Lpk v. Sh and Another

FCMC 14402 / 2011

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NUMBER 14402 OF 2011

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BETWEEN

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Coram: Before Deputy District Judge G. Own in Chambers

Date of Hearing: 26 June 2012

Date of Decision: 27 June 2012

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REASONS FOR DECISION

(Expedition of Decree Absolute)

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Introduction

1.This is the Petitioner Wife’s (“Wife”) Summons dated 15 November 2011 seeking the making of the Decree Absolute in this case be expedited and that the Wife be at liberty to apply for the decree nisi to be made absolute forthwith (“DA Summons”).  

2.On 17 November 2011 (that is, 2 days after the DA Summons), the 1^st Respondent Husband (“Husband”) issued a Summons seeking an Order that I shall recuse myself from taking any further part in these proceedings (“Recusal Summons”). 

3.Both Summonses came before me on 18 November 2011 and was adjourned to a date to be fixed for argument with half day reserved. Directions were given for the filing and exchange of Affirmations on both the DA Summons and Recusal Summons.  I also ordered that no further Affirmation be filed without leave except those as directed.  Accordingly, the following Affirmations were filed :-

(a)   Wife’s 11^th Affirmation dated 15/11/2011;

(b)   Husband’s 5^th Affirmation dated 12/12/2011;

(c)   Wife’s 13^th Affirmation dated 20/12/2011.

4.On 22 November 2011, the Husband filed a Notice of Application under Rule 56B of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, Cap.179A (“Rule 56B Notice”) seeking the Court to consider his financial position under section 17A of the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, Cap.179 (“MCO”).

5.On 11 May 2012, the Wife ‘filed’ her 15^th Affirmation.  A Summons was issued on the same day seeking leave for such Affirmation to be filed (“Leave Summons”).  

6.On 14 May 2012 which was the date fixed for argument of the DA Summons and Recusal Summons, I heard the Recusal Summons.  The DA Summons and Leave Summons were adjourned to today.

7.On 13 June 2012, I handed down my reasons for decision on the Recusal Summons which was dismissed with costs to the Petitioner.

8.At today’s hearing, I granted an Order in terms of the Leave Summons.  The Wife’s 15^th Affirmation was also considered for the DA Summons.  

Section 17A of the MCO

9.Section 17A provides :

“(1) This section shall apply where –

(a) the respondent to a petition for divorce in which the petitioner alleges any such fact as is mentioned in section 11A(2)(c) or (d) has applied to the court under this section for it to consider the financial position of the respondent after the divorce, and

(b) a decree nisi of divorce has been granted on the petition and the court holds that the only fact on which the petitioner is entitled to rely in support of his petition is that mentioned in section 11A(2)(c) or (d).

(2)   The court hearing an application by the respondent under subsection (1) shall consider –

(a)   all the circumstances, including the age, health, conduct,earning capacity, financial resources and financial obligations of each of the parties; and

(b)   the financial position of the respondent as, having regard to the divorce, it is likely to be after the death of the petitioner should the petitioner die first.

(3)   Notwithstanding anything in this Ordinance but subject to subsection (4), the court shall not make absolute the decree of divorce if an application has been made under subsection (1), unless it is satisfied that –

(a)   the petitioner should not be required to make any financial provision for the respondent; or

(b)   the financial provision made by the petitioner for the respondent is reasonable and fair or the best that can be made in the circumstances.

(4)   The court may, if it thinks fit, proceed without observing the requirements of subsections (2) and (3) if –

(a)   it appears that there are circumstances making it desirable that the decree should be made absolute without delay; and

(b)   the court has obtained a satisfactory undertaking from the petitioner that he will make such financial provision for the respondent as the court may approve.”

The Husband’s opposition

10.Apart from the reasons of opposition set out in his 5^th Affirmation, the Husband also referred to certain paragraphs in his 3^rd Affirmation filed in the previous divorce suit FCMC No.11930 of 2010 with respect to the following :-

(a)  The Wife has taken all the moneys and stocks kept in his accounts without his prior consent or authority;

(b)  The Wife had earned a salary of NTD 32,000 which the Tax Department of Taiwan notified the Wife that she had not reported for salary tax;

(c)  The Wife had, without his knowledge and consent, instructed estate agents to sell the Taiwan Property and had forged his signature by signing agreements to instruct the agents.

