Success Insurance Ltd v. George Kallis (Manufacturers) Ltd
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CACV000133/1980 Marine insurance - voyage from Hong Kong to Limassol - Warehouse to Warehouse clause of Institute Cargo Clauses 1963 - irregular shipped on board Bills of Lading, goods not having been shipped - named vessel never arrived in Hong Kong - goods shipped in another vessel to Keelung under separate Bill of Lading - stored in Customs godown for 3 months and then shipped in third vessel for Limassol - goods lost en route - non-disclosure of fact that goods not shipped in named vessel - no duty on assured to inquire whether named vessel had arrived in Hong Kong - goods not on risk, because voyage wholly different from that for which they were insured. Dates of hearing: 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 18th May, 1981 3rd October, 1981 K. Rokison, Q.C. & C. Mumford (Robert W.H. Wang & Co.) for Appellant. N. Phillips, Q.C. & R. Faulkner (Robertson, Double & Boase) for Respondent.
----------------- Coram: Sir Alan Huggins, V.-P., Leonard & Cons, JJ.A. Dates of hearing: 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 18th May, 1981 3rd October, 1981 Date of Judgment: 3 October 1981 ----------------- JUDGMENT ----------------- Sir Alan Huggins, V.-P. : 1. The Respondent Plaintiff, a Cypriot company, bought denim material from a Hong Kong firm called Wantex Trader for delivery to Limassol. Wantex negotiated policies of insurance with the Appellant Defendant and the Respondent claimed as the consignee of the goods and as assignee of the benefits of the policies. It is common ground before us that the goods were lost as a result of a peril which was covered if the policies were in force at the time of the loss. The Insurer contends that the policies were void for non-disclosure of material facts and, alternatively, that the goods never came on risk under the policies or, if they did, that the cover terminated before the loss occurred. 2. There were three policies, dated respectively 22nd July 1976, 31st July 1976, and 31st July 1976. The first and third policies were issued pursuant to applications bearing date one day after that of the policies, and the second pursuant to an application bearing date five days before that on the relevant application. They were All Risks policies which included the Warehouse to Warehouse Clause of the Institute Cargo Clauses dated 1st January 1963 and the condition "including from warehouse to buyer's warehouse in Nicosia". The Schedule named the carrying vessel as the Ta Shun and the voyage as from Hong Kong to Limassol. The first policy stated that the vessel would sail on or about 27th July 1976, the second that she would sail on or about 7th August 1976 and the third that she would sail on or about 1st August 1976. In fact, the Ta Shun did not call at Hong Kong at the relevant time and never loaded the goods in question. Nevertheless, there were issued to Wantex received for shipment Bills of Lading dated 28th July 1976 for 66 bales, 3rd August 1976 for 58 bales, and 3rd August 1976 for 41 bales. They were on forms issued by the Blue Sky Shipping Co. Ltd. and signed by Seawise Shipping Co. for and on behalf of the master "as agents". They named the vessel as the Ta Shun, the port of loading as Hong Kong, and the port of discharge as Limassol. Each bore an incorrect endorsement, "shipped on board" with a date, the date of the endorsement on the first being 28th July 1976, that on the second 8th August 1976 and that on the third 3rd August 1976. With these irregular documents Wantex drew under Letters of Credit accepted by their purchasers. 3. In fact all the goods left Hong Kong in a vessel named Ta Hung under a shipped-on-board Bill of Lading issued by the Oneness Shipping Co. Ltd. "as agents". The shipper was declared as Seawise Agency Ltd., the port of loading as Hong Kong, the port of discharge as Keelung, and the consignee as Blue Sky Shipping Co. Ltd. There were three material endorsements - "Transhipment from Hong Kong to Mediterranean Sea via Taiwan", "Cargo to be transit (sic) to Mediterranean Sea at Taiwan by Consignee themselves at their own risks and expenses" and "Freight Collect". The goods were discharged into a Customs godown in Keelung on or about 20th August 1976 and remained there until November 1976. They were then loaded aboard the m.v. Intellect and sailed for Limassol. Having called at Hong Kong that vessel proceeded until she suffered a casualty in the Malacca Straits on 27th November 1976, when the goods were lost. 4. For the purposes of the first issue raised on the appeal it may be assumed that the loss of the goods allegedly insured under the two later policies would be covered if the policies were not avoided. The Insurer contends that Wantex failed to disclose that these goods were never shipped aboard the Ta Shun and that irregular Bills of Lading had been issued in respect of them. The contention is founded upon ss. 17 & 18 of the Marine Insurance Ordinance, which read :
