Chik Shui-wai and Another v. The Queen

CACC001220/1976

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Coram: Briggs, C.J., Huggins, J.A. & McMullin, J.

Date of Judgment: 20th May, 1977

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JUDGMENT

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1. On the 12th day of March 1976 four men attempted to rob a large sum of money from a party of Securicor guards who were conveying the cash box containing the money from their security van parked in Ashley Road to the security area of the Securicor premises in the same road. The attempt to seize the money failed by a matter of seconds only, one of the guards having just received it through a special hatch within the building, but in the course of assaulting and disarming the Securicor guards one of the robbers shot and fatally wounded a guard, CHEUNG Moon-lam. who died almost instantly from a .22 calibre bullet wound in the chest. Four suspects were later arrested. The present two appellants were put upon trial and one of their number, CHEUNG Hau-chung, who received a free pardon, was the principal witness against them at the trial. The two appellants gave evidence in their own defence and called witnesses to support alibis. One of the major grounds of appeal for both appellants was directed at what was said to the jury as to what effect the possible rejection of their alibi evidence by the jury might have upon the proof by the prosecution of its case. To that point we will turn first.

2. The judge correctly warned the jury that it would be dangerous to convict without corroboration, but he said further:

It is contended that the lies could not be corroboration and that the jury might have been unwilling to convict in the absence of corroboration. In Credland v. Knowler ⁽¹⁾ (which was followed in Clynes ⁽²⁾) Lord Goddard, C.J. said at p.54:

"It seems to me that there are two quite distinct issues here. Most of the argument and, no doubt, much of the Case, has dealt with the lie which the appellant told and the question whether the fact that the appellant told a lie is in itself corroboration. I should be very sorry to lay down, and I have no intention of laying down and I do not think any case has gone the length of laying down, that the mere fact that an accused person has told a lie can in itself amount to corroboration. It may, but it does not follow that it must. If a man tells a lie when he is spoken to about an alleged offence, the fact that he tells a lie at once throws great doubt upon his evidence, if he afterwards gives evidence, and it may be very good ground for rejecting his evidence, but the fact that his evidence ought to be rejected does not of itself amount to there being corroboration."

That was no doubt the view taken by Baber, J. in the present case, but it is contended before us that it is no longer good law. The main basis of this contention is Reg. v. Chapman ⁽³⁾, but counsel for the appellants also relies on the decision of the Privy Council in Tumahole Bereng v. R. ⁽⁴⁾. In the latter case the appeal was allowed upon a ground which is not material to the issue now before us, but the Board also commented on a passage in the judgment of the trial judge where he had remarked that the rule of practice which emphasized the dangers of acting on accomplice evidence (be it that of one or more accomplices) which is uncorroborated in some material respect implicating the accused "may in the absence of direct evidence be satisfied in various ways, inter alia, by the non denial by the accused of the evidence given by the accomplice incriminating the accused, or by the giving of false evidence". The Board observed at p.270:

"...an accused admits nothing by exercising at his trial the right which the law gives him of electing not to deny the charge on oath. Silence of that kind - and it is the only kind relevant to this appeal - affords no corroboration to satisfy the rule of practice under consideration. Nor does an accused corroborate an accomplice merely by giving evidence which is not accepted and must therefore be regarded as false. Corroboration may well be found in the evidence of an accused person; but that is a different matter, for there confirmation comes, if at all, from what is said, and not from the falsity of what is said. It is, of course, correct to say that these circumstances - the failure to give evidence or the giving of false evidence - may bear against an accused and assist in his conviction if there is other material sufficient to sustain a verdict against him. But if the other material is insufficient either in its quality or extent they cannot be used as a make-weight."

Mr. Lucas submits that as the accused in that case did not give evidence (and, therefore, no question of lies arose) this passage is not binding upon us in so far as it relates to the possible effect of lies told by an accused person. In our view he rightly says that an accused person's silence in court in the exercise of his acknowledged right to remain silent is a very different thing from his telling lies after he has elected to give evidence.

3. It may be that the passage cited from Credland v. Knowler⁽¹⁾ has led to misunderstanding and has been taken to mean (as grammatically it might) that "the mere fact that an accused person has told a lie ... may [in itself amount to corroboration]". As was said in Reg. v. Chapman ⁽³⁾ at p.780:

"mere rejection of evidence is not affirmative proof of the contrary of the evidence which has been rejected".