11.Mr. Neal Clough, Counsel for the Husband, in his written Skeleton Argument submitted to this Court the day before this hearing raised the contention that the DA Summons application was premature.  In so submitted, Mr. Clough made 3 observations as follows :

(a)  The application to make a decree nisi absolute must follow the pronouncement of the decree nisi not precede it;

(b)  The urgency claimed by the Wife on 15 November 2011 when she issued the DA Summons and filed the supporting 11^th Affirmation, namely, that a hearing was scheduled for 15 December 2011 in Taiwan Court has now gone. Reason being that the Taiwan Court refused to deal with the matter and had deferred to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong court.

(c)  Part IIA of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap.192, gives the Court jurisdiction to grant financial reliefs in Hong Kong after divorce outside Hong Kong.

12.For the sake of convenience, I will in this Decision referred the above as Mr. Clough’s observations (a), (b) and (c) respectively. 

The Wife’s 11^th Affirmation

13.The Wife in this Affirmation sets out the sequence of events which had happened since the commencement of her first Petition under FCMC No.11930 of 2010 (“first divorce suit”) where she had relied upon the Husband’s Unreasonable Behaviour as the fact in support of irretrievable broke down of the marriage.  Reference was also made to the concurrent divorce proceedings filed by the Husband in Taiwan which, as part of the Wife’s case, had been proceeded along by the Husband in parallel to her divorce proceedings in Hong Kong. 

The Wife’s 13^th Affirmation

12.   The Wife in this Affirmation commented on the way in which the Husband responded to the first divorce suit and the present divorce proceedings.  There has been a delay for almost a year since the filing of the first divorce suit on 13 September 2010 when the Husband eventually consented to the divorce going forward as an undefended suit.  

13.   The Wife also sets out her replies to the Husband’s contentions in his 3^rd Affirmation which I have outlined in paragraphs 10(a), (b) and (c) in this Decision.  More importantly, the Wife deposed to agreeing to give an undertaking that she would make such financial provision for the Husband as the Court may approve.

The Wife’s 15^th Affirmation

14.The Wife in this Affirmation referred to the latest development of the Taiwan divorce action which was commenced by the Husband. She produced as exhibits “LPK-64” and “LPK-65” respectively the Taipei District Court Judgment dated 30 January 2012 and the Taipei High Court Civil Judgment dated 28 March 2012 together with their respective English translations. Suffice is to say here that the Taipei High Court Civil Judgment showed the Husband appealed against the Taipei District Court decision made on 30 January 2012 to stay his Taiwan divorce action.  Such appeal was dismissed by the Taipei High Court on 28 March 2012.

The Rule 56B Notice

15.Miss Corinne Remedios, Counsel for the Wife, relied upon her Skeleton Submissions dated 12 May 2012 and also her Submissions in Reply produced today just before this hearing.  In the Reply, Miss Remedios also referred to Order 18 rule 19 of the Hong Kong Civil Practice for this Court’s consideration to strike out the 1^st Respondent’s Section 17A application as it is wholly without merit and is an abuse of the process of the Court.  This was strongly opposed by Mr. Clough for not being properly fashioned by an application and not properly raised on notice giving the Husband the right to answer it.

Analysis and Discussion

17.I will first deal with Mr. Clough’s 3 observations as they all addressed upon the basic and crucial question whether the DA Summons was issued prematurely or justifiably. 

Mr. Clough’s observation (a)

18.The DA Summons was issued on 15 November 2011 and initially fixed with a returnable date on 17 November 2011 at 9:25 a.m. which is 2 days later.  The decree nisi was scheduled for pronouncement on 17 November 2011 at 9:30 a.m.  On the same day of 17 November 2011, the Husband’s solicitors issued the Recusal Summons and fixed a returnable date to be the following day, which is 18 November 2011 at 9:30 a.m. 

19.According to the Court records, the DA Summons was adjourned 1 day to be dealt with at the same hearing as the Recusal Summons.  The hearing on 18 November 2011 started at 11:03 a.m. and ended at 11:56 a.m.  Therefore, at the time of the hearing of the DA Summons and Recusal Summons, the Decree Nisi has been granted on the day before.

