Nkyl v. Lsp
Read the full judgment text of FCMC 8026/2007 on BabelCite. This Family Court judgment was delivered on 16 October 2012 before Deputy District Judge G. Own.
Matrimonial Causes – Variation of Consent Order – Child Maintenance – Educational Expenses – Reimbursement – Evidence – District Court – Whether there are good reasons to modify agreed terms of Consent Order – Whether billing statements suffice as evidence of payment instead of receipts – Scope of 'educational expenses' including boarding and meals – Whether child's endorsement is required for reimbursement – Whether 50% reduction in maintenance rate is reasonable – Variation Application dismissed – Judgment Summons adjourned – Respondent to pay costs
Legal issues: Variation of Consent Order terms · Billing statements v. Payment receipts · Meaning and Scope of educational expenses · Right to reimbursement and double reimbursement · Alternative variation of maintenance rate
Outcome: Respondent's Variation Application dismissed; Judgment Summons adjourned to 31 January 2013
Cites 1 case
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FCMC 8026 / 2007 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION MATRIMONIAL CAUSES NO. 8026 OF 2007 ----------------------------
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------------------------- J U D G M E N T ------------------------- Introduction 1.This is an application by the Respondent husband for variation of the Consent Order dated 3 December 2008. The application for variation was dated 30 April 2012 but was filed on 3 May 2012 (“Variation Application”). The Petitioner wife has issued a Judgment Summons on 12 January 2012 to enforce outstanding sum of US$81,100.24 together with further interest, such sum which she says are being due and owing in respect of maintenance and educational expenses together with interest on arrears for the eldest daughter KT under the terms of the Consent Order. 2.The Respondent filed a further application (“Amendment Application”) on 12 September 2012 which is the day before this hearing seeking amendment of the Variation Application. 3.As at today’s hearing, there are three matters pending, namely :-
4.In line with the practice, the Petitioner’s Judgment Summons was adjourned to be dealt with after determination of the Respondent’s Variation Application (see C (formerly known as C) v. H, reported in [2012] 3 HKLRD 351). 5.Mr. Pilbrow, Senior Counsel for the Petitioner, took no issue either on the late filing of the Amendment Application or the amendments sought therein. Accordingly, leave was granted for the Respondent’s Variation Application be amended and then proceeded forthwith. There be no Order as to costs of this Amendment Application. Background 6.The parties were married in 1984. The marriage lasted for 13 years when they separated in April 1997. Somehow, divorce proceedings on the basis of 2 year separation was only filed 10 years later in July 2007. Decree Nisi was granted on 24 October 2007. Decree Absolute was granted on 12 December 2008. There are 3 children of the family who at present are of the age of 20, 18 and 15 and living with the Petitioner in the United States of America. 7.Both parties were legally represented at the time of the divorce. A Consent Order dated 3 December 2008 (“Consent Order”) was granted which contains, inter alia, an undertaking under Recital D which I will refer to below. Suffice to say is that the parties through their legal representatives entered into a global settlement with the Petitioner receiving a substantial lump sum and periodical payments of maintenance payable annual in advance for each of the 3 children of the family. Furthermore, leave was granted for the 3 children of the family to remain out of the jurisdiction of Hong Kong with the Petitioner who was entrusted with their sole custody, care and control. The Consent Order 8.In relation to the terms which the Respondent is seeking variation are Recital D and paragraph 4 of the Consent Order which I now recite as follows :-
9.Further, paragraph 4 of the Consent Order provides :
The Respondent’s application 10.The Variation Application (as amended) read as follows. The intended variation was reflected by those wordings inserted by the Respondent into the original agreed terms which I now recited in italics and underlined. There are altogether 3 variations sought. Under Recital D (i) of the Consent Order
Under Recital D (iii) of the Consent Order
Under Paragraph 4 of the Consent Order
11.The Respondent, in his Amendment Application, also sought to induce 2 alternative variations to Paragraph 4 of the Consent Order as to the rate of the periodical payments in the event that he was unsuccessful in varying Recital D (i) as per his Variation Application. The alternative variations, which I also recited in italics and underlined, read as follows :