On that basis (and we are not unmindful of the doubt expressed in Reg. v. Boardman ⁽⁵⁾ the only effect which the telling of lies in court may have seems to be that it can turn other evidence which would not by itself be corroboration into corroboration. Thus in Clynes ⁽²⁾ the appellant had been charged with indecent assault and there was evidence that he had said to a police officer that he had never touched the woman but had only asked her for the time. That connected him with the woman but did not tend to confirm that he was guilty of the offence. However, in the witness-box he denied that he had been in the place where the assault was alleged to have taken place and if that denial was disbelieved it could put a different complexion on the evidence of the police officer that the appellant had admitted speaking to the woman: it might tend to show a guilty rather than an innocent association. Whether or not it did tend to show guilt depended upon the jury's conclusion as to the reason for the lie. There is a passage in Reg. v. Chapman ⁽³⁾ which at first sight may appear to be inconsistent with this view :

"... there is a clear distinction in principle between a lie told out of court and evidence given in the witness-box which the jury rejects as incapable of belief or is otherwise unreliable. Proof of a lie told out of court is capable of being direct evidence, admissible at the trial, amounting to affirmative proof of the untruth of the defendant's denial of guilt. This in turn may tend to confirm the evidence against him and to implicate him in the offence charged. But a denial in the witness-box which is untruthful or otherwise incapable of belief is not positive proof of anything. It leads only to the rejection of the evidence given, which then has to be treated as if it had not been given."

Then follow the words which we have cited above and we think those words indicate that Reg. v. Chapman ⁽³⁾ is not inconsistent with the view we have expressed, When a lie is being considered to see whether it alters the complexion of other evidence it does not seem to us to matter whether the lie has been told in court or out of court. On the other hand, if a lie is told in court there is no "evidence" of the lie - and corroboration must be evidence. It is presumably this which justifies the distinction between a lie told in court and one told out of court. for evidence may be led of the fact that the defendant has lied out of court. Thus the lie told in court cannot by itself be corroboration and "leads only to the rejection of the evidence given, which then has to be treated as if it had not been given". That does not prevent its being treated as corroboration in conjunction with, for example, evidence of opportunity.

4. If this be correct then, although the second passage cited from the summing-up in the present case may be open to the criticism that taken in isolation as a statement of principle it is not accurate, we think the jury would not have been misled, for there was evidence which, together with the lies, was capable of amounting to corroboration.