20.It is at first not at all clear Mr. Clough used the word ‘application’ in paragraph 11 of his written Skeleton Argument whether he was referring to the DA Summons which is, by nature an application by way of summons, or that he was referring to the prescribed application form 5 under Rule 65(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, Cap.179A.   Upon further consideration, it must be the case that he was referring to the DA Summons because the Wife’s Solicitors only filed the prescribed application form 5 on 12 May 2012.  Such application by way of the prescribed form 5 could not be processed further by the Registrar because of the Rule 56B Notice sitting in place.

21.Mr. Clough has not referred me to any authorities or statutory provisions to support his observation (a) that the DA Summons for expediting the Decree Nisi should be issued after the decree nisi was granted, otherwise, it is premature.  I am not aware of any authorities either save and except that the relevant provisions on expediting a decree nisi are contained in the Matrimonial Causes (Decree Absolute) General Order, Cap.179C which I recite as follows :-

“2. In relation to any decree nisi granted after the coming into operation of this Order the period of three months specified in section 15(5) of the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance (Cap. 179) shall be reduced to six weeks and accordingly the decree shall not be made absolute until the expiration of six weeks from its grant unless the Court in any particular case fixes a shorter period (my emphasis).”

22.Mr. Clough’s contention (a) seems to suggest the right time to issue the DA Summons should be after the grant of the Decree Nisi.  With due respect to Mr. Clough, I do not agree.  First, as Miss Remedios rightly pointed out, whether an application was made prematurely will be determined at the time of the hearing.  In the present case, had the DA Summons been issued and heard by the Court before the grant of the Decree Nisi on 17 November 2011, no doubt this would be a premature application and is bound to be dismissed.  The critical time for determination, in my decision, will be the time of the hearing by the Court.  In the present case it will be 18 November 2011.  Secondly, there are no statutory provisions I am aware of, or did Mr. Clough is able to refer me to, which restricts the time for issuing the DA Summons to beafter thesubject Decree Nisi was granted.  Thirdly, I noticed that such contention had never been raised by the Husband’s Solicitors when directions for the filing and exchange of Affirmations were given by this Court 7 months ago during the 18 November 2011 hearing.  Furthermore, the Husband has never raised such a contention anywhere in his 5^th Affirmation which was filed specifically in opposition to the DA Summons.

23.Therefore, I find Mr. Clough’s observation (a) unsustainable.

Mr. Clough’s observation (b)

24.With due respect, I believe Mr. Clough also missed the point.  Even though the urgency initially claimed by the Wife as at the time of issuing the DA Summons has now gone, this does not necessary follow that there are no other basis for the Court to consider expediting the Decree Absolute. Section 17A of the MCO, Cap.179, which are financial protection provisions for a respondent spouse and which the Husband is now relying upon by his filing of the Rule 56B Notice, empowers the Court in suitable cases if it thinks fit to proceed with making decree absolute without delay and with a satisfactory undertaking obtained from the petitioner spouse on making financial provisions (see section 17A(4) of the MCO).

25.Thus the fact that the Taiwan Court has now deferred to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong court is neither here nor there. Section 17(A)(4) does not require any element of urgency before the Court can exercise its wide discretionary powers.  The Court is given such wide statutory powers under section 17(A)(4) even without having to consider those mandatory factors under sections 17A(2) when the Court is hearing a section 17A application.  It is also the case that section 17A(3) is subject to (my emphasis) section 17A(4). As at today’s hearing, there has been a lapse of 7 months and 10 days already since the Decree Nisi was granted.

26.Mr. Clough’s observation (b) seems to me, if I understand it correctly, is to bring out the point that there was no urgency now for the Wife to expedite the Decree Absolute in light of the Taiwan Court’s decision.  The ‘urgency’ once there at the time of issuing the DA Summons has now gone.  Considering the actual circumstances as it now stands, such observation is, if I may use the word without any disrespect to Mr. Clough, a fallacy.   As I see it, the Husband himself had seen fit to ‘expedite’ or ‘keep moving along’ with his Taiwan divorce action whilst seeing no urgency for the Wife to obtain the Decree Absolute after 7 months and 10 days had elapsed from the date of the Decree Nisi.   He was not contended with his Taiwan divorce action being stayed by the Taipei District Court on 30 January 2012. According to the Taipei High Court Civil Judgment, the Husband had appealed the Taipei District Court decision to stay his divorce action.  Such conduct of the Husband, on all fours, corroborates with the Wife’s contention that the Husband has been engaging all available tactics to delay her divorce case in Hong Kong whilst he was trying to pursue his Taipei divorce action at full speed if he could. 