12.The Respondent is a medical practitioner by profession. There is no issue as to his means and ability in meeting the terms of the Consent Order. There is no application for variation by the Petitioner. Accordingly, no updated financial statements (Form E) are required from either party. It is fair to say the Variation Application (as amended) read in its context is not seeking any kind of downward adjustment of maintenance because of Respondent’s means and ability. It is rather, in my view, that the Respondent is seeking some kind of modification of the agreed terms. At the hearing, the Respondent submitted that he would need this Court’s clarification. The Respondent’s Grounds of Application 13.The Respondent filed 2 Affirmations. The 1st Affirmation was filed on 3 May 2012 together with the Variation Application. The 2nd Affirmation was filed on 12 September 2012 together with the Amendment Application. 14.The Respondent’s contentions, set out in his two affirmations and submitted at the hearing, can be summarised as follows :-
The Law 15.The jurisdiction of the Court in applications for variation of maintenance order is under section 11 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap.192 (“MPPO”) which provides :
16.The approach of the Court has been summarised in the leading case of AEM v. VFM (Variation of Maintenance) [2008] HKFLR 106 :
Issues 17.It seems to me that the central issue is whether there are any good reasons or basis for the Respondent to ‘modify’ the agreed terms embodied in the Consent Order, in the way which he had done, by adding those words he set out in the Variation Application. 18.The answer boils down to whether there has been any material change of circumstances since the Consent Order was granted which necessitate such a modification or, as a fall back argument, whether the circumstances are such that which could not have been foreseen or anticipated by the Respondent when the Consent Order was made. Discussion 19.It is trite law that in applications for variation of maintenance, the Court is entitled to consider the matter de novo and to make an award which is fair and reasonable (see Flavell v. Flavell [1997] 1 FLR 353)). Given the fact that the Variation Application, as I saw it, rests upon modification of the agreed terms of the Consent Order, I will consider each of the Respondent’s contentions I summarised under paragraph 14 of this Judgment and to decide whether those agreed terms ought to be modified in order to best meet the needs of the children. Reaching majority age of 18/ Need to protect child’s right’s and interests 20.The Respondent referred to the eldest child reaching majority of 18 on 23 April 2010. Thus, the eldest child has the right to manage her own financial affairs independently (see paragraph 4 of 1st Affirmation). The eldest child has not been in contact with him except a 7-day visit in February 2010. He was not given any contact details of this child. He did not know whether the eldest child had access to the bank account. He even doubted whether the eldest child knows about the maintenance order which she has a beneficial interest (see paragraph 5 of 1st Affirmation). 21.There was filed an Affirmation of the eldest child on 3 September 2012. She confirmed currently over 18 years of age. She also confirmed she is well aware of the maintenance order. She is more than happy to continue to let the Petitioner supervising, including operating and managing, her bank account. Finally, she deposed it would be against her will to exclude the Petitioner from management of her bank account. 22.It is obvious that the Respondent, upon seeing the eldest child’s Affirmation, saw fit to seek amendment of his Variation Application (on the day before this hearing) to a more or less similar arrangement for the 2nd and 3rd child who has yet to attain majority. I have recited the intended amendments at paragraph 10 of this Judgment. 23.In my judgment, contentions (a) and (b) must fail. The fact that a person reaching the statutory age of majority would, by law, be bestowed with full capacity and status to enter into all kinds of contractual relationships with others. This does not necessarily fit into the case that he or she would then have to manage financial affairs independently as the Respondent so contended. In fact, contention (b) does not sit happily with contention (a). By saying the eldest child attaining full age having the right of managing her financial affairs independently, it follows naturally and also legally that protection against any invasion, deprivation or infringement of her rights and interests would have to be sought by herself independently since she is of full age. How could the Respondent contend, on the one hand that ‘the child’ had reached majority but; on the other hand, require him to protect ‘the child’s’ rights and interests ? By delaying maintenance payment for the eldest child, in my view, seems quite the opposite. Parties’ intention 24.At paragraph 8 of the 1st Affirmation, the Respondent said he understood it was the parties’ intention at the material time that the maintenance payments would be made directly to the child upon her reaching 18. 25.Section 10 of the MPPO provides :