5. Of the remaining grounds, of appeal which are the same in respect to each appellant, the 1st, the 5th, the 6th and the 7th grounds constitute the real substance of the attack upon these convictions. What they amount to is that the convictions are unsafe and unsatisfactory in view of what is said to be (a) the total unreliability of the evidence of the first prosecution witness, the accomplice Cheung (b) the unreliability of the identification evidence whether viewed as substantive evidence of the guilt of the two appellants or as corroboration of the accomplice. The first ground of appeal indeed suggests that the evidence was so unsatisfactory that there was not even a case fit to go to the jury. We think that goes too far. Whatever criticisms have been levelled against the evidence and the alleged corroboration (and they are considerable) we do not think the learned trial judge would have been justified, upon any view that might be taken of this evidence, in withdrawing the case from the jury at that stage. It is true nevertheless that the testimony of P.W. 1, Cheung (the accomplice) does differ startlingly in certain outstanding respects from the evidence given by the security guard CHAN Kwok-sang, P.W. 3, and the other eye-witnesses. The learned trial judge pointed out that Cheung's evidence did differ enormously from that given by the disinterested witnesses. He reminded them that it was the defence case that this evidence was so unreliable that it indicated that the witness might not even have been present at the event. He reminded the jury of a number of the unsatisfactory and inconsistent features of the accomplice's evidence both as to what occurred prior to the attempted robbery and in the course of it. The appellants' complaint at this point is that the analysis of these discrepancies and other deficiencies was inadequate. It is clear that the learned judge did enumerate and summarise a number of the points bearing on the evidence of the accomplice which have been made the subject of special mention in the course of the appeal. There would be little in this criticism were it not for what must later be said on the question of identification. Indeed a number of the points mentioned by the judge were not such as lent themselves to any elaborate analysis and in their regard the mere retailing and enumerating of them to the jury must have been enough to remind the jury of the extent of those criticisms in view of the prominence given to them in the course of the defence both by way of cross-examination and in final submissions. But since the identification of the accused by independent witnesses assumed a position of great importance in the case it should be noted, before turning to consider that question, that there is some substance to Mr. Zimmern's complaint concerning the analysis of the accomplice's evidence inasmuch as it may be said that the learned judge while mentioning a number of less important points did not specifically remind the jury of what were perhaps the most glaring contradictions between that evidence and the story as described by other witnesses. It is common ground that it was P.W. 1, the accomplice, who approached P.W. 3, the Securicor guard Chan, and snatched his gun. It is very unlikely that the jury would have disbelieved Chan's evidence on this point yet Chan describes this as having occurred as he was about to mount the pavement outside the Securicor premises and immediately in the rear of the deceased. Chan had followed the deceased from the Securicor van which was parked on the opposite side of the street and that short journey had commenced from the nearside of the van just outside the passenger door there being then nobody in the passenger seat. The driver, Sau, was still seated in the driver's seat. Cheung, the accomplice, however described how he had approached the Securicor van from its front with the van upon his right. He said that, as he passed the driver's door, he observed a guard emerging from the driver's seat and stepping down into the road holding a shot gum. He thereupon approached that man and snatched the shot gun from him shouting "this is a robbery" and warned him to stay still which he did. On his account of it the accomplice then left the person from whom the gun had been taken and came round the front of the van, having heard a shot fired from the area in the front of the Securicor headquarters. He was holding his own hand gun and the shot gun taken from the guard. He then observed his three confederates strung out more or less across the road between the van and the Securicor premises and he saw also a man (presumably the deceased) lying on the pavement and another outside the Securicor premises a Securicor guard (presumably Chan) kneeling upon the pavement nearby. None of this could have been true if Chan's evidence was the truth. Apart from the driver Sau there were only four Securicor guards upon the scene. One of those, Lau, was as is admitted, inside the Securicor building already. The driver Sau never left the driver's seat. That left Sergeant Luk, the deceased, and the witness Chan. On Chan's version he and the deceased alone were in the vicinity of the pavement having left Sergeant Luk at the van near the passenger door. Sergeant Luk by that time had no shot gun in his possession and was moreover on the passenger side of the van and not on the driver's seat side so that he could not have been the person from whom the accomplice took the gun. The learned judge did warn the jury that one of the dangers of this king of evidence was that an accomplice, being a person who was present at the action, could tailor circumstances which he had personally observed in such a way as to suit his own case. It may be that that is exactly what happened in this case because the deceased was shot almost immediately after Chan's gun was snatched from him by one of the robbers. In putting himself at the other side of the van at this point in time the accomplice may well have been safeguarding himself from the imputation that it was he and not one of his companions who had in fact shot the deceased. It would have been better if this very major discrepancy and its possible implication had been specifically drawn to the attention of the jury. Again, there was the fact that the accomplice described having seen one of the Securicor people carrying a box from the van towards the building after he, the accomplice, had disarmed his man and come around the front of the van to where his companions were deployed across the road. He had described earlier having seen. prior to the commencement of the action, a couple of Securicor men carrying another box into the building and by common consensus this box was indeed the cash box carried into the building by Chan, guarded by Sergeant Luk, immediately before the attempted robbery commenced. There was no second box of any sort being carried in the van and no other witness described any such incident.

