Bofai Development Ltd. v. Summit Leader Ltd.
Read the full judgment text of CACV 134/1999 on BabelCite. This Court of Appeal judgment was delivered on 9 December 1999.
1. This is an appeal from an order of His Honour Judge Wesley Wong (sitting as a deputy judge of the Court of First Instance) made on 6 May 1999. By his order, the judge resolved a dispute between vendor and purchaser which came before him on an application by the purchaser, for summary judgment for the return of its deposits and other relief, pursuant to the provisions of Order 86 of the Rules of the High Court. The judge, being of the opinion that a requisition on title raised by the purchaser
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CACV000134/1999 CACV 134/1999 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF APPEAL CIVIL APPEAL NO. 134 OF 1999 (ON APPEAL FROM HCA 4378/1998)
---------------------- Coram : Godfrey, Rogers & Keith JJ.A. Date of Hearing : 9 December 1999 Date of Judgment : 9 December 1999 ---------------------- J U D G M E N T ---------------------- Godfrey, J.A. : Introduction 1. This is an appeal from an order of His Honour Judge Wesley Wong (sitting as a deputy judge of the Court of First Instance) made on 6 May 1999. By his order, the judge resolved a dispute between vendor and purchaser which came before him on an application by the purchaser, for summary judgment for the return of its deposits and other relief, pursuant to the provisions of Order 86 of the Rules of the High Court. The judge, being of the opinion that a requisition on title raised by the purchaser had not been satisfactorily answered by the vendor, ruled in favour of the purchaser and gave judgment in its favour accordingly. The vendor now appeals to this court. The facts 2. The property the subject of the transaction between vendor and purchaser is "Office B" on the 6th floor of a building at 12 Harcourt Road, Hong Kong, originally known as Gammon House, but now known as Bank of America Tower. 3. The building is the subject of a Deed of Mutual Covenant ("the DMC") made on 5 June 1981. As appears from this, the 6th floor incorporates a service lift and lift hall, and another lift and lift hall serving the 6th floor offices. The lift hall enjoyed with the use of the service lift is within what is described in the DMC as "the Building Common Areas". The other lift hall is within what is described in the DMC as "Each Floor's Exclusive Areas". 4. The 6th floor has since been partitioned into "Office A" and "Office B". On 15 May 1997, the vendor took an assignment of "Office B". The property assigned to the vendor included half of the lift hall serving the 6th floor offices. 5. On 17 November 1997, the vendor agreed to sell to the purchaser and the purchaser agreed to purchase from the vendor "Office B" together with a car parking space. 6. On 9 December 1997, the purchaser's solicitors wrote to the vendor's solicitors raising a number of requisitions on title. These requisitions included a requisition No. 24 which reads as follows :-
7. On 31 December 1997, the vendor's solicitors replied to this requisition as follows :-
8. The purchaser's solicitors were not satisfied with this answer. On 6 January 1998, the purchaser's solicitors wrote to the vendor's solicitors as follows :-
9. On 19 January 1998, the vendor's solicitors replied as follows :-
10. This still did not satisfy the purchaser's solicitors. In the end, the sale went off and the purchaser instituted proceedings in which it applied, as I have said, for summary judgment. The judgment below 11. The judge, having considered the material to which I have referred, came to the conclusion that there was "a real risk of litigation" and that "the Requisition No. 24 has not been satisfactorily answered." He made the order now under appeal. Was this a suitable case for summary judgment? 12. In the course of the proceedings below, an affirmation had been filed by Wong Chi Kau, a solicitor in the firm of solicitors acting for the purchaser. In this affirmation, referring to the requisition with which the court is concerned, Mr. Wong said this :-
There is, I think, no room for any doubt that that is indeed the substance of the requisition with which we are now concerned. 13. When the matter came before the judge below, the judge was presented with an argument on behalf of the purchaser making it clear that the only point to be taken by the purchaser on the summary proceedings under Order 86 was a point on this requisition, that is to say, whether it had or (as the purchaser contended) had not been satisfactorily answered. The purchaser expressly disclaimed reliance on any other objection to the vendor's title for the purposes of its Order 86 application. 14. In this court, Mr. Ronny Wong, S.C. for the purchaser, instructed at a late stage in connection with this appeal, sought to raise before us a point which went beyond the point the subject of the decision of the judge below. We refused him leave to do so. Accordingly, we are now concerned only with whether or not the judge was right to reach the conclusion which I have already mentioned. Conclusion 15. My conclusion is that the judge was wrong to conclude (as he must have done) that the vendor plainly had no defence to the action. As it seems to me, the vendor has at least an arguable defence to the one point relied on by the purchaser at this stage; that is, that the answer given to the requisition No. 24 was a good answer. Accordingly the action must proceed to trial, a trial at which of course all issues will be open to the purchaser in the usual way. I do not think it desirable to express any opinion as to whether, at the end of the day, the vendor or the purchaser will succeed on the issue concerning requisition No. 24; i.e. whether the vendor's answer was or was not, in fact, a good answer. Indeed, it is, in my view, undesirable for the court to express any such opinion when denying an application for summary judgment under Order 86. It is sufficient to state that, for the reasons I have given, I am satisfied that we should allow the appeal; set aside the order of the judge; and, instead, give the vendor unconditional leave to defend the purchaser's action. 16. The vendor's costs of this appeal must be taxed (if not agreed) and paid by the purchaser to the vendor. The costs below will be costs in the cause. Rogers, J.A. : 17. I agree. 18. I wish to say no more at this stage since, as Godfrey, J.A. has pointed out, these are summary judgment proceedings and the less said at this stage the better. Keith J.A.: 19. I agree that this appeal should be allowed. It is important to remember, as my Lords have pointed out, that the order appealed from was made on an application for summary judgment under Ord. 86 rather than on a vendor and purchaser summons. Accordingly, the question for the judge was simply whether there was an issue to be tried as to whether the requisition to which the summons related was sufficiently answered. In my view, there is such an issue to be tried. The relevant requisition related only to whether the lift hall and the toilets on the 6th floor of the building were common areas of the building, or whether the Defendant vendor was entitled to assign them to the Plaintiff purchaser. The answer to the requisition referred the purchaser's solicitors to the precise terms of the Deed of Mutual Covenant. In my view, it is arguable that that was a sufficient answer to the concerns expressed by the purchaser's solicitors because the terms of the Deed of Mutual Covenant were arguably such as to make it clear that the Defendant was entitled to assign the lift hall and the toilets to the Plaintiff. In those circumstances, I agree that the order to be made to give effect to the allowing of the appeal is that the Defendant should be given unconditional leave to defend the action.
Representation: Mr. Ronny Wong, S.C. & Mr. Johnson Lam (M/s. Charles Yeung Clement Lam & Co.) for the Plaintiff (Purchaser) Mr. Adrian Huggins, S.C. (M/s. Charles Chu, Kenneth Sit & Wu) for the Defendant (Vendor) |
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