27.I find Mr. Clough’s observation (b) unsustainable.

Mr. Clough’s contention (c)

28.Part IIA of the MPPO, Cap.192 is a new enactment empowering the Court to determine financial reliefs after divorce was obtained outside Hong Kong.  However, there is a filtering mechanism under the enactment which requires leave of the Court before the financial reliefs claim can be issued.  There is a threshold test which need to be satisfied before leave will be granted (see the Judgment of Hon Poon J in the recent case of C v. H, HCMC No.3 of 2011, date of decision 10 May 2012).

29.I do not see the logic as to why such enactment would support the Husband’s objection to the Wife’s expediting the Decree Absolute. The Husband is seemingly suggesting that the Wife could resort to those provisions which would protect her financial interests in any event even though the decree of divorce was granted by the Taiwan court.

30.Those Part IIA provisions can only be relied upon after a decree of divorce has been granted by another jurisdiction which decree the Hong Kong courts recognise.  To raise such an observation as part of the contention to the DA Summons presupposes the Husband’s Taipei divorce should be adopted for dissolution of the parties’ marriage.  This is, however, contradict with the concluding views expressed in the Judgments of both the Taipei District Court and the Taipei High Court. 

31.Quoting the English translation of the relevant part of the Taipei District Court’s Judgment in exhibit “LPK-64” at paragraph 2 :

“…………… This court holds the view that regarding the divorce and distribution of the spouses’ properties between the parties, it is not impossible that the validity of the decisions of the Hong Kong Court will be recognised in our country.  Taking into consideration that there is no significant inconvenience of the Plaintiff to appear in the Hong Kong Court and it is not necessary to institute another action in relation to the same dispute, it is decided that the litigation procedures in this case should be stayed before the final decision is made in the Hong Kong Court.”

32.Further, quoting the English translation of the relevant part of the Taipei High Court Civil Judgment in exhibit “LPK-65” as follows :

“The Appellant has also signed the abovementioned consent agreement, submitting to the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Court in the divorce action of the parties, and acknowledged that the Hong Kong Court has jurisdiction in the divorce matter of the parties.  And according to the circumstances, the Appellant has no significant difficulty in attending to answer in the proceedings and appear before the Hong Kong Court.  Therefore, despite the Appellant maintaining his previous claim that according to the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Sub-section 1 of Section 402 of the Civil Code, the validity of the decisions of the court of Hong Kong would not be recognised in our country is therefore without ground.  So the ground of appeal that the original decision is improper and should be set aside is invalid and should be dismissed.  The decision is given as in the Main Statement.”

33.In my view, the availability of financial reliefs under Part IIA of the MPPO cannot be considered as any legitimate contention towards the Wife’s DA Summons.

34.With respect, I find Mr. Clough’s observation (c) also unsustainable.

35.In my decision, all the three observations of Mr. Clough stated in his written Skeleton Submissions are not accepted as legitimate grounds of opposition.

36.During the hearing, Mr. Clough also addressed me on section 17A(3)(a) of the MCO in that the Court should not be relying upon assertions or assumptions of the Wife that the ‘payer’ of maintenance would be the Husband without this Court making any findings of fact at a full hearing.   The Wife’s case is simply that the Husband has been the entire owner of the Taiwan property and a part owner of the Hong Kong Mei Foo property.   Mr. Clough submits, however, the crux of the matter which need to be decided is whether the Husband has any beneficial interests in those properties, not only being the registered owner.  This is a live issue which had not yet been decided.   This Court is bound to make findings of fact before it will be in the position of determining, as required by section 17A(3)(a),  whether or not the Wife would be required to make any financial provisions for the Husband.  