6. The great issue in the case was the reliability of this accomplice evidence. Of the remainder, the most important evidence was that given by two Securicor employees who purported to identify the two appellants as persons present and in some degree participant in the action going on outside the Securicor premises upon the day in question. The security arrangements at the building included a television camera mounted on the outside of the building and covering the pavement and part of the roadway immediately outside the long rolling metal shutter which covers both the entrance to the building and also the seourity bay into which cash is carried for delivery through a hatch into the interior of the building. These two witnesses happened to be watching a small screen. One of them was P.W. 4, TSANG Chak-ho, a security inspector who was watching the monitor screen within the building. He purported to identify the second appellant as a person he had seen upon the screen at the time the deceased was shot. The other identifying witness was Chan himself, the Securicor guard whose gun had been snatched from him by Cheung. the accomplice. The importance of this evidence was of course that it constituted (a) direct evidence of the involvement of both the appellants in the robbery and murder; and (b) that, if accurate and reliable, it constituted good corroboration of the accomplice witness. In what follows we bear in mind the stringent observations and expressions of concern relating to identification evidence which have appeared in decisions of the Court of Appeal in the last few years in England. In particular we have had regard to the advised prescriptions relating to matters to be put to a jury in commenction with identification evidence which appear in the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the recent case of R. v. Turnbull ⁽⁶⁾. Before considering what was said by the learned trial judge of the dangers of such identification in the present case it will be helpful to enumerate in some detail the particular deficiencies in this evidence which have been urged upon us in the present case and which appear to be of substance : (1) Of the many witnesses who might have been expected to be able to identify some of the four persons said to have taken part in the robbery P.W. 3, P.W. 6 and P.W. 7, the surviving Securicor man outside the building; and P.W. 9, P.W. 10 and P.W. 13 all of whom were inside the building and had an opportunity of observing the monitor screen at about the time the deceased was shot, only CHAN Kwok-sang, the guard whose gun was snatched by the accomplice and TSANG Chak-ho (P.W. 4) the Securicor inspector watching the monitor screen within the building identified any one; (2) The identification by P.W. 3 was based upon a brief view of the profile of the person he identified and was described by him as a view "out of the corner of my eyes". He was then standing or crouching near to the intercom apparatus on the outside of the building and had lowered his head, presumably not to excite any precipitate action on the part of his assailant; (3) The person he thus identified was the first appellant yet the evidence of the accomplice - the only evidence available on this point apart from that of Chan himself - seems to indicate that the gun was snatched from Chan by the accomplice and not by either of the appellants. This is so because it is common ground that it was immediately prior to the shooting of the deceased that Chan had his gun snatched from him by one of the robbers. At that moment the deceased was carrying two shot guns and Chan was carrying one. The only other shot gun involved in the affair was held by the witness Lau who was already safe within the premises. There is no evidence that either of the two guns was snatched away from the deceased by any one prior to the shooting of the deceased. The only evidence, that is to say, of the snatching of a gun by surprise from a living. moving guard is the evidence relating to the taking of the gun from Chan, P.W. 3. If Chan, in talking about his gun being snatched from him by one of the robbers and P.W. 1, the accomplice, in talking about snatching a gun from one of the guards is talking about the same event - and the evidence shows only one such event in the whole course of the attack - either Chan's identification of the first appellant as the person who snatched his gun is wrong or else the accomplice's account of having snatched a gun from a guard is wrong. If, as seems most likely, it is the accomplice whose story is wrong this would be another, and very major, reason for regarding his evidence as wholly unsatisfactory; (4) On Chan's evidence the only persons who might have been expected to be within the view of the television camera and near enough to it for identification by persons within the building would be persons in the immediate vicinity of the deceased at the moment when he received his fatal injury. Nevertheless the man identified by the Securicor supervisor Tsang, who looked at the screen immediately after hearing a shot, was the second appellant and he observed only the deceased sinking slowly upon the ground and the second appellant facing the camera for about 30 seconds. He did not see either Chan or any stranger, other than the second appellant, in Chan's immediate vicinity. Another Securicor witness WONG Chun-fan (P.W. 10) who did not purport to identify anybody, nevertheless gave evidence that upon hearing a shot he looked at the screen and saw one of his colleagues (presumably the deceased) lying down on the pavement and another half kneeling with his head lowered. This latter must presumably have been the witness Chan. P.W. 10 saw various other figures moving around whom he could not see clearly. CHAN Chun-cheong, (P.W. 13) also a Securicor witness from inside the building, gave evidence of having seen on the screen, before the point at which the deceased received his injury, a man in a floral shirt trying to push against the door of the part of the premises into which the witness Lau had already entered with his shot gun and he described something he clearly could not have been seen that is to say the man within the building pushing against the doorway being forced from the outside by the person in a floral shirt. No doubt what he meant was that the screen showed him the man in the floral shirt pushing against the door from the outside and he concluded, either from what he later heard, or simply because he assumed it that Lau was resisting this from the inside. He then saw the deceased carrying two shot guns running towards the man who was pushing at the door. That man turned to face the deceased. The witness heard the sound of an explosion and the deceased, still holding the two shot guns, collapsed slowly on the pavement. These were the only two persons seen by that witness on the screen and he could identify neither of them apart from saying that he realised that one of them was one of his colleagues by his uniform. Yet the moment thus described must have corresponded very closely with the moment described by Chan P.W. 3 when he saw the deceased collapsing slowly on the pavement. It seems likely that Chan must have been visible upon the screen at the same moment since he must have been the person described by WONG Chun-fan (P.W. 10) as one of his colleagues who was kneeling upon the pavement with his head lowered. The accomplice had described seeing one of his associates pushing against the door but the person identified by him was neither the first appellant nor the second appellant nor he himself (the witness) but the fourth member of their party Tai Tau Lam. There is thus the situation that during the very brief period of time described by five witnesses the area covered by the outside T.V. camera disclosed a scene which included, apart from Seouricor personnel, only one stranger and that stranger is variously described as the first appellant, the second appellant and the man in the floral shirt. Tsang (P.W. 4), the witness who identified the second defendant as the man he saw upon the screen, said that he observed the scene for 30 seconds during which apparently no change took place upon it and he was able to observe the face of that man during that period. This period of time was actually measured out for his benefit in court and he adhered to his estimate of 30 seconds. During that period the only thing which he could describe was seeing the deceased fall slowly down and seeing the man he later identified as the second defendant facing the camera and holding a shot gun in one hand and a hand gun in the other. He did not claim to have seen the accomplice, who had remained in close attendance upon Chan, P.W. 3, during the period while the deceased was sinking to the ground although, according to WONG Chun-fan, (P.W. 10), he (Wong) was able to see both of his Securicor colleagues upon the screen when he looked up immediately after hearing the shot which was presumably the shot which killed the deceased. These are all perhaps factors which may be accounted for on the basis that those engaged in the action outside, or some of them, were in violent and rapid movement and upon the basis that those who were observing were persons whose powers of observation were of unequal quality and who in their individual ways were fixing upon one rather than another element of the scene presented to them. But there is no doubt that one monitor screen has yielded a surprising variation in the description of a scene lasting a very short time and part at least of which must have been simultaneously observed by the several witness.