26.The law is clear. Provided the child is receiving instruction at an educational establishment or undergoing training for a trade, profession or vocation, the maintenance order will be extended beyond the age of 18. Moreover, the provision of paragraph 4 of the Consent Order as to how designated maintenance payments are to be paid, is also clear and unambiguous and reflecting the parties’ intention. Such contention of ‘parties’ intention’ now raised by the Respondent is a sham devoid of any merit. Section 19 of the MPPO, Cap.192 27.The Respondent referred to this statutory provision in paragraph 5 of his 2nd Affirmation as being applicable since the eldest child already reached 18. This section, however, relates to orders on custody and education only. It does not relate to child’s maintenance or educational expenses. Such contention simply does not stand. Billing statements v. Payment receipts ? 28.The Respondent in paragraph 9 of his 1st Affirmation referred to Recital D (iii) of the Consent Order which requires ‘receipts’ to be produced for seeking reimbursement. He was only given billing statements by the Petitioner seeking from him reimbursement of educational expenses. 29.It was attached to the Petitioner’s 5th Affidavit as exhibit no.”NKYL-4” various documents (at pages 91 to 106 of the Hearing Bundle) consists of extract of a Housing Contract printout as to payment instructions and marked “Step 4: Make $650 Prepayment – Coupon Instructions”; copies of cheques issued by the Petitioner along with the related payment stub hand marked with the amount enclosed; billing statements issued under the name of the University where the elder child is studying. 30.The University’s billing statements contain the name of the student (i.e. the elder child) along with her university email address, student account number and statement date. There are column entries on ‘dates’, ‘description’, ‘payments/credits’, ‘charges’ and also boxes at the bottom showing any ‘previous balance’, ‘current charges’, ‘disputed charges’ and ‘amount due’. There is also a closing date on each of the billing statement. The layout format is similar to bank statements. The Petitioner also attached 3 pages (at pages 93, 95 and 101 of the Hearing Bundle) of download from viewing online of the University website about General Information on transactions activity where one can find out payments made and outstanding dues. 31.If one looks at Recital D (iii) of the Consent Order, the meaning and objective are obvious without any need of elaboration. In essence, it is the Respondent’s undertaking to reimburse the Petitioner for expenses paid by her before seeking the Respondent to repay. This is clear and simple. The fact that no receipts were produced would not affect the Petitioner’s entitlement to reimbursement provided there is sufficient proof of payment having been made. To insist on ‘receipts’ and not accepting any other form of solid proof is, in my view, merely playing a game on words for no constructive purpose if not being ignorant or difficult. Nowadays and in particular in western countries, even in Hong Kong, on-line payment has become increasingly popular and most of which would not generate a receipt afterwards for obvious reasons, including environmental friendly purposes. Take a day to day example in Hong Kong, which I am prepared to say no difference overseas, that if a person pays his utility bill on line, there will be no receipts even if the payer demanded for one. The record or evidence of the payer having made such payment or, for the present purpose and sake of argument, evidence of the payee having received such payment would take the form of either entries in the payer’s bank records or in the next bill issued by the payee. It would be repugnant to say these are not evidence of payment and only a receipt will do. 32.On the same scenario, if payment is made over the counter at the Post Office, the utility bill will be stamp printed at the bottom with the amount tendered and again no separate receipts will be issued afterwards; either by the Post Office as collecting agent or by the utility company. Would it be of any sense or logic to say the stamp printed bill is not sufficient evidence of payment merely because there are no receipts ? 33.Upon review of the billing statements, I am satisfied that the credit entries within the contents could be accepted as evidence of payment in the same way as receipts do. I do not accept the Respondent’s views in paragraph 9 of his 1st Affirmation that one of the purpose of his variation application is to avoid any future doubts and uncertainties. In my finding, there are no doubts and uncertainties whatsoever had any sense been given to the entries in the billing statements. As my further observation, had the requirement of ‘receipts’ is a must under Recital D (iii) which is now contended by the Respondent (which I do not agree), it might then be open for further argument on the format of the receipt if one is available; say for instance, whether it needs to be personally signed by the Principal or the Treasurer or whoever in charge, whether it needs the stamp chop of the University, so on and so forth. I have such further observation because the Respondent indicated that he need to know whether the moneys paid had actually been received by the University. 34.Thus, I find the Respondent’s intended variation on Recital D (iii) is unfounded. Meaning and Scope of ‘educational expenses’ 35.The Respondent at paragraph 10 of his 1st Affirmation said as follows :-
36.Further, at paragraph 6 of the 2nd Affirmation, the Respondent said :