What is said is that Wantex ought to have known at the latest by 31st July 1976 (the date appearing on the 2nd and 3rd policies) that the vessel had still not arrived in Hong Kong and that consequently the endorsements on the first Bill of Lading, to the effect that the goods to which it related had been shipped on board on 28th July 1976, must be wrong. The learned Judge found that Wantex did not know of the non-arrival of the vessel and that it was under no obligation to acquaint itself as to the arrival or non-arrival of the vessel. This conclusion is challenged by the Insurer as being unjustified by the evidence. Indeed, Mr. Rokison points out that the Judge apparently accepted the evidence of a Mr. Pleitgen that substantial business houses with specialist export departments made a practice of checking the movements of non-conference vessels in which their goods were to be carried. Yet the Judge adopted a different standard of conduct for small businesses. This, it was submitted, was wrong. Reliance was also placed on the answers of Mr. Cheung of Wantex which, it was said, admitted that he ought to have looked in the newspaper to see if the Ta Shun had arrived. 5. In my view the duty on an assured is not as high as that contended for by the Insurer here. It is one thing to say that an assured is to be deemed to know information which has been sent to his office and which, in the ordinary course of business, ought to have been noted and acted upon (e.g., the casualty slip in London General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. General Marine Underwriters Association Ltd., 1921 1 K.B. 104) but quite another to say that he must go out and look for information, even though an extraordinarily prudent man might do so. The present case is stronger in favour of the Assured than was Australia and New Zealand Bank, Ltd. v. Eagle Wharves, Ltd. 1960 2 Lloyd's Rep. 241, where the information not disclosed related to the manner in which a company's own operations were performed. 6. The next issue is whether the goods ever came on risk. It is common ground that if they did, it was when they left the Winsome godown. However, the contention of the Appellant is that when they left that godown they did so upon a voyage other than that in respect of which they were insured. The first argument is that the goods never started upon the insured voyage, because the policy covered a named ship and the goods were never loaded aboard that ship. It is true that the modern tendency is not to insert the name of a particular vessel in policies insuring goods carried by sea, but, where a ship is named, then one must look to the terms of the policy to ascertain whether the cover extends to an alternative vessel for the whole or part of the voyage. 7. On behalf of the Assured it is contended that there were reasons why the identity of the carrying vessel was not vital in the present case. The first reason was that there was liberty in the contract of affreightment to employ another vessel and there was a "variation of the adventure arising from the exercise of a liberty granted to the shipowners or charterers under the contract of affreightment" within para. 3 of cl. 1 of the Institute Cargo Clauses. The relevant contracts of affreightment were, of course, the Ta Shun Bills of Lading. Clause 1 begins :
Unfortunately, there was before the trial judge no evidence as to the status of the Blue Sky Shipping Co. Ltd. There is thus no evidence that it was the owner or demise charterer of the Ta Shun and, therefore, the "carrier" under these Bills of Lading. Both parties appeared to assert that it was probably a mere charterer, though I confess I do not understand why that should be any more likely than that it was the owner. However, under cl. 13 of the Bills of Lading, only the carrier was granted any liberty:
Mr. Philips objects that this is a technical ground for opposing the claim and that it was Blue Sky which throughout purported to exercise the liberties: if it was not the owner, it was at least the agent of the owner. I have much sympathy with that objection. The contract was on a Blue Sky form; Blue Sky in a letter at page 182 of the record says that Union Creative Shipping Ltd. is its agent and in a letter at page 204 Seawise says that it had been, but was no longer, agent of Blue Sky and that Union Creative Shipping Ltd. is "the owner's present agent"; it was Blue Sky which was the consignee under the Ta Hung Bill of Lading, which was liable for the Ta Hung freight and which made arrangements for onward carriage from Keelung, something which it would be unlikely to do if it was acting as agent only and was under no personal liability in respect of the Bill of Lading; indeed, Blue Sky expressly asserted that it had suffered loss. In the absence of evidence that the company was a mere charterer, or that someone else owned the Ta Shun, I would have thought it not unreasonable for the Judge to proceed on the basis that Blue Sky was the owner, and, therefore, the carrier. It is true that the letter at page 182 asserts that Wantex had consigned the goods in the Ta Hung for transhipment, but that was clearly inaccurate on any view of the facts. Wantex consigned the goods to Limassol in the Ta Shun, with liberty to employ another vessel and to tranship. It seems to me that the Judge was entitled to conclude that Blue Sky, as owner, had the goods consigned to it at Keelung for transhipment and that there was insufficient evidence of any intent either at that time to send the goods to Keelung for the purpose of perpetrating a fraud or thereafter in fact to detain them in Keelung pending payment of further freight. 8. Secondly it was argued that, even if there was liberty to substitute another vessel, that vessel never sailed for the destination specified in the policy and the risk did not attach even though the carriage had in fact commenced when the goods left the warehouse. Section 44 of the Marine Insurance Ordinance provides :