7. A more serious criticism which emerges from a close analysis of this evidence is that according to TSANG Chak-ho, (P.W. 4), he heard the sound of a shot, looked at the screen, and saw his colleague, the deceased, actually collapsing upon the ground and at about the same time saw a man holding a long gun and a short gun a man who he later identified as the second appellant. Although this witness was not questioned about the guns being held by the deceased at that moment it seems clear from the evidence of WONG Chun-fan (P.W. 10) that the deceased was still clutching the guns when he had fully fallen down. As noted above there is no evidence of any one having snatched a gun from the deceased prior to the shooting of the latter or indeed immediately thereafter. The only evidence there is of any one of the robbers having snatched a gun from any of the guards is that of the accomplice so that, if his evidence is correct, at the moment of time described by Tsang (P.W. 4) the only person so armed who could have been visible upon the screen was the accomplice himself. He has however emphatically placed the episode in which he was involved at the far side of the van and presumably out of the line of the camera's sight. If the jury believed that then the identification by Tsang is seriously called in question. (5) Although the identification of the second defendant by Tsang at the parade was of a positive nature the identification of the first defendant by P.W. 3 was in terms merely that the person so identified looked similar to the man who had snatched his gun. (6) The screen upon which the scene was viewed was a small one 8 "by 6" and it is established that the face of the person identified as the second defendant would have occupied space upon the screen of about half an inch in length; (7) The quality of the monitor screen picture and its angle of reach and the camera's power of resolution although described in various terms were not made the subject of any practical test by the court or jury; (8) Out of eight witnesses called to the identification parade at which the first defendant was identified by P.W. 3 only P.W. 3 was able to make any identification. Again, of the ten witnesses called to attend the identification parade upon which the second appellant and the accomplice were present only Tsang (P.W. 4) identified any person.

8. The factors affecting the reliability of this identification evidence have been detailed at some length not only because it was clearly evidence of great importance in the case, whether viewed as direct evidence of guilt or as corroborative evidence supporting the accomplice, but also because it has been, from the outset of the appeal, and before that at the trial, a cardinal point for the defence that this evidence required close attention and analysis. Although the learned trial judge gave a very detailed account of what had actually occurred at the identification parades he nowhere seems to have given the kind of general warning in relation to the dangers inherent in such evidence which is described as essential in Turnbull's Case ⁽⁶⁾. The only observations which might be said to be of a general nature were in the following terms:

"Now, of course, if you were satisfied that at the individual identification parades the first accused and the second accused were correctly identified by respective witnesses CHAN Kwok-sang and TSANG Chak-ho, and that is a major thing to be satisfied about, you could convict the two accused. Indeed, that evidence would be more than corroboration, it would be independant, direct evidence ..."