37.I see the force of Mr. Clough’s argument. The Court certainly has to make findings of fact of its own. However, section 17A(3) is subject to section 17A(4). Since Miss Remedios is now inviting me to exercise the wide discretionary powers under section 17A(4), I do not have to make those findings of fact as to whether the Husband is or is not the beneficial owner of those properties and how likely would be that the Husband is the ‘payer’ of maintenance.  As I said earlier, section 17A(3) is subject to section 17A(4). Further, as rightly pointed out by Miss Remedios, those findings which Mr. Clough referred to would have to be made after the ancillary reliefs trial in any event in the future.  For consideration of an exercise of powers under section 17A(4) of the MCO, I do not have to venture into those findings save and except that my discretion must be exercised properly and reasonably. 

Any factual grounds of opposition ?

38.It is pertinent to note that the Wife has, in her 13^th Affirmation dated 20 December 2011 agreed to provide an undertaking to make financial provision for the Husband as the Court may approve.  The Wife’s position as to providing such an undertaking, as confirmed by Miss Remedios at this hearing, remains unchanged.   Therefore, if there are circumstances making it desirable that the decree should be made absolute without delay, this Court is empowered to do so (section 17(4) of the MCO) without having to venture into those factors under section 17(2) and 17(3) of the MCO.

39.Mr. Clough argued that the Wife’s readiness to give an undertaking in a form without any definitive ability to satisfy such undertaking if circumstances so require should not be accepted by the Court.  With due respect, I do not agree.  Section 17A(4)(b) explicitly states that the undertaking required of the petitioner is that he (or she) will make (my emphasis) such financial provision for the respondent as the court may approve.  It requires no more than that.  The section again leaves it to the court’s discretion as to whether or not the undertaking is a satisfactory one and decide whether the court will approve it.  There is no requirement, on the plain and literal meaning of the words used, that the petitioner spouse should be shown to be able to fulfil or satisfy such undertaking.

40.On the available evidence and considering all the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that it is desirable for the decree nisi pronounced on 17 November 2011 to be made absolute forthwith and without delay. My reasons are as follows :-

(a)  As at today, there has been a lapse of 7 months and 10 days since the Decree Nisi was granted which, but for the Husband’s Recusal Summons issued on the very day of the Decree Nisi, could have been made absolute after 6 weeks. This 6-week period had expired on 29 December 2011. The Husband’s Recusal Summons was, in the end, a complete failure and dismissed with costs.

(b)  On 22 November 2011 (which is 5 days after the Recusal Summons was issued), the Husband filed the Rule 56B Notice seeking financial protection relying upon section 17A of the MCO. I agree with Miss Remedios that this is a tactical manoeuvre without substance. Throughout these proceedings, the Husband’s case has been that he and the Wife at all times during the marriage were wholly and financially supported by his Father, the 2^nd Respondent (see paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Husband’s 3^rd Affirmation). On such basis, the filing of the Rule 56B Notice would lead him nowhere save and except delaying the decree nisi to be made absolute.  Therefore, if Miss Remedios is relying upon section 17A(3) and not section 17A(4), which is obviously not the case here, it seems to me more likely than not that the court will be satisfied with section 17A(3)(a) and proceed to make the decree of divorce absolute.

(c)  For those moneys and stocks allegedly taken by the Wife from the Husband’s account without his knowledge (see paragraph 8 of the Husband’s 3^rd Affirmation), there was no concession that those were the Wife’s assets. In fact the Husband has never been able to show the Wife has any assets available to meet any of his financial claims which he could look upon in these divorce proceedings. In the Husband’s Answer filed in the first divorce suit of FCMC 11930 of 2010 and even in his intended amendments to the Answer, I noticed that there had never been included any claim for ancillary reliefs against the Wife which he is entitled so to do under Rule 68(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, Cap.179A. There has never been any Form A/Form 25 filed by the Husband before the Decree Nisi.  It was only until 22 November 2011 when the Husband, in the absence of any such claim on notice or at all, sought to rely upon section 17A of the MCO by filing the Rule 56B Notice. As pointed out by Miss Remedios, this was filed after issuing the Recusal Summons and as a further attempt to delay the Wife’s application for expediting the process of the Decree Absolute.  I agree with Miss Remedios.

(d)    On 28 July 2011, a maintenance pending suit order at the rate of HK$26,000 per month was granted in the first divorce suit (that is, FCMC No.11930 of 2010) in the Wife’s favour to cover her needs and expenses. The Husband is now seeking for a downward variation which application has been adjourned to a date to be fixed for full argument with 1 day reserved.  Had there been financial resources on the part of the Wife justifying the Husband to invoke the financial protection under section 17A of the MCO, the maintenance pending suit order would not have been granted. Again, the Husband’s filing of the Rule 56B Notice is suspicious.