37.The term ‘educational expenses’ was not defined anywhere in the Consent Order. The Respondent in his Variation Application sought to ‘define’ it as excluding boarding, meal, excursion trip and other items expenses which would reasonably be covered by the maintenance payment. 38.In the Statement as to Arrangement for Children filed at commencement of the divorce in April 2007, the 3 children of the family were already residing with the Petitioner in the United States of America and by that time respectively attending Grade 9, Grade 6 and Grade 3. They were of the age of 15, 13 and 10. When the Consent Order was granted in December 2008, the 3 children had yet to complete their secondary education. To the very least, the eldest child still had 2 years to go before starting her tertiary education. 39.In the Petition for divorce, there was attached a Schedule by the name “The relevant terms of the agreement and arrangement agreed by the Petitioner (“the Wife”) and the Respondent (“the Husband”). This Schedule is a comprehensive one dealing globally with ancillary reliefs and children’s arrangement. On the latter, there is a reference as follows :-
40.Considering the reference quoted against the factual matrix at the time, it is fair and reasonable to say both parties contemplate the children would continue to reside with the Petitioner and receive their education anywhere which was found to be suitable. The parties, through their respective legal advisers, came to the consensus of the need to include an Undertaking by the Respondent as Recital D (i) in the Consent Order on ‘all the tertiary educational expenses’ led to my following observations :-
41.Those words now sought to be added to Recital D (i) are, in my view, exactly in the opposite. They tend to trim down or restrictively ‘define’ tertiary educational expenses by excluding those named items. As I have said in paragraph 18 of this Judgment, the modification sought by the Respondent could only be accepted if it can be shown there had been a material change of circumstances since the Consent Order or something not being foreseen or contemplated by the Respondent had happened. 42.Clearly and in particular, the Respondent foresaw tertiary educational expenses to be out of the scope of maintenance payments that he had been paying whilst the children were receiving secondary education. He also undertook to be responsible for allof them. Thus I see no basis how the Respondent could now retrieve from his undertaking by trying to trim down or restrict the scope of the tertiary educational expenses by excluding various items. 43.The Petitioner in her 5th Affidavit confirmed the distance between the University where the elder child is studying and her place of residence is about 653 km with no less than 9 hours of driving time. The boarding fees are, in my finding, therefore necessary as an integral part of the tertiary educational expenses. I agree with the Petitioner. 44.Further, I am prepared to take judicial notice that it is not uncommon for students even living in the vicinity of University to choose boarding given the convenience of research available at the University. For the present case, the distance apart in itself already justified the choice of boarding. 45.Apart from the boarding fees, the Respondent also referred to meals and excursion trip to be excluded from his undertaking on tertiary educational expenses. However, none of these items can be found within the University billing statement where reimbursement under tertiary educational expenses was being sought. 46.At paragraph 10 of the 1st Affirmation, the Respondent also referred to health insurance fees were already covered under the maintenance payments he was paying and there was ‘double reimbursement’. First of all, I noted health insurance fees had not been included as part of those named items sought to be excluded in the Variation Application (as amended). It only came out from the Respondent’s Affirmation. However, even if it had been so included, it is bound to fail. The reason being that it can be seen from the entries in the billing statements that there are entries of charges on health insurance but there are also corresponding entries of waiver (see pages 97 & 98; 99; 102 & 103; 104 of the Hearing Bundle). I noted health insurance fees were included in the Judgment Summons dated 12 January 2012 (at page 63 of the Hearing Bundle). However, as far as the present Variation Application is concerned, the evidence on the billing statements appears to be no issue of ‘double reimbursement’. Whether there need to be any amendment to the Judgment Summons in light of this finding is something to be considered by the Petitioner at the Judgment Summons hearing. 47.Thus, I find against the Respondent as to the meaning and scope of ‘educational expenses’. Right to reimbursement and possible ‘double reimbursement’ 48.In light of the Affirmation from the eldest daughter, the Respondent in his 2nd Affirmation at paragraph 4 referred to the 2nd and 3rd child that when each of them are coming to age, each of them need to make an affirmation in the same way as the eldest daughter did. He further added the following :-