Later he said:

"You will have to consider carefully the purported identifications of each of these accused by Chan and Tsang respectively."

As to the particular difficulties inherent in the identification evidence what he said was as follows:

"Of course, as I have said before, there is always the danger that an accomplice knows enough about the matter to tell part of the truth, that part which can be confirmed from other sources, and invents the rest. Here, the defence says even the parts that can be confirmed from independent and reliable sources are not so confirmed. Quite the reverse. You will remember a very important point in Mr. Allman-Brown's argument was that Chan and Tsang, who are endeavouring to identify the person who must have been the killer and are speaking about the one person who was on the pavement at the vital time, identified two entirely different persons. Mr. Allman-Brown says there is no escaping from the conclusion and he explained to you why. Mr. Lucas asks you to believe that in fact the two witnesses were dealing with a slightly different moment of time, namely, before and after CHAN Kwok-sang had walked over to the intercom on the robber's orders. You will have to consider whether that argument appeals to you."

And later:

After due deliberation we have come to the conclusion that the confusions and disjunctions evident upon an analysis of this evidence ought to have been more fully exposed for the consideration of the jury who should also have been warned in general terms following the lines of the decision in Turnbull ⁽⁶⁾ of the nature of the dangers inherent in identification evidence and the reasons generally for giving a warning in relation thereto. The corroborative potential of this identification evidence, together with its potential as substantive evidence, together with its potential as substantive evidence against the appellants, must obviously have bulked very large in the jury's mind; compared with it the other matters referred to by the learned judge and pointed out to the jury as affording possible corroboration of the accomplice were obviously matters of less force and more peripheral effect. If this identification evidence is put aside we do not think it could be said that the jury must have inevitably come to the conclusion to which they came.

9. Delivering the judgment of this court in Criminal Appeal No. 152 of 1977 Pickering, J.A. while acknowledging the importance of the judgment in Reg. v. Turnbull ⁽⁶⁾, coming as it does upon the heels of the recommendations made by the committee under the chairmanship of Lord Devlin, and the general anxieties which set that committee in motion, nevertheless emphasized that the Court of Appeal was laying down the guidelines only. Obviously, cases will differ enormously in the details of different identifications and this court will not countenance any attempt to crystallize the wisdom underlying these guidelines in a series of rigid prescriptions to be construed with the strictness of a statute so that a departure from them in one or more particular must be said to be fatal to a conviction. The doubt which continues to beset us after this close sifting and analysis of the suspect evidence does not derive solely or even principally from the failure of the trial judge - in a summing-up which was in all other respects admirably clear and succinct - to give this particular evidence what one might call the full Turnbull ⁽⁶⁾ treatment. Had the evidence itself not been of such a questionable nature the omitting of a general direction on the dangers inherent in identification evidence would certainly not have been enough to oblige this court to interfere. It is the particularities which give rise to concern. Put them at their highest, these identifications were based upon fleeting observation on a single occasion under very un-ideal conditions of strangers who must have been, according to most of the observers, in fairly rapid movement. Most of those observers were unable to identify anyone in the parades and of the two who did one was somewhat tentative. The other expressed no doubts, but his recollection was based upon a very small image in a television screen. A viewing of the scene and a test of the monitoring equipment for the benefit of the jury might have been decisive in fortifying this evidence or destroying it.

10. For these reasons we have come to the conclusion that the convictions are unsafe. The appeals are allowed. The convictions quashed and the sentences set aside. We have not invited counsel to address us on the question of re-trial because we do not think that this is an appropriate case for the making of such an order.

Representation:

Zimmern, Q.C. & Allman-Brown (Henlen A. Lo & Co.) for 1st Appellant.

Zimmern, Q.C. & N. Singh (D.L.A.) doe 2nd Appellant.

M. Lucas for Crown.

(1) (1951) 35 Cr. App. R.48.

(2) (1960) 44 Cr. App. R. 158.

(3) (1973) 1 Q.B. 774.

(4) (1949) A.C. 253.

(5) (1974) 3 W.L.R. 673, 680A.

(6) (1976) 3 W.L.R. 445.