In so far as the Institute Cargo Clauses appeared to provide otherwise, Mr. Rokison submitted, the statute must prevail. The Judge took the view that s.44 was overriden by cl. 1 of the Institute Cargo Clauses and that cl. 4 also applied. With respect, I cannot agree. I accept that a policy may expressly override s.44, just as a policy including para. 3 of cl. 1 of the Institute Cargo Clauses may override s.46(1). However, it seems to me that there is no fundamental conflict between the Ordinance and the Institute Cargo Clauses. Clause 1 deals with the time at which the risk attaches, provided that it attaches at all. Section 44 states that the risk shall not attach at all in the circumstances indicated. It is here that the basic nature of the contracts is material, for the governing factor is that in spite of the inclusion of the Warehouse to Warehouse Clause, the contract of insurance is a contract of marine insurance and the contract of carriage is a contract of carriage by sea. The Warehouse to Warehouse Clause is incidental to the main purpose of the insurance policy. Obviously such a conclusion poses difficulties for an assured, but it seems to me that it would be wrong that the Warehouse to Warehouse Clause should have the effect of binding the Insurer to cover the goods on a voyage wholly different from that which was originally contemplated by the parties. As in the deviation cases (e.g. Glynn v Margetson & Co. 1893 A.C. 351) I think one must have regard to the main object of the contract and construe it accordingly. Prima facie the taking of the goods to Keelung was wholly inconsistent with a voyage from Hong Kong to Limassol. It was suggested that cl. 13 of the Bill of Lading was wide enough to permit the transhipment at Keelung, but, if they could properly have been taken to Keelung, why should they not properly have been taken to Rio de Janeiro? I do not think cl. 13 should be construed as permitting forwarding by a route so "indirect" as that taken by the Ta Hung. The clause must be construed in the light of the commercial adventure contemplated by the parties. 9. As for cl. 4 of the Institute Cargo Clauses, that reads :
There was here no "change of voyage" as that phrase is understood in marine insurance, but a substitution of an entirely different voyage before the planned voyage began; nor was there any "omission or error" in description of the interest vessel or voyage: there was a change of intention because of a casualty to the interest vessel. Equally, I do not think there was a "deviation" within the meaning of para. 3 of c1. 1. 10. It was emphasized by Counsel for the Assured that, if the Insurer's contention is correct, a shipper whose goods have been loaded aboard a permitted ship at a time when she was still destined for the port to which the goods were consigned might nevertheless find that his goods were uninsured on the transit from warehouse to ship, by reason of the vessel's destination having been changed before she sailed. That is a formidable objection but I do not think it can justify forcing upon the Insurer a risk out of all proportion to that which was originally contemplated by the parties. It was conceded that where a marine policy contained no Warehouse to Warehouse Clause the risk would normally attach on loading over the rail. Nevertheless, in such a case the risk would not attach if the vessel subsequently sailed for the wrong destination. As Mr. Rokison submitted, that is only different in degree from our case. 11. It was argued that if this had been a Held Covered situation the Respondent could not have succeeded. because prompt notice was not given. This argument turned upon where lay the duty to give notice, for it was admitted that Wantex did not give notice even when it did become aware of the shipment to Keelung, and clearly the Respondent did not become aware of it until after the casualty. Under s.50(2) of the Ordinance:
It is contended by the Insurer that it is entitled to put up against the assignee the defence that the assignor failed to give notice. An assignee is affected by his assignor's non-disclosure (William Pickersqill & Sons Limited v. London and Provincial Marine and General Insurance Co., Ltd. 1912 3 K.B. 614), but no case has been cited to us as to the application of the subsection to a case of notice required by the policy. It would undoubtedly be hard upon the assignee if it were adversely affected by a default for which it was in no way to blame, but it would be no less hard on the insurer if it were held that the assignor were relieved of his contractual burden. 12. For the reasons I have given I think this appeal must be allowed. However, in case I be held to be wrong so far, I will briefly consider the Appellant's contention that, if the risk did attach, it terminated before the casualty. 13. If the risk attached by virtue of cl. 1 of the Institute Cargo Clauses, that clause itself provided that it should continue "during the ordinary course of transit". The Insurer contends that the goods ceased to be in the ordinary course of transit long before the casualty and it suggests different points of time at which the risk may have terminated. The first was when the goods were loaded into the Ta Hung and the second when the Ta Hung issued Bills of Lading for Keelung. Here we have other aspects of matters already considered. Whilst I would hold that the identity of the vessel alone was not vital, I agree that the shipment to Keelung cannot be brought within the cover given by the policy. Such a shipment would, in any event, then constitute a voluntary change of destination under s.45 and the Insurer would be discharged: even if cl. 4 of the Institute Cargo Clauses would have applied, prompt notice was not given. It seems to me that the change of destination was voluntary in the sense that no sufficient cause has been shown to justify it. It was not proper to send the goods to Keelung on the change that a vessel could be found to take them to their intended destination, more especially when eventually they returned to Hong Kong in the Intellect en route for Limassol. 14. The next dates suggested for termination of the insurance were that on which the goods were discharged at Keelung, and alternatively that when they were detained there in store, for the purpose of an unjustified demand for further freight. I have already said that on the evidence I think the judge was justified in concluding that there was no foundation in fact for holding that the case is analogous to Thames and Mersey Marine Insurance Company Ltd. v. H.T. Van Laun & Co. (1905) 1917 2 K.B. 48 Note. Even if there was a repudiation of the relevant (Ta Shun) contract of carriage while the goods were in Keelung, the repudiation was not accepted. 15. The final date suggested for termination of the cover was that on which the goods were loaded into the Intellect. It does not seem to me that such shipment would have been outside the liberty granted by cl. 13 of the Bill of Lading and the loss, in those circumstances, would have been covered. Leonard, J.A. : 16. I also would allow this appeal. Cons, J.A. : 17. In early 1976, a firm by the name of Wantex sold a quantity of denim material to the plaintiffs who are manufacturers of jeans in Cyprus. The material was to be sent under C.I.F. contracts to Limassol. Many of the consignments were sent off with no problem but then in the July there was difficulty in obtaining shipping space. The ship which Wantex had wanted to use was full. Late in the month Wantex managed to make contact with a Seawise Shipping Company (Seawise) which at that time was advertising in the Shipping Section of the South China Morning Post as general agents of "Blue Line". The advertisements announced the arrival of the s.s. "Ta Shun", that she would depart for Tripoli-Benghazi-Piraeus and would accept "transhipment cargo to Limassol Alexandria." 18. Wantex placed shipping orders with Seawise and delivered three consignments of denim from the warehouse where it had been sent to be packaged. The receipt of the denim at the warehouse of Seawise was acknowledged by three separate documents which were then exchanged for three Bills of Lading. Each Bill of Lading was stamped with a chop that the goods had been "shipped on board" and was made out on a printed form, which bore the heading "Blue Sky Shipping Co. Ltd. of Taipei, Taiwan" (Blue Sky). The signature was that of Seawise, "for and on behalf of the master". 19. In further pursuance of their C.I.F. obligations Wantex arranged insurance, by three separate policies issued by the defendants. They are all in similar terms, the ship being named as the "Ta Shun" and the voyage "From Hong Kong" "To Limassol". Only the expected sailing date varies, the latest being the 7th August. The Institute Cargo Clauses (All Risks) 1/1/63 were expressly included. In due course, the policies were assigned to the plaintiffs. 20. Despite the chop applied to the Bills of Lading, the denim had in fact not been shipped on board the "Ta Shun", for that vessel ran into difficulties and had to put in elsewhere. Instead Seawise made arrangements for the goods to be put on board another ship, the "Ta Hung". She is not a sister ship of the "Ta Shun" although there does seem to be some connection between the respective owning companies. However, it goes no further than that and the "Ta Hung" is managed by completely separate agents, the Oneness Shipping Co. Ltd. (Oneness) who treated Seawise as any other customer. 21. The "Ta Hung" sailed on or about the 17th August. Her destination was not the Mediterranean but northwards to Keelung. She carried the plaintiffs' three consignments of denim under a Bill of Lading issued by Oneness and which gave as shipper the Seawise Agency Ltd., a company which owns Seawise, and Blue Sky as consignee and notify party. There was an endorsement, "Transhipment from Hongkong to Mediterranean Sea via Taiwan, 957 packages general cargo (Full details as per riders attached); Cargo to be transit to Mediterranean Sea at Taiwan by consignee themselves at their own risks and expenses." 