to be a proper order places them in an identical situation only in so far as they did at once respond to the order given. In proceeding to follow it out their situations were essentially different. In recent years, in the English courts, a considerable body of authority has developed concerning the obligation binding upon motorists to accord precedence to pedestrians upon pedestrian crossings. A convenient conspectus of this body of opinion is to be found between pages 67 and 71 of the 6th Edition of Bingham’s Motor Claims Cases. These cases lean heavily on the fact that regulation 4 of the 1954 Pedestrian Crossings Regulations in England (which is in very similar terms to regulation 4 of Road Traffic (Road Crossing) Regulations, Cap. 220) impose upon a motorist a duty to yield precedence to a pedestrian upon a crossing which is absolute in the sense that he can only escape liability for striking a pedestrian upon such a crossing if he can show that the reason why he struck him was due to the intervention of some untoward and wholly unexpected factor which rendered it impossible for him to avoid the accident. Examples given in the case of Levy v. Hockey ([2]) included such possibilities as the driver being stung by a swarm of bees or suffering a sudden unforeseeable form of attack disabling him, or a vehicle being knocked forward on to the crossing by another vehicle from behind, or the sudden removal of control occasioned by a latent defect in the vehicle of which the driver did not and could not reasonably know. In the case of Gibbons v. Kahl ([3]) it was said that it is the duty of any motorist approaching a pedestrian crossing to approach it in such a way that he can deal with the situation on the crossing when he gets there. He must be in such a position, and driving at such a speed, that if anybody is on the crossing he is in a position to stop. In the later case of Lockie v. Lawton ([4]) this principle was taken a shade further when it was said that once a pedestrian is on such a crossing the driver of any vehicle approaching that crossing must accord him precedence however unexpectedly or suddenly he crosses. In Kozimor v. Adey ([5]) Megaw J. was dealing with an accident in which a woman ran suddenly out upon an uncontrolled pedestrian crossing in front of the defendant’s car which was travelling at 25 miles per hour and was only 15 yards away when the plaintiff made her sudden move. Although it was held that the defendant, i.e. the driver of the motor vehicle, was not guilty of any negligence from the point when the plaintiff ran on to the crossing nevertheless he had failed to accord such precedence upon the crossing and it was said that he could only have been certain of avoiding a breach of the relevant regulation by approaching the crossing at such a slow speed that he could stop in time to avoid any pedestrian however unexpected and however foolish. It is interesting to note that in that case although the precipitous and apparently suicidal act of the plaintiff was the obviously efficient cause of the accident, the motorist was nevertheless held 25% to blame. In Lockie v. Lawton (supra) the duty of the motorist in respect of such crossings is said to be that he must drive at such a speed that he can stop if in fact there is pedestrian on the crossing even though such pedestrian is hidden from the motorist’s view. The tram driver in this case was well aware that the west-bound traffic had stopped although he was not aware that it had been stopped by a police officer. He expressly admitted that he took precautions against the possibility of there being pedestrians upon the crossing by slowing down to a very slow speed. Although neither he nor the plaintiff was entitled to assume that the signal given by the relevant police officer carried with it a guarantee that the way was safe to proceed without further caution, it was, in my view, more reasonable that the pedestrian should conclude that his police officer, standing by the westward tram tracks and facing west, had seen that the tram tracks were clear of eastward travelling trams then it was for the tram driver to assume that the police officer standing 60 feet to the west of the crossing and in a less favourable position than he himself to appreciate the state of pedestrian traffic upon the crossing should by his signal have given a guarantee that the crossing was clear. In the circumstances it may well be said that neither the driver of the tram nor the plaintiff was guilty of any very high degree of negligence and that the major pre-disposing cause of the accident was the unco-ordinated operation of the police officers. For all that, however, it was the acts of the tram driver and of the plaintiff which were the immediate and effective cause of the accident. They both contributed to the creation of an irretrievable confrontation by a negligent failure to anticipate the danger inherent in the situation. As to the respective degrees of responsibility I have no hesitation in saying that the major responsibility must rest with the driver of the tram. I have accepted that he rang his bell as he said but in the general confusion of the traffic, and in view of the fact that other trams travelling in both directions must also have been using their bells that warning sign by itself cannot have been anything like a sufficient discovery of the presence and progress of tram No. 21. The possibility that he might have to stop suddenly was, upon his own evidence, in the driver’s mind. When one considers that he was driving a vehicle which when fully laden weighs something in the region of 14 tons the need for extreme caution in proceeding in that confused state of affairs is evident enough. I accept the testimony of Mr. Boocock who was of the opinion that the mark of 92 inches upon the road caused by the dropping of the “life-guard tray” would indicate a speed of 6 to 7 miles per hour at the point of impact. The driver denies that he was going so fast but on this point I prefer the evidence of Mr. Boocock. In any event as I have said, speed is not a material feature in the case since it is obvious that even if he had been travelling considerably slower than 6 miles per hour it would have been impossible for him to pull up in time to avoid Mr. Edwards after he caught sight of him. I find that the driver of the tram 80% to blame for this accident and I assign 20% only of the blame to the act of the plaintiff. 12. Special damages have been agreed in at $4,000 and nothing further need be said on that score. As to general damage, there has been no loss of income, the plaintiff continues to be able to discharge the duties of his present office although it may be with more difficulty than before. His damage therefore is to be comprehended under the general catagories of pain suffering and loss of amenity. In all the circumstances it appears to me that the appropriate figure would be $40,000. To this must be added the agreed sum of $4,000 in respect of special damages i.e. $44,000 in all. That sum abated in accordance with my finding as to contributory negligence amounts to $35,200 and that is the sum I award for all damages. Costs of action to plaintiff. 13. The $20,000 lodged in court by the defendant to be paid out to the solicitors for the plaintiff within 14 days.
J.D.M. Donnelly instructed by Gordon Hampton & inter for plaintiff. C. Ching instructed by Deacons for defendant. | |||||||||||||||||