49.Upon my enquiry, the Respondent elaborated at the hearing what he meant was that had he made reimbursement to the Petitioner for those of the children’s expenses, it could happen that the children might not be aware of it and might request for payments from him again. It is in this context that he used the term ‘double reimbursement’ again under this heading of contention. This is different from the same terminology of ‘double reimbursement’ that he had used when he was referring to him having to reimburse for boarding fees, meals, excursion trips, health insurance premium on the one hand and having to pay maintenance payments on the other hand at the same time. 50.The Respondent claimed that either the children seek reimbursement directly from him or, if the Petitioner had paid and would like to get the money back from him by way of reimbursement, the Petitioner could only do so with the children’s endorsement. The reason being that it could happen that the children did not want him (i.e. their Father) to pay but would rather want the Petitioner (i.e. their Mother) to pay the expenses. In which event, the children would not give their endorsement to the Petitioner seeking reimbursement from him. This is a way to find out whether the children wish their expenses to be borne by their Father. 51.Again, the Respondent completely missed the point. Under the terms of Recital D he has, under the full benefit of legal advice, given his undertaking to the Court and to the Petitioner on reimbursement of children’s expenses. Accordingly, the Petitioner’s right to reimbursement is not subject to the children’s consent irrespective of whether the children reach majority or whether they would like the Petitioner (i.e. their Mother) to bear the expenses. As regards the duration of maintenance order for the children subsequent to their coming to age and over 18, I have already dealt with in the preceding paragraphs. I would only add that in the scenario posed by the Respondent, it could only be handled by the Petitioner (respecting the children’s wishes) not enforcing her right and also the Court’s indulgence. The Respondent could not simply add a requirement of children’s affirmation or endorsement as some kind of condition precedent to fulfilment of his undertaking or the Petitioner’s right to reimbursement. 52.Accordingly, I find against the Respondent on his contention on right to reimbursement and ‘double reimbursement’. Underlying purposes of payments made to be made known 53.At paragraph 10 of the 2nd Affirmation, the Respondent contended that the underlying purposes of many of the payments sought by the Petitioner to be reimbursed were not known to him. He was therefore unable to ascertain whether those payments fell within the reimbursement item of ‘educational expenses’ under Recital D (i) of the Consent Order. 54.I do not see such contention lead him anywhere to support his Variation Application. He was referring to historic event which could, in my view, easily discerned by having a look at the contents of those documents which were issued by the University. The contents of which are clear. There are dates and descriptions against each entry of charges such as Physics 2CL Laboratory Fee, Hsg Contract Charge – pay in full (at page 102 of the Hearing Bundle), Chemistry Lab Fee, Winter Qr 2012 Registration Fees (at page 104 of the Hearing Bundle) etc. I noted, however, the Respondent was able to understand those entries of health insurance fees also recorded in the same billing statements which he contended as ‘double reimbursement’ but at the same time claiming that the underlying purposes of those other payments (all expressed in simple English) were not known to him. 55.I do not believe the Respondent that he did not know the underlying purposes of payments sought for reimbursement. Conclusion 56.For the reasons aforesaid, I find against the Respondent in his Variation Application (as amended) on Recital D (i) and (iii) of the Consent Order. 57.Now I will deal with his alternative variation application on Paragraph 4 of the Consent Order. Alternative Variations 58.The alternative variation application is a two-limb variation. 59.The first limb refers to the situation where there is a separate reimbursement before the children completing tertiary education (bachelor degree) towards boarding, meal, excursion trips and other items which are not directly related to education under Recital D (i) of the Consent Order, the rate of periodic maintenance payments should then be reduced accordingly to take such reimbursement into account. The second limb refers to the time when the children reaches 18, the rate to be reduced to US$2,250 per child per month after the age of 18 until each child completes tertiary education (bachelor degree). 60.The Respondent provided his reasons on the two alternative variations application at paragraphs 7 and 8 of his 2nd Affirmation. 61.The basis which I have found against the Respondent on his variation on Recital D (i) of the Consent Order is that those expenses sought to be reimbursed fall within ‘all tertiary educational expenses’ under Recital D (i). Since the first limb would ‘survive’ only if there is a finding that the items which should be reimbursed are not directly related to educational expenses, this follows that the first limb must fail. The simple reason is that there is no finding that those expenses in issue are not directly related to educational expenses. 62.The second limb in essence is a reduction in money terms of the maintenance amount under the Consent Order. As I have stated in paragraph 12 of this Judgment, there is no issue at any time as to the Respondent’s means and ability of meeting the agreed maintenance sum. The Respondent is relying on the ground of ‘reasonableness’ as can be seen in paragraph 8 of his 2nd Affirmation :-