22. It was not until two and a half months after the discharge in Keelung that Blue Sky complied with that endorsement. In the meantime the goods were stored in a customs warehouse. On or about the 16th November Blue Sky put the goods aboard another vessel, the "Intellect", belonging to the Shiu Shiu Navigation Co., S.A. which indeed was bound for the Mediterranean. However, as she passed through the Malacca Straits there was a serious fire on board. Although the goods in question were not directly affected they became so saturated with oil and water that they had to be written off completely. 23. In an action to recover for that loss the learned Commissioner below gave judgment for the plaintiffs. The defendants now appeal. 24. The primary argument that was put forward may be simply formulated - the adventure which the defendants, as Underwriters, insured never took place; the carriage on board the "Ta Hung" and the "Intellect" was an adventure with which they had no concern whatsoever. 25. The plaintiffs do not agree. They say it was the same adventure and although not carried out in the manner originally contemplated it was still within the terms of the policies. The plaintiffs rely upon the first paragraph of Clause 1 of the Institute Cargo Clauses and on the Forwarding Clause of the Bills of Lading, which granted very wide liberties as to the way in which the cargo might be carried. The combined effect of these two clauses, say the plaintiffs, constrains us to look at the adventure not from the point of view of the ship, but from the point of view of the cargo and to conclude that the adventure consisted in the carriage of the cargo from the warehouse in Hong Kong to the warehouse in Limassol regardless of how that was done, so long as it was done under the original contract of affreightment whether directly or by means of subcontracting. 26. It is convenient here to set out the two clauses. The first paragraph of Clause 1 of the Institute Cargo Clauses reads:-
27. And the Forwarding Clause from the Bills of Lading :-
28. The argument of the plaintiffs, as I understand it, runs as follows. By reason of the first paragraph of Clause 1 the insurance attaches when the cargo leaves the warehouse; likewise the insurance continues to attach "during the ordinary course of transit"; the "ordinary course of transit" includes any form of transit permitted by the Bills of Lading; the instant Bills of Lading permit the substitution of another ship for that named therein; therefore the cargo remained covered when it was upon the "Ta Hung" instead of the "Ta Shun"; the instant Bills of Lading permit reshipment by another vessel; therefore the cargo remained covered when upon the "Intellect"; the instant Bills of Lading permit carriage "by any route direct or indirect"; therefore the goods remained covered on the indirect route via Keelung. 29. The reasoning is impressive and, as counsel pointed out, it gives to the merchant what one assumes he really wants, namely door to door cover for his goods. Yet it seems to me that it does not take into account the third paragraph of Clause 1. This paragraph provides that the insurance shall remain in force during certain particular contingencies which would not in themselves be considered as part of the ordinary course of transit and then further extends the cover "during any variation of the adventure arising from the exercise of a liberty granted to shipowners or charterers under the contract of affreightment". In my view the two paragraphs must be read together, the latter qualifying the former. Thus we arrive back at the crucial question 'what was the adventure contemplated in the present instance?', for until we know that, it is not possible to say whether what subsequently occurred was merely a variation of that adventure or was some other and different adventure. 30. I have not found it an easy question to answer. I have eventually come to the conclusion that the view of the Underwriters is to be preferred. I am content to look upon the door to door coverage as an adventure in itself. It is a commercial enterprise. But I do not see it as the adventure contemplated by the policies. One has to look at the context in which they were issued and one then sees immediately that the adventure was basically a maritime transaction. I agree with counsel for the underwriters, the inclusion in the policies of a warehouse to warehouse clause, described at one stage of the argument as an "additional frill", does not change the basic nature of the transaction. Such a clause does no more than cover certain risks only incidental to the main purpose of the policy, which is to insure the goods against the perils of the sea, and in this instance, when encountered in relation to a particular ship. 31. It is suggested that underwriters no longer set the same store by the identity of a named ship as they did in times past. The learned Commissioner quoted from Arnould, 9 British Shipping Laws para 241: "insurance by a named ship is probably now the exception rather than the rule". That may well be so, but it is not sufficient to justify our completely ignoring the exception when it is expressly made. 32. In the present instance the cargo was taken from Hong Kong by a ship different from that named in the policies and in a direction almost completely opposed to what one would have expected from the destination specified, with intention to reship on a yet further vessel. In my judgment that is more than a variation of the adventure originally contemplated. It is a completely different adventure. 