(e)  The making of the Decree Absolute to bring the parties’marriage to an end is in line with the parties’ views that the marriage had been irretrievably broken down.  In the recent Court of Appeal decision in SJH v. RJH, CACV 280/2011 and HCMP 749/2012, Date of Reasons for Decision : 18 June 2012, Hon Justice Cheung, JA at paragraph 11 (7) said :-

“…….As both parties are now of the same view that the marriage has been irretrievably broken down, the Court in exercising its divorce jurisdiction in a modern setting, will be loathed to allow the parties to use valuable court time to litigate on a matter which has no impact whatsoever on the divorce itself and which should be dissolved as quickly and painlessly as possible. As Ormrod LJ observed in Grenfell v. Grenfell [1978] 1 All ER 561 at 566 that,

‘ There is no point, as I see it, in a case like this in conducting an enquiry into behaviour merely to satisfy feelings, however genuinely and sincerely held by one or other of the parties. To do so would be a waste of time of the court and, in any event, would be running, as I think, counter to the general policy or philosophy of the divorce legislation as it stands today. The purpose of Parliament was to ensure that where a marriage has irretrievably broken down, it shall be dissolved as quickly and as painlessly as possible under the Act, and attempts to recriminate in the manner in which the wife in this case appears to wish to do should be, in my judgment, firmly discouraged.’

(f)  No prejudice has been shown by the Husband that could not be remedied by the Wife’s undertaking under paragraph 26 of her 13^th Affirmation given under Section 17A(4)(b) of the MCO.  

Other Matters

41.As to striking out the Rule 56B Notice, I will not consider it in the absence of any proper application as Mr. Clough rightly submitted.  Considering the draconian nature of such application, on all fairness the Husband should be informed well in advance and on proper notice. 

42.However, even upon proper application and notice being given, I have reservation as to whether a party’s rights for matrimonial financial reliefs protection where such protection is afforded by statutory provisions could be struck out in a way as in other cases of civil litigation.  If it is proved to be an abuse of process, the party seeking such reliefs would not be able to obtain any reliefs. Further, even if ‘striking out’ is applicable which I have expressed my reservation, it might have to be considered under the Court’s case management powers under Order 1B having regard to the underlying objectives of the Civil Justice Reform under Order 1A (see paragraph G of the Practice Direction 15.12). I should perhaps mention that Order 1B rule 1(2)(j) empowers the Court to exclude an issue from consideration. There are, of course, other extensive case management powers under the rules.    

Conclusion

43.Based on the above reasons, I find the conditions for section 17A(4)(a) have been fulfilled in that there are circumstances making it is desirable for the Decree Nisi pronounced on 17 November 2011 to be made absolute. I am also satisfied with the undertaking given by the Wife at paragraph 26 of her 13^th Affirmation which still subsists as at today and will approve it for section 17A(4)(b) of the MCO.

44.Since the Wife’s Solicitors have also filed the prescribed form 5 on 12 May 2012 for the Decree Nisi to be made absolute, I now direct the Registrar to proceed with the application in light of this Decision.

45.As regards costs, I am unable to find any basis for departing from the normal rule on costs to follow the event. Accordingly, I order the 1^st Respondent to pay the Petitioner’s costs of the DA Summons, including all costs reserved to be taxed if not agreed, with Certificate for Counsel. The Petitioner’s own costs be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations.   

Orders

46.I now make the following Orders :-

(a)  The Decree Nisi pronounced on 17 November 2011 be made absolute forthwith;

(b)  The 1^st Respondent do pay the Petitioner’s costs of the Summons dated 15 November 2011 including all costs reserved, to be taxed if not agreed;

(c)  The Petitioner’s own costs be taxed in accordance with Legal Aid Regulations;

(d)  There be Certificate for Counsel.

47.This costs order nisi will become absolute unless any party apply to vary the same within 14 days from the date of this Decision.

Miss Corrine Remedios instructed by Messrs. Iu, Lai and Li., Solicitors for the Petitioner

Mr. Neal Clough instructed by Messrs. Li, Chow & Co., Solicitors for the 1^st Respondent