63.In addition to the approach to be adopted summarised in the case of AEM v. VFM (which I recited at paragraph 16 of this Judgment), it has also been said in an earlier English case of Boylan v. Boylan [1988] 1 FLR 282 at 289D by Booth J :-
64.Moreover, in the case of J v. C (Child : Financial Provision [1999] 1 FLR 152 at 160A by Hale J :-
65.The question posed by the second limb is simply that whether it is reasonable for a 50% reduction (i.e. from US$4,500 to US$2,250 per month) merely because the children are receiving tertiary education with full boarding arrangement provided ? 66.In my judgment, the answer is in the negative for the reasons below. 67.As part of my finding, boarding arrangement falls within “all tertiary educational expenses” which the Respondent foresaw and undertook to be fully responsible. The children would be attending tertiary education (bachelor degree) is at all times expected. At the same time, the Respondent had agreed to US$4,500 per month per child until each of them individually attains 18 or completes tertiary education (bachelor degree) whichever is the later or further order (see Paragraph 4 of the Consent Order). 68.Applying the principle of ‘reasonableness’, which must be considered fairly, objectively and with all things being equal, I find it unreasonable if the Respondent could now raise such a 50% downward variation which, as I see it, could have been canvassed at the time of the Consent Order but it had not. In particular, the reason put forward now for such 50% downward variation was not something unforeseeable or unexpected by the Respondent when the Consent Order was granted. Quite contrary, the children receiving tertiary education is something within full contemplation of the Respondent at all times. The downward adjustment of 50% is also arbitrary and unreasonable. 69.Secondly, the conduct of the Respondent himself has not been reasonable. Given the benefit of doubt as to whether those expenses at issue are part of the tertiary educational expenses has yet to be clarified and determined, the Respondent started with failing to comply with the terms of the Consent Order by not paying the annual periodical maintenance for the eldest child of US$54,000 annually due on 5th January 2011 resulting in a Judgment Summons was issued against him on 12 January 2012. As Mr. Pilbrow rightly pointed out in paragraph 4 (e) of his written note of submission dated 12 September 2012, the Variation Application was only taken out on 30th April 2012 which was 1 year and 4 months since the due date for payment. Due to the Variation Application, the Judgment Summons has then to be adjourned and yet to be heard. 70.Moreover, I do not agree the costs of maintenance will be substantially lowered merely for the fact the children are having boarding arrangement. First, the Petitioner would still have to maintain the accommodation for the children since they would be returning home on holidays. The accommodation costs would not be necessarily lowered in a way that the Petitioner was expected and able to ‘rent out’ the children’s rooms whilst they were in school boarding. The costs of food and personal items which are necessities would be more or less the same whether the child is living at home or at school boarding. The price for a pack of sandwich bought at the University if compare with a ‘home-made’ one may be different. But in real life, it is difficult if not impossible, to compare and count on food and necessities to every single dollar and dime when one comes to work out the amount of children’s maintenance. 71.In my Judgment, there is no basis for the 2 limbs of the alternative variation. Besides, I also find the 50% downward reduction in the second limb of the alternative variation differs radically from the approach which the parties had adopted in terms of periodic payments at the time of the Consent Order. Applying the cases of AEM v. VFM and Boylan v. Boylan, I will dismiss the alternative variation. Overall Result 72.For all the reasons aforesaid, I find the Respondent’s Variation Application (as amended) (including the 2 limbs of the alternative variation) lack of merits and must be dismissed. There are no exceptional circumstances which I can consider departing from the usual rule on costs. I will accordingly order the Respondent to pay the costs of the Variation Application (as amended), including all costs reserved, to be taxed if not agreed. Given the Respondent’s application is not a complicated one, I find it not a case fit for granting Certificate for Counsel. 73.As to the Amendment Application, I have already decided at the hearing that there be no Order as to costs. Judgment Summons 74.The Judgment Summons was adjourned pending determination of the Variation Application. I now directed the Judgment Summons be tried on 31 January 2013 at 10:30 a.m. with one day reserved. Order 75.I will grant the Order as follows :-
76.The costs order nisi will become absolute unless any party applies to vary the same within 14 days.
Mr David Pilbrow, Senior Counsel, instructed by Messrs. Sit, Fung, Kwong & Shum, Solicitors for the Petitioner Respondent acting in person | |||||||||||||||||||
Cases cited in this judgment