33. It was suggested that if this were so, uncertainty would arise over the land carriage of goods booked upon a particular ship which was expected but had not yet arrived. If a loss occurred during that carriage, and the ship ultimately did not call, the loss would not be covered by the policy. 34. If the circumstances were similar to those that obtained here in the present instance, that would necessarily follow. And if such circumstances are at all common, exporters would be wise to guard against them separately. But the position is in principle no different from that where a ship subsequently sails for a different destination. Sec. 44 of the Marine Insurance Ordinance, Cap. 329, provides that the risk then shall not attach, although otherwise it would have done so as the goods were taken over the rail. 35. I find it therefore necessary to refer only briefly to the other arguments which were put forward to show that even if the risk had attached in the first instance it was no longer attached by the time of the loss. To some extent these arguments are only particular aspects of the primary argument. I refer to those based on the identification of the ship, and the sailing for a different destination. The change of voyage argument is closely allied to them, for it could only succeed if the "voyage" were taken to be that of the goods themselves rather than that of the vessel. Furthermore it would in my view have failed in any event, for the Plaintiff cannot overcome the lack of notice by Wantex. 36. There is a suggestion that the real reason behind shipping the goods to Keelung was the hope of obtaining extra freight and that the detention of the goods there was nothing but an attempt to hold the cargo owners to ransom. 37. The learned Commissioner did not accept this. He found that in so doing Seawise had the genuine intention of getting the goods ultimately to Limassol. I would not disturb that finding, which disposes of the argument based on Thames & Mersey Marine Insurance Co. Ltd. v. H.T. Van Laun & Co. (1905)(1917) 2 K.B. 48 note, and the suggestion that Blue Sky there repudiated the contract. Even had they done so the repudiation was not accepted, and I am not satisfied the circumstances were sufficient to have frustrated the adventure. 38. There was much argument as to whether Seawise or Blue Sky were in any event entitled to rely upon the liberties granted by the Bills of Lading on the grounds that the liberties -
39. The third point was raised only very late in the argument. That and the second must be points of general concern outside the particular circumstances of this case. All are points of considerable difficulty no longer material to the decision in this case. I would prefer to leave a decision upon them until such time as it may become necessary. 40. There is the final matter of non-disclosure. It is clear that if Wantex had followed the advertisements relating to the Ta Shun in the Shipping Section of the South China Morning Post they would have realized from the arrival dates subsequently announced that the first shipped on board Bill of Lading was irregular. The defendants say that Wantex should have kept in touch in the ordinary course of their business; in that case, by reason of sec. 18 of the Ordinance they are deemed to have known of the irregularity; because they failed to bring it to the attention of the Underwriters before the issue of the second and the third policies, the Underwriters are entitled to avoid at least those two policies. 41. The defendants adduced evidence that it was the custom of Gilman & Co. Ltd. and other exporters in Hong Kong, when making use of non-conference or little known shipping lines, to make a point of checking the arrival and departure dates of vessels independently of the information supplied by the booking agents. And answers were extracted in the cross-examination of the witness from Wantex which might be taken as accepting that as a prudent practice. The learned Commissioner appears to have drawn a distinction between "large organizations" and others, in which presumably he put Wantex, when considering what is "the ordinary course of business". With respect I do not think he was entitled to draw that distinction. Nevertheless I am inclined to agree with my lord Vice President and the Commissioner that Wantex were not under an obligation to investigate information from Seawise which, on the face of it, they had no reason to suspect. 42. For these reasons I would also allow the appeal. -3 OCT 1981 Representation: K. Rokison, Q.C. & C. Mumford (Robert W.H. Wang & Co.) for Appellant. N. Phillips, Q.C. & R. Faulkner (Robertson, Double & Boase) for Respondent. |